At Basra: Opening the Great War's Mesopotamia Campaign

The Prewar Peaceful Basra

By LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Strategic Assessment

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire existed only in name and a group of army officers created the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), which was the real power behind Sultan Mohammed V. Military leaders like Enver Pasha, and Talat Pasha were all products of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1876 to 1909) pro-German policies. This culminated in a secret pact signed between the Germans and Ottomans in August 1914. Iraq, at the time was divided into three sanjaks (Ottoman governing regions) of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. The British Indian Army auxiliary forces were reorganized in 1904, which left only one Indian Expeditionary Division, dedicated to the protection of Persian Gulf interests. The Sixth “Poona” Expeditionary Division was composed of the 16th, 17th, and 18th Infantry Regiments. A decade later this force would be called upon to defend several key strategic interests:

· The 140-mile Anglo-Persian oil pipeline

· The oil refineries at Abadan

The central debate of the Mesopotamian campaigns was whether to secure Arabstan (roughly Persia) and the British oil interests only or press forward and drive out Ottoman forces from Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) in a bold strategy called forward defense.

Key Sites of the Mesopotamian Campaign

Landings in Basra

A British and Indian Expeditionary Force left Bombay (7,000 troops) in mid-October and was positioned in anticipation of the formal Ottoman declaration of war to secure Abadan. Between mid-October and the landing of 600 British/Indian troops on Fao Peninsula on 7 November, the commanding general, Sir Arthur Bennett, used the time to practice to exercise his force in amphibious landings and combined operations with the Royal Navy.

On the evening of 21 November 1914, two gunboats advanced toward Basra with detachments of Indian forces belonging to the 104th Wellesley Rifles and the 117th Mahrattas of 16th Brigade of the Indian Army’s 6th Division. The Ottomans—unused to combined naval and infantry tactics—panicked and ordered the evacuation of  the city. Marsh Arabs from the southern estuaries arrived before the British and began to loot the city. Finally, as the Ottoman forces withdrew, the Turkish commanders scuttled four ships vessels tied together to form a barrier against approaching British gunboats, this action along with mining should’ve been done as the English Expeditionary Force amassed in Bahrain. The current swung one vessel aside and allowed the British flotilla to enter the Shat Al-Arab one at a time. The capture of Basra was among the first major British successes in the Great War then entering its fourth month. On 27 November 1914, the British flag was raised over the town.

The Ottomans had sent two regiments to intercept the British landing force, but it was too little too late.  One of the little known secrets of the success of the British landings is the alliance they had  bought of the Sheikh of Muhamara who provided valuable intelligence on Ottoman movements.

Both Shiekh of Muhamara and the Emir of Kuwait received protection and funds from the British, and their territories bordered one another. This cultivation of tribal fiefdoms enabled British units to be sent prior to the landing to cut the Fao to Basra telegraph wire. The constant information from these tribes is highlighted by  late Iraqi General Shukry Mahmood Nadeem, who wrote the most comprehensive study of the 1914–1918 Mesopotamian campaigns in the Arabic language. This flow of intelligence allowed the attacking infantry units supported by a flotilla of gunboats to envelop four Turkish regiments of 1,500 troops and 2,000 volunteers.

Newspaper Depiction of the Assault on Basra

Occupation of Basra (27 November 1914)

What is extraordinary is the way in which British commanders  reestablished some semblance of order in the town. They quickly brought in members of the revenue service to sort through documents in Basra. The occupying force made distinctions between Turkish combatants, Ottoman administrators and Arab peoples of Iraq. The Turkish subjects were treated as combatants and the Arabs cultivated as allies if possible. This led to discussions among British officers as how to provide benefits to Arabs who were technically “enemy aliens.”  Mesopotamian Arabs were issued papers describing the bearer as subjects of the Occupied Ottoman Territory of Mesopotamia. 

Additional Indian Army Forces Arriving at Basra

Another aspect that was brought to the attention of British military planners in Basra was dealing with the economy. Indian silver rupees and banknotes were brought in and an exchange rate established. Other highlights included cultivating relations and co-opting Shia and Sunni tribes, visits from British officials to tribal leaders that bolstered the sheikh’s standing among his people.

The cultivation of tribes was a risk and a gamble, with examples such as Sayyid Talib Pasha, an influential Sunni who controlled the Muntafiq Shiite Tribal Confederation who coveted autonomous rule over Basra to the exclusion of other tribal unions. This was unacceptable, and Sayyid Talib was marginalized and switched over to the Ottomans and Germans.

However with enough money and a demonstration of military might, Sheikh Ibrahim of Zubair and the Sheikh of Hartha cooperated with the British. To the uninitiated these tribal unions could be dismissed but the British having experienced the Indian Sepoy Rebellion and using their long experience in co-opting the sheikhs along the Persian Gulf coast, understood these alliances meant access to land between Basra and Qurna on the way to Baghdad unmolested, conserving British firepower for the Ottomans. The date 13 April 1915 is an example of neglecting tribal co-option a Turkish force augmented with tribes was near Al-Shuayba, and entered into battle with the British who had secured Basra. After the Ottomans were beaten, they retreated through Lake Hammar (Muntafiq territory) where the Muntafiq tribe fell on them, massacring the Turks.

On to Baghdad or Secure Arabstan?

The ease in which the initial attack of Southern Iraq and securing Abadan occurred led to a debate between London and Delhi (the British Indian Administration) over whether to seize the initiative and march on Baghdad. Sir Percy Cox argued for pressing onward to Baghdad, and the field commander in Mesopotamia, General Arthur Barrett, argued that it was 400 miles to Baghdad and even if he had defeated the Ottomans, he had too few troops to secure the city. How the decision came about to fight on the Baghdad will be discussed in future postings on Roads to the Great War.

Source: "The First World War Mesopotamian Campaigns: Military Lessons on Iraqi Ground Warfare," Strategic Insights, Volume IV,  June 2005; Hurst Publishing; the National Army Museum