| General Luigi Cadorna |
Italian Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna, having learnt of the Treaty of London, accepted the orders but declared that the army would not be ready before one month. This notwithstanding, morale was high; the general was convinced that within a month his army would have reached Trieste; upon being asked by Francesco Saverio Nitti in the summer of 1915 on the army's winter equipment, Prime Minister Salandra answered: "Do you believe that the war will last beyond winter?"
Both of them did not seem to have taken into consideration the several communications that were already in circulation regarding the new war. The military attaché in Berlin, Luigi Bongiovanni, had written for instance several reports on the conditions of this conflict and on how, after a few weeks of fighting, the struggle would be transformed into one based on positional warfare that would be intense, stationary, with the excavation of trenches and battlefronts that would be difficult to move.
The preparation of the Italian army envisaged both an offensive plan as well as a plan to contain the enemy across an area that covered from the Stelvio Pass (the border between Lombardy and Alto Adige) up to the eastern zone of the plains of Friuli for a total of some 600 kilometers. The front was divided in five segments: the westernmost segment was largely of a defensive nature whereas the other four segments, from Cadore right up to the zone of Cervignano del Friuli, were offensive.
| Italy's Soldiery Was Highly Enthusiastic at the Start |
On its part for several weeks Austria-Hungary had already understood what would happen. Military propaganda had already started to depict Italy as a State that was treacherous and that could be expected to undertake any kind of dishonorable action. On 20 May the Emperor ordered a state of alert and nominated Archduke Eugene as commander of the new front in the south-east. Three days later Vittorio Emanuele III sent to the Italian ambassador in Vienna the declaration of war. This declaration said that on the next day, 24 May 1915, the Italian army would start military operations along the border.
When fighting began, Cadorna had under his command some 400,000 soldiers in the plains of Veneto and Friuli. Besides the First Army which had largely defensive duties, the other armies and the Zona Carnia already had received orders to advance beyond the border.
| Early Attack on the Italian Front |
The Austro-Hungarian Army could rely instead only on 50/70,000 soldiers, that went up to 110,000 during the next weeks. Its troops reflected the heterogeneous nature of the empire where only one fourth could speak German and included among their ranks even two percent who were Italians. But these differences were overcome by a strong anti-Italian sentiment (especially among the Austrians and the Slavs), as was pointed out by the German Field Marshal Hindenburg: "[the Habsburg troops] fought against the Russians with their heads but attacked the Italians with all their heart."
In the zone of Medio and Basso Isonzo, the initial objective was to isolate Gorizia and to reach Monfalcone in the south and the basin of Caporetto in the north. Although the Austro-Hungarian army left several kilometers without any resistance and placed its defenses on the first elevations, the Italian troops advanced with a lot of prudence. They crossed the border at Cervignano del Friuli and took two days to reach the right bank of Isonzo which was impossible to cross because of heavy rains. After the night of 4 June, the troops were again slowed by the marshes that had been prepared by the Austrians who in the meantime had organized their own defense on the Karst behind Monfalcone, which the Italians reached on 9 June.
While the Messina Battalion entered this port, further north the Second Army launched its first attack on Mount Calvario, on the outskirts of Gorizia. All the hills that surround this city on the river Isonzo had already been prepared for its defense and so this action failed. Instead in the Natisone Valleys the inexperience and the lack of preparations led to several rather simple mistakes: on reaching Caporetto on 25 May, the military commanders decided to conquer the mountains Nero and Mrzli so as to surround the village of Tolmino from the north. For some unknown reason, however, the advance was stopped toward the end of May, and it was only on 6 June that the 3rd Reggimento Alpini conquered Mount Nero.
| Inevitably, Though, It Came to Trench Warfare |
From this it was obvious that what should have been a war based on an offensive strategy revealed itself instead as a hazardous and badly organized advance. The poor quality of the equipment and of communications between divisions was already giving rise to problems. Besides, the morale of the troops already began to sway from the first moments when they found out that the population of Friuli and of the Isonzo region had welcomed their arrival with a lot of suspicion (although propaganda had convinced them of the contrary). In the first month Italy lost about 15,000 men and already on 10 June 1915 Cadorna informed his family (and also Salandra at a later stage) that even on the Italian front a battle based on trench warfare was looming that would not be concluded in a short time.
Forty-two months later the war of choice by Italy had joined voluntarily would lead to victory, but at a stupendous price. The Great War cost Italy approximately 600,000 to 650,000 military deaths, over 950,000 wounded, and a total direct financial cost of over $12 billion (1914–1918 USD). Postwar inflation, political instability, and the rise of Fascism followed the Armistice.
Source: Itinerary Della Grande Guerra