Monday, August 22, 2022

Norway: The Neutral Ally


Norwegian Troops Mobilized at Coastal Fort for
Neutrality Protection


Norway managed to stay neutral during the First World War, but the war still crept into Norwegian life and impacted it in numerous ways. With a large merchant fleet—the fourth largest in the world—and heavily dependent upon imports, Norway’s relations with the belligerent parties became problematic soon after the outbreak of war. Less than a year into the war, Norway had to negotiate trade agreements with Great Britain that strongly favored Britain and the Entente. In late 1916, Norway was forced to cease trading with Germany. This process culminated in April 1917, when Norway, through a “Tonnage Agreement,” in effect gave Britain full control over the Norwegian Merchant Fleet. Norway thus became a "Neutral Ally" of Great Britain.

The crisis in late July 1914 took the Scandinavian countries by surprise. In February, during a parliamentary debate, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gunnar Knudsen (1848–1928), had described the European situation as “cloudless. When Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August, Norway, along with Sweden and Denmark, issued a declaration of neutrality. On 4 August the Norwegian government issued an additional, separate statement, again emphasizing its neutrality. Two days earlier, the Norwegian Navy had been mobilized and soldiers were sent to man the coastal fortresses. Norway was mobilized to protect its neutrality. 

Norway was ready to defend its neutrality, despite being both politically and militarily unprepared for war. The armed forces had not fired a shot since 1814, and the political authorities had no experience of international crises. The first priority of the government was to keep Norway out of the war; the second was to provide supplies in order to feed the population and maintain economic stability. The catastrophic effect of the British blockade during the Napoleonic Wars was still a part of the collective memory.  By the time of the war, Norway’s merchant fleet was the fourth largest in the world overall and, in terms of carrying capacity per person, actually the largest. Norway was importing to and exporting from both Britain and Germany and had no desire to stop either. Some of Norway’s major exports were fish and fish-related products (fish oils, etc.) and iron pyrites and copper, which were important commodities for the German war industry. Meanwhile, imports were dominated by fuels such as coal and oil. Significantly, though, despite their dependence on war materials from Norway, the German Navy showed no reluctance to sink the Norwegian ships sailing to Britain. In the course of the war, U-boats would send 889 Norwegian ships to the bottom. This, naturally, outraged  the Norwegian public, tilting public opinion further toward the Allies.


King Haakon VII of Norway (left), King Gustav V of
Sweden (center), and King Christian X of Denmark
(right) Meeting in Malmö, Sweden, December 1914


Like much of Norway’s history, what happened next comes down to ships  and global commerce. The fuels were vitally important for keeping both Norway’s industries and the merchant vessels running. And most of the fuels came from Britain. Once Britain successfully secured the North Sea as a military zone under their control, they had big levers to use to ensure Norwegian compliance.  On the other hand, given that Norwegian ships could get to Germany without using the North Sea, it was easy for Norway to bypass the Royal Navy checks via the Baltic that would have seized goods. The Norwegian foreign minister at the time, was able to deal with both parties concerns quite well. He was a businessman and fluent in German, which was an advantage in the situation. 

Nonetheless, even though Norway was a neutral country by international law able to trade with both sides, the trade became so heavily skewed toward Britain that Norway was, in some ways, starting to appear like an ally of Britain, posing as a neutral. By the end of 1916, the Norwegian government was under heavy diplomatic pressure from the Allies to cease trading with Germany.  Several agreements were made, none completely satisfying to the British government. On Christmas Eve 1916, the British government issued an ultimatum, informing the Norwegian foreign minister, Nils Claus Ihlen, that British exports of coal to Norway would cease unless trade with Germany stopped. The Norwegian government weighed their options and eventually submitted to the ultimatum. This coincided with Germany's expansion of unrestricted submarine warfare at the beginning of 1917. All Norwegian ships were now fair game for the U-boats, and losses at sea quickly skyrocketed to 66 sinkings in March 1917 and growing to 423 for the year.


Norwegian Freighter Rufus Sunk by a UB-37


The Tonnage Agreement

To replace their shipping losses, the British government made gestures toward several neutral countries regarding a possible purchase of their ships. The British initiative was discussed and rejected, but the problem of Norway's own losses remained unsolved: Was it possible to reduce their merchant navy’s huge losses?

The Norwegian government suggested an alternative. The Allies would charter Norwegian vessels and use them for safer routes outside of the War Zone. Allied ships, armed and eventually convoyed, would replace Norway's  ships on the most exposed routes where losses occurred. This was agreeable to all parties. Toward the end of April 1917, the Norwegian parliament accepted the transfer of ships by chartering or requisitioning. The deal between Norway and Britain was signed by representatives from the Norwegian Ship Owners Association (Rederforbundet) shortly thereafter and thus camouflaged the Norwegian government’s role:

As a return for and conditional on the concessions embodied in the agreement as regards the supply and transport of coal to Norway, the Rederforbund has declared itself willing to enter into this understanding, with a view to increase the Norwegian tonnage employed in allied trade, while at the same time safeguarding as far as humanly possible Norwegian seamen’s lives and Norwegian shipping property by the substitution of British ships for Norwegian in the Anglo-Norwegian trade.

Norway had become the "Neutral Ally." As it turned out, it was the introduction of convoys that reduced the losses from the peak in March. The entry of America into the war helped nudge Norway even closer to the Allies. Most significantly in strong-arming the Norwegians to  acquiesce in the laying of the huge (60,000-mine) North Sea Barrage, a large part of which was set in Norway's waters.

Norway was badly hurt by the war at sea, 1.3 million tons—about half of Norwegian merchant shipping—and 11,050 seamen being lost. With growing casualties caused by German submarine warfare, public feeling in Norway grew strongly anti-German during the second half of the war. The war also drained the Norwegian government financially. Financing the neutrality guard was costly, as thousands of men were mobilized for more than four years. It was not until two years after the war that the real situation—that Norway had accumulated a massive debt during the war—became known.  

But Norway's independence had been kept. Surviving the  complex "Neutrality Game" in the First World War convinced Norway's interwar leadership that it could similarly maneuver through any future international crisis. It was a perception that was to be proven wrong in 1940.

Sources: Encyclopedia 1914-1918; Life in Norway; Wikipedia

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