Friday, September 6, 2024

Montfaucon Revisited


Editor's Note:  I recently stumbled across an academic paper from the US Army Command and Staff College, highly critical of the 79th Division and its commander, Maj. Gen. Joseph Kuhn, for failing to take Montfaucon on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. I decided it was time to resurrect my 2016 article on that that subject. Forgive me for pointing this out, but I have actually visited Montfaucon many times and traveled the path of the 79th Division on that day. Therefore, I have a pretty good feel for the terrain.  MH

In the opening of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive the most important objective for the AEF's First Army was the German strongpoint and commanding observation point of Montfaucon. It lay over four miles north of the Doughboys' jump-off line of 26 September 1918. The job to capture Montfaucon was assigned to the 79th Division, a unit that had never seen combat before and was commanded by a general, MG Joseph Kuhn, who had not been in battle himself. The men of the division were not quite "just off the troopships" but had received much less training in France than most of Pershing's other divisions. One member of the division, novelist James M. Cain, assigned to the divisional headquarters, later summarized what happened that day.

1945 View of Montfaucon with the U.S. WWI Memorial
Atop a Little Hill in the Middle of French Farm Country

On the 26th of September, 1918, when the old 79th Division hopped off with the rest of the AEF on the big drive that started that morning, the big job ahead of us was to take a town named Montfaucon, and it was the same town where the Crown Prince of Germany has his PC [Post of Command] in 1916, when them Dutch was hammering on Verdun and he was watching his boys fight by looking up at them through a periscope. And our doughboys was in two brigades, the 157th and 158th, with two regiments in each, and the 157th Brigade was in front. But they ain’t took the town because it was up on a high hill, and on the side of the hill was a whole lot of pillboxes and barbed wire what made it a tough job. 
From "The Taking of Montfaucon"


Your Editor Takes in the View from
Atop the Montfaucon Memorial
Some historians downplay the delay in the American advance caused by the failure to capture Montfaucon that day, but its effect was immediate and long term. Pershing's First Army had caught the defenders by surprise and in most parts of the sector were advancing fairly promptly. The failure to take Montfaucon that first day held up the advance somewhat but—much more important—allowed the trained observers atop the hill to get a more detailed and comprehensive estimate of just what the Yanks were up to. High-explosive and gas shells were directed onto the advance columns. Reserves were promptly forwarded to the best possible locations—the heights running across the sector  north of Montfaucon—by the German commanders based on the accurate reports they were receiving.

Over the years, I've read many explanations as to why Montfaucon was not captured that first day. Lack of training, exhaustion of the troops, mismanagement by the division commander MG Kuhn, and the AEF-wide inexperience at coordinating artillery with infantry advances all make the list of problems and are serious considerations. However, over the years that I have visited the battlefield, two other matters have come to seem more important to me than any of these factors.

1.  What Were the Planners Thinking?
Why was a completely inexperienced division given the most important objective of the opening of the battle? Asking this question, of course, suggests that an experienced division probably would have taken Montfaucon that day. However:

2.  It's Long, Long Way to Tipperary.
The map below from Google shows the distance to be covered that first day (about 4.1 miles) and helps give an idea of what had to be accomplished that day by the 79th Division. First, the village of Malancourt needed to be captured, and that was no small task. It had been a German strongpoint since 1916. The intervening terrain up to Montfaucon was originally open across rolling hills, but years of artillery fire had broken up the ground, and scattered all around were old trenches and  wire entanglements. Rainy weather ensured the troops would be marching across muddy fields as well. In the present day, the 87-minute hike indicated on the map would be conducted along a paved road, with no mud, and no one shooting at you. In actuality, with the grimmest of wartime conditions, it was many hours later that the division reached the base of Montfaucon, and adequate artillery support was no longer available.


Approximate Route of 314th Infantry, 79th Division, on 26 Sep 1918
from Jump-Off Line to Montfaucon


This next photo is from about a mile from the American monument, which is adjacent to the site of the former main German observation post, the ultimate target. Compared to the photo at the top, up close from this angle, Montfaucon looks pretty formidable, commanding the approaches—a little like Little Round Top at Gettysburg. Keep in mind also that it was guarded in 1918 by the "whole lot of pillboxes and barbed wire" Cain described. Try to project those details on the hill in this image. This is what the boys faced after slogging about three of those four miles from the start line. A hornet's nest was waiting for them. To the right (east) of the 79th division, the 4th Division had advanced farther than the 79th and were in a position to launch a flank attack on the hill, but—for whatever reason (this has been controversial for a century)—it never came to pass.


View of Montfaucon from Intersection of D15 and D19


I usually try to avoid "what if" or revisionist history, but in this case I've actually visited the battlefield, and over the years it has made a strong impression on me. My thinking today is that I question—given the level of challenge and capabilities of the AEF at that time—any of General Pershing's units could have taken Montfaucon that first day of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The men and officers of the 79th Division did as much as could be expected in a single day, and they took the Montfaucon the day after. A more experienced division might have succeeded on that first day, but they were in short supply in September 1918.

5 comments:

  1. I've visited Montfaucon and agree with your assessment. But I think a lot of the blame belongs to the Army commander/staff for putting a corps boundary to the immediate right of the objective (creating a corps boundary) and not better coordinating 4th Div (where my grandfather served) movements. I reject the hypothesis this was done on purpose, though. This was just due to the general inexperience of the commanders & staffs handling large units.

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  2. What I meant to say was "creating a corps coordination problem" (Sorry, the dogs were barking and I got distracted.)

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  3. I enjoyed this article and thank the author for it.
    I visited the Butte in 2014 and went on from there to
    the US Cemetery at Romagne. Both are impressive sites
    and I hope to see them again before I "Go West."

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  4. Recommend William Walker’s “Betrayal at Little Gibraltar “. It addresses the key questions & answers the controversies...case closed! I too have visited the battlefield & beautiful monument. My uncle was in the battle & his short comment in his diary was “ an awful place to be”...a fitting commentary. Ted Hitchcock

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