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| Some of the 130,000 Austro-Hungarian Prisoners Taken at Przemyśl |
By Franz-Stefan Gady
Originally Published in War On the Rocks, 2 December 2025
The southeastern Polish city of Przemyśl, with its elegant 19th century Habsburg-era train station, remains one of the principal gateways to war-torn Ukraine. I pass through it regularly on my way to Ukraine, never missing a chance to visit the statue of the good soldier Švejk on one of the town’s squares. Over a hundred years ago, in the first months of World War I, this at-the-time multinational city in the northeastern corner of the Austro-Hungarian Empire became the center of military operations on the Eastern Front, site of the largest and bloodiest siege of the war, and an illustration of the upsides and downsides of dogged static, positional defense — the usual approach of the underdog — and that contingency is the ultimate arbiter of its effectiveness. It holds a valuable lesson for the ongoing fighting in Ukraine [in 2025].
Przemyśl was the most important bulwark in the Empire’s East, with a single mission. In the event of war with Russia, it was meant to protect the passes into the Carpathian Mountains from which a Russian invader could march into the Hungarian plains, on to Budapest, and knock the Dual Monarchy out of the war. The idea was simple: Russia would have more men and materiel available and likely attempt to steamroll Austrian forces with its sheer mass and push back the frontline. In such an event, with the frontline being pushed back and Austrian forces retreating under pressure, Przemyśl was supposed to serve as a bulwark tying down significant Russian forces and buying Austria-Hungary time.
By and large, this plan worked during a short siege of the great fortress city, which took place from Sept. 16 to Oct. 11, 1914, during these crucial fall weeks. The tenacious defense of a ragtag garrison composed of middle-aged reservists from every corner of the empire — Austrian Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Czechs, Italians, Poles, and Ukrainians — prevented the collapse of Austro-Hungarian military power on the Eastern Front, as Alexander Watson argues in his magnificent book on the subject. It also destroyed any Russian hopes of a quick victory over Austria-Hungary, thereby guaranteeing that the war in the East, just like on the Western Front, would become an attritional contest.
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| A Russian Officer Inspects One of the Destroyed Forts |
However, a second siege lasting 133 days from November 1914 to March 1915 destroyed Austro-Hungarian military power in the East. Austro-Hungarian forces launched several ill‑fated counteroffensives through the wintry Carpathian Mountains to relieve the city, which cost them and their Russian opponents at least 1.8 million casualties in the course of a few months. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary’s Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf, refused to authorize breakout attempts, judging the situation from his distant vantage as far more favorable than it actually was — contrary to the dire assessments of local commanders who understood the true severity of the garrison’s predicament. When Przemyśl capitulated in March 1915, preceded by one last-ditch breakout effort, over 130,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers fell into Russian captivity and dealt a blow to Habsburg prestige in the region from which it would never recover. At that stage, the professional officer corps and non-commissioned officers had ceased to exist. From that point on, the Austro-Hungarian military was a reservist force incapable of conducting complex offensive or defensive operations at scale for the remainder of the war, save in close cooperation with its German ally.
The two sieges of Przemyśl illustrate a fundamental principle about static defense doctrine: it can serve a legitimate strategic purpose when it creates time for operational maneuver or enables relief of the defending force, but it can become catastrophic for an overstretched military when political imperatives combined with an inflexible and centralized command structure override sound military judgement, preventing commanders from executing the tactical withdrawals necessary to preserve troops and operational effectiveness. This distinction holds vital lessons for the ongoing war in Ukraine, where a “no step back” defense posture by Ukrainian forces risks worsening the relative attrition rate between Ukrainian and Russian forces.
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| Road Network Around Bastogne |
Historically, a static positional defense of urban terrain — or a fortress‑type defense posture — has been justified based on five main points: favorable casualty ratios, tying down enemy forces and preventing their deployment elsewhere on the front, buying time, allowing defensive preparations and mobilization in depth, as well as overall morale and political symbolism. Indeed, there have been many examples in history where such a defense made sense. Just think of World War II and Bastogne in December 1944. The defense of this Belgian town during the Battle of the Bulge was strategically rational because Bastogne controlled a critical road junction essential to German offensive operations. The Allied defensive effort bought time for Patton’s Third Army to relieve the garrison; the defenders were ultimately relieved, not destroyed; and the German offensive was defeated. Critically, Allied commanders recognized Bastogne’s operational importance: losing it would have enabled German armor to move freely through the Ardennes — not merely its symbolic value. The defense succeeded because it served a purpose beyond holding terrain for its own sake.
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| A Sherman Tank and Crew of the Relieving Force |
Excerpted from: "When Defense Becomes Destruction: Austria-Hungary’s Mistake and Ukraine’s Risk", War On the Rocks, 2 December 2025
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