A Troop Train Passing through West Virginia |
By Leo P. Hirrel
Of all the aspects of home front mobilization, railroad operations produced the most spectacular failure. In turn, the crisis in railroad transportation resulted in overdue structural reforms both for the War Department and the entire national mobilization process. At this time motor vehicles were still in the developmental stage, and water transportation served only limited areas. The nation moved on its rails, and railroads relied upon steam engines.
Troop transportation had some difficulties but on the whole the railroads did a credible job. They moved soldiers from home to initial training, often from one installation to another, and then to the ports of embarkation. Along the way they coordinated with the Red Cross or other organizations to support the troops.
Even in peacetime the American cargo movement was inefficient because railroads could not manage their freight cars. Cars might pass between different lines, and in the process, they might be held while loading or unloading. Railroads might also hold empty cars with the expectation of needing them later. After the war in Europe began, the demands upon railroads increased, creating further problems. In the winter of 1916/1917, trains serving New York City and its port became severely congested, and the lines were just starting to clear up when the United States entered the war.
American entry into the war further complicated the procedures. In theory, the railroads recognized the potential problems presented by the war and organized the Railroads War Board, but this was only an advisory organization, without any real authority. Antitrust laws further prevented railroads from cooperating in the emergency to find more mutually efficient means of managing operations.
Troubles began quickly. Cantonment construction dominated freight shipments. Soon each of the supply bureaus began pushing its own shipments either for raw materials or finished goods, often without regard for whether the organization at the other end was ready to receive and unload the cargo. Government contracts called for payment once a product was loaded on to the train, so manufacturers wanted to begin shipment upon completion of production. Shipments to the New York port soon exceeded the ability of the port to unload the cars or load the ships. Efforts to ease the congestion through a priority system failed miserably because there were no controls, and every shipment became a high priority.
Winter turned a bad situation into a disaster. Winter always brought added stress to the railroad system, with increased demands for coal, the difficulties of heating steam engines in cold weather, snow on the tracks, and frozen equipment. The winter of 1917/1918 was brutally cold with extra snow storms and sub-zero temperatures. The forces already in France required supplies, and these shipments contributed to the backlog. At the peak of the crisis, railroads were backed up from New York City to Buffalo, while 200 ships lay at anchor unable to load.
Coal shortages plagued the northeastern states and hindered the sailing of cargo ships, which further contributed to the traffic jams on the rail system. Finally, on 26 December 1917, President Wilson seized control over the railroads using authorities granted in the 1916 Army Appropriation Act. Concurrently, President Wilson created the U.S. Railroad Administration. Less than one month later, on 17 January 1918, the director of the Fuel Administration announced that factories in the eastern United States would close for four days in order to provide coal to the ships ready to sail.
1918 Cartoon Characterizing the Start-up of the U.S. Railroad Administration |
Resolution of the paralysis required control over shipments at the point of origin. Even before the federal seizure of the railroads, the War Department initiated a process to control shipments through a newly created Inland Traffic Division on the expanded General Staff. The supply bureaus lost their freedom to initiate shipments, and instead each rail shipment required a War Department Transportation Order from the Inland Traffic Division. Following seizure of the rail system, the Director General of Transportation instituted a similar system to resolve comparable conflicts among the other government agencies and essential civilian commerce.
Requests for a transportation order needed to include evidence that the receiving party was ready to unload and store the traffic, instead of using the cars as improvised storage. Other changes allowed for better tracking of freight cars and more efficient use of less crowded lines. With the coming of warmer weather the situation resolved itself.
Source: Source: "America Mobilizes," Over the Top, September 2017
No comments:
Post a Comment