The Battle of Armageddon, Part I

Key Locations in the Late 1918 Palestine Campaign

On my trip to Israel in 1989, one of our group's days of touring was dedicated to the northern part of the country. It turned out to be a long haul that included stops at Nazareth, the Mount of the Beatitudes, a kibbutz, the Sea of Galilee, and more. On the stretch back to Jerusalem, our guide let us rest a bit, and everyone was dozing off. Abruptly, the bus stopped, and our guide went on the mic to announce in a dramatic tone, "Look around ladies and gentlemen. You are in the Valley of Armageddon. According to some scriptures, this is where the last battle between Good and Evil on Earth will be fought." That sure woke everyone up—possibly like me—hopeful that the big battle was not about to start, like, now. Anyway, over the next two days, I'll be presenting the story of the Great War's Battle of Armageddon, know in formal military histories as the Battle of Megiddo.

After Jerusalem: What Next?

Allenby's 1917 campaign had achieved significant operational and strategic objectives. He had broken through the Gaza defenses and into the southern frontiers of Palestine, giving little respite to the retreating and shaken Turks. His capture of Jerusalem gave the Allies a much-needed morale boost in an otherwise sagging war effort. With 1917 coming to a close, Allenby would continue to focus on the complete annihilation of the Turkish forces in Palestine. Winter rains had put an end to campaigning for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) after the advance from the Gaza-Beersheba line to the capture of Jerusalem in December 1917. This lull in the fighting offered the opportunity for the captured territories to be consolidated. Extensive developments were also required along the lines of communication to ensure that frontline troops were adequately supplied, as they were approximately 150 miles (240 km) from their main bases at Moascar and Kantara on the Suez Canal.

Muslim Soldiers of the British Army Guarding the
Dome of the Rock

After the shoring up, Allenby defined his first goal of 1918 on 25 January: "I want to extend my right, to include Jericho and the N[orth] of the Dead Sea." This advance would remove the more serious threat to his right by pushing all the enemy across the Jordan River and securing the Jordan River crossings. It would also prevent raids into the country to the west of the Dead Sea and provide a narrow starting point for operations against the Hedjaz Railway.

Allenby's Allied troops began the renewed offensive on Tuesday, 19 February, on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Despite battling adverse weather conditions and a determined enemy in the Turks, the Allies were able to move nearly 20 miles toward Jericho in just three days. On the morning of 21 February 1918, combined Allied forces of British troops and Australian mounted cavalry captured the city of Jericho. The time for a decisive push north through Palestine to Syria seemed at hand. However, distant events interceded.

Events on the Western Front would critically impact the organizational structure of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in the early months of 1918. Hoping to break the deadlock of the trenches before American manpower would again shift the balance of power in favor of the Allies, Gen Erich von Ludendorff launched Operation Michael on 21 March. A massive drive of over 60 divisions, Michael made initial progress but was held up at Arras, thanks to a determined British defense, but the Allied High Command was alarmed.

Turkish Soldiers Killed Attempting to Retake Jerusalem

As Ludendorff continued to follow up his initial drive, the British War Office hurriedly pulled divisions from other theaters to fill losses in France. Allenby was forced to send the bulk of his soldiers to the Western Front, retaining only one British division. Partially trained Indian regiments constituted the majority of the EEF's replacements, and while the cavalry arm was no worse for the wear, the infantry and specialty troops were seriously weakened. For instance, signalmen, normally requiring two years of training, were forced to become proficient in just two months.

Before losing his veteran troops, the EEF commander ordered expeditions across the Jordan River toward Amman in March. Hoping to combine efforts with Lawrence's Arabs and capture important Turkish garrisons in the Es Salt region, Allenby believed the raids would demonstrate Ottoman vulnerabilities in the East. Unfortunately, poor weather grounded aircraft, Arab cooperation never materialized, and the Turks intrepidly fought off the attack. The EEF suffered its first setbacks in nearly a year. Chetwode later wrote, "These two expeditions of Allenby's across the Jordan were the stupidest things he ever did, I always thought, and very risky." While tactically a reverse, Allenby had accomplished one key operational objective. The Trans-Jordan raids had raised doubt in the enemy camp as to where the next major blow would fall—either east of the Jordan River or west, on the coastal flank.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1918, Allenby took advantage of the forced operational pause to bring his new troops up to training standards. One soldier in the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps described Allenby's guidelines: "The principle adopted in the infantry was to brigade one British battalion to every three Indian battalions right through the divisions; and this acted very well indeed, for the White troops provided just that leaven of steadiness lacking in the young Indians." During the same time, supply matters were tended to as the EEF's railway was extended to the front lines. Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots—the RAF being officially formed on 1 April 1918—flew photography missions while also dropping propaganda leaflets among the already demoralized Turkish troops. As desertion rates swelled among the ranks, Mustafa Kemal, commander of the Seventh Army, lamented that British aircraft were "dropping more leaflets than bombs."

Turkish Prisoners Captured, July 1918

By the autumn of 1918, Allenby decided that the time was ripe to capitalize on the deterioration of the enemy army. His plan, code-named Armageddon, aimed at the complete destruction of the Yildirim Army Group by exploiting Turkish preconceptions created in part by the Trans-Jordan raids. The Amman expeditions, coupled with the assault at Beersheba a year earlier, had shown the vulnerability of the eastern flank. Using an elaborate deception plan that reinforced Turkish predilections, Allenby decided to reverse the formula used at the Third Battle of Gaza by placing the weight of his effort on the coastal flank.

Organizing Armageddon

In September 1918 the British front extended from the Mediterranean Sea just South of Caesaria across the Judean hills to the Jordan River Valley slightly north of Jericho. The Jordan valley was steep and desolate with few serviceable roads. The Judean hillside was equally poorly suited for mobile operations. The major towns in this area had easily defended approaches. Only the narrow coastal region offered the terrain necessary for a rapid breakout. It offered few obstacles to movement, though the narrowness of the region could allow the Turks to concentrate there. The open terrain widened to the north with few obstacles to maneuver to the major Turkish command and communications centers at El Affula, Nazareth, and Samakh on the south end of the Sea of Galilee.

The EEF consisted of three corps comprising approximately 11 division equivalents of troops. Its XXI Corps contained four infantry divisions, including the two Indian divisions that had just arrived in theater, and a small French contingent. The XX Corps possessed two Infantry divisions. The British Desert Mounted Corps (DMC) was the mobile striking force. It consisted of the Australian Mounted Division and the Indian Cavalry divisions that had arrived from France.

Each of the Cavalry divisions contained armored car detachments, while the Australians were trained to fight as either mounted infantry or shock cavalry troops. Chaytor's Force, named after its commanding general, filled out the British ranks. This force consisted of the ANZAC Mounted Division and an Indian Infantry Brigade, plus supporting artillery units. At the sharp end of the stick, Allenby had 12,000 cavalrymen, 57,000 riflemen, and 540 guns, plus the normal combat support troops.

New Zealand General Edward Chaytor and Australian General Harry Chauvel Would Be Key Commanders in the Offensive

Supporting the main force were the Arab forces operating on the flanks and fringes of the EEF in Palestine. Numbering only a few thousand on a good day, possessing meager training and few heavy weapons and with a distinct abhorrence for suffering casualties, they proved to be a positive force multiplier in Allenby's scheme of operations. The Arabs continuously forced the Turks to devote much of their slender resources to keep the railroads open.

The forces opposing Allenby were organized under the Yildirim Army Group commanded by Liman von Sanders. South of the Haifa-Dera railway, this included three armies with 23,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. North of the line, in reserve, were 32,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.

Part II of The Battle of Armageddon will be presented tomorrow on Roads to the Great War

Sources: Our articles on Allenby's 1918 campaign have quoted extensively from two studies, "Deep Battle in World War One: The British 1918 Offensive in Palestine," by Lt. Cmdr. Paul A. Povlock of the Naval War College and "Armageddon’s Lost Lessons: Combined Arms Operations in Allenby’s Palestine Campaign," by Lt. Col. Gregory Daddis of the U.S. Military Academy. Maps from the West Point Atlas and the British Army Museum.