The Ottoman Army and the First World War

By Mesut Uyar

Routledge, 2021

Reviewed by Michael Tyquin

 British Journal for Military History, 7.1 (2021)

Ottoman Artillery Battery Passing Through Constantinople

The Ottoman Army and the First World War is a thorough analysis of the Ottoman Army on all fronts during the Great War. It describes its operational military history and military effectiveness during that war, and it is difficult to disagree with Uyar in his assessment that Western historiography has for too long ignored the so-called peripheral campaigns of the war.

He reminds us that in 1914 it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the Ottomans would join the Central Powers. Once committed, the author contends that the First World War exposed Ottoman unpreparedness, having taken no steps prior to the war to secure stocks of food, fuel or munitions. Another of the book's themes is the constant interference of Germany's High Command and Ottoman acquiescence to both its strategic vision and its demands.

Western scholars have long struggled with access to Turkey's war archives, let alone the translation of both old and modern Turkish. If only for this reason Uyar's book is tremendously important for those interested in the Ottoman contribution to the First World War. The footnotes contain some archival material which sees the light of day for the first time. There is an extensive and up-to-date bibliography providing a handy synthesis of non-English language sources, although the author has not included Klaus Wolf's 2020 in-depth study of the German-Ottoman Alliance.

The Turkish Soldier—Tough, Tenacious, and Enduring

Uyar highlights the problems found in the wake of army reorganization when, in 1911, triangular divisions were established but insufficient attention was given to doctrine and combat services support, which were ignored. He details the vastly over-stretched military resources of the Ottoman Empire in the lead-up to and subsequent prosecution of the First and Second Balkan Wars.

The author examines the genesis of German military advisors and support. Initially the German alliance appeared to provide security against the territorial aspirations of both greater and lesser powers. But the optimism of the German High Command in using pan-Islamism as a force multiplier soon foundered on the reality of regional and tribal politics. In the body of the text, it is refreshing to see that Austro-Hungarian units and armaments deployed to Turkey receive more than a passing footnote. Little-known Ottoman contributions to Macedonia, Galicia, and Romania are also included in this study.

While the Ottoman Army of 1914 was far more representative of the empire's population than that of any other period, it lacked well-trained NCOs. This hindered the effectiveness of mobilization and the sudden appearance of tens of thousands of new recruits. In this the empire was not alone. The British Dominions shared a similar experience. The Ottoman Army was initially hampered by the total absence of aviation assets and any organization to manage line of communications issues. In addition, much heavy equipment and weapons had been lost in the Balkan Wars (1912/13). Unfortunately, the Ottoman High Command made no systematic effort to resolve or at least reduce the impact of these problems. Lack of a good road and rail network did not help matters. In 1914 the Ottoman Army was burdened by the inheritance of a dying empire: rampant corruption; inefficiency, and inadequate lines of communications; and hopelessly inadequate medical and veterinary care.

There was an abysmal lack of understanding in Berlin of not only the cultural and political mores of its Ottoman ally, but the challenges facing a collapsing empire from 1917 onward. We learn too that as early as April 1914, senior German advisors worked actively to deny Ottoman officers positions of influence and kept them uninformed of developments on the Western Front. The author also highlights fundamental tactical flaws in General von Sanders' initial defense plan for the Dardanelles in March-April 1915, where his interference further exacerbated tensions between the Ottoman staff and their German advisors.

Michael Tyquin