By James J. Cooke
Billy Mitchell was never one to hide his talents or to use (some would argue overuse) his fine staff, but, despite his good experiences with the French and British air arms, his relationship with Pershing's staff soured. One main problem was his deteriorating relationship with Brigadier General William Kenly, the first Chief of Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force, over the direction of the Air Service. Frankly, Kenly had little feel or knowledge of the air war, having come from the artillery. Pershing knew of Kenly's even-handed approach to command and his ability to organize units under his command.
What Kenly could not deal with was Mitchell's personality and Mitchell's drive. Kenly was also vehemently opposed to Mitchell's call for the Air Service to be an independent arm within the AEF. Mitchell would have been wise to point out that the Air Service would be a part of the Pershing orthodoxy of the rifleman as the key to victory and that AEF divisions would be part of a combined-arms team. Billy Mitchell did indeed recognize the importance of assigning an aero squadron and a balloon unit to the divisions, and air liaison officers would be a part of divisional, corps, and army level units.
All was not rancor and dispute. Under Mitchell's guidance a large air depot was established at Colombey-les-Belles, less than 100 miles from the front. The depot began stockpiling repair parts and the serious training of those all-important ground crews. There was much to be done in a very short period of time. Training at Issoudun showed promise, but there appeared to be confusion in the ranks of the Air Service. Pershing, who was under great pressure to get the Americans into the fight, became displeased with what seemed to be a lack of coordination, command, and control in the Air Service.
Word of Black Jack's displeasure reached Mitchell, and he believed that a change in the position of chief of the Air Service should see him as the new commander with the star of a brigadier general. Mitchell was devastated when Pershing announced that Benjamin Foulois would be the new chief of the AEF's Air Service. Foulois was an old airman who served with Pershing during the Mexico operation, 1916–1917, and Pershing had been impressed with the potential of the 1st Aero Squadron, especially in the area of observation to support ground combat operations. It did not hurt that Foulois, who trained under Orville Wright in 1909 and earned his army pilot's wings in 1912, was a solid team player and supported the Pershing orthodoxy. The selection of Foulois greatly upset Mitchell, who reacted very badly. There would be bad blood between the two airmen. Mitchell was assigned to command the newly formed I Corps' aviation.
Despite his grave disappointment at not getting the position as chief, Mitchell worked hard to build the air arm of the corps. His newly trained aero squadrons began flying close to the front in what was known as a "quiet sector" where there was little combat action. Mitchell did have a realistic view of what the mission of the AEF was. He wrote, "The Air Service of an army is one of its offensive arms. Alone it can not bring about a decision. It therefore helps the other arms in their appointed mission."
There is complexity in dealing with Mitchell in the Great War. On one hand he was consistent in building an air arm from the ground up into a viable fighting force, while on the other his personality grated on other high-ranking, influential officers and interfered with his mission. His open hostility toward Foulois was obvious and alienated key officers like Generals Hugh Drum (operations) and Dennis Nolan (intelligence). Meanwhile, Mitchell's ideas were forming into an air doctrine. He instilled in his subordinates the principle of mass and immediate and aggressive counter-air operations—in other words, gaining air superiority over the German air arm. Mitchell was simply too valuable to relieve and send home.
Other problems, however, began to surface with the Air Service. Foulois had great difficulty in coordinating air issues between the Zone of Advance and the Line of Communications. Supplies were slow in moving to the front, there was confusion at higher commands, and there was a great deal of lost time when Foulois succeeded Kenly. It did not help that when the great German offensives began in early 1918, Washington slowed down the transportation of Air Service personnel to France in favor of infantry and machine gun units. Pershing was becoming greatly distressed over the confusion in the Air Service and decided that a very firm hand was needed to bring order out of what now appeared to be a chaotic situation.
On 29 May 1918, Pershing appointed Brigadier General Mason Patrick to become the chief of the American Air Service. Patrick's appointment came as a surprise to everyone because he had no experience with air operations and had never flown in an aircraft. Patrick had been a classmate of Pershing at West Point and spent his career as an engineering officer. Patrick kept Foulois on as his assistant. Mason Patrick came to the Air Service with a reputation of being an excellent, no-nonsense officer, and he had the full support of Black Jack Pershing. He was quick to see that Mitchell was a first-rate officer with a quick mind and an organizational ability. While the Mitchell-Foulois feud continued, Patrick looked to Billy Mitchell for complicated combat tasks.
Meanwhile, by the summer of 1918, the press, then under Pershing's strict censorship policies, was looking for stories for their newspapers. Mitchell, who by now sported a British- style walking stick and a beautifully tailored uniform, was pictured as the boyish bon vivant, the stuff that national heroes were made of. Of course, the press exaggerated the picture and reported none of dangers or miseries of the airmen who had no parachutes, who could be roasted alive in a flaming plane, or suffered the serious intestinal distress from the castor oil that lubricated temperamental engines and blew back into the cockpit. Billy Mitchell loved it and did nothing to dissuade the press from idolizing the AEF's "dashing knight."
By the summer of 1918, the Mitchell-Foulois feud had grown into a festering sore for the AEF, and something had to be done because the AEF was planning for its first major offensive operation in September 1918. On 25 August General Foulois asked to step down from his post and that Mitchell be appointed as the chief of the Air Service at 1st Army headquarters. Mitchell would direct the air operations for the two largest attacks ever mounted by American arms, the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives.
By the end of the war, Mitchell's stock was never higher, especially among the members of the Air Service, but his image among other officers was one of a self-serving, self-promoting maverick officer who had the protection of Pershing and Patrick. Pershing was in the process of forming the U.S. Third Army to occupy a sector in Germany on the west side of the Rhine River, and he chose Mitchell to head up the air section of that army. Mitchell went to Coblenz and selected a residence and a headquarters, but his time with Third Army would be short. General Theodore Dickman, army commander, and Brigadier General Malin Craig, Third Army chief of staff raised serious objections to Mitchell's appointment. To make matters worse for Mitchell, Major General Charles T. Menoher, who had commanded the 42nd "Rainbow" Division, was sent back to Washington to become the Chief of the Air Service, and Menoher, a traditional artilleryman and very successful infantry commander, disliked Mitchell.
Billy Mitchell was ordered back to Washington in early 1919, and during his trip he conferred with General Hugh Trenchard in England. This meeting reinforced a growing feeling that the Air Service should become an independent service. From that point on, Billy Mitchell would become the leading exponent of a separate U.S. Air Force, a position opposed by Pershing, Menoher, and most other members of the officer corps.
During the 1920s, Billy Mitchell would achieve successes and notoriety, but his list of critics and enemies in the army and navy would continue to grow. His public criticism of government policies, in defiance of Army regulations, resulted in his court martial for "conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline" and insubordination in Oct–Dec 1925. Found guilty and suspended for five years, Mitchell resigned his commission in Jan 1926. He continued to promote aviation and decry government inefficiencies until his death.
This article is something of a prequel to our earlier article on Mitchell's 1925 court martial. Click HERE to read how his controversial views and personality led to the end of his remarkable military career.
Source: From "Billy Mitchell and the Great War, Reconsidered", Relevance, Quarterly Journal of the Great War Society, Summer 2010
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