About 15 years ago, there was a debate, mostly in a couple of books and academic journals like War in History as to weather the Schlieffen Plan was a real thing. Alfred Graf von Schlieffen (1833–1913) was a German field marshal and strategist who served as chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891 to 1906. I'm not in a position to judge such matters. If you are interested in the debate, you can find more on the various arguments HERE and HERE. Additionally, since Schlieffen died before the July Crisis and the coming of war, we are without any commentary from him on how he would have graded his former students, Moltke and Company, on their performance in August 1914.
What I'd like to show here is that the ghost of Schlieffen was present in the thinking, animating spirit, and actions of the German High Command in the opening of the war. Schlieffen's statements that I've gathered below are—of course—limited by my research and language skills. Also, I've not included the best known quote attributed to him, "When you march into France, let the last man on the right brush the channel with his sleeve." There is some question on its authenticity and I didn't think it was pertinent to this article. MH
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| Alfred Graf von Schlieffen |
On Policy and Command
A man is born, and not made, a strategist.
Attack is the best defense
In western Europe the military machine with its thousands of wheels, costing millions to maintain, cannot stand still for long. One cannot fight a war for one or two years, from position to position, in 12-day long battles until both combatants are completely exhausted and weakened and force to sue for peace. We must attempt to defeat our enemies quickly and decisively.
To win, we must endeavour to be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not in waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses for us.
The [coming] total battle as well as its parts, the separated as well as the contiguous battles, will be played out on fields and across areas that dwarf the theatres of earlier martial acts.
[The modern commander finds] himself further back in a house with a spacious office, where telegraphs, telephones and signals apparatus are to hand. . .There, in a comfortable chair before a wide table, the modern Alexander has before him the entire battlefield on a map.
During the Moroccan Crisis of 1905
These preparations [encircling Paris] can be made any way that you like: it will soon become clear that we will be too weak to continue the operation in this direction. We will have the same experience as that of all previous conquerors, that offensive warfare both requires and uses up very strong forces, that these forces become weaker even as those of the defender become stronger, and this is especially true in a land that bristles with fortresses.
From a military point of view I see the only solution in an immediate war against France. England is still weak from the Boer war, Russia is still tied down in her war against Japan, France is isolated, and we should be able to cope with France on her own.” . . . Now we could get out of the noose,” [and settle accounts with France.] . . . Let them come!
On Strategy and Tactics
Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not in waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses for us.
A German offensive that sought to wheel around Verdun] must not shrink from violating the neutrality of Belgium, as well as of Luxembourg. [When asked about this later.] Of course! It still holds good today. We have not become more stupid in the meantime.
However, it should not be forgotten that the enemy will take countermeasures against such turning movements and flank attacks, Hence a modern battle will be more than ever a struggle for the flanks. . . In the struggle for the flanks, he wins whose last reserve is not behind the front but on the extreme wing.
Most generals and almost all able commanders apprehend the danger of the units being defeated before their junction and zealously endeavor to execute the junction of separate units, and on the battlefield itself, but as long as possible before the battle.
A compIete battle of Cannae [i.e. one of annihilation] is rarely met in history. For its achievement, a Hannibal is needed on the one side, and a Terentius Varro, on the other, both cooperating for the attainment of the great goal.
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| Schlieffen's Grave in Berlin |
Quotes Schlieffen Liked
“Attack them bravely with our heavy guns, fire case shot at them and then gain their flank.” Frederick the Great
“One ages rapidly on battlefields.” Napoleon
Sources: Cannae by Schlieffen; Alfred von Schlieffen's Military Writings; Wikiquotes; Encyclopedia 1914-1918
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