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| Kaiser Wilhelm II on State Visit to Constantinople, 1913 On Sultan's Left, Enver Pasha Looks On |
By Mesut Uyar
The Decision for War
The Ottoman decision for war, followed by the Ottoman navy’s fateful naval attack on the Russian Black Sea ports on 29 October 1914 has attracted the attention of politicians and scholars for nearly a century. The political decision-making process, the role of political and military leaders, public opinion, intellectuals and the press have been well covered by recent scholars drawing on newly opened archives and comparative studies. We now know for certain that it was not a foregone conclusion that the Ottomans would join the Central Powers. We also have a better picture of Ottoman leaders’ early dilemma of keeping the empire out of war while securing an alliance with a Great Power. Although we still come across old clichés repeated in recent books, most historians no longer believe that the Ottomans were actively seeking war in 1914, and there is no need to describe the background to their decision at length.
. . . It is important to emphasise that the Ottoman decision to enter the war on the side of Germany was a mixture of band-waggoning and balancing strategies. As regards the first, given that the Entente was regarded in Constantinople as the stronger side, it might have made sense to side with that combination.
However the short-sightedness of the Entente in refusing an Ottoman alliance offer, its siding with Greece over disputed Aegean islands, the British government’s requisitioning of two Ottoman dreadnoughts – Reşadiye and Sultan Osman – being built in England, the presence on the spot of a German Military Mission and the general effectiveness of German diplomacy changed the attitudes of decision makers.
Although Ottoman leaders were about equally divided in their sympathies at the beginning of the war, they were all impressed by the power and the advantages of the German military system. Indeed, in their view, Germany had the means and talent to achieve victory well before the Entente could bring the might of its colonial resources into play. Hence, in the short term at least, although they were well aware of the junior role they were likely to play, they still saw the Ottoman Army as capable of tipping the balance and offsetting the longer-term advantages of the Entente.
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| 1915 Poster Celebrating Early Successes of the Central Powers |
Initial War Aims
In comparison to those of the other belligerents Ottoman war aims were initially relatively few—just two—and conservative. The most obvious one was to preserve the integrity and independence of the empire, a constant aim of Ottoman diplomacy and the military since the end of the 18th century. However the series of defeats in the recent Balkan Wars had shaken both the self confidence of the Ottoman military and the Porte’s faith in the international system. The Great Powers had shown their colours by endorsing the territorial gains of the Balkan states in direct violation of their treaties and promises.
The Great Powers—especially Britain—formally declared at the beginning of the Balkan Wars that they would not accept any changes of the border and status quo. Apparently they were expecting an Ottoman victory. The Balkan Wars changed this perspective. Instead of trying to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as they had previously done, they had accommodated themselves to the idea that the multinational empire was disintegrating. In this situation, the Ottoman government was anxious to enlist the support of at least some of the Great Powers, even if that meant joining the war.
With the luxury of hindsight Turkish and western scholars have tended to see the Ottoman leadership’s belief in the need to join one of the alliance systems as a fatal blunder. However they are ignoring not only the general psychology of the Ottomans with their ingrained fear of Russia but also the signs and messages coming from all of the Great Powers. A German alliance seemed to offer security against the territorial aspirations of all the other Powers, great and small. In Ottoman eyes, Germany was the only Power that would respect the integrity and survival of the empire in return for an alliance. At the same time Ottoman leaders were hoping to reinforce their regional security by constructing a Balkan bloc with Rumania and Bulgaria; and here, too, they would need Germany’s support. It was certainly a gamble, but one which offered a chance of winning. . .
The second Ottoman war aim was the economic independence of the empire and the creation of a modern economic system by radical reforms. War seemed to provide a unique opportunity to get rid of the irksome Capitulations, the dream of several generations. The Ottoman economy had always been in a critical state, but after the Balkan Wars it had got into an acute downward spiral and with the July crisis it collapsed altogether. Most Western-owned businesses completely stopped their activities and foreign-dominated maritime transportation came to a halt. It was only by signing the alliance with Germany that the Ottoman government was able to raise any foreign loans at all. These terrible experiences convinced the leadership that the empire had to do all it could to establish an independent and viable economy and that this could not wait for the end of the war. The Capitulations were unilaterally abrogated just before the empire entered the war. [Editor's note: The term “capitulation” refers to the legal position of foreigners in the Ottoman Empire, as regulated by a series of treaties (and some customary rules) that gave foreign citizens special privileges such as the right to worship, special tax status, and exemption from the jurisdiction of the local courts.]
. . . To sum up: their initial war aims demonstrate clearly that Ottoman decisionmakers were not expecting a momentous outcome in terms of either territory or power; and that their prime motive for entering the Great War was simply to preserve the independence and integrity of the empire as far as possible, and, ideally, to reinforce their position by means of Balkan pact. In short, they considered their options and formulated their war aims rationally, not in terms of making gains but of eliminating threats.
While the General Staff was dealing with the problems of mobilisation, the ruling authorities failed to develop an effective strategy for achieving their political aims. In the first place, they the were divided into two camps in terms of both their attitude towards joining the war and their preferred alliances: Enver Pasha, Cemal Pasha and Talat Bey—the triumvirate of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)—managed to win over or outmaneuver the opposition to the German alliance; but their methods aroused ill-feeling and further opposition.
In the second place, the Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha and civilian members of the leadership did not fully understand the demands of war. They had only a limited understanding of the basic decisions that would affect the nature, scope, length, and the economic and human costs of the war; and they lacked the courage to tackle such problems. Clearly, these civilian politicians were overruled by the CUP triumvirate.
In the third place, for Enver and the inner circle of the CUP, who were firm believers in the superiority of German military thinking and in the imminence of victory, the role of the Ottoman military ought to be to tie down as many Entente troops as possible, so as to enable the Germans to win decisive victories on the main fronts. This thinking was, of course, welcomed by the German General Staff, which saw in the Ottoman Army a useful diversionary tool to force the enemy to waste more troops in “Oriental side shows.” But it was a way of thinking that went directly against the need to defend the empire’s territories and it confronted the leadership with a dilemma which they were to prove unable to resolve.
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| Ottoman Casualties in Mesopotamia, 1917 |
Evolving War Aims
As regards the strategy to be adopted against the Russian threat in the Caucasus, the Ottoman leadership and General Staff took more time to reach agreement. In the 19th century the Ottomans had twice failed to stop Russian assaults at the border, the tsar’s army managing to penetrate deep into eastern Anatolia and capture Erzurum both in 1829 and in 1877. The feeling was therefore one of skepticism and it was decided to conduct a strategic defense; but no clear decision was reached as to where the main defensive line was to be established. The Third Army commander Hasan İzzet Pasha received conflicting and vague orders, some advising him to use the archaic Erzurum fortress and the high ground around it, while others recommended defensive lines near to the border.
As for the southern provinces of the empire, these were, interestingly enough, virtually ignored at this stage. There was no threat assessment or discussion of Mesopotamia, Yemen and Hejaz and only some speculations about the defense of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. Indeed, units that were stationed or mobilized in the south were considered suitable for deployment at the Straits or in Thrace.
Source: "Ottoman Strategy and War Aims during the First World War"; Mesut Uyar; The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies; Schriften des Historischen Kollegs; 2012/2013
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