Tim Cook on Canadian Trench Raiding and a Raid Too Far

Canadian Soldiers Training for a Gas Attack

Tim Cook is the award-winning Chief Historian and Director of Research at the Canadian War Museum.

After losing 24,000 casualties in the grisly fighting on the Somme, the Canadian Corps under the command of Sir Julian Byng turned in the winter of 1916–1917 to rebuilding its shattered battalions and integrating new troops into the formations. Despite their losses, and during this period of recuperation, the Canadians continued to harass the German lines by trench raids. Long had the Canadians been regarded by the British as elite soldiers and their refinement of trench raiding in the last month of 1915 had led Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, to congratulate the colonials for their skill and elan.

The Canadians transformed trench raiding to a deadly art, which wore away at the enemy's morale and strength as he was kept taut and nervous whenever opposite the "wild colonials." The raids were conducted in the dead of night and centered on the principle of destroy and retreat. They were not meant for holding ground in the enemy trench, simply to wreak havoc. The chaos of night fighting, false attacks and barrages up and down the enemy front line, disrupted communications, and the inherent confusion of ascertaining where the exact attack was being launched, left the defenders momentarily vulnerable. Yet trench raiding was not without its costs and the intricate plans could degenerate into mad, vicious battles with high casualties to both sides. Casualties notwithstanding, the success of the Canadians in winning control of no-man's-land, as well as recognition in the language of the trenches as "fire-eaters,"  further pressed their commanders to organize larger more innovative assaults. . .

Yet, it is still worth examining Canadian commanders and policies, rather than simply declaring them a breed apart from their British colleagues. Mistakes were made and the history of the Canadian Corps was not one of sweeping successes; it was, rather, one of learning from mistakes and making sure they did not happen again.

After a series of daring raids, the 4th Division [the newest and freshest of the Canadian Corps] planned a larger and riskier operation than anything carried out by its more experienced corps companions. It was to be launched against the heights of Vimy Ridge, a position which dominated Canadian lines and included the unmarked graves of thousands of Frenchmen from two previous failed but more formal assaults. 

As a result of the particularly strong position held by the Germans on top of the ridge, the planners decided that poison gas would be employed to suffocate the dug-in garrison. Components of four battalions would raid the enemy lines. This policy of raiding was not born in a vacuum, however, and there was a gradual evolution culminating in this massive chemical raid on 1 March 1917.

After several months of trench raids gathering in scope and size, the 4th Division planned to launch the largest Canadian raid of the war to date. It was labeled "a reconnaissance in force," and the operation was to consist of 1,700 men from the 54th, 72nd, 73rd, and 75th Battalions. Their objective was the highest point on Vimy Ridge, Hill 145 (where the Vimy Memorial now stands), a fortified series of interlocking machine gun nests, wire belts, and deep dugouts. 

A Canadian Attack Moves Forth

The danger and complexities of attacking up-hill where the Germans would have the advantages of their fixed defences as well as the heights, when combined with the difficulty of accurately laying down counter-battery fire on the enemy guns, resulted in the plan being conceived as a surprise attack. Because of the strong defensive position, it was necessary that poison gas smother the enemy before he realised what was occurring.

The conception was flawed from the start and the division's staff officers planning the raid had little understanding of how chemical agents worked in battlefield realities. Ever since the British disaster at Loos in 1915, canister-released gas clouds were seen as a fickle weapon, to be used only by specialists who were seen more as chemists than soldiers. There was simply very little understanding of this weapon by senior commanders, who hoped that any release of gas would emulate the first gassing at 2nd Ypres when two whole divisions were routed. Although gas was still a fearful weapon, better anti-gas discipline and respirators ensured that no such rout would occur again.

 Equally detrimental, the staff officers and commanders had neglected training their soldiers in any doctrine—or set of common accepted instructions or guidelines—about how to work with this weapon. Yet, because of the formidable position of the Germans on Vimy, gas was needed for the very reason that other more conventional weapons could not guarantee success. Gas was not the weapon of choice, but of desperation. Ill-placed faith created delusions which outweighed all logical assumptions.

Moreover, the heights of Vimy were ill suited for a gas cloud release. Being heavier than air, poison gas sinks into low-lying trenches, dugouts and shellholes. Gas was an useful weapon for ferreting the enemy out into the open, but it had to reach his lines first. For gas to move uphill would require a very strong breeze and without it the gas would pollute the craters and depressions that pocketed the Vimy battlefield—the exact positions that the attackers would have to pass over to reach their destination. Without a forceful breeze the operation would be fiasco. . .

[This raid did, indeed, turn into a fiasco.]  When the roll was called the next day, the full extent of the disaster became known; the four attacking battalions suffered 687 casualties—a 43 percent casualty rate  Tim Cook's detailed discussion of the failed raid can be read HERE.]

Canadian Stretcher Party Bearing Casualties

The 4th Division's gas raid was the single most self-destructive Canadian raid of the war. It not only temporarily impaired the fighting efficiency of the 4th Division, but called into question the whole policy of raiding. The most experienced Canadian divisional commander, Arthur Currie, who was soon to be appointed corps commander, had forbidden uncontrolled raiding in the months prior to the Battle of Vimy Ridge. After a study of the after-battle reports, he noted that the results generally did not bear out the casualties to the attackers. More detrimental, it was the best men of the units—the junior officers, NCOs and other ranks—who were generally lost. When necessary, Currie ordered raids to be carried out, but he certainly did not endorse such raids for the simple sake of keeping men busy. . . 

The spiraling policy of raiding had begun to get out of hand in the months prior to the assault on Vimy Ridge. The harsh rebuke of the Gas Raid of 1 March 1917, happened time and time again to those who had begun to expect results rather than carefully plan for them. As a result, the Canadians learned from their mistakes and returned to the basics of war-fighting. Byng's policy was to train every soldier to know all aspects of the battlefield and his expected role. The Gas Raid was a powerful lesson which drove officers and soldiers to hone their hard-won skills in order to never repeat such a disaster.

Source: Excerpted from “A Proper Slaughter”: The March 1917 Gas Raid at Vimy Ridge by Tim Cook.; Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999]