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| General von Hindenburg |
Part I of this article was presented yesterday HERE.
By Vanessa LeBlanc
The German High Command was adamant about sending the peace proposal to Washington immediately, because although General Hindenburg asserted that the “army could protect German borders until early 1919. . . [this could not be guaranteed] against a fresh enemy offensive.” Prince Maximilian did not want to dispatch such a telegram so soon after the formation of the new government, as he feared that this would discredit the new democratic government and be “interpreted by the enemy as capitulation,” potentially leading to demands for unconditional surrender, which is exactly what happened. Yet, in spite of Prince Maximilian's concerns, military pressure prevailed, and the armistice telegram was drafted and sent to President Wilson on 3 October 1918.
It was with the second American note that the repercussions of the German officials' unfamiliarity with Wilson's Fourteen Points became apparent. The first correspondences between the Germans and the Americans served largely to clarify what each party meant before beginning to negotiate the conditions of the armistice. The American reply on 8 October 1918 to the first German note of 3 October asked, “Does the Imperial German Chancellor mean that. . . the Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his addresses to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January last and in subsequent addresses. . .?” It also clarified that Germany would have to withdraw from the territories it had invaded before “a cessation of arms” could be suggested to America's Entente allies.
The German government made sure in its reply to this note, on 12 October 1918, to state that the American's allies must also agree to “accept the position taken by the president in his addresses.” Over the course of 1918, Wilson had made addenda to his Fourteen Points, creating 24 points in total. In his analysis of the Versailles settlement, Ferdinand Czernin characterizes the second American note of 14 October 1918 as being tougher than the first. Robert B. Asprey suggests that the tougher tone of the second American note was due to a German submarine sinking an Irish ship two days prior. The note referenced Wilson's speech at Mt. Vernon of 4 July 1918 — “the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can. . . disturb the peace of the world.” This was a direct reference to the destruction of the Hohenzollern monarchy, which also conveyed that “`justice' might not be the `forgiveness'” that the Germans had envisioned.
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| President Wilson at Mount Vernon |
Though the Americans had alluded to the necessity of the Kaiser's abdication in their previous note, the “abdication crisis” perhaps only truly began on 23 October, when it was made clear by Wilson in a third note that peace could not be arrived at without the abdication of the Kaiser. Czernin argues that “Short of saying in so many words that `the Kaiser must abdicate before we will sign an armistice,' Wilson's note could not have been more explicit.” As Prince Maximilian had suspected, having sent the request for peace so soon after the formation of the new government had caused “Wilson and his allies. . . [to believe] that Germany was defeated and should be shorn of all its power,” beginning with the removal of the Kaiser. Furthermore, the failure of the German officials to actually read the Fourteen Points, instead relying on the points' hearsay, and the military's insistence on starting peace negotiations, is indicative of how desperate the German position in the war of attrition had become. Had the German officials taken the time to familiarize themselves with Wilson's points and supplemental principles and ends, they would have known the significance of demanding the Kaiser's abdication and perhaps decided against utilizing the Fourteen Points as the basis for peace. Instead, the Germans appeared desperate to Wilson, giving him the unquestionable authority to dictate that Wilhelm II must abdicate.
The abdication crisis can be divided into two related parts: that of the Kaiser's officials and that of the German people. At the start of the war in 1914, there was widespread support for the war and the Kaiser, both of which were linked to German nationalism. Four years later, the war was taking a toll on most German people and the Hohenzollern dynasty was falling into disfavor. The soldiers at the front shared this disheartened feeling, information that the generals included in the arguments they made to the Kaiser for an armistice. As Ralph Haswell Lutz argues in his analysis of the German Revolution, “not even. . .military defeats. . . demoralized the nation as much as did the publication of the first note to Wilson.” As opposed to wartime censorship laws that had caused dissent to go underground, censorship was relaxed in mid-October 1918 and many people discussed the Kaiser's abdication freely. Many Germans were now aware that the Kaiser was abhorred “everywhere in Europe [and] America,” and came to see Kaiser Wilhelm II as a symbol of militarism, “an impediment to. . .peace. . . but also the logical scapegoat.” In this manner, foreign sentiments regarding the Kaiser were not only echoed by many Germans but also influenced German discontent. As the month of October wore on, people's cries for the Kaiser's abdication grew louder and the threat of internal revolution increased.
Furthermore, the German people would not have supported the abandonment of armistice negotiations: “[a]s in Russia, the one thing which the majority of people wanted was peace. . . A fight to the death, as an alternative to capitulation, had little attraction for anyone.” In this way, as in Russia, the revolutionary movement in Germany garnered support by calling for peace. Contrary to Russia, however, the threat of revolution had yet to materialize as a concrete movement. Thus, the German government, already committed to negotiating an armistice, had to follow through lest the country be devoured militarily by its enemies, as well as by internal revolution. General Ludendorff's call to keep fighting, while it appeared patriotic, actually represented his loss of support for the approved plan and thus the Kaiser.
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| Prince Maximilian von Baden German Chancellor |
Prince Maximilian's government was formed not only to carry out the armistice negotiations but also to reestablish government by putting an end to a military dictatorship. As previously noted, Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff's influence only ceased with the end of the double government, marked by Ludendorff's dismissal on 26 October 1918. Despite this change, the Kaiser remained a peripheral figure. The armistice negotiations were entrusted to the government, which was hesitant to relay bad news to the Kaiser, possibly due to fragile morale. Furthermore, Kaiser Wilhelm II isolated himself. During the crucial month, he “made few speeches, failed to attend a number of important meetings, and ratified. . . whatever [Prince] Max told him needed royal assent.” Kaiser Wilhelm II's withdrawal was due to his “nursing both his sciatica and his resentment at the diminution of his authority. . . [which] suited the chancellor, who. . . [hoped] that this would lead to less talk of abdication.” Nevertheless, though Kaiser Wilhelm II was stubbornly opposed to would lead to less talk of abdication.” Nevertheless, though Kaiser Wilhelm II was stubbornly opposed to relinquishing his throne, Prince Maximilian accepted the necessity of the Kaiser's abdication.
Part III, the conclusion of this article will be presented tomorrow.
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