The Sedan Affair: a Debacle at the Moment of Victory for the AEF

General Pershing and MG Charles Summerall Inspecting Soldiers of the 1st Division, September 1918

By Mitchell Yockelson

[As the Meuse-Argonne Offensive drew to a successful conclusion, General] Pershing wanted the Americans to capture Sedan and hand it over to the French as a goodwill gesture. The city’s importance to the French Army could not be understated. During the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the Germans had defeated the French in Sedan and in the process arrested their emperor, Louis Napoleon III, a humiliating blow to French pride. To his credit, Black Jack did seek approval from General Paul Maistre, commander of the French Group of Armies, which included Gouraud’s Fourth Army, which was on a parallel course with First Army. In the event that American troops reached Sedan first, Pershing thought they should take the city, and Maistre consented. 

On 6 November, First Army Chief of Staff Bg. General Hugh Drum [without consulting First Army Commander General Hunter Liggett] issued a memorandum [originally encouraged by AEF operations chief Bg. General Fox Conner] on behalf of the AEF commander to the I and V Corps, instructing them that the coveted honor of entering Sedan would fall to First Army. “[General Pershing] has every confidence that the troops of the 1st Corps, assisted on their right by the 5th Corps, will enable him to realize the desire,” he wrote. Furthermore, “your attention is called to the favorable opportunity now existing for pressing our advantage throughout the night. Boundaries will not be considered binding.”  

This Color Coded Map Shows That on 6 November 1918,
Troops of the 1st Division Crossed the Lines of the 42nd and
77th Divisions and Fought in at Least Four Separate Areas

Throughout the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, keeping each corps in its designated area (boundaries) during an attack had been problematic. If divisions crossed over one corps boundary to another, it could clog roads, increase straggling, or, even worse, create incidents of friendly fire. But in the advance on Sedan, Drum told the two corps that it was permissible to intersect boundaries if necessary, as long as the objective was met. This decision resulted in confusion and chaos.

Instead of an organized military operation, the pursuit to Sedan turned into a debacle. Summerall decided that 1st Division, which was on the far left flank of his V Corps [in reserve] . . . would capture the city. This meant the Big Red One would have to cross the front and rear of two other divisions, the 42nd and 77th. Summerall wanted this accomplished at night and without [first gaining] Dickman’s approval.

Click on Map to Enlarge

More Detailed Map of the Sector Showing the Confused Movements of Units

Doughboys of the 1st Division, under the command of Frank Parker, headed toward Sedan on the night of November 6. Driving in the pitch black, their headlights turned off, a pool of reporters followed closely behind the Doughboys, who marched along slick roads that grew worse from a constant rain. Because the Germans had laid mines at certain intervals, the troops had to take detours. Correspondent Thomas M. Johnson witnessed how little noise the troops made, save the “click of hobnails on the hard gray stone road, the creak of equipment, the word of command.” As they approached the historic city, the soldiers saw “glimmers of white flashes from artillery shells.” Johnson found a vantage point to watch what happened next.

Along the way, the 1st Division became tangled up with other divisions. One group of soldiers thought another was the enemy and opened fire. Communications and traffic broke down. Nearby, Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur was awoken and told that his 42nd Division was being infiltrated by unknown troops. He immediately dressed and headed to the front. While he stopped to read a map, he was confronted by a 16th Infantry Regiment patrol led by a Lieutenant Black. MacArthur, wearing his trademark floppy hat, muffler, riding breeches, and polished boots, was mistaken as a German officer. Lieutenant Black held took him prisoner at gunpoint, but quickly released him with apologies after his true identity was revealed.  Decades later, MacArthur downplayed the incident, claiming he was never actually arrested. He recalled that along with his executive officer and an aide-de-camp, he went out to warn the regimental commander of the 167th not to fire on the approaching troops from the 16th Infantry, 1st Division. . .  The press blew the story out of proportion, he suggested, until it grew into his capture by a patrol. . .

The Three Generals Most Responsible for the Affair
BG Fox Conner, BG Hugh Drum, MG Charles Summerall

Much of the blame for the Sedan debacle can be directed at Hugh Drum, who was responsible for drafting the First Army order detailing the advance on Sedan. As one historian has pointed out, Drum’s order was “not well written or especially clear as to responsibility for seizing the town.” But Summerall deserves some blame as well. He “used this ambiguity to justify ordering the 1st Division to move out of its zone of operations in the 5th Corps area and across the advance of the 42nd Division in the area of the 1st Corps on the left. Considerable chaos and confusion resulted.” No doubt “Summerall was not alone in the responsibility for this debacle. But he put his personal feelings, wanting his corps and the 1st Division, in particular to beat other units to Sedan, above his professional judgment.” Liggett pleaded innocent, claiming “he had never heard of the order.”  One historian summed up the confusion this way: “Pershing wanted to beat the French, Summerall wanted his corps, and the 1st Division in particular, to beat the rest of the American army." 

Pershing didn’t seem concerned about the Sedan affair and didn’t say anything at the time. Stackpole thought he failed to “entirely appreciate the serious consequences which might have resulted.” However, a month later, Summerall attended a luncheon at Pershing’s Chaumont château with a number of other AEF and French officers. During the meal, Black Jack asked Summerall about the advance of 1st Division at Sedan. Summerall explained the orders he had received and on the tablecloth sketched the route taken by the troops with the towns they marched through. Pershing seemed satisfied.

This selection is from Mitchell Yockelson's history of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, Forty-Seven Days: How Pershing's Warriors Came of Age to Defeat the German Army in World War I, 2016. Yockelson is considered one of the foremost authorities on the topic of World War I. Currently he teaches at Norwich University, and works as an Investigative Archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration.