Post-Cambrai: JFC Fuller's Evolving Tank Tactics

JFC Fuller

Dr. David Payne

John Frederick Charles Fuller (1878–1966), later to be known as "JFC" or "Boney"—due his facial likeness to Napoleon—was a Light Infantryman (Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire) who spent the first two years of the Great War training officers for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).  In December 1916 he was appointed, somewhat to his amazement, to the post of Chief General Staff Officer of the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch that was soon to become the Royal Tank Corps. His amazement was due to his not knowing anything about the new tanks and mechanical devices in general and to his conviction that the "tank concept" wouldn't work on the Western Front.   

Once in post, Fuller soon began to see the potential of the new tank in trench warfare. From the outset he astutely foresaw the need to ensure that the tanks were deployed only where the terrain was suitable for their operation and that they would operate best when closely supported by aircraft. He also saw the infantry as supernumeraries to the tank and not vice versa, as was the consensus in much of the British Army. 

After the challenges and many disappointments for the Tank Corps at the Somme and Passchendaele, it was decided that the next major deployment of the tank in large numbers would be at Cambrai on 20 November 1917. Cambrai was part of the formidable German defense-line called by the British the Hindenburg Line, located in Artois, east of the 1916 Somme battlefields. Here the terrain was chalky and dry, which was considered ideal for the new Mark IV tanks.  

Early German Depiction of Fighting Tanks

Fuller's tank tactics were generally considered to be a success. But even the new Mark IV tanks were still too slow, mechanically unreliable, and overly susceptible to skillful artillery and anti-tank fire. However, there had been big territorial gains: the British infantry swept forward the next day to make a 5 km break in the German line that allowed a penetration of up to 6 km in depth. However, poor coordination between the tanks and the British infantry caused a loss of momentum. The tanks blindly proceeded according to plan—without the benefit of the infantry's "critical eye" on the battlefield—and ran smack bang into the ranks of German 77mm cannons. The Germans waited until tanks crested Flesquières Ridge and fired over open sights into the elevated hulls. In this sector alone, 28 were knocked out by artillery fire, nine by a single German gunner. Many of the other tanks were brought to a premature halt by a design fault in the caterpillar track system. They, too, became easy targets for the German guns. The exposed British infantry were left at the mercy of the ever-alert German machine gunners. 

By 27 November 1917 the British were forced to call off the attack; the town of Cambrai was beyond their reach. But their ordeal was by no means over. On 30 November 1917 the Germans counterattacked with seven divisions and had huge success using their new infiltration tactics of the Sturmtruppen (storm troopers). On 7 December 1917 the British were, in places, back behind the line whence they started. In the latter stages of this retirement, the tanks, further encumbered by snowfall, were only minimally effective. It was back to classic trench warfare and hand-to-hand fighting

The disappointment of Fuller and the entire Tanks Corps at the failure of the tanks at Cambrai to effectively "turn the tide" can only be imagined. Fuller was left with the conundrum of how to realize the potential of this new weapon. On the other hand, the German Army still showed little enthusiasm for it.

Successful Canadians at Amiens, 1918

The New Tactics

Paradoxically, the solution to the more effective deployment of the tank, apart from the obvious one of making it faster and more mechanically reliable, appeared to be to improve the coordination between the RFC ground-support aircraft and the movement of the tanks. Toward this end the RFC introduced armored ground-support aircraft with better camouflage and more sophisticated communication backup.

The new tactics were tried successfully in the Battle of Hamel in July 1918 on the old Somme battlefield, when 60 of the new, improved Mark V tanks were backed by intelligent artillery support of 600 guns and phosgene gas was used extensively.

Next came the Battle of Amiens, which began on 8 August 1918, when even more tanks were deployed than at Cambrai—552—which represented almost the total operational tank force on the Western Front. Included for the first time in numbers was the new, fast British light Whippet tank as well as some armored cars.

Well protected by a creeping barrage, the troops and the tanks made an advance of up to 13 km deep in the enemy defenses. Many of the tanks,  however, again broke down or were knocked out by artillery fire.

The following day—9 August—the Canadians advanced another 6 km, and reaching the limit of their artillery and depleted tank support, they halted. Finally, General Sir Henry Rawlinson's "bite and hold" strategy was being put into effect. 

General Ludendorff declared the 8th of August 1918 to be "Germany's Blackest Day," and the pernicious seeds of pessimism were sown in the higher ranks of the German High Command.

The Mark V Would Have Been the Main Heavy of 1919

JFC Fuller's Plan 1919

While the Hamel and Amiens attacks were going on, Fuller was already  producing a plan for 1919 in which he envisaged a mechanized army with heavy air support using the following principles:

 * The first objective would be to storm and breach the enemy lines with the heavier, but slower, Mark V tanks.

 * Artillery support would be intense and carefully targeted to keep up with the advancing troops.

 * Large numbers of armored ground-attack aircraft would be deployed in a coordinated way to support the advance. (Whether the newly formed and independent RAF would have gone along with this highly dangerous concept is another matter).

 * Once a tenable breach in the enemy's front line had been achieved, the new 20 mph Medium "D" Type tanks would then swarm in and head for the German rear. Their objective was to neutralize the German command structure, rear-area support organization, and general communications in effect roll up the enemy's defenses from behind.

 * The infantry, transported by lorries, would follow through on the tank attack, hold the ground and mop up the remaining enemy defenses.

Because of the Armistice in November 1918, Plan 1919 was never put in action. 

Source:  Winter 2009 Relevance