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The duties of antisubmarine patrol and escort required primarily a small vessel of light draft, good sea-keeping qualities, and preferably high speed. The destroyer was especially suited for the work, but since the number available was inadequate to meet the demands, they were supplemented by converted yachts, revenue cutters, gunboats, small cruisers, etc. The first American men-of-war to reach Europe was a division of destroyers that arrived at Queenstown on 4 1917. This place was selected as a base of operations on account of its proximity to the focus of traffic lanes to the waters of Great Britain and northern France. As the war progressed, there were established similar American main bases at Brest and Gibraltar, and smaller bases on the west coast of France.
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| Destroyer USS Allen and Troopship SS Leviathan Destroyers Played a Key Role in the Convoy System |
During the first few weeks of American participation, the method of protection to shipping in the war zone was by patrol. Each destroyer was assigned a certain area within which it cruised with the object of forcing any submarines in that area to remain submerged and thus hamper the facility of its operations and favor the safe passage of surface vessels proceeding singly. This method proved to be extremely inefficient because of the small force which could be assigned to the work and the very large area to be covered.
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| A Troop Convoy Approaching Brest, France |
Meantime plans were formulated to put the convoy system into effect. As is well known, this system involved the formation of a large number of merchant vessels into one group and the escort of that group through the war zone by antisubmarine vessels. It was not adopted earlier principally because of a shortage of war vessels to serve the tremendous amount of shipping passing through the danger zone. It was due to this fact that the American naval aid was at first so important, that American destroyers and other suitable vessels were available in fairly sufficient numbers to place world shipping on a convoy basis at a very acute crisis. This was true especially of the destroyers which necessarily had to form the keystone of the whole convoy system.
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| A Gun Crew at Their Station in the U-boat Zone |
While the convoy system was a defensive measure, it was established as a matter of sheer necessity. Offensive measures would have been generally preferred as being the surest way in which to defeat the submarine campaign, but no offensive means had been sufficiently developed at that time to promise any considerable success, and the severe losses which were being incurred in the spring of 1917 left no other than a defensive alternative. To a degree the convoy system was an "offensive-defensive" in that the escort vessels were prepared, upon an attack being made on their convoy, to instantly take the offensive against submarines and endeavor to destroy them with gunfire or depth charges.
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| Principal Destroyer Base, Queenstown, Ireland |
From the beginning, the convoy system was a great success. It was put into effect gradually, and by the end of July 1917, more than 10,000 ships had been convoyed and only one-half of one percent of them lost. Ultimately practically all shipping was placed in convoy, and the low percentage of losses under this system was maintained until the end of the war. The very fact of its success created a strong tendency to make the escorts of destroyers and other small vessels more numerous, thus constantly absorbing the reinforcements of small craft for this semi-defensive work rather than for more offensive measures, such as hunting. By July 1917, there were 34 American destroyers with their tenders based on Queenstown, and 17 converted yachts and 9 minesweepers were based on the Bay of Biscay French ports for the purpose of keeping that coast clear of mines and giving escort to local convoys. As more destroyers became available, they were assigned to Brest, and at that port there was gradually assembled a force of approximately the same size as the Queenstown organization. These two detachments were the principal American anti-submarine forces employed in Europe for the protection of the sea transportation of the American Army. Their work was, of course, augmented by British and French forces.
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| View of a Convoy from an Escort Ship |
Another very important American detachment was that at Gibraltar, the "gateway" for more traffic than any other part in the world. Gibraltar was the focus for the great routes to and from the east through the Mediterranean, and from it extended the communications for the armies in Italy, Saloniki, Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. The Allied forces based here were chiefly British and American, though French, Japanese, and Italian vessels also assisted. The American contingent comprised cruisers, gunboats, revenue cutters, antiquated destroyers, and yachts, ultimately aggregating about 41 vessels, with a personnel of nearly 5,000.
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| Leave Party from the USS Great Northern |
The duty of escorting convoys was extremely arduous. The small vessels had to keep the sea for long periods and maintain the same speed as the convoy regardless of weather conditions. Many convoys had to be met as far as 300 miles from the coast. The great extent of the ocean combined with the comparatively few (about 12) submarines which the Germans could maintain continuously on station prevented frequent attacks by enemy submarines. Many escort vessels went through the entire war without a hostile submarine, but this was due in part to the fact that the submarines preferred to leave the protected convoys alone and to expend their efforts in the less dangerous work of attacking single ships of which one or more usually straggled from each convoy.
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| American Lives Were Lost When the USS Tuscania— Part of a British Convoy—Was Sunk |
Usually the escort vessels went through the cycle of proceeding to a port in Europe where empty ships were made up into convoys, scouting the approaches of the port, forming up the convoy and getting it started westward, escorting it through the danger zone and dispersing it, scouting for and picking up an inbound convoy, escorting it eastward through the danger zone, and protecting it during the period when detachments separated to go to respective ports. This usually occupied three or four days, after which the escort vessels would proceed to their home port for a few days of rest and repair, preparatory to another cycle of operations.
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| Doughboys Heading Over |
During the period at sea, it was principally hard work and hardship with no wild adventure, although expectations were keyed up by the frequent radio reports of submarine positions and operations, S.O.S. signals from vessels which had been attacked by submarines, and other similar information. A destroyer was frequently detached and sent ahead or astern of the convoy to drive down a submarine which had been reported. When vessels in the vicinity were torpedoed, one or more destroyers would be sent to rescue the personnel, taking them off the sinking steamer or picking them up from their boats. Not infrequently, a submarine would hover about a convoy for several days awaiting an opportunity to attack, even though its presence was known to the escorting vessels, and a number of attacks were made upon convoys after which the submarine escaped successfully in spite of barrages of depth charges from the destroyers.
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| Aboard Ship |
The most successful operation of American escort vessels during the war was the capture of the U-58 by the United States destroyers Fanning and Nicholson. This occurred in November, 1917, when an American destroyer division was escorting an outward bound convoy of eight empty ships toward its point of dispersal, with instructions to meet subsequently an incoming convoy. After the usual preliminary scouting off the port, the destroyers were patrolling the vicinity and giving instructions with a view to having the merchant ships take their formation promptly. While the Fanning was thus engaged, the lookout sighted a periscope in such a location as to seriously endanger the merchant ship Welshman. Immediately, the Fanning's helm was put over and the difficult task undertaken of reaching a position immediately over the submarine whose periscope had disappeared. The Fanning made a wide and rapid turn and depth-charged the place where she estimated the submarine to be. The Nicholson also joined the attack and dropped another depth charge ahead of the Fanning.
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| Flotilla of Navy Destroyers Guarding a Convoy |
Eagerly the sea was scanned for evidence of success in the usual form of oil patches, air bubbles or pieces of wreckage, but none were seen. For 10 or 15 minutes, everything was quiet and it appeared that the submarine must have been missed, but at that time she came to the surface apparently undamaged and was immediately fired upon by the guns of the destroyers. Suddenly the submarine's conning tower opened and officers and crew filed up with their arms overhead shouting Kamarad. Of course, the gun fire was immediately stopped. The submarine had surrendered, but soon afterward she began to sink, her sea valves having been purposely opened. The crew was rescued from the water by the American destroyers. It was subsequently learned that although the depth charges had not exploded sufficiently close to the submarine to do her any material structural damage, the concussion had wrecked her motors, making it impossible to control the vessel while submerged. The German captain then had the alternative of sinking until the water pressure crushed the vessel or to blow the ballast tanks, rise to the surface and surrender. He first attempted to stay under water but upon reaching the critical depth of 200 feet with the boat still descending rapidly, he decided to take his chances on the surface.
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| USS Agamemnon Returning Part of the 26th Yankee Division |
During the 18 months of war when American vessels escorted convoys through the war zone, 183 attacks were made by them upon submarines, 24 submarines were damaged and two known to have been destroyed. A total of 18,653 ships were escorted carrying vast quantities of freight to the armies in France and the civilian population of the Allies, as well as more than 2,000,000 troops.
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| American Doughboys Returning Home Aboard the Battleship USS Louisiana |
The principal burden of this stupendous work fell upon the destroyers, whose very efficiency created never ceasing demands for protection to the endless stream of vessels passing the great focus of the allied lines of sea communications. Few of the millions of soldiers, sailors, and civilians, who were met far at sea by these comparatively tiny craft will ever forget the sense of great relief and security given by their mere presence. The thousands who witnessed attacks upon submarines or who were rescued from stricken vessels will have an even more vivid recollection and a better comprehension of the highly important work of the destroyers. The fact that not a single American soldier, en route to France under the protection of the United States Navy, was lost through submarine attack, is very largely due to the efficient and unremitting work of the American destroyers. (See Note 1.)
Note 1. There were some losses of American troops en route to France. See our article on those losses HERE.
Source: American Naval Participation in the Great War (With Special Reference to the European Theater of Operations) by Capt. Dudley W. Knox, Naval History and Heritage Command
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