The Dramatic Abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Part I – A Promise of Reform

Statement of Abdication

I herewith renounce for all time claims to the throne of Prussia and to the German Imperial throne connected therewith. At the same time I release all officials of the German Empire and of Prussia, as well as all officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the navy and of the Prussian army, as well as the troops of the federated states of Germany, from the oath of fidelity which they tendered to me as their Emperor, King and Commander-in-Chief. I expect of them that until the re-establishment of order in the German Empire they shall render assistance to those in actual power in Germany, in protecting the German people from the threatening dangers of anarchy, famine, and foreign rule. Proclaimed under our own hand and with the imperial seal attached.

Wilhelm

Amerongen, 28 November 1918

By Vanessa LeBlanc

At the end of the summer of 1918, the Great War had been ongoing for four years; the German Imperial Army “had spent the last of its strength [and] the Imperial High Command had begun to realize that. . . Siegfrieden (the victorious peace that would enable Germany to dictate her own terms) was no longer obtainable.” The Great War has been characterized as a war of attrition. After the United States of America joined the war on the side of the Entente, Germany simply “lacked the ability to place enough men [and military resources] on the western front to provide an adequate challenge,” especially in light of the abandonment of Germany by its allies Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, all of whom began negotiating their own independent armistices in September 1918. Yet, despite losing the war of attrition and facing total defeat, Germany did not lose the war militarily as it was not defeated by a crushing Entente invasion. In fact, by the end of the Great War, Germany still had “troops in foreign lands [and] there was no fighting in Germany.” As such, some historians have maintained that Germany did not lose the First World War, as an armistice is “a cessation of hostilities by common agreement of the opposing sides; a truce,” to be concluded by a peace treaty, not a surrender by either side.

What the Entente powers did not accomplish militarily, however, they accomplished through the diplomacy of the pre-Armistice negotiations, and ultimately, the Treaty of Versailles. In a telegram from United States president Woodrow Wilson to the German government during the pre-Armistice negotiations, it became clear that a peace to end the war could not be arrived at without the abdication of the Kaiser. (14 October Note, Pt. Six) The monarch's support crumbled among his officials as they came to understand that his abdication was the only way to end the international conflict and quell the increasing threat of revolution in Germany. An examination of the decay of support for Kaiser Wilhelm II during the “abdication crisis” of the pre-Armistice negotiations reveals how his abdication contributed to Germany's “loss” of the Great War. 

Germany lost the Great War “diplomatically” by having to agree to the terms of the Armistice, which demanded that the Kaiser abdicate, as this resulted in a loss of a strong national figurehead who might have defended Germany in the ensuing peace negotiations. 

The German Empire was a parliamentary system with limited male suffrage that was tiered in favor of industrialists and the landed elite. The Kaiser was the head of state and was able to appoint and dismiss the chancellor as well as dissolve the Reichstag. The Kaiser was also the commander in chief of the Germany military. Yet, Kaiser Wilhelm was a poor military strategist and a military commander only in theory. Therefore, at the outbreak of the war in 1914, he transferred “the right to issue operational orders in his name” to the Chief of General Staff, the position to which General Paul von Hindenburg was appointed in August 1916. This, combined with the trend of shielding the Kaiser from bad news, resulted in the Kaiser becoming an increasingly peripheral figure. Moreover, it enabled General Hindenburg and fellow military strategist, Quartiermeister General Erich Ludendorff, to establish a de facto military dictatorship sometimes referred to as “the Duo.”

Approaching the Kaiser just over a month later, on 29 September 1918, Ludendorff was certain that Germany's loss of the war was inevitable and impending.  Along with General Hindenburg, he called for the immediate undertaking of armistice negotiations for a peace treaty based on President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff sought an “honourable peace” for the German military and relied on the American president's calls for “a just 'peace' and 'impartial' justice.” Therefore, though Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff had not read the Fourteen Points, they requested that the ensuing peace treaty be based on them in order to allow Germany and the German Army to escape a “shameful peace.” Beginning armistice negotiations before the military situation became more desperate served two purposes: it would spare the military from the embarrassment of a total defeat, and more important, it was hoped that it would give Germany equal negotiating power as there had been no military victory by the Entente.

The Kaiser and Crown Prince, 1916

The resolution to pursue armistice negotiations also initiated reforms of the governmental system. These democratizing reforms were to be undertaken in order to better Wilson's perception of Germany prior to the negotiation process, as well as to maintain and garner support for the Kaiser, which had been waning for at least 18 months. It is difficult to gauge public opinion and support of the Kaiser due to wartime censorship, however, as Christopher M. Clark notes in his examination of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the “last eighteen months of the war saw the growth in the circulation of anti-monarchical pamphlets and a drastic falling-away of confidence in the dynasty.” The reforms were to democratize government by expanding suffrage, resubverting military authority (i.e. Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg) to the Chancellor, and “`mak[ing] the Chancellor responsible to the Reichstag.'” These reforms would have seen the creation of a constitutional monarchy, curtailing much of the Kaiser's power and vesting more power in the chancellor. For the purposes of this article, what is important is that the reforms were an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to save the Hohenzollern dynasty from the Associated Powers by paying lip service to Wilson's ideals.

Support of these reforms was not unanimous. On 30 September 1918, Chancellor Georg von Hertling, who opposed the democratization of government, was dismissed. On 3 October, Prince Maximilian von Baden was appointed the new chancellor and began his task of, as he would later phrase it, “carrying out the great liquidation with some dignity.” Though the military commanders were subjugated to Prince Maximilian von Baden by the government restructuring, they still managed to rival and undermine his authority. The best example of this was the decision regarding when to send the request for an armistice. 

The next two parts of this article will be presented tomorrow and the following day.