The Soldier Factory: Training and the Making of the British Soldier in the First World War, 1914-1918

  

The Soldier Factory: 

Training and the Making of the British Soldier in the First World War, 1914-1918 

Harry J. Sanderson, Helion and Company, 2026

Reviewed by David F. Beer

 

 

 

 

When World War I broke out Britain had far fewer than a million men who wore the Army uniform. Some 247,500 were full-time soldiers while the rest were either part-time reservists or home defense territorial volunteers. These numbers were further reduced after fighting began and Britain quickly suffered significant casualties, most of them infantrymen. Obviously, more soldiers were desperately needed. How in the following months millions of men flocked to enlist, and how Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener played a vital role in these events, is a well-known story. Less known is how over the next four years the Army trained all these men and prepared them to fight in a war that had been scarcely imagined.

Sanderson’s book takes a carefully organized approach to all the aspects of turning a civilian into a soldier. In a style reminiscent of a dissertation, he first presents a long introduction on the historiography and methodology which informs his work. He then follows with fourteen detailed chapters and a conclusion. There is a lengthy bibliography but no index. Many chapters include tables presenting regimental names and numbers and each chapter ends with a detailed conclusion or summary.

Little standardized training of raw recruits existed when war began. So much depended on the available resources of the Army and the location and unit where the training took place. A lot depended on the background and quality of the recruits and even on the experience and attitudes of the instructors. Although traditionally the Army had been formed into regiments of men from a certain area (e.g. the Devonshire Regiment) who had a lot in common, this was no longer always the case due to the initial rush of men to join up. Units could not "rely upon command ties to sustain discipline and morale" and had to work harder at building basic discipline and espirit de corps (p. 31). Moreover, supplies were not always immediately available and instances of new recruits training while wearing partial uniforms and even using broom handles in place of rifles were not unknown.

Initially the shortage of men to fill the ranks was drastic and as the author points out “…the Army’s desperation for reinforcements at the front meant they rushed many men to the front whilst only partially trained” (p.70). Nevertheless, training eventually was improved and more or less standardized. The author takes us through this development with detailed chapters discussing specific training: Drill, the Rifle, Machine Guns, Bombing, the Desire to Kill, the use of the Bayonet, Entrenchment, "Weapons of Frightfulness" (gas, chemicals, flame weapons), and even mention of the shovel as a potential weapon of war. Not all soldiers would receive a solid background in all of these, of course, and there were wide gaps in both quantity and quality of training among troops arriving at the front (p.69).

The author’s conclusions are quite blunt and are based on his impressive research evidenced throughout the book. It’s impossible to say how many Tommies would have survived the war with better training. Also, it should be noted that in late 1916 and early 1917 “many recruits were accepted into the Army despite being wholly unfit for military life” (p. 221). Nevertheless, by the end of 1917 training had been considerably improved, especially the training troops received once they were at the front. This no doubt helped bring about the final Allied victory, yet Sanderson cannot help ending on a somber note: “…the BEF high command wasted so many of these men through rushed and poorly prepared attacks after they had achieved initial success” (p. 223). May they rest in peace.