| French Trench Bois Brulé, St. Mihiel Sector, 1915 |
By Terrence Finnegan
The town of St. Mihiel on the Meuse River fell to the Germans on 24 September 1914, the beginning of a four-year occupation. American commentary four years later assessing the front line stated, "The German possession of St-Mihiel cuts both canal and railroad at that place and greatly embarrasses the French transportation system." The consequences of this German attack at St. Mihiel were serious. It placed the main rail, road, and canal supplying Verdun in enemy hands and brought the main lines of communication into Verdun within range of German guns. Verdun was supplied by a single railway the Petit Meusin, a narrow gauge line running from Bar-le-Duc. The danger presented by such conditions became evident when the battle of Verdun started in February 1916. Verdun was effectively neutralized as a base from which the French could conduct sustained and meaningful offensive operations in the region. To France, the German occupation of St. Mihiel became a visible and lasting hernie (hernia).
| Early Development of the St. Mihiel Salient 9 September 1914 |
Minor skirmishes became the norm for the most part. A French attack against St. Baussant on 12 December met with catastrophic losses, including several hundred prisoners taken by German forces. In December 1914 General Joffre placed the 32e corps d'armée at the disposal of General Sarrail. The simultaneous advance of the Germans on the heights of the Meuse and in the Argonne alerted Joffre to place more effective fighting units at the Woëvre. He personally considered the 32e corps d'armée to be one of the best
The new year saw General Joffre focusing on St. Mihiel. He issued a series of instructions on 21 January, ordering an attack against General der Infanterie von Strantz's detachment presently holding St. Mihiel on the east bank of the Meuse. The following months did not achieve the goal Joffre sought. On 18 March he informed General Dubail that he wanted IVe d'armée to undertake the operation to reduce the St. Mihiel salient as soon as possible, employing all means at his disposal in this attack. General Dubail had four corps d'armée and a corps de cavalerie to work with. GQG [French General Headquarters] planned an offensive for 5 April on the southern Woëvre plain to relieve Verdun.
The plan comprised two simultaneous attacks on either arm of the salient, one in the direction of Verdun to La-Chaussée and the other centered on Toul-Thiaucourt. On 30 March the French 73e division d'infanterie attacked along the Moselle River capturing over 500 metres of enemy trenches west of Bois-le-Prêtre in the Quart-en-Réserve. The 1re corps d'armée and 2e corps d'armée, which were to operate east of Verdun and against the northern arm of the St. Mihiel salient, were moving up the line with the intent of establishing themselves within assaulting distance, where they were to remain until the artillery bombardment commenced. The 31e corps d'armée established itself at several points only 100 meters from the edge of Bois de Mort-Mare (Death Pond).
| German Trench in the Eastern Part of the Sector |
Other offensive thrusts were made in early April. But things bogged down. Surprise was essential but the most difficult element to bring about. Orders were issued for absolute secrecy but, in spite of this, it was disconcerting to Maréchal Joffre how rapidly news spread. He discovered to his chagrin that the date and location of the attack was becoming common knowledge in Paris. With the advantage of surprise lost, the Germans responded by beefing up their forces.
Source: A Delicate Affair on the Western Front: America Learns How to Fight a Modern War in the Woëvre Trenches by Terrence Finnegan
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