How Did the Schlieffen Plan Work on the Eastern Front?

Cosssacks Arriving in East Prussia

The Plans for East Prussian and Galicia

Under the Eastern dimension of Germany's Schlieffen Plan a single army (the Eighth), made up primarily of territorial forces, was to be deployed  against the slow-moving Russian goliath and defend the homeland. Later, after France had been disposed of, the  entire German Army would be shifted to the east to  confront the tsar's forces. 

The opposing Russian War Plan XIX featured an ambitious double offensive. In the north, anticipating that France would be the initial focus of attention for the German Army, a two-army converging drive into East Prussia to threaten the Germans and relieve pressure on  the French was to be executed. Not to be neglected,  because its posture toward the Slavs of Serbia had  brought Russia into the war, was the old enemy Austria Hungary. Four armies would mount a second invasion  into Galicia, the empire's northernmost province with  the goal of destroying the Austro-Hungarian Army.  

Early Deployments in the East

What Happened

In the north, Russia—responding to  French appeals for alacrity—moved more quickly than  anyone thought possible and crossed into German  territory on August 17th. After being bloodied in the  small-scale Battle of Gumbinnen the commander of the  German Eighth Army Maximilian von Prittwitz  proposed, then withdrew, a panicky request to abandon East Prussia. The decision to replace him had already been made, however. A new team, Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, had been dispatched to restore control. 

Meanwhile, the Russian advance in East Prussia was developing its own problems. Initiated prematurely, the two armies found they were short of both  manpower and ordnance. The greatest deficiency for the  Russian forces, though, was in what is now called  "command and control." The two Russian armies operated as though they were oblivious to one another's  movements. Battlefield radio communication was also  in the clear and unciphered, allowing German  intelligence to deduce the southernmost Russian army  (the Second) could be isolated and destroyed before the  northernmost (the First) could come to its assistance. 

The Battle of Tannenberg and the envelopment and  destruction of the Second Army followed. Another setback, albeit less catastrophic, came for the First Army  at the Masurian Lakes in September. Russia was driven  out of East Prussia and would never regain the initiative  in the war. The key element of Plan XIX had failed. 

The 1914 campaign to the south in Galicia is one of the lesser-told tales of the Great War. After much pushing and shoving, though, the Russian steamroller proved too much for the Austro-Hungarian Army. By the end of the year, they had repelled an Austrian incursion into Poland, occupied the province of Galicia, and were threatening the passes across the Carpathian Mountains, gateway to Hungary. The first year of the war was an utter disaster for the empire that had wanted it most. 

The Eastern Front never was quite as deadlocked as the West, but the sheer size of Russia and the sub-par leadership of the Austro-Hungarian command doomed it to be just as costly in human suffering.

Source:  Over the Top, March 2009