Turkey Prepares for War, 1913–1914

Turkish Soldiers Learning the Machine Gun

By Lt. Col. Edward J. Erickson

The events of August 1914 would reveal the mobilization and war plans of the major combatants of the First World War to be extremely aggressive. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France fielded huge armies capable of offensive action at the strategic and the operational levels of war. Even Great Britain, with its "contemptible little army," was able to deploy a six division expeditionary force for immediate combat operations in France. Serbia as well proved capable of rapid action. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Ottoman Empire was unwilling to enter the war until November and its army was incapable of combat operations until December 1914.

The reasons the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War at all are complex, and a case can be made that their German partners unwillingly manipulated the Turks into the war. The empire had no clearly defined war aims, nor did peacetime Turkish war plans in 1914 call for any offensive operations against neighboring countries. Indeed, absent the presence of the German naval squadron of Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, the Turks might have remained neutral. There were many reasons for Turkey's lack of enthusiasm for war, but most Important was the condition of its army. For the Turks, 1914 was not a year of cheering crowds sending off troop trains of patriotic soldiers to the front. Instead, 1914 was year of respite and recovery from the disastrous Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. For the Turkish General Staff and for the Turkish Army, 1914 was supposed to be year devoted to the rebuilding of an army shattered by war. 

What was the condition of the Turkish army in the summer of 1914'? Why was it unready for immediate combat operations and what were its priorities? This article will address these questions by outlining the massive reorganization and re-stationing effort in which the Turks were engaged in 1914. 

In terms of human resources, the Turkish General Staff believed that the empire had a mobilization potential of about 2,000,000 men. However, this ambitious figure was, in fact, never achieved during the course of the war. In the summer of 1914, the classes of 1893 and 1894 (each age cohort was about 90,000 men) had been called to the colors and the Turkish Army enjoyed a peacetime operating strength of about 200,000 men and 8,000 officers. Unlike other European powers, Turkey did not employ first-line formations in peacetime at war establishment, preferring instead to field a higher number of reduced establishment formations. This policy was systematically carried out by reducing all units below division level—every Turkish infantry regiment was short a battalion and every battalion was short a company. The average strength of a Turkish infantry division, in the summer of 1914, was 4,000 men out of a war establishment of 10,000 personnel. In order to bring the field army to war establishment the Turkish Army required a total of 477,868 men and 12,469 officers to completely fill out its divisions. This use of a reduced establishment or cadre structure (a lean and under strength organizational framework designed to be heavily augmented) was intentional and reflected a deliberate decision taken by the army after the Balkan Wars. There were no reserve artillery or reserve technical formations. In any case, the Turkish general staff believed that approximately 1,000,000 men and 210,000 animals were easily available for recall and that, immediately upon full mobilization, the field army would have an effective strength of 460,000 men, 14,500 officers, and 160,000 animals."' To this must be added the heavily armed and trained Jandarma of 42,000 men (25,000 gendarmes, 12,000 frontier guards, and 6,000 mule-mobile troops). Altogether, Turkey planned to field about 500,000 men in mobile operational units, the remainder serving in fortress commands, coastal defenses, garrisons, and in lines of communications duties. 

A Skoda Artillery Battery Passing Through Constantinople

In material terms, the army was ill equipped to fight a modern war. Most divisions had only 21 75mm field howitzers out of an establishment of 24. This artillery force was a mixed bag of French Schneider, German Krupp, and Austro-Hungarian Škoda pieces and numbered about 1,000 field pieces. At corps level, most of the 12 105mm howitzers required for the 3 batteries of corps artillery were available. Overall, the army needed 280 field artillery pieces to bring itself up to war establishment. Additionally, in the fortresses of Adrianople, Erzurum, and Qatalca, there were numerous fixed 120mm artillery pieces, which were ill placed for immediate use. 

The machine gun situation was worse. Each Turkish infantry regiment was authorized four machine guns. Some regiments were short and the army needed 200 to equip the regimental force to standard. At battalion and company level, there simply were no machine guns and the army estimated that it needed 200,000 more to fill all requirements. At 1,500,000, rifles were a less critical shortage but the army still needed 200,000.

Ammunition stockage was low and the Turks were unable to meet anticipated wartime demands. There were 150 cartridges available per rifleman, a further 190 available in corps depots, and for the entire army there were 200,000,000 cartridges in reserve. For the Turkish artillery, there were about 588 shells available per gun. 

Typical Turkish Conscripts

In service support, the Turkish Army suffered terribly. Each division was authorized a field medical unit, and each corps was authorized four field hospitals, however, these were never filled at established strengths. This deficiency was compounded by chronic shortages of doctors, medicine, and medical supplies. The total Turkish hospital capacity was 37,000 beds, of which 14,000 were located in the city of Constantinople. Transportation was a critical weakness; especially short were supply wagons and draft animals. Motorization and aviation were almost nonexistent in the Turkish Army.

Upon the advice of the German advisor General von der Goltz, mobilization planning was based on peacetime conscription, which provided a flow of trained individuals into the reserve forces. Active service in the peacetime Turkish Army was for a period of three years for the infantry and four years for the artillery and technical services. Likewise, animals served for a period of four years and, in turn, were returned to civilian use carrying a lifelong obligation for national service. Non-Muslims were excluded from military service and were forced to pay a special military tax instead. By 1914, the period of active obligatory service was reduced to two years for infantry and cavalry, and to three years for the artillery. Although under this scheme, the active army was maintained a lower strength, the staff thought that a 50 percent biannual turnover was superior to a 33 percent turnover every three years. This was partly due to the huge losses in trained leaders suffered during the Balkan wars and reflected an inability of the forces to adequately train replacements. It was also partly due to the necessity to normalize the empire's economy. 

All men were liable for military service and were drafted according to their chronological age as a class or cohort. Liability for service began at age 20 and ended 25 years later. The Turkish military was divided into an active force (Nizamiye), a reserve force (Redif), and a territorial force (Mustahfiz). The two youngest classes provided the manpower for the active army, the next 16 classes provided the trained manpower for the reserve, and the oldest seven classes comprised the territorial forces. Most reservists and territorials were organized into units of battalion size or smaller and had local depots designated as mobilization stations. Unlike all other major European powers, Turkey did not have a large-unit reserve system, which could field intact reserve corps composed of reserve divisions. Consequently, there was no major increase in the raw number of formations available to the Turkish Army upon mobilization. There were several exceptions, those being the XII Corps (Independent), the 38th Infantry Division (Independent), and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Reserve Cavalry Divisions. 

Enver Pasha

Between July 1913 and August 1914 the Turkish Army was undergoing an enormous reorganization and reconstruction effort as a result of the devastating losses suffered in the Balkan Wars. Compounding this huge task was Enver Pasha's determination to rid the army of older and less active officers, which he felt were an obstruction to modernization. Over 1,100 officers were involuntarily retired during this period. The scale of this effort to rebuild the army must be explained in some detail because this reorganization of the Turkish forces provides the basis for understanding both the offensive failures of 1914 and the defensive successes of 1915. 

Prior to the beginning of the Balkan War of 1912, the Turkish Army enjoyed a fair degree of stability based on a garrison system extending throughout the empire A German military assistance group under General von der Goltz had restructured the Turkish Army and standardized the organization of Turkish corps at a strength of three infantry divisions. In a prescient decision, von der Goltz also standardized the organization of the Turkish infantry division at a strength of three infantry regiments—all European armies during the First World War would later adopt this triangular structure. In the Balkans, the 12 infantry division strong Turkish second army provided security for Turkey's remaining possessions in the Vardar Valley and Albania. The equally powerful Turkish first army (12 infantry divisions) provided security for Adrianople and Constantinople. The smaller 3rd and 4th Armies provided protection for Caucasia and Mesopotamia, and independent corps garrisoned Syria, Palestine, and Arabia. This powerful regular establishment was backed up by a reserve system, which fielded infantry divisions in all major cities of the empire. 

However, in less than a year, both the 1st and 2nd Armies had been destroyed. The Turkish Army had lost 12 infantry divisions out of a beginning total of 43 infantry divisions and the corps-sized fortress garrison of Adrianople was also lost. Additionally, eight regular infantry divisions and 15 newly raised infantry divisions of reservists and territorials had been redeployed to Thrace to serve in the newly formed Qatalca and Gallipoli Armies. Several infantry divisions and a corps headquarters had been dissolved to provide replacements. Only six of the infantry divisions of the pre-Balkan War regular Turkish Army were spared the trauma of combat. In another context, 90 percent of Turkish infantry divisions mobilized participated in the Balkan Wars. Casualties from the wars exceeded 250,000 men. This was a military disaster of unprecedented magnitude for the empire, which all but destroyed the regular Turkish Army as an effective fighting force. 

At the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, the condition of the Turkish Army demanded attention. Complete armies had been shattered, corps had been deliberately dissolved, and there were huge disparities in the fighting strengths of infantry divisions. There was a large number of ad hoc divisional formations (named after their city of origin) composed of older reservists and territorials Training was at a standstill, as was weapons procurement. Finally, and not the least worrisome, almost the entire Turkish Army was deployed in the Turkish Thrace. These strategic and operational imperatives forced Turkey to immediately engage itself in a massive military reorganization effort in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. 

Typical Turkish Officers

The reorganization of Turkish forces in 1914 was comprehensive and was designed to redeploy the army into its pre-Balkan War garrison locations and also to rebuild the divisional and corps base of the army. This was a gigantic undertaking and was incomplete on the eve of the First World War. In the reconstituted 1st Army, only the III Corps survived the war intact and retained its original organic pre-Balkan War divisions. The II Corps and I Corps lost a division each and each were rebuilding a new division. It is significant, and no surprise, that the combat hardened and intact III Corps was selected to defend the strategic Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. Facing the Russians in Caucasia, of the 3rd Army's nine infantry divisions, three were being rebuilt from scratch and four were redeployed from Thrace that year. This hastily assembled and cobbled-together army was hurled against the Russians in December 1914 with predictably disastrous results. The 2nd Army was reconstituted in Syria and Palestine and was rebuilding two divisions while absorbing two more which had been transferred there from Thrace. Altogether, 14 of 36 Turkish infantry divisions organized in August 1914 were in the process of being rebuilt from scratch, and eight divisions of the 36 had conducted a major redeployment within the year. The overall effectiveness of these 22 new or redeployed infantry divisions was low and would inevitably take years to remedy. However, events overcame preparation time and 12 of these divisions were involved in the early Turkish offensive disasters of 1914. Reciprocally, the single organizationally intact corps—the III corps with its organic 7th, 8th, and 9th infantry divisions—successfully defended the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. It could be argued that defeat in the Balkan Wars, and subsequent Turkish reconstitution and re-stationing efforts, set the stage for Turkish success or failure in the initial phases of the First World War. 

The emergent picture of the condition of the Turkish Army on the eve of the Great War portrays a condition of great weakness. Serious deficiencies in material and readiness were in abundance. "Snapshot" comparisons of the army's dispositions in 1912, in July 1913, and in August 1914 reveal an incredible pattern of unit movements as the disaster of the Balkan Wars overtook the empire. Finally, the magnitude of the losses of both trained manpower and the destruction of almost half of the empire's combat infantry divisions defies understanding. Under these conditions, that Turkey entered the war at all seems incredible. That the Turkish Army fought magnificently for four years and was still on its feet in the fall of 1918 is more incredible still and is a story yet to be told. 

This article first appeared in the Spring 2000 issue of RELEVANCE, the Quarterly Journal of the Great War Society.  Images from Tony Langley's collection 

A War Poem of Young and Old

Young and Old

Young. What makes the dale so strange, my dear?
     What makes the dale so strange?
Old. The men have gone from the dale, my dear,
     And that makes all the change.

Young. The lanes and glens are still at night,
    No laughter or songs I hear.
Old. Our lover-lads have marched to the fight
    And maidens are lonely, my dear.

Young. The kine are slow to come to the call
    That once were all so quick.
Old. They miss the voice known best of all,
     Of John or brother Dick.

Young. And will the dale be always strange
     And dull and sad, my dear?
Old. Ay, lassie, we shall feel the change
     For many a mournful year.

Henry Allsopp from Songs from a Dale in War Time, 1915

About the Victoria Cross

For most conspicuous bravery or some daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice or extreme devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy. The Victoria Cross (VC) medal was instituted on 5 February 1856 with awards retroactive to 1854. The first award to a Canadian was in February 1857, to Lt. Alexander DUNN (Charge of the Light Brigade). There have been 1,351 Victoria Crosses and 3 Bars awarded worldwide. During the First World War there were 628 awards to 627 individuals. Captain Noel Godfrey Chavasse, VC with Bar, MC, was a double recipient of the award.

Description: A cross pattee, 1.375 inches across, with a dark brown finish. Made from cannons captured from the Russians during the Crimean War.

Obverse: The obverse displays the Royal Crown surmounted by a lion guardant. Below the crown, a scroll bearing the inscription: FOR VALOUR.

Reverse: Raised edges with the date of the act engraved within a raised circle.

Mounting: A straight bar (ornamented with laurels), slotted for the ribbon, has a V-lug below. A small link joins the V-lug to a semi-circular lug on the top of the cross.

Ribbon: The crimson ribbon is 1.5 inches wide and a miniature cross is worn on the ribbon in undress. The ribbon was dark blue for naval recipients until 1918.  

Naming: The recipient’s rank, name, and regiment are engraved on the reverse of the mounting bar.

Sources: The Vimy Ridge Project, Cyril Mazansky Collection

When Did America Declare War on Austria-Hungary?

Austro-Hungarian Forces on the Western Front
The AEF Would Face Them at St. Mihiel & the Meuse-Argonne

By Patrick Gregory
Posted on Centenarynews.com on 10 December 2017

During his annual State of the Union address on 4 December 1917 Woodrow Wilson first voiced his opinion that war with Austria-Hungary should be formally proclaimed.

In a speech necessarily dominated by events in Europe, the President described the Dual Monarchy as "the vassal of the German government...the instrument of another nation." His concerns about the empire’s status as a belligerent had been heightened during the autumn by its armies’ successes in the field against Italy at the Battle of Caporetto. He joined Britain and France in fearing the reverse could prompt the Italians to leave the war.

So it was, eight months after asking Congress for its approval for war on Germany, that President Wilson found himself recommending that that war be extended to its ally. "We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one," he told the assembled gathering.

Three days later, after short debates in both houses, Joint Resolution 169 was adopted unanimously by the Senate and approved by the Houses of Representatives by a vote of 350 to 1.

A state of war is hereby declared to exist between the United States of America and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, it said. The President was 'hereby authorised and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war.'

Later that day, 7 December 1917, Woodrow Wilson formally signed the declaration.

Sources:  Photo—http://www.austro-hungarian-army.co.uk/

Not Well Regarded: The Debut of Tanks at the Somme

The Battle of Flers-Courcelette, an attempt to restart the Somme Offensive of 1916, stands out in the broader memory of the First World War due to one principal factor—the debut of the tank. Most historians who write of the action focus on the tanks as its central feature, and most of them are quite critical of their effect on the battle. 

Tanks Envisioned in the 19th Century by French Futurist Albert Robida

For example, the chapter on the 15 September attack in Martin Gilbert's The Battle of the Somme (2006) is titled "The arrival of the tanks: 'We are feeling top dogs.'" Similarly, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson's The Somme (2005) discusses Flers-Courcelette in a chapter titled "Lumbering Tanks: The Battle of 15 September." Such works are in agreement about two principal conclusions: (1) the attack was not a stirring success (2) but it did showcase the potential for the tank as an offensive weapon. The British official history discusses the many shortcomings of the tank on 15 September but concedes that the battle was a "valuable tryout" for the possibilities of tank assaults. J.F.C. Fuller was similarly unkind about the tanks' initial performance. In his Tanks in the Great War, Fuller wrote that the 15 September attack was "from the point of view of tank operations, not a great success." He, too, argued that the silver lining in the tanks' poor showing at Flers-Courcelette was that the battle served as a field test to hone tank tactics and design for future deployment.

British Mark I Tank, Chimpanzee Valley, Somme

Although at Flers-Courcelette most of the tanks suffered mechanical breakdown or battle damage and failed to influence events, some tanks rendered valuable assistance to the infantry in surmounting German strong points, such as at the village of Flers. In any case, ever after, the tank became a valued weapon of war. 

Source: Canadian Military History, Autumn 2011

Checkout Our Latest Issue of the St. Mihiel Trip-Wire

Visit our latest issue of our monthly St. Mihiel Trip-Wire. This month we feature a review of Peter Jackson's They Shall Not Grow Old, articles on the opening of the occupation by the Allies of the Central Powers, the surrender of the High Seas Fleet, our monthly retrospective of the war, my personal look back at the Centennial commemoration of the war, plus our numerous monthly features and announcements.

http://www.worldwar1.com/tripwire/smtw.htm

Forgotten Soldiers of World War I Reviewed by David F. Beer

Forgotten Soldiers of World War I: America's Immigrant Doughboys

by Alexander F. Barnes and Peter L. Belmonte

Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 2018

Country of Origins for Men of an Unidentified AEF Unit in France: 1. Poland 2. Philippines 
3. Mexico 4. Germany 5. Ecuador 6. Turkey 7. Alsace-Lorraine 8. Greece and 9. Austria

When I emigrated from Devon to the United States in 1956 aboard the SS Irpinia, I gave little thought to those who had come before me. Now, much later and with an ongoing interest in the war my grandfather took part in, I'm delighted to have gained, through Forgotten Soldiers of World War I, considerable insight into how early immigrants fared when they came face to face with an America about to go to war in 1917.

We're constantly reminded that the United States is a nation of immigrants. From 1891 to 1914 some 13 million immigrants came here and many for a long time thought of themselves as hyphenated Americans: German-American, Polish-American, Irish-American, and so on. Yet in May 1917 the newly instituted draft called for all men between the ages of 18 and 45 to register.

Forgotten Soldiers is divided into ten chapters which chronologically follow the draftee experience from induction to return after the Armistice. First, however, a Foreword sets the tone of the book by providing useful background information and statistics. The authors estimate that of the four million soldiers in the AEF by the end of the war, some 20 percent were foreign born. This means of the nearly 800,000 immigrants in the ranks, a great many spoke only their native language or spoke English to a very limited extent. Many couldn't read or write in any language.

Poles and Bohemians were numerous among the recruits, and such names as Czsertozc Mjovscek were frequent. As a result, when the first sergeant of one company sneezed while taking roll call, fourteen of his men answered, 'Here' [p.12]. (A common joke at Camp Travis)

It's not difficult to image the difficulties this presented. Yet foreign-born soldiers in the AEF paid the same price as their native-born comrades. For example Rochester, New York, records 609 from that area as having made the supreme sacrifice. Of these, 41 were Italian born and a goodly number of the rest were from Canada, Britain, Germany and Austria (p. 16).

Thus Italians, Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Britons, Danes, and many other nationalities were to show up at draft boards to be processed. Eventually the military found itself with considerable numbers of recruits from almost every nation in the world, including Iceland, Montenegro, Jamaica, Brazil, India, and New Zealand. One recruit's place of birth was recorded as "Timbuktu, Africa."

The fascinating story of how these "hyphenated Americans" were classified, processed, trained, and deployed is the subject of the first four chapters of Forgotten Soldiers. The authors provide statistics plus problems and outcomes resulting from this huge influx of "alien" troops. Many situations were unique, but most of these recruits also endured the hardships their American-born comrades did, such as lack of equipment, inadequate training, and the rush to be shipped to France and maybe right to the front line and combat. In spite of cultural or language problems, however, the evidence shows that the vast majority served as faithfully and well as their American counterparts and conspicuous acts of heroism were not uncommon.

Chapter 5 contains absorbing accounts of how foreign-born Doughboys fared in battle, while Chapter 6 gives biographies of some of these soldiers. We are left in no doubt about the international nature of the AEF: Even the Stars and Stripes, published in Paris, France, noted the prevalence of foreign-born soldiers in the ranks. In a 28 February 1918 article, the newspaper reported that the US Army was 'the most international in history'…[ and] that the staff responsible for censoring soldier mail handled on a regular basis letters written in 'twenty-five European languages, many tongues and dialects of the Balkan States and a scattering few in Yiddish, Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Tahitian, Hawaiian, Persian and Greek, to say nothing of a number of Philippine dialects [p. 75].

Half of these letters were likely to be written in Italian, followed by Polish, French, and the Scandinavian languages. In fact much of the material in this book focuses on Italian-born soldiers since the authors had to rely on what archives were available plus private collections, family histories, and unpublished sources, all of which are listed in their bibliography. An in-depth book covering every nationality represented in the AEF at the time would be enormous—assuming such information could be retrieved.

We visit "The Home Front" in Chapter 7. Although at least half of the AEF sent to France didn't face battle, they were essential for support as transport, supply, medical, and various other units. Meanwhile back home parents, relatives, friends, and the general public did all they could by raising liberty bonds, recruiting, and increasing war production. Indicative of the home situation, a poster from the United States Fuel Administration urged increased coal mining in the languages of many of its coal miners: English, Italian, Slovenian, Bosnian, Polish, and German (p.105)

It's not surprising that so many diverse linguistic groups within the AEF sometimes led to unusual "Events and Unique Episodes"—the title of Chapter 8. This makes for surprising reading. We learn about America's "Dutch Foreign Legion" and the Slavic Legion. The prevalence of the name Deluca in its various forms is considered. This group suffered pretty much the same percentage of casualties as the rest of the Army: of some 60 Delucas, two were killed, one died of wounds, six were severely wounded, and one died of disease (p.113). A Mexican Doughboy relates his story, and we learn of the military relevance of Japan, India, and the Danish West Indies. Interestingly, many of the Hello Girls were born in foreign countries, as were several nurses.

A Famous U.S. War Poster by Howard Chandler Christy

The last two chapters cover the end of the war for hyphenated Americans as they returned to the United States. Some confusion and mix-ups were inevitable, as they were for other Doughboys. Some problems arose about where the dead were to be buried. Many foreign-born soldiers received citizenship, some nursed wounds or were hospitalized, and some returned to their country of origin. For many it was hard to land on their feet again, as this announcement in a 1919 newspaper shows:

Angelo Biscardi, bearing seven wounds received in the war, the Croix de Guerre, and honorable discharge papers from the Italian and United States armies, is walking the streets of Chicago seeking employment (p. 168).

Authors Barnes and Belmonte obviously did a tremendous amount of research, which clearly shows. They write with clarity and precision and have given us a wide and deep insight into the lives of the "Forgotten Soldiers" of the AEF. This book is attractive when you first pick it up, with a haunting cover picture and attractive formatting of the contents on quality paper stock. Its 192 pages contain numerous portraits, posters, and photographs, often with a near-sepia tint that invokes the historical nature of the subject. End notes plus a full bibliography and index complete this valuable study of a little-known aspect of World War One.

If you would like to increase your awareness of how foreign-born American soldiers experienced the Great War, this would be a great book to read. If you are interested in further research on the subject, Forgotten Soldiers would be an excellent place to start.

David F. Beer

12 Views of No Man's Land: Some Fictional, Some Poetic, Some Firsthand

No Man's Land, Flanders, 1919 Photo

No man's land is a surprisingly old term, dating back to the 1300s.

The Grammarist

[No Man’s Land is] like the face of the moon, chaotic, crater-ridden, uninhabitable, awful, the abode of madness. . . It is pock-marked like a body of foulest disease and its odour is the breath of cancer.

Wilfred Owen

Men drowning in shell-holes already filled with decaying flesh, wounded men, beyond help from behind the wire, dying over a number of days, their cries audible, and often unbearable to those in the trenches; sappers buried alive beneath its surface.

Fran Brearton

No Man's Land is an eerie sight
At early dawn in the pale gray light. . .
But  No Man's Land is a goblin sight
When patrols crawl over at dead o'night

Grantland Rice

Out in No Man’s Land there was no sign of any German activity. The only remarkable thing was the unbroken silence. I was in a sort of twilight, for there was a moony glimmer in the low‑clouded sky; but the unknown territory in front was dark, and I stared out at it like a man looking from the side of a ship.

Siegfried Sassoon

"No Man's Land," by French Illustrator Lucien Jonas

An exhalation arose, drawn up by the moon, from an old battlefield after the passing of years. It came out of very old craters and gathered from trenches, smoked up from No Man’s Land, and the ruins of farms; it rose from the rottenness of dead brigades, and lay for half the night over two armies; but at midnight the moon drew it up all into one phantom and it rose and trailed away eastwards.

Lord Dunsany

No man’s land is of fixed length but of varying width. There are places where it is very narrow, so narrow that it is possible to throw across a hand grenade or a box of cigarettes, depending on the nearness of an officer whose business is war. Again it is wide, that friendly relations are impossible, and sniping becomes a pleasure as well as an art

Mary Roberts Rinehart

The dead who waited in No Man's Land didn't look like dead, as the men who came to them now had thought of death.  From a distance of a few yards, the bodies, lying in queer huddled attitudes, appeared to have something monstrously amiss with them. . . their skins had the bursting blackness of grapes.  It was impossible to recognize features or expression in that hideously puffed and contorted blackness.

Robin Hyde

[It's] pocked, diseased, ripe with rot" 

Bernard [?]

Creep and crawl, follow me, that's all

What do you hear? Nothing near

Don't fear, all is clear

That's the life of a stroll

When you take a patrol

Out in No Man's Land

Ain't it grand?

Out in No Man's Land

James Reese Europe

The Deep Roots of the Great War, Part 6: The Interests of Russia

How Its Neighbors Viewed Russia Before the War

Russia simply has hypnotic power. This was especially evident in its dynamic 19th-century history, when its population tripled. Russian military power, critical in defeating Napoleon, cowed the empire's neighbors and allowed the tsar to expand wherever he could get away with it. Even Europe's master statesman, Otto von Bismarck, accepted that Germany's well-being depended on peaceful relations with the Russian bear. Wilhelm II forgot this and started down the the

road to doom. 

Russia's centralized and militarized state has distinguished the country for centuries, although whether its militarization was offensive or defensive has been a matter of considerable historical debate. Nonetheless, starting from the beginning of the 16th century Russia eventually and uniquely came to control major portions of two continents. Historian George Vernadsky embraced the argument of geographical determinism—that the peculiar geography of Eurasia encouraged a dynamic national grouping (i.e. Russia) to extend its domination as far as possible for security reasons. Richard Pipes suggests, however, that the Russians, and later the Soviets, adopted an ideology—be it "Moscow as the Third Rome" or Marxism-Leninism—that promoted and encouraged the government to be inherently aggressive and expansionist.

From the beginning of the 16th-century through the middle of the 17th, Russia on  average annually added territory equivalent to the size of the Netherlands, and it continued expanding until World War I. No other state in world history has expanded so persistently.

Historian  Richard Pipes

The Kremlin in the 15th Century

Beginning with the Napoleonic Wars, Russia's imperial ambitions brought it into conflict with other nations and empires similarly ambitious or anxious about their declining fortunes. Throughout the 19th century, Russian rebuffs or defeats in Europe were repeatedly followed by greater attention and expansions to the east. For example, the defeat of Russia in the 1853–56 Crimean War at the hands of a coalition of France, Sardinia, the Great Britain, and the Ottoman Empire was followed by extensive Russian conquests in the east. In the Caucasus, Russia had been fighting for decades, but pacification was nearly complete when in 1859 legendary Chechen leader Shamil was captured. In a series of successful military expeditions from 1865 to 1876 in Central Asia, Russia conquered the khanates of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva. The far eastern boundary of Russia had remained unchanged from the Treaty of Nerchinsk with China in 1689, but in 1858 China gave up the left bank of the Amur River to Russia through the Treaty of Aigun, and in the 1860 Treaty of Beijing, China ceded the Ussuri River region.

In the 19th century—to borrow a phrase from Churchill—plague bacilli were evolving and mutating in Russia. Despite suppressing the first post-Napoleonic revolt against the old order, the Decembrist revolt of reformist military officers in 1825, Russia then continually disconcerted the rest of world by serving as an incubator for more extreme forms of radicalism, nihilism, anarchism, and Marxism, as well as for innovations in terrorism and assassination. Regardless of the oppressive measures taken by the tsars' agents, secretive groups of Russians relentlessly borrowed or invented, then tested, perfected, and propagated the revolutionary and nationalistic ideologies that would make the next century one of the most violent in history, all of this going on while innumerable Russian writers and musicians—like Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Tchaikovsky, and Rimsky-Korsakov—were enchanting the world with their creativity.

Bakunin, Father of Anarchism

Further the Russian traditions of messianism and expansionism took on racial overtones in the 19th century, adding another frightening aspect to the world's perceptions of autocratic Russia. As with some of the revolutionary theories, this racialized thinking developed abroad, having Czech and German roots. But Russia embraced it, applied it more diligently, and passed it on to the rest of the world and posterity, in particular, on to Germany's National Socialist Party.

In large empires, such as Austria-Hungary or tsarist Russia, this emerging form of nationalism initially led to a heightened self-awareness by minorities and conquered people. But in Russia, the now-alarmed establishment's response was to turn this around with an insistence on "one, indivisible Russia," believing that non-Russians could be turned into Russians. This policy, of course, would never appeal to the non-Russian population, but the overall approach had some other flaws. What about the non-Russian Slavic peoples, who had been absorbed into the empire? Furthermore, this Russia indivisible policy was too inwardly focused for an empire still interested in outward expansion. 

The solution found for these complications by influential Russians was to adapt something called "Pan-Slavism." It was never official state policy, but would periodically dominate state policy. Not just Russians but their fellow Slavs were united in their messianic mission. Other Slavs were also divinely "chosen” and thus superior to all other nationalities.

This anchored the empire politically with a Slavic core and supplied a rationale for international adventurism ranging from dabbling in the affairs of other countries with Slavic minorities (like the Balkans) to acquiring territory for Slavic population expansion from inferiors (like the Ottomans) to simple conquest of other Slavs (like the Poles).

Nicholas and Alexandra Before Things Went South

This new form of Russian nationalism was a clear threat to all its neighbors. Pan-Slavs claimed as early as 1870 that the best possible starting point for an  enlarged Pan-Slav empire would be the disintegration of the Hapsburg empire. Later in that decade, Pan-Slavists in the tsar's government maneuvered the country into a war with the Ottomans for the purpose of capturing Constantinople. Later, after Russia's expansionist aims in the East were defeated by the Japanese, the Pan-Slavists next steered the nation to focus on the Balkans. The Pan-Slav movement had set the table for World War I. It embroiled Russia in the Balkans where crisis piled on crisis and one was sure to become unmanageable and lead to war. The July Crisis after the Archduke's assassination also provided—albeit with considerable risk—the double opportunity of swallowing a chunk of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and capturing the Dardanelles and Constantinople from the Ottomans. Behind the tsar's decision to mobilize and go to war was the Russian version of neo-nationalism, Pan-Slavism.

Source: Over the Top, March 2014

The Singapore Mutiny of 1915

By James Patton

On 15 February 1915, members of the 5th Light Infantry (Indian Army) mutinied in Singapore. The British called this incident the "Singapore Mutiny," but in Singapore it was called the "Sepoy Mutiny" or the "Indian Mutiny", notwithstanding that the 1857–8 uprising in India was also called the "Sepoy Rebellion" or the "Indian Mutiny."

This event was a part of the Indian independence movement that the British labelled the Ghadar Conspiracy. A key goal of the Ghadars was to incite discontent in the Indian Army. In January 1915 such a plan involving the 130th Baluchis was averted by a timely warning. Studies more than half a century later found that the Singapore Mutiny may have had strong support from factions based in India, keen on weakening British control in the region. The Ghadars in Singapore were allegedly led by a Gujerati Muslim coffee-shop owner named Kassim Mansoor,  a religious leader named Nur Alum Shah, and three Indian VCO’s, Subedar Dunde Khan, Jemadar Christi Khan, and Jemedar Ali Khan.

In October 1914 the all-Muslim 5th LI (comprised of Rajput Ranghars and Pathans) had been dispatched to Singapore to replace the 1st Bn King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, which was rushed off to the BEF. The 5th LI was not combat ready; morale was low, communications poor, and leadership lacking. The commanding officer, Lt. Col. E. V. Martin, had been recently promoted from within the regiment, an unpopular choice even with the British officers. 

Orders came for the 5th LI to leave Singapore for Hong Kong on 16 February. So little was Martin trusted that rumors flew that the 5th LI was going to be sent to the Middle East to fight against Muslims, contrary to the Fatwa of Mehmet V. 

The 5th LI was guarding the 309 prisoners from the SMS Emden and other interned Germans, and one named Lauterbach, a reserve Oberleutnant who spoke Urdu, allegedly encouraged the troops to mutiny, promising German cooperation.

By plan the mutiny started around 3:30 P.M. on the 15th. The four Rajput companies of the 5th LI plus about 100 men from the Malay States Guides Mule Battery swarmed out, killing the two British duty officers. The mostly Pathans of the remaining four companies refused to participate and laid low. 

Lt. Col. Martin's House Still Stands

The mutineers divided into groups. One was sent to obtain more ordnance from the Tanglin Barracks magazines, another to kill Lt. Col. Martin and other officers at their residences and the last to release the Germans, held at Alexandra Barracks. There the sepoys killed ten British soldiers, three Sultanate troops, and one German. Three British soldiers and one German were wounded but survived, as did the eight RAMC personnel in the hospital, one of whom managed to escape under heavy fire to raise the alarm. The sepoys expected the Germans to join them, but they declined, even refusing to accept rifles. About 35 Germans did choose to leave the compound, contemplating escape. 

Meanwhile, more officers had been killed, although not Martin, who attempted to rally the Pathans but failed. The Tanglin Barracks occupied 210 acres and were too big for the mutineers to fortify, so the sepoys roamed the streets, targeting civilians randomly. But without strong leadership and without German assistance, the mutiny never had a chance of success. 

Since it was the middle of the Chinese New Year, the majority of the Chinese in the Singapore Volunteer Corps were unavailable, but a scratch force of  British garrison personnel, Royal Marines from HMS Cadmus and some Sultanate soldiers fought desperate little running skirmishes with the mutineers throughout the 15th and 16th.  On the 17th, 158 Japanese marines, plus French and Russian sailors, came ashore and promptly defeated the largest group of the sepoys in a sharp battle after which many surrendered and the rest dispersed into hiding. 

On the 20th the 1/4th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry arrived from Burma and cleared the pockets of resistance. By the night of 22 February all was secure.

Execution of the Mutineers

A Court of Inquiry was convened on 23 February, first held in secret but later publicly, which concluded on 15 May, resulting in 47 death sentences (including Kassim Mansoor), 184 prison sentences and several transportations. Public executions were conducted at Outram Prison, witnessed by an estimated 15,000. 

Casualty lists vary, but at least 40 loyal soldiers and as many as 18 civilians died. Mutineer casualties are not known.

Lt. Col. Martin was cashiered. The remnant of the 5th LI was sent to Africa, then to Aden and served credibly. Nevertheless, it was disbanded in 1922.

After the Singapore Mutiny the British were unwilling to garrison colonies exclusively with Indian units, which placed a further strain on their manpower. All Indians residing in Singapore were required to register, causing ill feelings among a mostly loyal community. In order to enhance Singapore's internal security, the British passed the "Reserve Force and Civil Guard Ordinance" in August 1915, requiring compulsory military service from all male subjects between 15 and 55 years of age who were not already serving  in the armed forces, volunteers, or police. 

The mutiny is commemorated in Singapore by two tablets at the entrance of the Victoria Memorial Hall and four plaques at the St Andrew's (Anglican) Cathedral.

Sources: Singapore Infopedia, Wikipedia

Recommended: CSPAN's Battle of St. Mihiel Program

American Troops Passing Through a Village in the St. Mihiel Salient

There has been so much produced in the last two years on America's involvement int the Great War that I've not been able to keep up with all of it.  A good example of this is CSPAN's 2017 program on the St. Mihiel Battle, which features my friend, and frequent contributor to our publications, Mitchell Yockelson as the featured commentator.  I just viewed it and I recommend it strongly.  

At the Montsec U.S. Memorial

If you are like my typical  traveler on my military tours, I assure you that the operation is bigger than you imagined  in the size of the battlefield, the forces involved, and its importance in the culmination of the war. The film has footage of the battle I've never seen before, and Mitchell does a fine job explaining things.

View the Video at:

https://www.c-span.org/video/?450932-1/american-artifacts-recalls-wwi-battle-saint-mihiel

A Wounded Doughboy's Christmas – A Roads Classic

In early December 1918, almost completely recovered from the wound he had received in the Argonne campaign, my father, Sgt Albert K. Haas, was able to return to his unit, the 309th Infantry of the 78th Division. From Vichy, where he had been hospitalized, Albert went  by train to Nevers and from there to divisional headquarters in Semur. Next he was directed to hike on to the nearby village of Genay, where he was eventually billeted in a room in the home of Madame Laurent and her mother.

At Christmas time Albert was supposed to go to a special leave area, but something went awry with the railroad arrangements, so he and his roommate, Ed, were sent back from Semur to Genay to await orders. Arriving back in the village on Christmas Eve, they discovered Madame had misunderstood the new billeting arrangements and had given their room to two other men. 

My dad later wrote, "After much discussion, we asked Madame's permission to sleep in the hayloft for the night. She did not think it good enough for us, but we finally convinced her it was. She insisted on climbing the ladder to the loft and taking a couple of white pillows with her for our bed. All our protest against misuse of pillows was in vain and we slept in the beds as arranged. It was rather a unique place to spend Christmas Eve."

Genay, Site of Albert's Christmas

On Christmas Morning, "Madame insisted they have breakfast in her home. It was the strangest breakfast I ever had, Beef soup, wine, bread and cheese." In the evening, an impromptu entertainment was given at the Y.M.C.A. hut and Ed and I took the old folks along. All civilians in the town had been invited to attend. They thought the perfectly rotten show was wonderful." That night he and Ed again slept in the hayloft.  Thus ended Christmas in Genay. The following morning he started for Semur again for transportation to the leave area in the Vosges Mountains, where he spent ten days.

From Margaret Haas

Christmas at the Front, 1915–1919

One story from World War I is so dramatic and moving that it's the only holiday episode that has stayed the public's consciousness.. That tale, of course, is of the famous Christmas Truce of 1914. But how were the subsequent Christmases celebrated? The 1914 Truce had one traumatic impact—it horrified the generals and their staffs on both sides, and they worked hard subsequently at discouraging such fraternizing. However, there were more incidents in later years [albeit smaller in scale]. The tradition of gift giving, on the other hand, was encouraged, even institutionalized, by the governments of the combatants. The soldiers themselves found their own ways to celebrate: decorating the trenches, having special meals, caroling, exchanging "joke" gifts with their mates, and so forth. 

Here are some Christmas reports from troops at the front.

On Christmas Day we were in the firing line and were served one slice of pudding and seven dates. But it was so cold and we were always wet.

Joe Clement, Royal Marines

Gallipoli, 1915

Now it's Christmas for the second time in this war...And here I am alone with my tree in a small trench. Some candles are fixed on the branches and an old steel helmet.

Ernst Bergner, German Army

Flanders, 1915 

Received from Red Cross and YMCA: 3 bars of chocolate, 4 packages of gum, 5 boxes of Mallomars. . .A "Tres Bon" dinner of: Veal, Sweet Potatoes, White Potatoes, Dressing, Salad, Apple Pie and Coffee.

Pvt. Clair Pfennig

U.S. 29th Engineers, 1918 

Christmas and New Year were celebrated by the companies with great festivities at which beer and grog flowed in rivers. There were exactly four men left in the 2nd Company who spent the previous Christmas with me in the line before Monchy...."

Ernst Jünger, German Army

Somme, 1916

We had our Christmas dinner in Albert in an old sewing machine factory. We had beer for our dinner - plenty of it - and a good tuck-in to go with it! Roast pork! Beautiful after bully beef!

C.H. Williams, British Army

Somme, 1916 

Christmas time on the island was happy. The boys hung up their socks, and I had to sneak round at 3 am and fill them with toys and sweets. Two men saw me and said Father Christmas had a white cap and gown on. There was great excitement in the morning.

Sister Evelyn Davies

3rd Australian General Hospital, Lemnos, 1915 

At the spontaneous request of the officers and men, I shall be saying midnight mass in the village church very beautifully decorated by the daughter and son from the château, with whose help, too, I have been able to teach the men some carols...what more do we need to forget for a few moments the war and the trenches...this Christmas gives me the opportunity for me to appear openly as a priest. 
                                                
                                                                          Stretcher Bearer & Jesuit Priest Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

                                                                                                                                                         French Army, 1915

[Under anti-clerical laws, French priests could not serve as chaplains but were obliged to serve in the military.] 

The Valuable Lesson the German Navy Learned at Dogger Bank

The Battle of Dogger Bank was a naval engagement on 24 January 1915, near the Dogger Bank in the North Sea, during the First World War, between squadrons of the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet.

SMS Seydlitz

Following the battle, the British claimed a victory, having sunk the obsolete armored cruiser Blücher, but their modern battle cruiser Lion had to be towed home, and the Germans had learned a lesson that would serve them well at Jutland—a lesson that, unlearned by the British, would cost the Royal Navy dearly. The destruction of the two after turrets of Seydlitz was caused not by a 13.5-inch British shell but by the explosion of ready ammunition and ammunition in transit. From now on, German ammunition would be protected until it was loaded into a gun. In his memoirs, Scheer wrote “However regrettable was the great loss of life on board the Seydlitz through the fire spreading to the munitions chamber of each turret, a valuable lesson had been learned for the future dealing with reserve ammunition, and it was applied in subsequent actions.” The British learned the same lesson at Jutland—at the cost of three battle cruisers.

Sources:  "1915: Battle Cruisers Clash,"  Mission: History, Naval Order of the United States 

The Rise and Temporary Conquest of Trench Fever

From:  "The First World War: Disease the Only Victor,"  Lecture by Professor Francis Cox at the Museum of London, 10 March 2014

Shortly after the beginning of the war, a new syndrome appeared, soldiers reported with intermittent fever, headache and pain in the leg and bones lasting about five days; it was rarely fatal but recovery took about a month. The problem with this new disease, soon called trench fever, was not that it was fatal but that it was incapacitating which meant that the fighting force was, at least temporarily, reduced. 

Symptoms of Trench Fever (Lancet)

It took some time, and a lot of disagreement between medical bacteriologists and parasitologists including Sir David Bruce and Sir William Leishman, both serving army officers with distinguished records in the field of tropical diseases, and the military authorities before it was established that the condition was caused by a bacterium, Rickettsia quintana (now Bartonella quintana), and it was not until towards end of the war was it was realised that this disease was transmitted by lice. This realisation was of tremendous significance because, even if it could not be cured, it could be prevented with the use of insecticides such as naphthalene and creosote, and heat fumigation. 

This came far too late, however, and it is estimated that some 800,000—97 percent—of Allied troops were at some time infested with lice. [?Total seems low.] Infection with trench fever represented a massive loss of active manpower. Sir David Bruce later suggested that had this disease and its mode of transmission been recognised earlier, the war might have been considerably shorter. After the war, disinfection centres were set up at all the Channel ports and there was not a single case of trench fever among the civilian population of the British Isles and the disease was soon eliminated from the whole of Europe. 

On the positive side, this is widely regarded as one of the most successful medical campaigns in military history. Microbes do not give up easily, however, and the descendants of the bacterium that were seen for the first time in the trenches have cropped up recently among the poor and homeless in France, Russia, Japan, and, in the United States, in Seattle and San Francisco. It is now clear that this disease has the capacity to establish itself in conditions of crowding and malnutrition in refugee camps and areas of deprivation anywhere in the world and has the potential to become a very serious emerging disease.

The Importance of Aviation in Breaking the Trench Stalemate

By John Terraine

RFC BE2 Equipped with Camera

In general, 1915 was a miserable year for the BEF, with every kind of equipment in short supply. On the other hand, it was also a period of experiment and incubation of what, in some cases, turned out to be priceless new techniques. As one novelty breeds another, photo reconnaissance, having appeared, was much in demand—and so, on both sides of the line, was prevention of enemy photography, leading quite naturally to air combat, in turn calling for specialized aircraft . . . the necessity to seize and hold air supremacy was perceived [by] 1915.

1915...saw the first step taken toward the ultimate war-winner. In the artillery war...in the words of two Royal Artillery brigadiers, who have researched firepower with such authority...the "starting point" and pivot was the Royal Flying Corps pilot. 

The artillery war was, from the first, almost entirely conducted by "indirect fire," i.e. the gunners of all armies were normally shooting at invisible targets. This made possession of an accurate map essential—accurate, that is to say, to within 15 to 20 yards. No such thing existed in 1915, so the decision was taken to have one made by the newly formed Field Survey Companies of the Royal Engineers, working closely with the RFC. From this derived many hours of tedious but highly dangerous photographic flying for the RFC, but for the artillery the opportunity came to restore surprise and precision to battle—which it duly did at Cambrai in November 1917. And this technique, in the hands of [both] the Germans and Allies in 1918, supplied the key to unlocking the trench-bound front. 

Effective Artillery Broke the Trench Stalemate in 1918

[For the British Army] this could not have been done without the RFC, and in conjunction with the rest of its day-in, day-out cooperation with the Royal Artillery. This constituted in my opinion the most important contribution of the Royal Flying Corps to winning the war.

From John Terraine's 1994 lecture to the Royal Air Force Historical Society

Imperial Germany and War, 1871-1918 Reviewed by Ron Drees

Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918

by Daniel J. Hughes and Richard L. Dinardo.

University Press of Kansas, 2018

Contrary to the title, the history of the German Army in this book goes back to 1802 and the Napoleonic wars. Hughes and Dinardo describe how command structures changed over the next century leading up to the Great War. During that period, the Prussian/German Army transformed through constant re-thinking of how it should prepare to wage war, how war should be waged, and how many theaters of conflict in which to wage war. There were also concerns about how to staff, train, and equip its army and the reserves behind them. One constant was that officers should be of noble birth and preferably Protestant. Roman Catholics were tolerated but did not advance very far, and Jews were simply not acceptable. These requirements limited candidates and later were thought to have impaired the army.

Alfred Graf von Schlieffen

Napoleon's defeat of Germany's army spawned reforms under the direction of leaders such as Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and then Moltke the younger. However, the entrenched power structure resisted change. The authors discussed each military chieftain in turn, but Schlieffen drew the most surprising statements.

Schlieffen served as chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1891 into 1906. In those 15 years, Schlieffen developed deployment plans on an annual basis, considering one and two front wars. While the authors describe the plans, they are not illustrated with maps. Only six maps are in the book, with no listings in the table of contents. Between the small size and print, they are difficult to understand. A few maps dedicated to Schlieffen's plans would have made his ideas understandable.

Schlieffen also held staff rides, where groups of officers traveled to the frontiers and engaged in large-scale map-based exercises. No war games were conducted. The authors, after considerable discussion, concluded that Schlieffen's memorandum of 1905 was only an "academic discussion of alternatives." Since Schlieffen never prepared a comprehensive war plan, historians cannot determine how Schlieffen or even Moltke would have conducted the war. There is no Schlieffen plan, especially one that would have enveloped Paris. Further, the German High Command did not provide the field armies with unified orders for conducting operations in 1914.

The previous statement is one of several areas where Germany was unprepared for a war it allegedly started. German law specified that the Kaiser was the Supreme War Lord, in command of the army and the navy. Wilhelm recognized his shortcomings and agreed to recuse himself from most major decision making. Yet he controlled appointments, making him significant. He was not consistent in his decisions, making the war effort inconsistent also. Overall command was not exercised or coordinated by one individual.

About halfway through Imperial Germany and War, the Great War began. The book switched from discussions of theory to analysis, commentary, and review of German strategy for the next four years.

Germany had hoped for a short war but like everyone else, had to adjust as, by November 1914, their hopes faded to the realization of a protracted war. Events would show that Germany was unprepared for a long war, did not adjust successfully, and eventually suffered social, military, and economic breakdowns throughout the nation. There was a lack of training among reserve troops and officers and the top commanders were also affected as none had experience in commanding so many troops, but this was true for every nation. Germany was not united in its war effort and this was displayed in a multitude of ways with an ineffective emperor and a lack of military and civil coordination.

Marching to War, 1914

The Prussian Siege Law of 1851 went into effect and the corps commanders of the army became civil administrators with authority over areas as varied as censorship, labor negotiations, and police functions. Americans should not be smug, as the Wilson administration usurped the Constitution and skewed the Bill of Rights to where no one could criticize the government without risking imprisonment and several people were imprisoned for speaking their minds. The German Military Administration did not play an effective role in food rationing, and starvation deaths ran into the hundreds of thousands.

Germany also failed to learn to use technology such as radio communications and to coordinate with Austria. However, the two nations agreed by early 1916 that victory was not possible. Germany's internal struggle between peace and victory put an armistice out of reach.

While the General Staff had spent much time thinking about how to attack, insufficient consideration was given as to what weapons and tools should be used to attack the Allies. Between Verdun and the Somme, the prewar German Army died. As the war wore on, it became evident that the Central power lacked almost everything including manpower, labor, submarines, aircraft, tanks, and officers. Even what the army was supposed to do did not happen adequately, including officer training and coordinating the infantry and artillery.

Out of desperation, Germany decided to begin unrestricted submarine warfare, hoping to sink enough ships to bring Britain to its knees before American troops reached Europe. Not enough ships were sunk, the strategy failed, and America's manpower entered the war with decisive results. This failure led to the decision to launch the 1918 offensive. The thinking was that the war had to be won in 1918 or it would be lost in 1919.

Germany spent most of the war fighting a defensive trench war. In preparation for the 1918 offensive, it had to retrain officers and men to fight a different, aggressive mobile war. While the training may have succeeded, the offensive failed, partially because the artillery could not advance fast enough to maintain pace with the infantry nor could the supply of munitions keep pace with the artillery. As throughout the war, losses could not be replaced, mobility was poor, and infantry units wore out. Even British logistic depots slowed down the German Army as hungry soldiers interrupted their assaults to eat.

The book's summary explains that Germany lost the war for several reasons: army commanders who operated independently; inability of the Kaiser to coordinate military action; a navy that did not support the army; loss of confidence by the rank and file toward the officer corps; and an army in control of economic and social policy without the competence to do so.

The most valuable part of Imperial Germany and War—and the reason for reading it—is to learn about the Great War from the German point of view. The importance of social class to the army, political infighting, the inability to mobilize the nation effectively, the isolation of the army from the German nation, and the overall lack of preparation for war contributed to this defeat. Yes, Hindenburg was right; Germany was stabbed in the back, by its army.

Ron Drees

Rave Reviews in for Peter Jackson's They Shall Not Grow Old

I spent all Tuesday morning responding to enthusiastic messages from my friends and editors who viewed Peter Jackson's new film They Shall Not Grow Old.  If you haven't heard it features colorized film footage of the British Tommies during the war, with a sound track—produced with the help of professional lip-readers, that allows viewers to listen in on the conversations of the troops.  Below are some Warner Brothers stills from the production.  It is only scheduled to show one more day around the States—27 December. Below the images you will find a link to a site where you can find theaters showing the movie.

For locations and tickets:

https://www.fathomevents.com/events/they-shall-not-grow-old

Late News Arriving:  Reader Courtland Jindra informs us that the Hollywood trade magazines are announcing that there will be a limited theatrical review of the film in January in three cities: Los Angeles, New York, and Washington,DC. Also, there is consideration of a broader release to follow.