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| Lafayette, We Are Here! |
The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) required a massive fleet of approximately 82,500 motor vehicles. About half the total were trucks including 8,000 the famous standardized "Liberty Trucks" (such as the FWD Model B) Other types of transport vehicles, ambulances, and approximately 2,000 Cadillac touring cars used for transporting military officers made up the rest.
The U.S. Army's only previous experience in deploying motorized transportation had been the recent Punitive expedition into Mexico, in which General Pershing had 731 vehicles. When the nation was called to war, the trans-oceanic deployment of America's army, the 100-times increase in scale, the sped-up learning curves for transport units and personnel, guaranteed that it would be extremely challenging and problem-filled. And it was.
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| Vehicle Park at the Gièvres, France, Supply Depot |
- The U.S. Army decided to rely more heavily on motor transportation than animals than any other army in the Great War. [However, the AEF still required over one million horses and mules to support the forces in the field.]
- Inexperienced and undisciplined truck drivers often caused delays, breakdowns, and massive traffic jams.
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| Classic AEF Traffic Jam at Esnes (Note Mix of Motorized and Animal Transport) |
- This in turn creates the need for proportionately larger mechanical maintenance and spare parts supply operations, as well as higher-level vehicle-friendly road maintenance.
- Mechanics? There were never enough mechanics.
- Failure to predetermine the level of control for the vehicles. Army, Corps, Division, Regimental? The AEF insisted on retaining divisional control of motor vehicles until nearly the war's end. This policy restricted the flexibility of the AEF's corps and army formations, because they could not count on having truck transportation at necessary times.
- Lack of attention from the highest levels. Issues regarding motorized vehicles did not receive the same attention as the AEF's highly successful railroad operation.
The author's of "Grinding Gears," however, do point out that there was one insurmountable issue for 1917–18: that the deployment of a huge expeditionary force to distance shores requires a commensurate amount of shipping space. In the Great War, that factor was intensified by the Allies requests to give precedence to live bodies over supplies and weapons.
Of even greater disappointment, the U.S. Army did not take to heart all the lessons learned during the war. The idea of a separate transportation branch died with America's postwar military cuts, and would not be resurrected until a new war demanded it in 1942. While the interwar army's small size forced such reductions, the military establishment also failed to heed the problems of operating many different vehicle models. When the army embarked on a major motorization program in 1926, it adopted 360 vehicle types. Not until 1939 did the army finally decide on just six models, greatly simplifying maintenance. The Army had, however, organized a transcontinental test convoy of 65 trucks that taught it a lot of lessons on motorized transportation and its staff happened to include a certain officer who was destined to command Allied Forces in Europe in the next big war. [Article]
McCoy's linked article is well worth the read. In addition to what it states, quite a few trucks intended for use in Europe were abandoned quayside in the US because of the difficulty of loading them into the available ships. But even had the vehicles made to France, gasoline shortages were seriously hindering operations by what proved to be the closing stages of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Had large-scale operations continued further into November, First Army would have been in very serious trouble in that regard. Indeed, when 1st Division moved into previously German-occupied territory after the Armistice, many vehicles were abandoned owing to the lack of fuel.
ReplyDeleteThis points to the oft-criticized lack of US-built tanks. In addition to a lack of thin armored plate, power plants, and other components to manufacture them, there was insufficient shipping to get them across the Atlantic and resources to handle them once they arrived. But even had those obstacles not existed, the lack of fuel would have prevented significant use until the fuel situation was improved. And that probably would not have occurred until well into 1919.