The Hentsch Inquiry

Colonel Richard Hentsch, Just Before
His Death in 1918

By Brigadier General J.E. Edmonds, Royal Engineers, ret.

[As the German nation belatedly became aware that its army had suffered an enormous set back along the River Marne in France, a rumor emerged]  that a Saxon General Staff Officer was the guilty party: he had given a wrong order, an order to retire he had no right to give to Prussian troops, and that he had given it in the name of the Supreme Command. . . The officer had been tried by court martial and shot. His name was Lieutenant-Colonel  Richard Hentsch, head of a section of the Great General Staff in the Field. [Hentsch was neither court martialed nor shot, but his role in the Battle of the Marne is still debated today.] Edmonds continues:

So much for rumor. It was not until June, 1919, when the Saxon General-Major Baumgarten-Crusius published his book Die  Marneschlacht, 1914, "compiled from war records," in order to destroy forever the absurd legend about the Third Army and its leader, that some of the facts began to be known. It is to the quarrel between the Saxons and the Prussians that we owe it. Since then, other books on the Marne have  appeared, among them those of the commanders of the German First and  Second Armies, and there have been numerous magazine articles and letters on the subject of Colonel Hentsch. 

Finally, the result of the Court of Enquiry on him in 1917 has just been published in the Militär Wochenblatt, and we have practically the whole story. Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch actually did have a great say in the orders for the retreat from the Marne, and his name will doubtless be connected with the battle for all time. 

Hentsch. . . has expressly written: "I was charged in case of necessity to order the retreat of the whole army to the line St. Menehould-Rheims-Fismes-Soissons. I was expressly given full powers to issue orders in the name of the Supreme Command. . . . In the case of the First Army I drew attention to the full powers conferred on me, and ordered the retreat in the name of the Supreme Command."

At the outbreak of war he was one of the two officers in charge of the Foreign Armies section of the German Intelligence, one half of which dealt with the French Army and those of Western States, and the other with  Russia and the rest of the world. On mobilization he became head of both  parts, and in this capacity accompanied Supreme Headquarters into the field. He appears, however, to have been principally employed in liaison  work in August–September 1914 and was therefore well known to the Army Staffs.

 It is certain that he took out to the First Army the Supreme  Command operation orders of the 5th of September (which ordered von Kluck to face toward Paris). His arrival is mentioned by General-Major von Kuhl, von Kluck's Chief of the General Staff, who further accepted his  covering authority for von Kluck doing something quite different to what  was ordered, and pressing on southward. 

"The taking of a new front towards Paris," Hentsch said, when asked, "need not be hurried, but can be carried out at complete leisure (volle Ruhe)." 

The custom that obtained in the German Army in 1870–1871 regarding the power of General Staff liaison officers of Great Headquarters, is well known; they were not mere messengers and carriers. They were expected to explain orders, and even to give orders if necessary, in the name of the Chief of the General Staff; being supposed to be fully conversant with his wishes and intentions. There was nothing unusual, therefore, in Hentsch  taking upon himself to approve von Kluck's delay in carrying out his orders. No one probably knew this better than von Kuhl, for he had served 22 years on the Great General Staff. Hentsch was well known to him and had served under him. 

During the battle of the Marne, Supreme Headquarters were back at Luxembourg, more than 150 miles from the First Army. Their only means of communication with the armies was by wireless, which worked very slowly, messages taking eight—even 12—hours to get through, and by officers in motor cars. The great machine had been started and by the 6th of September, if not earlier, had escaped control. By the 8th von Moltke had no clear conception of what was happening in the great battle. What he did to obtain news and coordinate action, and what happened in consequence,  can hardly be better described than in the words of the Memorandum signed by Ludendorff on the 24 May 1917, numbered "Chief of the Staff of the Field Army, No. 2229." This paper embodies the results of the enquiry which Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch asked for in 1914 but which was not held until Hindenburg-Ludendorff were in power. It will be given in full. Further information elucidating its plain official statement will then be given. 

"Colonel Hentsch, then Lieutenant-Colonel and Head of a Section on the Staff of the Chief of the Staff of the Field Army, on the 8th of September, 1914, at Great Headquarters, received verbal instructions from the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army (Generaloberst von Moltke), to motor to the Fifth, Fourth, Third, Second and First Armies (a round trip of some 400 miles) and bring back a clear idea of the situation. In the case that rearward movements had already been initiated (eingeleitet) on the right wing, he was instructed so to direct them that the gap between the First and Second Armies would be again closed, the First Army going, if possible, in the direction of Soissons. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch was therefore authorized, in the specified circumstances, to give binding instructions in the name of the Supreme Command. 

"He motored on the 8th of September, 1914, to the Headquarters of the Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies, and spent the night of the 8th–9th September at Second Army Headquarters. The commander of the Second Army made the decision to retire behind the Marne early on the 9th of  September, independently (selbstständig). 

"Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch agreed with this conclusion and motored on to the First Army. There, after discussion of the situation with the Chief of the Staff on the afternoon of the 9th of September, he gave the order for  the retreat in the name of the Supreme Command, quoting the powers conferred on him. He was justified in this, for the case provided for in his instructions—the initiation of rearward movements—had arisen. 

"Whether the decision of the Second Army Headquarters and the order of Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch to the First Army Headquarters to retreat were actually necessary from the situation must be decided by historical research in later years. 

"Colonel Hentsch incurs no personal reproach that he went beyond what he was entitled to do. He acted solely in accordance with the instructions given to him by the then Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army. 

"I request that this decision may be circulated down to divisional staffs. 

"By order (signed) LUDENDORFF."  

After the Marne, Hentsch served with some distinction in Group Mackensen's successful Rumanian campaign. He received the Pour le Mérite and promotion to colonel in 1917. He died during an operation on his gallbladder on 13 February 1918. It's unclear whether he saw the results of Ludendorff's inquiry before he died. Despite the existence of the inquiry's report, he was still scapegoated over the decision to retreat in 1914.

Source:  "The Scapegoat of the Battle of the Marne. . .", Brigadier General J.E. Edmonds, The Field Artillery Journal, Vol. 12, 1922