The U.S. 1st Division Arrives in Treves, Germany |
The occupation of the Rhineland by the allies and the United States Army after World War I is often an afterthought in the historiography of the Great War. In this fine book, historian Dean A. Nowowiejski examines the U.S. Army’s role in the occupation and evaluates its performance. Nowowiejski, the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair for the Art of War at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, is well suited for this endeavor.
The author begins by examining the movement into the Rhineland by the U.S. 3rd Army in November and December 1918. He concludes:
In military terms, this was a complicated affair, notable for its success: a victorious army closely following a defeated force into enemy territory, over hilly and congested terrain, on a limited road network, in bad weather, across rivers, all the while occupying the area without major incidents with the civilian populace. (p. 25).
Indeed, this quotation sets the tone for the rest of the work as Nowowiejski focuses on the problems faced by the 3rd Army and its successor, the American Forces in Germany (AFG), and how those units overcame them. When most of the 3rd Army went home by the summer of 1919, the AFG then consisted mostly of newer recruits. Nowowiejski outlines how AFG commander Major General Henry T. Allen purposefully set out to make the AFG the premier U.S. Army unit of the time.
He did this, according to the author, by a careful selection of high ranking officers and a purposeful weeding out of undesirable soldiers. Nowowiejski also cites the various competitions, both athletic and military, that instilled pride and kept the men sharp. In particular, he cites the horse culture in the AFG. Despite the sunset of the use of horses in the U.S. Army, the AFG took pride in the appearance of its many horses, and officers studied equitation during their tours in Germany.
The author outlines the systematic annual training regimen devised for improving the AFG’s readiness. These cycles also had a dual purpose in demonstrating to the Germans that same readiness in the event the AFG had to resume military operations. As Nowowiejski states, “a respected army would give him [Allen] diplomatic leverage; his success in reforming the army and his subsequent diplomatic achievements proved this to be the correct approach” (p. 88). It was as a diplomat that Allen excelled, and the author spells out the challenges faced by Allen. Throughout the narrative, Nowowiejski acutely describes the confusing political and diplomatic atmosphere caused by the competing motives and goals of the occupying powers.
Mike, I appreciate your posting about this book, and I will add it to my reading list. My grandfather had just gone home to the US after his short tenure in France, but I had relatives from the other side of my family living in the occupation zone (the French zone, I think). Also appreciate your post on Robert Nisbet whom I remember reading in college almost 60 years ago now, and the link to the text of his presentation.
ReplyDeleteHave a nice holiday period, and best wishes in the new year.