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| Cosssacks Arriving in East Prussia |
The Plans for East Prussian and Galicia
Under the Eastern dimension of Germany's Schlieffen Plan a single army (the Eighth), made up primarily of territorial forces, was to be deployed against the slow-moving Russian goliath and defend the homeland. Later, after France had been disposed of, the entire German Army would be shifted to the east to confront the tsar's forces.
The opposing Russian War Plan XIX featured an ambitious double offensive. In the north, anticipating that France would be the initial focus of attention for the German Army, a two-army converging drive into East Prussia to threaten the Germans and relieve pressure on the French was to be executed. Not to be neglected, because its posture toward the Slavs of Serbia had brought Russia into the war, was the old enemy Austria Hungary. Four armies would mount a second invasion into Galicia, the empire's northernmost province with the goal of destroying the Austro-Hungarian Army.
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| Early Deployments in the East |
What Happened
In the north, Russia—responding to French appeals for alacrity—moved more quickly than anyone thought possible and crossed into German territory on August 17th. After being bloodied in the small-scale Battle of Gumbinnen the commander of the German Eighth Army Maximilian von Prittwitz proposed, then withdrew, a panicky request to abandon East Prussia. The decision to replace him had already been made, however. A new team, Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, had been dispatched to restore control.
Meanwhile, the Russian advance in East Prussia was developing its own problems. Initiated prematurely, the two armies found they were short of both manpower and ordnance. The greatest deficiency for the Russian forces, though, was in what is now called "command and control." The two Russian armies operated as though they were oblivious to one another's movements. Battlefield radio communication was also in the clear and unciphered, allowing German intelligence to deduce the southernmost Russian army (the Second) could be isolated and destroyed before the northernmost (the First) could come to its assistance.
The Battle of Tannenberg and the envelopment and destruction of the Second Army followed. Another setback, albeit less catastrophic, came for the First Army at the Masurian Lakes in September. Russia was driven out of East Prussia and would never regain the initiative in the war. The key element of Plan XIX had failed.
The 1914 campaign to the south in Galicia is one of the lesser-told tales of the Great War. After much pushing and shoving, though, the Russian steamroller proved too much for the Austro-Hungarian Army. By the end of the year, they had repelled an Austrian incursion into Poland, occupied the province of Galicia, and were threatening the passes across the Carpathian Mountains, gateway to Hungary. The first year of the war was an utter disaster for the empire that had wanted it most.
The Eastern Front never was quite as deadlocked as the West, but the sheer size of Russia and the sub-par leadership of the Austro-Hungarian command doomed it to be just as costly in human suffering.
Source: Over the Top, March 2009
William P. Gonzalez
ReplyDelete“Kein Operationsplan reicht mit einiger Sicherheit über das erste Zusammentreffen mit der feindlichen Hauptmacht hinaus.”-
ReplyDelete"No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy."- Helmuth von Moltke
Historians continue to debate if the Schieffen Plan was successful, but historians argue that Germany did not follow the exact plan accordingly. German Generals had to make decisions on the battlefield that did not align with the plan, which caused other problems, such as sustaining their advantage on the Western Front because of the transfer of resources to Austria-Hungary. Time was not on the German side, where they continued to bleed manpower and resources at an alarming rate. The Schieffen Plan provided short-term gains, and strategically, it was a deadlock.