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| Back in Vladivostok |
Washington was not deterred by news of these clashes. Indeed, during this time Wilson clearly stated whom the "Amerikanskije soldaty" were fighting for. Five days after the "Romanovka Massacre," Secretary of State Robert Lansing ordered the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Roland Morris, to travel to Kolchak's (provisional) capital, Omsk. His instructions were, first, to meet with Kolchak's Supreme Council, though "not involving any present recognition of Kolchak, leaves us free to take a sympathetic interest in Kolchak's organization and activities," and second, "to impress upon the Japanese Government our great interest in the Siberian situation and our intention to adopt a definite policy that will include the 'Open Door' to a Russia free from Japanese domination." When Morris finally reached Omsk he described the situation as "extremely critical." On the same date, Wilson pronounced to the Senate the necessity and reason for an expeditionary force in Siberia, which was maintaining order on the Siberian railways on which "the forces of Admiral Kolchak are entirely dependent."
By this time, however, the end of the White effort in Siberia was already in sight. Kolchak's army was demoralized. The Czech Legion was soon to quit the fight and begin to plan (once again) their exit from Russia, and the Trans-Siberian became increasingly congested with refugees fleeing the advancing Red Army. To Morris, for the U.S. to properly assist Admiral Kolchak it would have to extend massive monetary and military aid to his flagging forces and reinforce the AEF by "at least 40,000 troops." This Wilson simply could not afford to do, even if those measures would ensure a Kolchak victory. Wilson's pragmatic wait-and-see policy allowed him (and his expeditionary force) to exit Siberia when all hope of successful counterrevolution had vanished. With the fall of Omsk in November, this time had clearly arrived and plans for a U.S. withdrawal were laid.
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| The U.S. Army Transport Thomas Returned Many of the American Troops to the Philippines |
Rather than idealistic or misguided, Wilson's Siberian policy, as executed by General Graves, allowed the president to cautiously play the situation with a minimum political and military cost. Graves resisted British demands for wider action and Japanese calls for assistance while the latter was suffering heavy losses against Bolshevik forces. The argument put forward that Wilson decided to intervene under pressure to be a good ally is countered by the fact that U.S. actions in Siberia served to antagonize all parties involved, Russian and Allied. By the winter of 1919–1920 all American forces were pulled back to Vladivostok and departing Siberia.
During the Civil War, however, that force served its purpose. By limiting its activities in Siberia it avoided being engulfed in the civil strife while supporting counterrevolution. Arms and supplies could continue to be shipped inland, White and Allied forces could continue to control the territory (at least around the railroad), and the Japanese could be observed and left to their own costly counterinsurgency campaign. President Wilson, in the meantime, could continue to proclaim the honorable intentions of U.S. intervention into Russian internal affairs while campaigning in Congress for a League of Nations based on self-determination.
It Was Nothing Like This
Viewed in their entirety, the American expeditions to North Russia and Siberia appear today as pathetic and ill-conceived ventures, to which Woodrow Wilson — poorly informed, harried with wartime burdens, and torn between his own instincts and his feeling of obligation to his Allies - was brought against his own better judgment. He did his best at all times to keep the American action from assuming the form of an interference in Russian internal affairs, and there is no suggestion more preposterous than that he was animated in these decisions by hostility toward the Russian people or by a desire to overthrow the Soviet regime with American forces. In both cases, his original decision was closely linked with America’s wartime concerns. Had there been no great European war in progress, neither expedition would ever have been dispatched.That the expeditions were regrettable — that it would have been better, from the standpoint of American interests, had they never been sent — seems hardly open to doubt. That they reflected imperialistic motives and constituted a serious injury to the Russian people is a figment of the imagination of Soviet propagandists, useful to their political purpose but not to the development of historical truth.
The Canadian 16th Brigade was also sent to Siberia, but was instructed by Ottawa to have no contact whatsoever with either the Red or the White Russians. Thus they stayed in Vladivostock.
ReplyDeleteRaymond Massey was part of that contingent, Jim. He entertained the troops.
Delete"I know the duty of an officer is to obey, not to reason why, but I have never been able to reconcile the orders I received with the actual conditions existing in Siberia." - Major General Graves
ReplyDeleteHarsh awakenings were near for General Graves in Siberia. Grave's orders contradicted the realities when boots were on the ground, where his troops experienced violent and chaotic skirmishes because of partisans, which left many American soldiers dead and wounded. Following his orders to protect the coal mines, railways, and helping the Czech legions. Consequently, American conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, where commanders faced the same dilemma as General Graves. Commanders in Vietnam were sent as advisors, but the situation turned into a Pandora's box, where conflict kept on getting worse. Therefore, orders from afar change because of the reality of the situation that confronts the commanders.