General Jan Smuts and His First World War in Africa, 1914–1917

By David Brock Katz

Casemate, 2022

Peter L. Belmonte, Reviewer

General Jan Smuts Observing German Forces in East Africa

Jan Smuts is a controversial figure in South African military and political history. His mixed legacy involves South African nationalism and the roots of apartheid. This makes a fair evaluation of his performance as a general during the First World War quite difficult. Others have written about Smuts, but author David Brock Katz feels that recent scholarship has only parroted inaccurate information put forth years ago. Katz is an author and historian who lectures at the Army and Defense Colleges of the South African National Defense Force. He is also a university faculty member and a member of the South African Army. Katz had no desire to write a full biography of the complex man; instead, he chose to focus on Smuts’s World War I military career.

The result is a manageable project that bolsters the historiography of the military leaders of the Great War. Katz has selected a wide array of sources. Indeed, he cites “this book’s keen interrogation and wide and deep research of the documentary evidence housed in the British and South African archive” as an antidote to previous historical research that recited the same incorrect or incomplete information repeatedly (p. xix). 

After discussing Smuts’s rise to South African national prominence, Katz delves into the meat of the book, Smuts’s military leadership during the war. Katz covers Smuts’s activity during the German South West African Campaign (and Afrikaaner rebellion) and the German East African (GEA) Campaign, along with several other operations.

Smuts and His Staff, July 1916

True to his military background, Katz carefully analyzes the military movements and actions of both sides against the backdrop of operational principles and tactics. His discussions of the battles and campaigns are enlightening. For example, Katz explains how the South African Army used an amalgam of British and Boer tactics; the Boer tactics, mostly relying on mobility and maneuver, were superior to British tactics in some situations. It is this maneuver warfare that Katz feels distinguished Smuts’s success as a military leader.

In discussing the operational and tactical aspects of the South African war, Katz never loses sight of the delicate strategic situation with regard to both South African/British relations and South African national politics. By meticulously covering Smuts’s actions and showing them in light of South African politics, Katz is able to refute some misconceptions surrounding Smuts’s performance as a military leader. After analyzing the African military campaigns Katz also includes a chapter devoted to Smuts’s service in Britain on the War Cabinet, including his role in planning the Paris Peace Conference and in developing the Royal Air Force.

Katz frequently criticizes British naval officer and historian Harold C. Armstrong for what Katz sees are inaccurate and selective assessments of Smuts as a military leader (see Armstrong, Grey Steel: A Study in Arrogance, London: Methuen & Co., 1941). Katz, who calls Armstrong’s book “heavily flawed” (p. 157), also faults subsequent historians (for example, Ross Anderson, The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918, Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2004, and Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) for uncritically using Armstrong in their own work. 

Less convincing is Katz’s defense of Smuts’s leadership style of being near or in the front line. Large formations during World War I required leaders of those formations to be far enough to the rear to enable them to be in contact with as many subordinate units as possible; the World War I battlefield was too vast and its armies too large to permit the luxury of consistently leading from the front. Smuts commanded 73,000 men in the German East Africa (GEA) campaign, far too many to enable a commander to orchestrate tactics, operations, and logistics from the front line. Indeed, Smuts’s absence from his rear headquarters during the GEA campaign may have contributed to the poor state of logistics and medical care during that time.

The maps and illustrations in the text are helpful to understanding the battles and men in the narrative; Katz’s end notes and bibliography will help those who want to do more research. Katz succeeds in his goal of producing an objective analysis of Smuts as a military leader; indeed, Katz succeeds in rehabilitating Smuts in the historiography. The book stands alone in the historiography; there is no other thoughtful examination of Smuts as a World War I military leader. It is highly recommended to those who want to learn more about Smuts and the war in Africa in general.

Peter L. Belmonte