The Rise of Joffre

In August 1914, General Joseph Joffre controlled the design and execution of French strategy. He had played a decisive role in shaping French strategy for the opening of the war. Before a 1919  Chamber of Deputies Commission, as well as in his memoirs, Joffre acknowledged his having kept secret his intentions from his political superiors, his subordinate commanders, and his staff. He defended having done so by arguing it was "impossible to fix a definite maneuver for execution a long time in advance." How did this one man come into almost total control of his nation's destiny.  General Robert Doughty tells the story.

Though the government and the Minister of War could have circumscribed Joffre's powers, 17 French political leaders did not demand before August 1914 that he reveal his strategic or operational intentions. Instead, they abided by the  relationship between political and military authorities spelled out in the October 1913 regulations on the operations of large units. Approved by a presidential decree and based on a report submitted by the Minister of War, the first paragraph of the regulations said:

The government, which has responsibility for the vital interests of the country, alone has the authority to fix the political objective of a war. If the struggle extends to several frontiers, it designates the principal adversary against which should be directed the greater part of the national forces. It consequently distributes the means of action and all types of resources and places them entirely at the disposition of the generals charged with being commanders-in-chief of the various theaters of operation.

On the very day that France ordered mobilization, Messimy—who again served as Minister of War during the first Rene Viviani government from 13 June until 26 August 1914—met with Joffre and discussed their relationship. They agreed, "The political direction of the war belongs properly to the government. The conduct of operations belongs exclusively to the commander-in-chief." Like the ministers who had preceded him, Messimy made no attempt to place strategy under the umbrella of the "political direction of the war" and instead left it with Joffre.

To his substantial authority over the French army Joffre added considerable experience in dealing with political leaders. Unlike most French officers, he often had dealt with civilian authorities as he climbed the ladder of success. After demonstrating in the colonies strong engineering and leadership skills, he returned to France and had an unusual sequence of assignments that enabled him to work smoothly with political leaders and avoid interference from them. One of the most significant of these was his service as Director of Engineers from 1904 to 1906, but he also commanded 6th Division (which had its headquarters in Paris) and then II Corps (located in Amiens, 100 km north of Paris). After being appointed Director of Rear Services in January 1910, he gained an  specially sophisticated understanding of logistics and railway transportation, an understanding that served him well in his victory on the Marne. He also gained a seat on the Superior Council of War and became the youngest member of that body.

Much like general officers in other countries who have served in national capitals and been responsible for important engineering, logistical, and transportation  activities, he developed skills and methods for working with political leaders that other senior officers did not possess.

French politicians, including those on the left, had a relatively high degree of confidence in him. Unlike general officers such as Castelnau, Ferdinand Foch, or Paul Pau, who were known for their conservative or Catholic views, he was known for his republican views, something he did little to affirm and nothing to disavow. Some officers referred to him as "the crab" not only because of his thick girth but also because he never moved to the right politically. Yet, he was never as vocal or open about his views as officers such as Maurice Sarrail, and he avoided public disagreements with political leaders. As he dealt with the leaders of the Third Republic, he rarely made unreasonable demands on them or ignored them, and he shrewdly avoided placing them in embarrassing circumstances by giving them impossible choices. This tactic reduced the chance of anyone interfering with or intruding upon his prerogatives.

Only after the heavy losses and failed offensives of 1914–16 did the political  leaders who had misread him recognize his strong will and independence, and  some eventually became his strongest critics. Messimy in particular regretted having elevated him to such a powerful position.

Armed with considerably more power than his predecessors and a crafty understanding of French politics, Joffre took advantage of the increasingly tense international situation and shaped French strategy to his liking. As he considered alternatives, he preferred an offensive strategy rather than a defensive one followed by an offensive. This preference stemmed partially from his personal faith in the offensive, a faith he would demonstrate again and again in the 29 months he commanded French forces in the Great War, but it also accorded with the sentiments of France's political leaders. At one key meeting, for example, in January 1912, the President of the Third Republic welcomed Joffre's emphasis on the offensive and said, "We are henceforth resolved to march straight at the enemy without any hesitation. The offense, which suits the temperament of our soldiers, shall assure us victory." Joffre's preference for the offensive also came from his recognition of the strategic advantages of the Franco-Russian alliance. He remained confident in the benefits of a two-front war against Germany, and the strategy he pursued in the opening days of the war—most notably the attack into Alsace-Lorraine-clearly fit within the context of coordinated offensives by French and Russian forces. 

[When war came] After concentrating the French army on the northeast frontier in the opening days of the war, he waited until after the Germans began their advance to complete the design of his strategy and did not fully inform his political superiors or his military subordinates until he published General Instructions No. 1 on 8 August.

As Joffre implemented his strategy, he complied with the provisions of the Franco-Russian alliance by attacking into Alsace and Lorraine, but he sent his main thrust through central Belgium toward Neufchateau and Arlon where he hoped to avoid the powerful enemy force driving toward his left and strike the enemy's less dense, more vulnerable center. French strategy in 1914 was Joffre's own. [And its failure was his.]

Source: "French Strategy in 1914: Joffre's Own," by Robert A. Doughty, The Journal of Military History, April 2003