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| Major George Marshall in France |
As Remembered by General George C. Marshall
One Sunday morning at this time [early September 1917], M. Clemenceau appeared at our Headquarters, and said that he had been to Chaumont to see General Pershing, but had found him absent and so had come to see General Sibert. Clemenceau was not then Premier, but I imagine he was preparing for his approaching responsibilities.
One of the battalions of the Twenty-sixth Infantry was having a Field Day, and we took him there to get a look at our men under the most favorable circumstances. He was much pleased over the various competitions, particularly those between the machine-gunners. But it was not until he wa literally spattered with blood in his ringside seat during a particularly vicious boxing match that he registered enthusiastic appreciation of the American soldier.
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| Clemenceau: Soldier of the Rear, Gutting the Defeatists |
His great object at this time was to brace up the French morale and regenerate their offensive spirit. So the rugged fighting qualities displayed by our men were to him pleasing indications of our prospective power on the battlefield.
M. Clemenceau left that evening for another visit to Chaumont, but, as we learned later, he failed again to find General Pershing. who was absent on some inspection trip. The following day. about September 2nd, as I recall, he returned to [First Division HQ at] Gondrecourt. This time accompartied by General de Castelnau. and the latter's Chief of Staff.
[Division Commander] General Sibert received the party in his small office and I was the only other person present. Clemenceau made a short talk about the importance of the early entry into the line of American troops,and said that General de Castelnau would outline the arrangemets he proposed to accomplish this. The latter then described a sector of the line northeast of Luneville, a very quiet front, where he considered the opportunities for first experience in the trenches were unusually good. He explained how our troops would be brigaded with French troops and given every opportunity to secure actual front-line experience under the careful guidance of veterans and with a minimum of risk.
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| Inspecting Doughboys Departing for the Italian Front |
He asked General Sibert if the manner proposed for obtaining this first experience seemed salisfactory to him, and the latter replied that it appeared satisfactory. Then General de Castelnau remarked that he would return to the Headquarters of the Group of Armies of the East. at Mirecourt, and give the necessary instructions to arrange for our entry into the line about September 12th.
This was "a facer" [an unexpected difficulty]. General Sibert immcdiately explained that he was not empowerecl to make any such arrangement; that such decisions rested entirely with General Pershing.
Up to this moment everything had gone smoothly, though I thought I had noticed a very strained expression on General de Castelnau's face. Now, however, Clemenceau rose from his chair and walking back and forth in the little room, made an impassioned statement in English regarding the seriousness of the situation and the absolute necessity of the immediate appearance of American troops in the trenches.
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| Viewing Dead Germans at Château-Thierry with American Soldiers |
General Sibert had explained the status of the division as regards recruits and officers, and to this subject M. Clemenceau now addressed himself. He said it was not a question of our getting the division in perfect shape before committing it to the line. He said it was a question of losing the war; that the strength of the French soldier was exhausted; that his morale had reached its lowest point; that he had begun to doubt the good faith of the United States, because months had passed and no American troops had ever been seen in the line. He said he had tried to see General Pershing and had not found him and the matter was so vital that he had come to General Sibert direct, because the Americans must enter the battle and make some sacrifice to prove to the French soldiers that they meant business and were there to fight to a finish.
The situation was very embarrassing to General Sibert, and he tactfully replied that he thoroughly understood the feelings of M. Clemenceau, but that he was without power to take any action. Furthermore, however critical the existing condition of affairs, he thought M. Clemenceau and General de Castelnau would understand that for the Americans to commit their first organization to the line before it had had sufficient training to meet the enemy on equal terms would be taking a very grave risk, the unfortunate results of which would react as heavily against the French and English as against ourselves. He called attention to the fact that the world assumed that the First Division represented the pick of the Regular Army, when, as a matter of truth, it was an entirely new organization and its ranks were filled with recruits. For the reputed pick of our Regular Army, on its first appearance in the line, to suffer a serious or possibly an ignominious reverse would have a calamitous effect on the morale of the American soldier and on the Allies as well.
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| Reviewing Troops with General Pershing at Chaumont GHQ Their Relations Were Not Always Amicable |
M. Clemenceau and General de Castelnau left immediately after the interview and General Sibert remarked to me that, while the plans of GHQ for our entry into the line set the date several months ahead, he felt sure that M. Clemenceau would bring sufficient pressure to bear to send us to the front in a very short time. We did not move on September 12th, but we did enter the sector northeast of Luneville on October 20th.
From: Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918 by George C. Marshall, 1976
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