Paris at War — Now at the National World War One Museum

 

An exciting new exhibit opened 6 November 2025 at the National World War One Museum in Kansas City.  It's a presentation on Paris during the Great War. The organizers describe their program:

Follow the lives of Parisians as World War I transforms their city. Experience the city’s dramatic shift from the flourishing days of the French empire to the uncertainty and hardship brought on by hunger, air raids and the constant threat of German artillery. Discover how ordinary people navigated moments of fear and loss, while workers and newcomers from across the globe blazed new paths on the streets of Paris.

Here are some examples of the visual exhibits the curators have assembled:  

For details on scheduling a visit, check the museum's website HERE. The program runs through 2026.

Over the year, we have published quite a number of  articles on Paris during the war. A list of the links to those articles can be found HERE. 

The Dramatic Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Part III – Wilhelm Isolated

Final Blunder—
In the Midst of His Greatest Crisis the
Kaiser Returns to Military Headquarters  at Spa

Part II of this article was presented yesterday HERE.

By Vanessa LeBlanc

Thus, in pursuit of the armistice and in light of President Wilson's ultimatum, Prince Maximilian no longer supported the Kaiser. As Lamar Cecil argues, “Although Max's cabinet had agreed. . . in early October, that any Allied demands for Wilhelm's abdication would be resisted `to the utmost,'. . . Scheidemann [leader of the Social Democratic Party, and member of Prince Maximilian's government] pointed out that if the question—peace or the Hohenzollern dynasty?—was put to the German people, they would opt for peace”.

This was precisely the question being put to Prince Maximilian. Kaiser Wilhelm II became further isolated and, feeling betrayed by his chancellor, identified him as the leader of the abdication party.

On 29 October, despite Prince Maximilian's protests, Kaiser Wilhelm II returned to the military headquarters at Spa. This decision is considered controversial, as many historians consider this to be the fatal mistake that Kaiser Wilhelm II committed against the Hohenzollern dynasty; it is surmised that had the Kaiser stayed in Berlin the throne might have been saved.

Nonetheless, Kaiser Wilhelm II returned to Spa in hopes that his presence on the front would resuscitate the soldiers' morale and encourage them to maintain the offensive. Kaiser Wilhelm II understood that Germany's impending loss of the war was due not only to attrition, but also to low morale. In turn, support for the Kaiser depended on morale. He hoped high morale at the front might spread inward, perhaps quieting his people's call for his abdication. 

In retrospect, General Hindenburg concluded that there were three courses of action that the Kaiser could have undertaken to deal with the “abdication crisis”: 

[1] to fight his way back to Germany with loyal regiments; 

[2] to die at the head of his troops on the front; 

[3] to go abroad. 

Returning to Spa was indicative that Kaiser Wilhelm II may have been undertaking either [1] or [3], but there is no evidence that he would have deliberately arranged his murder/suicide (option 2). While the Kaiser was at Spa, there was a naval mutiny in Kiel on 30 October that caused the threat of revolution to boil and spread throughout Germany. During the time the Kaiser spent at Spa from 29 October 29 to 9 November, Prince Maximilian and other officials tried to convince him to abdicate, but he would hear nothing of it. By November 8, Berlin “appeared to be on the eve of a serious revolt.” On November 9, a general strike broke out, the scene becoming reminiscent of Russia's March 1917 revolution. In response, the Kaiser attempted to gather a small group of soldiers with which to march into Berlin (option 1 outlined by Hindenburg). 

Similar to the Romanovs' crisis the year before, German General Wilhelm Groener told Kaiser Wilhelm II that the army was “not under the command of Your Majesty, whom it no longer supports.” Therefore, the Kaiser exercised the remaining option available to him (option 3 according to Hindenburg). 

Announcement of the Abdication

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of 9 November, the Kaiser was prepared to abdicate and subsequently flee to Holland, when he was given word that Prince Maximilian had abdicated on his behalf an hour earlier. The situation in Berlin had become so grave that “the masses might have proclaimed the deposition of the Kaiser and established a provisional government.”

Given this crisis, Prince Maximilian was “determined to give the crisis a constitutional solution.” In this sense, domestic and international pressures combined to bring about the Kaiser's abdication. Though Kaiser Wilhelm II did not abdicate himself, his acceptance of the abdication showed that he had done what was perceived as being best for his country: rather than let a revolution overthrow the monarchy in a potentially violent uprising, he had seemingly provided Germany with a more favorable position in the eyes of the Associated Powers going into the peace negotiations. On 11 November 1918, the Armistice was signed; “after fifteen hundred and sixty-three days, for the first time, all was quiet on the Western Front.”

It was President Wilson's firm insistence that led the Germans to believe that Wilhelm II's abdication was the only way to achieve peace, thereby  encouraging calls for his abdication and weakening support for the Kaiser. However, as Michael Balfour writes, “the number of people who wanted radical recasting of society was infinitesimal.” The Hohenzollern dynasty would have likely survived the Great War had it not been for the influence of the domestic and international pressures active prior to and during the Great War, the attrition factor, and Wilson's dominance of the pre-Armistice negotiations. 

6 a.m., 10 November 1918; Kaiser Wilhelm II
Crossing the Border into the Netherlands

Time to Go

In November 1918, Wilhelm II was at the military headquarters of his troops in Spa, Belgium. He found himself unable to return home because of rebellions and revolution in Germany but unable to stay in Spa either due to the advancing troops of the Entente. He was advised by those closest to him to flee to a neutral country. The nearest neutral country was the  Netherlands. At 6 a.m on 10 November 1918, Wilhelm II arrived at the train station in Eysden on the Dutch border. There he was granted political asylum and was temporarily housed in Amerongen Castle where he would stay for nearly two years. A few weeks after his arrival he abdicated as German emperor.

Gradually, it became clear that the Emperor would not be forced to leave the Netherlands, despite the provisions set out in the Treaty of Versailles. He began to search for a permanent residence and in 1919 bought House Doorn from Baroness Van Heemstra de Beaufort, the great-grandmother of Audrey Hepburn. He renovated the house and furnished it with goods, art, and objects from his former palaces in Germany.

The Dutch government allowed Wilhelm II to remain in Netherlands under strict conditions. He had to stay in House Doorn and was only allowed to move freely within a radius of 15 kilometers around the house. He had to refrain from making political statements and his mail was regularly checked; he was also under permanent police surveillance. . . A return to Germany was impossible and Wilhelm stayed in Doorn 21 years until his death in 1941. In his last will, Wilhelm II stated that he wanted no Nazis present at his funeral. He was buried with full military honors.

Doorn Museum, The Netherlands

Postscript

Contrary to what many Germans believed, the Kaiser's abdication did not result in Germany being treated more favorably during the peace negotiations. Following the abdication, a provisional government led by the Social Democratic Party was formed before the establishment of the Weimar Republic government in early 1919. These governments were necessarily less stable than the established Hohenzollern monarchy and were further weakened because they inherited the responsibility for Germany's defeat. 

Source: Originally presented in the November 2018 issue of Over the Top: The Magazine of the World War I Centennial

The Dramatic Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Part II – The Generals & Politicians Have Their Say

General von Hindenburg

Part I of this article was presented yesterday HERE.

By Vanessa LeBlanc

The German High Command was adamant about sending the peace proposal to Washington immediately, because although General Hindenburg asserted that the “army could protect German borders until early 1919. . . [this could not be guaranteed] against a fresh enemy offensive.” Prince Maximilian did not want to dispatch such a telegram so soon after the formation of the new government, as he feared that this would discredit the new democratic government and be “interpreted by the enemy as capitulation,” potentially leading to demands for unconditional surrender, which is exactly what happened. Yet, in spite of Prince Maximilian's concerns, military pressure prevailed, and the armistice telegram was drafted and sent to President Wilson on 3 October 1918.

It was with the second American note that the repercussions of the German officials' unfamiliarity with Wilson's Fourteen Points became apparent. The first correspondences between the Germans and the Americans served largely to clarify what each party meant before beginning to negotiate the conditions of the armistice. The American reply on 8 October 1918 to the first German note of 3 October asked, “Does the Imperial German Chancellor mean that. . . the Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his addresses to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January last and in subsequent addresses. . .?” It also clarified that Germany would have to withdraw from the territories it had invaded before “a cessation of arms” could be suggested to America's Entente allies.

The German government made sure in its reply to this note, on 12 October 1918, to state that the American's allies must also agree to “accept the position taken by the president in his addresses.” Over the course of 1918, Wilson had made addenda to his Fourteen Points, creating 24 points in total. In his analysis of the Versailles settlement, Ferdinand Czernin characterizes the second American note of 14 October 1918 as being tougher than the first. Robert B. Asprey suggests that the tougher tone of the second American note was due to a German submarine sinking an Irish ship two days prior. The note referenced Wilson's speech at Mt. Vernon of 4 July 1918 — “the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can. . . disturb the peace of the world.” This was a direct reference to the destruction of the Hohenzollern monarchy, which also conveyed that “`justice' might not be the `forgiveness'” that the Germans had envisioned.

President Wilson at Mount Vernon

Though the Americans had alluded to the necessity of  the Kaiser's abdication in their previous note, the “abdication crisis” perhaps only truly began on 23 October, when it was made clear by Wilson in a third note that peace could not be arrived at without the abdication of the Kaiser. Czernin argues that “Short of saying in so many words that `the Kaiser must abdicate before we will sign an armistice,' Wilson's note could not have been more explicit.” As Prince  Maximilian had suspected, having sent the request for peace so soon after the formation of the new government had caused “Wilson and his allies. . . [to believe] that Germany was defeated and should be shorn of all its power,” beginning with the removal of the Kaiser. Furthermore, the failure of the German officials to actually read the Fourteen Points, instead relying on the points' hearsay, and the military's insistence on starting peace negotiations, is indicative of how desperate the German position in the war of attrition had become. Had the German officials taken the time to familiarize themselves with Wilson's points and supplemental principles and ends, they would have known the significance of demanding the Kaiser's abdication and perhaps decided against utilizing the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace. Instead, the Germans appeared desperate to Wilson, giving him the unquestionable authority to dictate that Wilhelm II must abdicate. 

The abdication crisis can be divided into two related parts: that of the Kaiser's officials and that of the German people. At the start of the war in 1914, there was widespread support for the war and the Kaiser, both of which were linked to German nationalism. Four years later, the war was taking a toll on most German people and the Hohenzollern dynasty was falling into disfavor. The soldiers at the front shared this disheartened feeling, information that the generals included in the arguments they made to the Kaiser for an armistice. As Ralph Haswell Lutz argues in his analysis of the German Revolution, “not even. . .military defeats. . . demoralized the nation as much as did the publication of the first note to Wilson.” As opposed to wartime censorship laws that had caused dissent to go underground, censorship was relaxed in mid-October 1918 and many people discussed the Kaiser's abdication freely. Many Germans were now aware that the Kaiser was abhorred “everywhere in Europe [and] America,” and came to see Kaiser Wilhelm II as a symbol of militarism, “an impediment to. . .peace. . . but also the logical scapegoat.” In this manner, foreign sentiments regarding the Kaiser were not only echoed by many Germans but also influenced German discontent. As the month of October wore on, people's cries for the Kaiser's abdication grew louder and the threat of internal revolution increased. 

Furthermore, the German people would not have supported the abandonment of armistice negotiations:  “[a]s in Russia, the one thing which the majority of people wanted was peace. . . A fight to the death, as an alternative to capitulation, had little attraction for anyone.” In this way, as in Russia, the revolutionary movement in Germany garnered support by calling for peace. Contrary to Russia, however, the threat of revolution had yet to materialize as a concrete movement. Thus, the German government, already committed to negotiating an armistice, had to follow through lest the country be devoured militarily by its  enemies, as well as by internal revolution. General Ludendorff's call to keep fighting, while it appeared patriotic, actually represented his loss of support for the approved plan and thus the Kaiser. 

Prince Maximilian von Baden
 German Chancellor

Prince Maximilian's government was formed not only to carry out the armistice negotiations but also to reestablish government by putting an end to a military dictatorship. As previously noted, Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff's influence only ceased with the end of the double government, marked by Ludendorff's dismissal on 26 October 1918. Despite this change, the Kaiser remained a peripheral figure. The armistice negotiations were entrusted to the government, which was hesitant to relay bad news to the Kaiser, possibly due to fragile morale. Furthermore, Kaiser Wilhelm II isolated himself. During the crucial month, he “made few speeches, failed to attend a number of important meetings, and ratified. . . whatever [Prince] Max told him needed royal assent.” Kaiser Wilhelm II's withdrawal was due to his “nursing both his sciatica and his resentment at the diminution of his authority. . . [which] suited the chancellor, who. . . [hoped] that this would lead to less talk of abdication.” Nevertheless, though Kaiser Wilhelm II was stubbornly opposed to would lead to less talk of abdication.” Nevertheless, though Kaiser Wilhelm II was stubbornly opposed to  relinquishing his throne, Prince Maximilian accepted the necessity of the Kaiser's abdication. 

Part III, the conclusion of this article will be presented tomorrow.

The Dramatic Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Part I – A Promise of Reform

Statement of Abdication

I herewith renounce for all time claims to the throne of Prussia and to the German Imperial throne connected therewith. At the same time I release all officials of the German Empire and of Prussia, as well as all officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the navy and of the Prussian army, as well as the troops of the federated states of Germany, from the oath of fidelity which they tendered to me as their Emperor, King and Commander-in-Chief. I expect of them that until the re-establishment of order in the German Empire they shall render assistance to those in actual power in Germany, in protecting the German people from the threatening dangers of anarchy, famine, and foreign rule. Proclaimed under our own hand and with the imperial seal attached.

Wilhelm

Amerongen, 28 November 1918

By Vanessa LeBlanc

At the end of the summer of 1918, the Great War had been ongoing for four years; the German Imperial Army “had spent the last of its strength [and] the Imperial High Command had begun to realize that. . . Siegfrieden (the victorious peace that would enable Germany to dictate her own terms) was no longer obtainable.” The Great War has been characterized as a war of attrition. After the United States of America joined the war on the side of the Entente, Germany simply “lacked the ability to place enough men [and military resources] on the western front to provide an adequate challenge,” especially in light of the abandonment of Germany by its allies Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, all of whom began negotiating their own independent armistices in September 1918. Yet, despite losing the war of attrition and facing total defeat, Germany did not lose the war militarily as it was not defeated by a crushing Entente invasion. In fact, by the end of the Great War, Germany still had “troops in foreign lands [and] there was no fighting in Germany.” As such, some historians have maintained that Germany did not lose the First World War, as an armistice is “a cessation of hostilities by common agreement of the opposing sides; a truce,” to be concluded by a peace treaty, not a surrender by either side.

What the Entente powers did not accomplish militarily, however, they accomplished through the diplomacy of the pre-Armistice negotiations, and ultimately, the Treaty of Versailles. In a telegram from United States president Woodrow Wilson to the German government during the pre-Armistice negotiations, it became clear that a peace to end the war could not be arrived at without the abdication of the Kaiser. (14 October Note, Pt. Six) The monarch's support crumbled among his officials as they came to understand that his abdication was the only way to end the international conflict and quell the increasing threat of revolution in Germany. An examination of the decay of support for Kaiser Wilhelm II during the “abdication crisis” of the pre-Armistice negotiations reveals how his abdication contributed to Germany's “loss” of the Great War. 

Germany lost the Great War “diplomatically” by having to agree to the terms of the Armistice, which demanded that the Kaiser abdicate, as this resulted in a loss of a strong national figurehead who might have defended Germany in the ensuing peace negotiations. 

The German Empire was a parliamentary system with limited male suffrage that was tiered in favor of industrialists and the landed elite. The Kaiser was the head of state and was able to appoint and dismiss the chancellor as well as dissolve the Reichstag. The Kaiser was also the commander in chief of the Germany military. Yet, Kaiser Wilhelm was a poor military strategist and a military commander only in theory. Therefore, at the outbreak of the war in 1914, he transferred “the right to issue operational orders in his name” to the Chief of General Staff, the position to which General Paul von Hindenburg was appointed in August 1916. This, combined with the trend of shielding the Kaiser from bad news, resulted in the Kaiser becoming an increasingly peripheral figure. Moreover, it enabled General Hindenburg and fellow military strategist, Quartiermeister General Erich Ludendorff, to establish a de facto military dictatorship sometimes referred to as “the Duo.”

Approaching the Kaiser just over a month later, on 29 September 1918, Ludendorff was certain that Germany's loss of the war was inevitable and impending.  Along with General Hindenburg, he called for the immediate undertaking of armistice negotiations for a peace treaty based on President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff sought an “honourable peace” for the German military and relied on the American president's calls for “a just 'peace' and 'impartial' justice.” Therefore, though Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff had not read the Fourteen Points, they requested that the ensuing peace treaty be based on them in order to allow Germany and the German Army to escape a “shameful peace.” Beginning armistice negotiations before the military situation became more desperate served two purposes: it would spare the military from the embarrassment of a total defeat, and more important, it was hoped that it would give Germany equal negotiating power as there had been no military victory by the Entente.

The Kaiser and Crown Prince, 1916

The resolution to pursue armistice negotiations also initiated reforms of the governmental system. These democratizing reforms were to be undertaken in order to better Wilson's perception of Germany prior to the negotiation process, as well as to maintain and garner support for the Kaiser, which had been waning for at least 18 months. It is difficult to gauge public opinion and support of the Kaiser due to wartime censorship, however, as Christopher M. Clark notes in his examination of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the “last eighteen months of the war saw the growth in the circulation of anti-monarchical pamphlets and a drastic falling-away of confidence in the dynasty.” The reforms were to democratize government by expanding suffrage, resubverting military authority (i.e. Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg) to the Chancellor, and “`mak[ing] the Chancellor responsible to the Reichstag.'” These reforms would have seen the creation of a constitutional monarchy, curtailing much of the Kaiser's power and vesting more power in the chancellor. For the purposes of this article, what is important is that the reforms were an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to save the Hohenzollern dynasty from the Associated Powers by paying lip service to Wilson's ideals.

Support of these reforms was not unanimous. On 30 September 1918, Chancellor Georg von Hertling, who opposed the democratization of government, was dismissed. On 3 October, Prince Maximilian von Baden was appointed the new chancellor and began his task of, as he would later phrase it, “carrying out the great liquidation with some dignity.” Though the military commanders were subjugated to Prince Maximilian von Baden by the government restructuring, they still managed to rival and undermine his authority. The best example of this was the decision regarding when to send the request for an armistice. 

The next two parts of this article will be presented tomorrow and the following day.

Sir Hew Strachan on Clausewitz and the Nature of War — Video

London on the First Armistice Day

Londoners at the Queen Victoria Memorial, 11 November1918

As reported by American War Correspondent Edgar Bramwell Piper:

The armistice was signed at 5 o’clock in the morning [on 11 November]. London and England should have been notified of the result early in the day, immediately after the signing of the document. But the London papers are poor contraptions, and they have a way here of awaiting official announcements. It isn’t news until the King, or the Premier, or some other great man has said it or done it. In any event, the method of communicating to the public the great fact that Germany had  officially acknowledged that it had lost was through Lloyd George. 

In the House of Commons that afternoon, immediately after prayers, I rose and announced the signing of the Armistice, the terms of which I proceeded to read.

I concluded by saying: “Those are the conditions of the Armistice. Thus at 11 o’clock this morning came to an end the cruellest and most terrible war that has ever scourged mankind. I hope we may say that thus, this fateful morning, came to an end all wars. This is no time for words. Our hearts are too full of a gratitude to which no tongue can give adequate expression. I will, therefore, move: That this House do immediately adjourn, until this time to-morrow, and that we proceed, as a House of Commons, to St. Margaret’s, to give humble and reverent thanks for the deliverance of the world from its great peril, the cruellest and most terrible war that has ever scourged mankind. 

David Lloyd George, Prime Minister 

The day was threatening and misty; a very poor time for a public celebration of any kind. Then a lorry came lumbering up the Strand firing anti-aircraft guns. The significance of the exploit was not at first clearly understood. Some thought it was a final German air raid. But at last it dawned on the London mind that the war was over; and the impossible happened. London cast all reserve to the winds and let itself loose in a spontaneous and mighty demonstration. It was mainly a thing of moving and joyous crowds, going somewhere, anywhere, and making a noise—not a din after the American fashion, but yet a fairly noisy noise, all quite seemly, disciplined and respectable.

The crowds were enormous, and they were everywhere. It is said that London has 7,000,000 people. It must be an underestimate. Far more than that number apparently assembled at Trafalgar Square and before Buckingham Palace, and marched in platoons or companies or irregular regimental formations up and down the Strand. The crowd before the palace wanted to see and hear the King and Queen. “We want King George!” cried the people. Here, where they have King George, and evidently intend to keep him, there was no emotional outburst, no passionate outcry, no mob frenzy, merely the more or less formal call of a disciplined people to see their King, doubtless because they reasoned among themselves, in good English style, that it was the correct procedure in the circumstances. There is no denying the popularity of the King, however.

If they were to hold an election for King in England tomorrow, the incumbent would distance all others at the polls. At a quarter to 11 there were no signs of special commotion before the palace. A few idlers had gathered to watch the ceremony of changing the guard. The only flag in sight was the royal standard. At 11 o’clock, precisely, a typewritten copy of the Premier’s announcement that hostilities had ceased was hung outside the railings and then the maroons exploded. The crowds began to gather, coming from all directions like bees in a swarm. Many had All Saints Alive flags. Men on horseback came from somewhere and reined up before the palace. Taxicabs and motor cars came along and people who wanted to see better began to climb on the roofs. Within a few minutes many thousands had assembled and they began to call for the King.

King George V Salutes the Crowd

At 11:15 King George, in uniform, appeared on the balcony. The Queen, bareheaded and wearing a fur coat, was with him. The Duke of Connaught came too, and the Princess Mary. The soldiers presented arms and the Irish Guards’ band played the national anthem and the crowd solemnly took up the slow refrain. Then the band played “Rule Britannia.” The people sang again and flags began to wave. The King removed his cap and his loyal subjects cheered, and someone proposed a groan for the Kaiser, which was given sonorously, and the ruler of Great Britain and all the Indies donned his cap and the royal group went back into the palace.

From a Londoner's Diary: 

Peace! London to-day is a pandemonium of noise and revelry, soldiers, and flappers being most in evidence. Multitudes are making all the row they can, and in spite of depressing fog and steady rain, discords of sound and struggling, rushing beings and vehicles fill the streets. Paris, I imagine, will be more spontaneous and magnificent in its rejoicing. Berlin, also, is reported to be elated, having got rid not only of the war but also of its oppressors.

The peoples are everywhere rejoicing. Thrones are everywhere crashing and the men of property are everywhere secretly trembling. ‘A biting wind is blowing for the cause of property’, writes an Austrian journalist. How soon will the tide of revolution catch up the tide of victory? That is a question which is exercising Whitehall and Buckingham Palace and which is causing anxiety even among the more thoughtful democrats. Will it be six months or a year?

Beatrice Webb, Diary Entry 11 November 1918

Celebrating at Waterloo Place

Later, the King decided to drive through the city. He was accompanied by the Queen and the Princess Mary. Rain was falling, but nobody in England minds rain. It was a triumphal procession. Everywhere at central points had gathered many thousands to welcome their majesties. Here and there was a police officer, but the police had no  difficulty with the crowds. There was no special or unusual guard for the King and Queen, only a few outriders. They have no fear, evidently, in England that anything untoward will happen to the Crown, through the act of a madman, or the deliberate deed of a regicide. A policeman’s baton is enough. The English respect authority and obey it. The celebration did not end on Monday night. But it started up again on Tuesday and continued through the week. When London celebrates it celebrates. There is no question about it. 

It was announced that the King and Queen would attend a thanksgiving service at St. Paul’s Cathedral on the succeeding day [12 November]. The street scenes of the previous day were repeated during the progress of the royal couple to the magnificent centre of worship. It is a noble and wonderful shrine, with a fit setting for occasions of vast importance. Great bells rang and a mighty concourse gathered, and a solemn and beautiful ceremony was conducted in commemoration of the triumph of the allied cause.

The King and Queen Mary Arriving for
the Thanksgiving Service

The Strand, ending in Trafalgar Square, the heart of London, is the most popular thoroughfare in the city. When the joymaking began, the crowds took possession not only of the Strand, but of all available vehicles. A favourite adventure of men and women was to commandeer a taxicab and to pile in and on anywhere, preferably on top. One car, with a prescribed capacity for four, had exactly twenty-seven persons sardined in its not-too-ample proportions.

Then there were lorries–automobile trucks–crowded with soldiers, civilians and girls, all waving flags and singing or shouting. Soldiers formed in procession and marched along. After a while they turned about and went the other way. Girls in uniform– munitions workers–appeared in large numbers, and walked along, arm-in-arm with the men in khaki. Flags were plentiful. The day went on with no diminution of the crowds or moderation of the excitement. Apparently it increased rather than diminished. Business was wholly suspended, except in the restaurants and hotels, and the metropolis gave itself up to merrymaking. 

An American Army Car Full of Revelers

Yet it was mainly an unorganized, though orderly, spectacle of movement, without any great variety of stunts or picturesque Incidents. There was little drinking or drunkenness, apparently, in the streets, though there was plenty, and to spare, later in the great hotels. Possibly the crowd was sober because intoxication costs money nowadays in England; or perhaps it was not in the humor to drink. But the gay assemblies within the walls of the restaurants had no such scruples. There was much drinking, much noise, much laxity, a complete departure from the innocent gaiety of the streets.

Sources: From Somewhere Near the War by Edgar Bramwell Piper; War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1918;  Beatrice Webb, Diaries of, 11 November 1918. 

The highly regarded memoir, Somewhere Near The War: Being An Authentic And More Or Less Diverting Chronicle Of The Pilgrimage Of Twelve American Journalists To The War Zone, can be ordered HERE.

The Origins of the War? — There's Too Damn Much Documentation and You Can't Trust the Memoirs!

Christopher Clark,

The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914

The historian who seeks to understand the genesis of the First World War confronts several problems. The first and most obvious is an oversupply of sources. Each of the belligerent states produced official multi-volume editions of diplomatic papers, vast works of collective archival labour. There are treacherous currents in this ocean of sources. Most of the official document editions produced in the interwar period have an apologetic spin. The 57-volume German publication Die Grosse Politik, comprising 15,889 documents organized in 300 subject areas, was not prepared with purely scholarly objectives in mind; it was hoped that the disclosure of the pre-war record would suffice to refute the 'war guilt' thesis enshrined in the terms of the Versailles treaty. For the French government too, the post-war publication of documents was an enterprise of 'essentially political character', as Foreign Minister Jean Louis Barthou put it in May 1934. Its purpose was to 'counter-balance the campaign launched by Germany following the Treaty of Versailles'. In Vienna, as Ludwig Bittner, co-editor of the eight-volume collection Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, pointed out in 1926, the aim was to produce an authoritative source edition before some international body — the League of Nations perhaps? — forced the Austrian government into publication under less auspicious circumstances. The early Soviet documentary publications were motivated in part by the desire to prove that the war had been initiated by the autocratic Tsar and his alliance partner, the bourgeois Raymond Poincare, in the hope of de-legitimizing French demands for the repayment of prewar loans. Even in Britain, where British Documents on the Origins of the War was launched amid high-minded appeals to disinterested scholarship, the resulting documentary record was not without tendentious omissions that produced a somewhat unbalanced picture of Britain's place in the events preceding the outbreak of war in 1914. In short, the great European documentary editions were, for all their undeniable value to scholars, munitions in a 'world war of documents', as the German military historian Bernhard Schwertfeger remarked in a critical study of 1929.

The memoirs of statesmen, commanders and other key decision makers, though indispensable to anyone trying to understand what happened on the road to war, are no less problematic. Some are frustratingly reticent on questions of burning interest. To name just a few examples: the Reflections on the World War published in 1919 by German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg has virtually nothing to say on the subject of his actions or those of his colleagues during the July Crisis of 1914; Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov's political memoirs are breezy, pompous, intermittently mendacious and totally uninformative about his own role in key events; French President Raymond Poincare's ten-volume memoir of his years in power is propagandistic rather than revelatory – there are striking discrepancies between his 'recollections' of events during the crisis and the contemporary jottings in his unpublished diary. The amiable memoirs of British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey are sketchy on the delicate question of the commitments he had made to the Entente powers before August 1914 and the role these played in his handling of the crisis.

---

King Mark:  Who will make known to the world the inscrutably deep secret cause?

Tristan: That, King, I cannot tell you; and what you ask, that you will never learn.

Tristan and Isolde, Act II

How the Germans Underestimated the Tommies (At Least Early On)

 

By George Kerevan

As a consequence of the long intermarriage of the British and German royal families, upper-class Germans knew upper-class Britain quite intimately during the decades before the First World War. Families and businesses were intermingled and it was common for young Germans to attend school or university in Britain. In turn, the British were in awe of German high culture, its literature, music and science. British universities were even persuaded to import that strange German innovation, the research degree or PhD. As a result, many German army officers spoke perfect English and had a deep working knowledge of British society — or thought they had. They were not impressed by what they saw. Upper-class Germans thought the English had become debased by Celtic and Jewish influences, and by a selfish concentration on commerce as opposed to heroic Wagnerian values and a love of science and the arts for their own sake.

So the Germans entered the First World War with contempt for the decadence of British culture. When the first British troops taken prisoner in 1914 sportingly tried to shake hands with their captors, they were beaten up for their pains. The Germans disdainfully characterized this British national characteristic as “sportsidiotsmus”—meaning they were un-serious and ignorant.

The Prussian military believed the French and Russians were brave and worthy enemies, while the Brits were only in it for the money. Ordinary rank-and-file Germans were taught to believe the British started the war out of jealousy and were paying the French and Russians to encircle the Fatherland.

[The Germans assumed that the disillusioned British deserters they interrogated were typical Tommies:]

One German report on 35 British soldiers captured at Ypres on 12 February 1916 sums up the received Prussian wisdom: “crooked legs, rickety, alcoholic, degenerate, ill-bred, and poor to the last degree.” Another intelligence report referred to the “poor little men of a diseased civilisation.”

[Thus, the Huns were shocked by the tenacity of the British Army—and by the high technology they brought to the war.]

Source: From a 2006 review of Through German Eyes: the British and the Somme 1916, by Christopher Duffy published in The Scotsman

The Attack of the Dead Men: The Russian Defense of Osowiec Fortress – Video

From your Editor:  The narration of this video is overly dramatic and some the details presented sound shaky, but it's a whale of a story anyway.  You won't be bored. MH

The Wartime Paintings of German Soldier Hans Baluschek

Introduction: Hans Baluschek (1870–1935) was a German painter, graphic artist and writer. Despite his age, he volunteered for army when war broke out and served on both the Eastern and Western Fronts.  He recorded his experiences in paintings. Baluschek was a prominent representative of German Critical Realism, and as such he sought to portray the life of the common people with vivid frankness. His postwar paintings centered on the life of working class Berlin. Baluschek belonged to the Berlin secession movement; a group of artists interested in modern developments in art. These selections are from his 1916 collection, Der Krieg 1914–1916 (The War). My friend Walt Kudlick discovered Der Kreig and scanned the images for a slideshow and my former website of those days.

Click on Images to Enlarge 

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Remembering a Veteran: Lt. Orlando Henderson Petty, MD, United States Navy (Assigned 5th Marines) MoH

Lieutenant Orlando Petty
(Apparently Prior to Presentation of the Medal of Honor)

By John F. Andrews

Orlando H. Petty was born on 20 February 1874 in Cadiz, Ohio. Some accounts list is place of birth as Harrison, Ohio. The forms he filled out by hand list Cadiz. He was the son of Asbury F. Petty and Sarah Kyle. His twin brother was Orville Anderson Petty. He graduated from Muskingum College, and then went to medical school at Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia, graduating in 1904. He married Marcia Mellersh in 1908. They had two children, Clara and Orville. He died on 2 June 1932, at the age of 58, in Philadelphia, PA. 

After Petty completed his training, he continued on the faculty at Jefferson and specialized in metabolic disorders (what we would refer to as endocrinology today). At the age of 42, he joined the U.S. Naval Reserve Force and was commissioned as a lieutenant, junior grade, on 5 December of 1916. 

In a letter received by the USN on 3/29/1917 he wrote:

To Surgeon General, USN

Subject: Request for assignment to active duty in the event of hostilities or if services are now needed will gladly serve in the interhostile period. In the event of hostilities or if my services are now needed I respectfully request assignment to active duty. As I am actively connected with two hospitals I would perhaps be more efficient with a hospital assignment. If such is not available I will well and faithfully perform whatever service you may assign me.” 

He shipped over to France in July of 1917 on the USS Henderson. He was stationed in St. Nazaire, France from August to November 1917. 

He was transferred to the medical staff serving the USMC 5th Regiment, AEF, on 8 May 1918 (USN Reserve Force class 4). His commanding officer was Lt. Commander Paul Dessez. He worked in the battalion aid station in Lucy-le-Bocage where he performed under arduous conditions. The aid station was subjected to heavy artillery barrages and gas attacks on multiple occasions during his work there. The events depicted in Our Desperate Hour: A Novel of the Battle of Belleau Wood are this author’s recreation of events described in available historical records. Petty was severely gassed while struggling to treat and rescue USMC Captain Lloyd Williams [of "Retreat? Hell, we just got here!" renown] on 11 June 1918.

 

Enemy Artillery Damage at Lucy-le-Bocage

Petty was evacuated and after degassing was admitted to Field Hospital Number 16. This was the hospital for gas cases located in Luzancy, France. It is a bit unclear how long he was there. His service records indicate admission on 11 June 1918 and discharge in “Jun 1918.” He was an inpatient at Officers Hospital #4 from 11 August 1918 to 1 September 1918. This was probably American Red Cross Military Hospital Number 4 in Paris. The exact location of that hospital in Paris is unclear. Another record showed him receiving care at Base Hospital #101 for bronchitis (probably due to the gas exposure) on 27 August1918. Yet another record showed him at Red Cross Hospital #3. From 1 September 1918 to 13 December 1918, one record has him assigned to US Navy Base Hospital 5 in Brest, France. He was transferred to the US Naval Air Station, Pauillac, Bordeaux, France on 16 October 1918. It appears that his time in the hospitals from September through his debarkation back to the U.S. in December was partially for treatment and that he probably continued to serve in a reduced duty fashion on the medical staff. According to Veterans Bureau records, his diagnoses included:

1.  Gassed

2.  Fibroid phthisis

3.  Chronic enteritis and colitis

4.  Gall bladder infection  

Fibroid phthisis is an antiquated term that included cases of tuberculosis complicated by chronic lung scarring along with other non-tubercular lung scarring. The thought at the time was that the non-tubercular cases (such as the condition we now call black lung disease) eventually became infected with tuberculosis. This disease, however, could be confused with other forms of fibrotic or scarring diseases of the lungs, including scarring in the aftermath of mustard or other warfare gas exposure. The “Chronic Enteritis and Colitis” was probably a form of persistent or chronic gastroenteritis, which in another report was listed as dysentery. 

Petty’s gas mask was torn while he carried Captain Lloyd Williams away from the destroyed battalion aid station in Lucy. During the evacuation and for an undocumented time afterward, he treated Williams and others without the gas mask in the midst of a gas attack. This exposed his facial skin, eyes, nose, mouth, and lower respiratory tract to mustard gas (the main gas apparently used in that attack). This would have left him with skin and eye inflammation. Swallowed mustard gas could cause gastroenteritis. When inhaled, mustard gas commonly caused chemical bronchitis that was often complicated by pneumonia. Heavy exposure could cause a non-infectious inflammatory reaction in the lungs that could lead to the formation of scar tissue that today would be called pulmonary fibrosis. At that time might be difficult to distinguish this from the after-effects of tuberculosis. The diagnosis of “Fibroid Phthisis” could be entirely due to the late effects of the gas exposure. However, tuberculosis was common in that era, and many physicians were exposed to it and became infected. Some of those would be left with chronic lung scarring. Radiology was a new science in that era, and chest x-rays were not a routine procedure. Thus, it was unlikely that he had baseline chest X-rays unless he had prior tuberculosis.

 

Aid Station at Belleau Wood

He left France on the USS De Kalb and arrived in the U.S. on 19 December1918. He was honorably discharged from active service on either 19 or 21 December 1918 and returned home. He continued to serve in the U.S. Navy Reserve Force after that. In 1921 the Congress reduced the appropriation for the U.S. Navy Reserve Force from a requested $12 million to $7 million. This led the Navy to drastically reduce its reserve force. In this process, Petty was honorably discharged from his “class 2” reserve commission on 30 September 1921. He applied for reinstatement in what was termed a “class 6” commission in October of 1921, but the Navy denied his application. The record of this stated that he was denied due to the fact that they had not received his application before the deadline of 1 January 1922. While he filed an application in October of 1921, the application must have not been complete. 

Petty applied for Veterans Bureau War Risk insurance compensation for his service-related disability in February of 1922. This was approved. Later records indicated that the disability was rated as “not less than 30%,” though the exact physical deficits were not clear.

 

Postwar Photo

At some time between 1922 and 1927, he applied for a commission in the U.S. Army Reserve Medical Forces. There was a statue that stated that service members receiving compensation for service-related disability were ineligible to serve in the reserve forces. The Army surgeon general waived this exclusion for Petty, who held the rank of major until at least 1927. 

In 1927, Petty discussed the possibility of a transfer from the Army back to the Navy. The 4th Naval District was planning to establish a group of six specialists to serve as the nucleus of a special medical unit attached to the USMC. They wanted Petty to be one of their members. He passed a physical exam and was ruled fit for that duty and offered a commission as a lieutenant commander in the Volunteer Naval Reserve, for Special Service [USN MC-V(S)]. However, the surgeon general of the Navy could not waive the statutory exclusion of those receiving Veterans Bureau compensation. On that basis, Petty withdrew his application to the Navy. 

After the war, Petty returned to Philadelphia. He took a position at the University of Pennsylvania, where he was a professor of metabolic diseases. He also served as the personal physician of Philadelphia mayor Harry Mackey. He was appointed to head the Philadelphia Public Health Department in 1931. During that time, he was active in the field of metabolic diseases and authored a number of articles and a book: Diabetes: Its Treatment by Insulin and Diet. 1924, Philadelphia, PA. F.A. Davis. This book went through a number of printings and was apparently quite well received.

 

Lt. Petty's Grave, Roxborough, PA

The details of Petty’s health after the war are unclear. He was found dead in his bedroom, shot through the heart with his military service pistol, on 2 June 1932. The death was ruled a suicide. His family stated that he had been in ill health. He is buried in St. Timothy Churchyard, Roxborough, PA. 

Lieutenant Orlando H. Petty’s awards include: 

U.S. Navy Medal of Honor citation of Lieutenant Orlando H. Petty, (M.C.), USNRF 

"For extraordinary heroism while serving with the Fifth Regiment, United States Marines, in France during the attack in Bois de Belleau, 11 June 1918. While under heavy fire of high explosive and gas shells in the town of Lucy, where his dressing station was located, Lieutenant Petty attended to and evacuated the wounded under the most trying conditions. Having been knocked to the ground by an exploding gas shell which tore his mask, Lieutenant Petty discarded the mask and courageously continued his work. His dressing station being hit and demolished, he personally helped carry Captain Williams, wounded, through the shellfire to a place of safety." 

U.S. Army Distinguished Service Cross

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant (MC) Orlando Henderson Petty, United States Navy (Reserve Force), for extraordinary heroism in action while serving as Medical Officer attached to the Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, American Expeditionary Forces, in France during the attack in the Boise de Belleau, 11 June 1918. While he was treating wounded under bombardment of gas and high-explosive shells, Lieutenant Petty was knocked down and his gas mask torn by a bursting gash shell, but he discarded his gas mask and continued his work. Later, when his dressing station was demolished by another shell, he helped carry a wounded officer through the shellfire to a place of safety. 

U.S. Army Silver Star Citation

By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 9, 1918 (Bul. No. 43, W.D., 1918), Lieutenant (MC) Orlando Henderson Petty, United States Naval Reserve, is cited by the Commanding General, SECOND DIVISION A.E.F., for gallantry in action and a silver star may be placed upon the ribbon of the Victory Medals awarded him. Lieutenant Petty distinguished himself by gallantry in action while serving as a Medical Officer with the Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, American Expeditionary Forces, in action at the Bois de Belleau, France, 11 June 1918. Under heavy shell fire of both high explosive and gas shells, Surgeon Petty attended to the evacuation of all wounded with extraordinary valor. Being knocked to the ground by an exploding gas shell and, tearing his mask, he discarded the mask and continued his work in a most courageous manner. When his dressing station was hit and demolished, he personally helped carry a wounded officer through the shell fire to a place of safety.

Croix de Guerre, with Palm awarded, 1919, by the French government.

Sources: Thanks to André Sobocinski at the Office of Medical History, Communications Directorate, US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery for his help finding Lt. Petty’s service records; “Military Times” Hall of Valor; Naval History and Heritage Command; U.S. Bureau of the Census.