A Dozen GREAT Great War Newspaper Headlines

Visit No Man's Land with Sapper

No Man's Land

Herman Cyril McNeile (Sapper)

Independently Published, 2023

 

No Man's Land by Lucien Jonas

H. C. McNeile (1888–1937) was a British soldier and author best known for creating the popular gentleman-adventurer character Bulldog Drummond. He began writing short stories from the trenches for the Daily Mail, adopting  the pen name "Sapper" (military slang for an engineer) because serving army officers were not allowed to publish under their own names. His writings on the war are considered highly authentic and were much admired by veterans of the fighting.

His No Man's Land is a novel written in 1917 while he was still on active service. The book delves into the experiences of soldiers during the war, told through the perspective of Clive Draycott, an officer called back to service after a period of leave. It captures the emotions, fears, and everyday realities of soldiers faced with the chaos and brutality of battle, while painting a vivid portrait of the camaraderie and resilience among men during tumultuous times. 

The opening of the novel introduces the lead character, Clive Draycott, and sets the stage for the narrative by exploring the atmosphere before the onset of war. As Draycott prepares for his return to the front lines, he reflects on the changes and fears that grip the society around him, contrasting the carefree attitude of civilians with the heavy burdens of duty and honor that weigh on soldiers. 

Original Cover
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The narrative unfolds with a mix of personal anecdotes and broader observations on the impact of the war, with poignant moments illustrating the pain endured by both those who go to fight and the loved ones they leave behind. The opening establishes an intimate connection between Draycott and the reader, hinting at the profound journey ahead as he steps into the chaos of "No Man's Land."

Mislearning from War: The Case of U.S. Coastal Artillery

American 12-inch Mortar Railway Mount

Editor's Note: The U.S. entered the war largely unprepared for industrial-scale manufacturing. Consequently, U.S. Coastal Artillery Corps (CAC) units deployed to Europe were primarily equipped with British and French weaponry.  The CAC converted older coastal guns  onto train carriages to move them along European tracks. These larger weapons struck deep targets behind enemy lines, helping cripple German rail nodes and supply dumps. They fought prominently in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Over 70,000 members of  the CAC in 34 regiments served on the Western Front in France

At the operational and strategic levels, there is the case of drawing a “lesson” that was an entirely erroneous application of wartime experience. The deployment of railway artillery for the coastal defenses of the United States in postwar years constituted a significant expense throughout World War II. Because the Coast Artillery Corps was the only branch of the U.S. Army with experience in indirect fire of heavy artillery before the war, Pershing had assigned it the responsibility for all heavy artillery—during World War I, those guns over five inches in diameter (about 130-mm.). 

CAC Mobile Long Range Artillery

In addition to towed artillery, this included the huge siege guns 12 inches and over. Because these pieces were so heavy that French roads would not support their movement, they were mounted and moved on modified or specially designed railway flatcars. Impressed with their effectiveness as siege artillery, the men of the Coast Artillery Corps came back from their war experiences enthusiastically advocating the railroad gun as a coast artillery weapon in the United States.

35th CAC, 80th Div. Loading a 14" Gun on the Argonne Front

Partly because Congress increasingly saw the coast artillery fortifications as anachronistic in the emerging age of the airplane, it was reluctant to appropriate funds for manning and maintaining the seacoast forts after the war. The chief of the Coast Artillery was, however, successful in persuading Congress to appropriate funds for railway artillery by asserting that it would enhance and supplement the forts and expand their ability to defend the coastal cities. Superficially, railroad guns for the Coast Artillery sounded like a good idea—even some diehards in the corps could see that the fortifications would become increasingly vulnerable to bombardment from the air. Railroad guns, it was envisioned, would be able to range up and down the coasts at will, shelling a hostile fleet at any point. 

Railway Mounted 8-inch Gun of the Post-WWI Period

In practice, it was an impossible concept. The weight of the railroad artillery meant that most railroad arteries could not carry them without special reinforcement. The guns could not fire from any random point on the line but had to have special reinforced concrete hardstands on railroad spurs. In effect, they were only a little more mobile than the fortifications, with all the same vulnerabilities to attack from air or sea. In the process of deploying, manning, and maintaining railway coast artillery, the United States squandered millions of scarce dollars during the interwar period, all to field a weapon that was unable to perform its mission of destroying enemy warships and was obsolete before it was built.

Source:  Learning Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces, Kenneth E. Hamburger, United States Army Center of Military History; WWIVet.com

Goodbye Nivelle! Welcome Pétain!

French Troops Pinned Down on the Chemin des Dames

The Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames failed in April and May 1917 because unrealistic promises of a rapid 48-hour breakthrough collided with poor tactical planning, bad weather, and deep German defensive preparations. General Robert Nivelle had promised to halt his "steamroller" operation if it did not succeed with 48 hours. Instead, he continued pushing his forces to attack for weeks, losing  30,000 killed, 100,000 wounded, and 4,000 captured. He had to go.  In the article, Brigadier General Robert Doughty tells the story of his replacement of  General Nivelle by General Philippe Pétain. More details on what Nivelle's "Winning Formula" was can be found HERE. 

One of the first casualties of the offensive was Nivelle's position as commander of French forces on the north and northeastern front. Aware of threats against his remaining in command, Nivelle visited Pétain on 27 April and offered him a position as his chief of staff. He made the offer even though he did not like Pétain personally and considered him too pessimistic and negative. Obviously, he thought having Pétain close to him would help deflect personal attacks. Pétain had already been informed, however, by a representative from the Ministry of War on 24 April that if Nivelle were relieved, he would be Nivelle's replacement. So he declined Nivelle's offer without warning the besieged general of his imminent relief. 

A few days later Pétain was summoned to Paris to meet with Painlevé and then Ribot, who told him formally that he would become chief of the General Staff and shortly thereafter succeed Nivelle as commander of the Armies of the North and Northeast. With the offensive formally ended but with its remnants still stirring, the government was unwilling to relieve Nivelle and thereby acknowledge publicly the  failure of the offensive; political leaders also were reluctant to infuriate the British by not supporting  their Arras offensive.

Nivelle

Pétain became chief of the General Staff on 29 April, and on 1 May he arrived in Paris and began carving out a larger role for himself. First, he sought to limit what Nivelle could do by limiting the size and scope of a new attack being planned for the Reserve Army Group. With the support of the minister of war, he canceled the most difficult part of this operation, the attack on Brimont. Next, on 4 May, he attended a meeting with the British to address their fears that the French, under his hand, would adopt a defensive strategy and do nothing but await the arrival of American forces. By the end of the meeting, the British and French had agreed that they would no longer seek a “rupture” of the enemy's front but instead would focus their efforts on destroying the enemy's forces and preserving their own. With limited objectives and incessant attacks, particularly with artillery, the two allies could weaken German forces and ultimately prevail. In essence, the two allies had accepted Pétain's method, which relied on attrition of the enemy, not rupturing German lines.

Getting rid of Nivelle proved to be complicated. On 11 May, the French government asked him to resign but he refused. He told a liaison officer, “They want my hide...But neither my dignity, my conscience, nor my sense of what I owe my country permits me to play their game.” On the morning of 15 May, Poincaré and Painlevé met with Nivelle, but he remained adamant.

That same day the Council of Ministers demoted him to being an army group commander, and Pétain succeeded him as commander of the Armies of the North and Northeast. Since there was no vacant position for an army group commander, Nivelle was put on leave for three months. Pétain later refused to allow Nivelle to take command of an army group, and he eventually was reassigned as commander of French forces in North Africa. Pétain took command of the Armies of the North and Northeast, a month after the beginning of the Nivelle offensive and three days before General John J. Pershing received orders naming him commander of the American Expeditionary Force. Pétain's first task was to repair the damage done by Nivelle and his second was to welcome the arrival of the U.S. Army. 

Pétain

To strengthen the confidence and capability of the army, Pétain began by reassuring French soldiers that their lives would not be wasted in useless attacks. In essence, he renounced costly offensives but he did not renounce offensives. On 19 May, four days after being named commander of the northern and northeastern fronts, he published his Directive No. 1 which stated explicitly that the situation on the Western Front ruled  out, “for the moment,” a “rupture” of the front followed by “strategic exploitation." The French, he said, had to deal with the “actual war” and not some false model detached from reality. Obviously with the failed Nivelle offensive in mind, he explained that a huge attack aimed at distant objectives would lose the benefit of surprise because of its size and would be costlier for the attacker than the defender. 

He preferred limited offensives that could be launched with minimum preparation and could surprise the enemy. Such attacks would rely as much as possible on the artillery and avoid unnecessary exposure of the infantry. Instead of trying to end the war quickly, the French had to launch operations, he said, that, while avoiding casualties in the infantry, would inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy. Such operations could occur anywhere along the front and thereby could “fix the enemy and take away his freedom of action.” When the situation changed, meaning when it was time to do something else, Pétain would issue, he said, new directives for the ensuing operations.

Meanwhile, Pétain did not halt all attacks, and he maintained pressure on some of the same points Nivelle had attacked. He did not know how the war would end, but he expected his limited offensives to bleed the Germans considerably and ultimately to compel them to seek peace. As Pétain's critics noted at the time, this could take a long time, for years. Some soldiers saw no reason to be optimistic about the outcome. 

Source: Over the Top, May 2017

The Official Report On the Lost Battalion Incident

HEADQUARTERS 77TH DIVISION

France.

April 15, 1919

 

General Order Number 30:

      I desire to publish to the command an official recognition of the valor and extraordinary heroism in action of the officers and enlisted men of the following organizations:

Companies A, B, C, E, G, H       308th Infantry

Company K                               307th Infantry

Companies C, D         306th Machine Gun Btln.

Some of the Lost Battalion Survivors Near the Site

      These organizations, or detachments therefrom, comprised the approximate force of 550 men under command of Major Charles W. Whittlesey, which was cut off from the remainder of the 77th Division and surrounded by a superior number of the enemy near Charlevaux, in the Forest d'Argonne, from the morning of 3 October 1918, to the night of 7 October 1918.

      Without food for more than 100 hours, harassed continuously by machine gun, rifle, trench mortar and grenade fire, Major Whittlesey's command, with undaunted spirit and magnificent courage, successfully met and repulsed daily violent attacks by the enemy. They held the position which had been reached by supreme efforts, under orders received for an advance, until communication was re-established with friendly troops.

      When relief finally came, approximately 194 officers and men were able to walk out of the position. Officers and men killed numbered 107.

      On the fourth day a written proposition to surrender received from the Germans was treated with the contempt which it deserved.

      The officers and men of these organizations during these five days of isolation continually gave unquestionable proof of extraordinary heroism and demonstrated the high standard and ideals of the United States Army.

Robert Alexander, Major General, US Army

Commanding

______________________________

Visit our other articles covering the Lost Battalion HERE.

Where Did Trotsky Come From?

Trotsky's gifts—his brilliance as an orator, author, theoretician, and strategist—would prove decisive for the unfolding of what history calls the October Revolution, as well as the civil war to follow. However, his deficiencies at winning personal loyalty and building political alliances would eventually lead to his marginalization in the post-Lenin Soviet state, his exile, and eventual death. MH

Leon Trotsky

Born Lev Bronshtein in November 1879 in the village of Yanovka in the Ukraine, Leon Trotsky, the son of a prosperous Jewish farmer, became involved in politics from a young age. Arrested in 1898, Trotsky was exiled to Siberia, where he married and had two daughters, both of whom predeceased him. In 1902, he escaped exile using a forged passport bearing the name Trotsky, the name, he later claimed, of a prison guard he had met in Odessa. He made his way to London, where he made the acquaintance of  Vladimir Lenin and joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Following the split of the RSDLP, Trotsky's loyalty floated between the two factions, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, often repudiating any party ties and holding a stance of non-allegiance. He opposed Lenin on many issues, a stance that was later held against him.

Following the outbreak of disturbances throughout Russia in 1905, Leon Trotsky arrived in St. Petersburg and there joined its council of workers, or "Soviet,"  becoming its chair until its forced break-up by tsarist troops in December. Trotsky, along with other leaders, was arrested and again sentenced to exile in Siberia, but en route he escaped and again made his way to London before settling in Vienna, where he founded and wrote a newspaper for Russia's workers, Pravda (Truth), earning the nickname "The Pen," (Пиро—Piro) for his writing. 

With the outbreak of war in 1914, Trotsky, as a Russian, was forced to leave Austria. He lived in Paris until, expelled for his anti-war writings, he emigrated to Spain and then New York, arriving in January 1917. During the two months he spent in America he found himself fascinated by the nation's dynamism, as it was distilled into its most concentrated form in New York City, although he was quite disappointed in the quality of the socialist leadership he observed firsthand. 

Trotsky Returns

After the February Revolution, Trotsky returned (with some difficulty, as he was arrested and roughly handled by the Royal Navy) to a "free" Russia and Petrograd (as St. Petersburg had been known since 1914) in May 1917 and became, in effect, Lenin's second-in-command for the Bolsheviks. Stalin had arrived in Petrograd at the end of the February Revolution, and Lenin followed in April. Now the three most influential Communists were together in Russia's capital plotting revolution. It would be Trotsky alone, however, who would plan and command the final ascendence of the Bolsheviks. “Insurrection,” he would say, “is not an art, it is an engine. Technical experts are required to start it, and they alone could stop it.”  

Leon Trotsky was the "technical expert" of Russia's October Revolution.

Source: Historyinanhour.com; The Technique of Revolution, Curzio Malaparte, 1931; Over the Top, November 2017

 

Eyewitness: Our General Visits the Front at Cantigny

Capt. Charles Evans, 6th Field Artillery

[The general is this account is Brigadier General Charles P. Summerall, who was the commander of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, of the 1st Division at the time. He was later promoted to major general and commanded the First Division and V Corps. From 1926 to 1930 he was the Army Chief of Staff.  The witness is Lt. Henry C. Evans of the 6th Field Artillery under General Summerall's command at the time, who would go on to become a general himself in the Second World War.]

From Lt. Charles Evans

Summerall used to visit us nearly every day and we were scared to death of him. The first unit in the regiment that would see him coming on his inspection tour would telephone all the rest of the batteries merely saying on the phone “Sitting Bull on the Warpath” and that was notice to get ready for inspection. These inspections were stiff enough so that shoes had to be shined, men shaved and no cigarette butts or match sticks within a hundred yards of the battery position. Summerall was very strict and fired officers out of the regiment right and left. Colonel [Charles] Pulis had been relieved from duty a few days before I arrived at the regiment. Eventually Colonel Scott was relieved. We also had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Neal, Major Starkey, Captain Haines,  Captain Huston, Captain Donnell and innumerable lieutenants. Captain Larabee who commanded A Battery was so scared of being relieved and so violent in his criticism of Summerall that he transferred to General Headquarters (GHQ). He later got sick of that and came up to the front with another unit. . .

Major General Charles P. Summerall [left] Later in the War, When
He Commanded V Corps

On May 27 the attack on Cantigny took place.  We fired a rolling barrage for some hours as the Infantry went forward. Prior to the attack early in the morning of the 27th, each battery adjusted its barrage. This adjustment was done with a time schedule, each battery having about five minutes to fire four shots on its initial barrage line. We would watch the battery on our left and when they completed we would fire ourselves to see if it connected properly with the Battery on the left.

For the next three days we caught the devil as the Germans counterattacked many times and drenched the whole countryside with gas and high explosive shells. 

About this time we were ordered to build a reserve position in the rear and started digging gun emplacements and dugouts about a mile back. Practically every day General Summerall would make an inspection of each battery and was strict all of the time about the looks of the men and the cleanliness of the gun position. He also questioned all men on duty and we had to keep the men thoroughly posted all of the time on their duties and try to have the most intelligent men on duty when the general came around.

One day General Summerall and Colonel Crane were at the battery position. As they completed their inspection the following conversation took place between General Summerall and Colonel Crane:

Summerall: “Crane, now that the Trench Mortar Battery is under your command I expect them to obey my orders in every detail.”

Crane: “Yes, sir.”

Summerall: “As you know, I have ordered them to do all of their work at night time and keep hidden in the day as they are in a defensive position and I do not want their position known to the enemy.”

Crane: “Yes, sir.”

Summerall: “Crane, I would like to inspect the Trench Mortar Battery. Let’s go over there.”

I could see from Colonel Crane’s face that he did not know anything about the Trench Mortar Battery or where it was. I had seen it go into position the night before and was about to suggest that I lead them to the place when Crane said: “General Summerall, you have given them orders to keep hidden in the day time. I think it would be bad discipline for us to inspect the position during the day.” General Summerall said: “Quite right, Crane, quite right. I will be back at dusk.”

As soon as Summerall was out of earshot Crane turned to me and said “Where in the devil is that Trench Mortar Battery. I never heard of it before.” The order concerning the Trench Mortar Battery had come to Crane’s headquarters and Charlie Baird, Crane’s adjutant, had probably forgotten to show it to him. 

The 6th Field Artillery on the March

[Later, during the Argonne Offensive]  We marched all night and pulled into a wood near Nixeville early the next morning. General Summerall [now the division commander] came by the next morning and as his car stopped made the remark to another general in the car with him “I see this is part of my old brigade so we do not have to inspect them as I know they are all right.” While he was our brigade commander we were scared to death of him and he was very hard-boiled but as soon as he was promoted to a larger command he got very hard-boiled with everyone else except his old brigade and nothing was too good for us after that.

Source:  Over There with the AEF: The World War I Memoirs of Captain Henry C. Evans 1st Division, American Expeditionary Forces

Lloyd George's Postwar Anti-Haig Offensive

In 1933–38, former British prime minister David Lloyd George published—in six successive volumes—his War Memoirs. The first 600 pages deal with the period 1914–1916, concentrating mainly on his impressions of the politicians of the time and their conduct of the war, and including 200 pages on his work at the Ministry of Munitions.  The remaining 1,400 pages of the War Memoirs. deal with the war in great detail. While not of the literary quality of, say, Winston Churchill's writings, their combative tone, lively personality sketches, and his "ringside seat view" of all the war's events made them highly readable.

After deciding to write his memoirs in 1922, he had spent the remainder of the decade gathering information. He seems to have drawn on his political allies, key historians, and the entire British Civil Service for support. Lloyd George was, of course, driven by a desire to defend his own record of wartime leadership and to shift responsibility for the nation's stupendous casualty count to other parties.

Lloyd George did not publicly criticize Haig in the war's aftermath, when Haig was widely revered across Britain as a national hero, spending his retirement championing the welfare of veterans through the Royal British Legion. Haig, by most accounts, experienced mostly positive press during the 1920s. Nor did Haig choose to complain about his former prime minister. Their personal contacts during this period have been described as "formal," "cold," and an "armed truce." This long period of surface calm  contributed to the power and shock of a no-holds-barred attack on Douglas Haig, which Lloyd George would launch almost 20 years after the Armistice.

David Lloyd George’s postwar indictment of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig stands as one of history's most influential and scathing political assassinations of a military reputation. Published as part of his multi-volume War Memoirs during the latter 1930s, the former British prime minister fiercely condemned the commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) for his handling of World War I. LLoyd George did not begin writing the work until 1931, three years after Haig's death, fully aware that—while the late field marshal would surely have his defenders—no one approaching his own stature as Britain's successful wartime leader would be able to effectively challenge his allegations.

David Lloyd George and Field Marshal Douglas Haig

In these writings, Lloyd George labeled Haig a "second-rate Commander" who was "intellectually and temperamentally unequal to the command of an Army of millions." He accused him of  failing to comprehend modern mechanized warfare. He claimed Haig mistakenly chose to fight devastating machine guns and artillery with sheer manpower and outdated cavalry tactics. Haig's offensives, he wrote, were, "heavy-footed and clattering movements" characterized by "long laborious and noisy preparations" that completely threw away the element of tactical surprise.

The thoroughness of the assault, rather than the substance of the charges has become its own object of study for historians.  In his 1997 Liddell Hart Centre Lecture, Professor Brian Bond detailed Lloyd George's criticisms of Field Marshal Haig made in the memoirs.

The work which surely did most damage to the generals and their part in winning the war was Lloyd George's Memoirs, published in six volumes between 1933 and 1936. The former Prime Minister, assisted by Liddell Hart, clearly delighted in demolishing the reputation of Field Marshal Earl Haig, by then safely dead. Haig's entry has five columns in the index, including this sample:

 His reputation founded on cavalry exploits.

 Insists on premature use of tanks.

 His refusal to face unpleasant facts.

 his limited vision.

 Viciously resists Lloyd George's attempts to get unity of command.

 His stubborn mind transfixed on the Somme.

 Prefers to gamble with men's lives rather than to admit an error.

 Completely ignorant of the state of ground at Passchendaele.

 Painstaking but unimaginative.

 Narrowness of his outlook.

 Incapable of changing his plans.

 His liking for great offensives.

 Unequal to his task.

 Did not inspire his men.

 His ingenuity at shifting the blame to other shoulders than his own.

 Only took part in two battles during the war.

So, it is clear, the Prime minister was not wholly satisfied with his Commander-in-Chief! But  note also two further entries:

 Lloyd George had no personal quarrel with...

 (and) No conspicuous officer better qualified for highest command than.

One should also not miss the index entries on 'Military Mind' which include:

 Military Mind, narrowness of.

 Stubbornness of, not peculiar to America.

 does not seem to understand arithmetic.

 Represented by Sir Henry Wilson's fantastic memorandum.

 Obsessed with the North-West Frontier of India.

 Impossibility of trusting.

 Regards thinking as a form of mutiny.

The Most Famous Photograph of Haig and Lloyd George Together

When the memoirs were published, the British nation's attitudes about the war were already shifting dramatically. The crusade against Kaiserism and Militarism was long forgotten. The postwar rituals of sacrifice and remembrance had been fulfilled with memorials and cemeteries—well, everywhere. And veterans, including the mutilated and psychologically damaged, were writing memoirs, and novels, and poems about a vast "Cockup" and a "Great Betrayal."  All that was needed to perfect a mythic entity of an utterly evil and pointless war was to personalize it with a villain, and Lloyd George provided him with Field Marshal Haig.

Lloyd George's writings were essential to permanently shape a new historical narrative, giving birth to a popular "lions led by donkeys" myth that portrays British soldiers as brave heroes pointlessly sacrificed by incompetent generals. This viewpoint—although still widespread and influential in popular culture—is, however, uniquely British. Other participants in the war had brutally unsuccessful generals—Cadorna of Italy, Neville of France, Conrad von Hötzendorf of Austria—but none of them were attacked with the peculiarly intense vehemence that Lloyd George showed towards his  nation's senior field commander.  

Sources:  JohnClare.net; The First World War by Stuart Robson; Liddell Hart Centre

J.M. Barrie's Wartime Plays — Echoes of the War

Echoes of the War

J.M. Barrie

Leopold Classic Library, 2016 

Playbill from an Off-Broadway Production

Originally published in 1918, this collection of four short plays,  from the pen of J. M. Barrie, the beloved author of Peter Pan, is set against the backdrop of World War I and captures the emotional depth and human spirit of those enduring the trials of war. Each story delves into the lives of ordinary people, their hopes, fears, and unwavering resilience amidst the chaos.

• The Old Lady Shows Her Medals: Follow the touching journey of Mrs. Dowey, an elderly charwoman who invents a son fighting at the front to gain respect among her peers, but, then, the imaginary son becomes a reality. 

• The New Word: Explore the strained yet tender relationship between a father and his son as they grapple with the impending separation due to the son's enlistment. 

• Barbara’s Wedding: Witness the story of Barbara, whose marriage is shaped by the shadow of war.  

• A Well-Remembered Voice: A mother hears the voice of her deceased son. 

Critic Jenna Kubly nicely summarized the unifying qualities of the four pieces:

A reading of these four one-acts reveals a narrative of wartime Britain: the collection begins with one family sending their son off to war and ends with another family that must come to terms with loss and an awareness of changing times. Each play deals with a different family, but collectively they suggest an “Every Family,” peopled not with unbelievable heroes and heroines (as was often typical of drama depicting war), but more realistic characters, neither perfect nor immortal. Barrie’s wartime drama, often considered quaint and sentimental, has largely been ignored by scholars, but a reconsideration demonstrates that his works are of critical merit, insightfully depicting aspects of the British experience of the Great War. . .

Without resorting to the formulaic plots that so many other wartime plays followed, Barrie’s plays supported the British cause. Without being truly unpatriotic, his dramas did not deny the humanity of the enemy and contained moments of subtle doubt. His dramas explored the shifting attitudes of Britain to the war, emphasizing recurring themes of sacrifice, patriotism, and the breakdown of class structure. . . The reactions to the war that Barrie portrayed ranged from distrust of the Germans to realism about the war and its effects on families, from determination that the war must continue at all costs to a nostalgic looking back to pre-war Europe with a desire that things could have remained unchanged.

 

Order HERE

Sources: Publisher provided information; Jenna Kubly's comments are from Humor, Entertainment, and Popular Culture during World War.

Charles Whittlesey and His Ancestors Have Left Lasting Contributions to American Life

Major General Clarence R. Edwards pinning the Medal of Honor on
Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Whittlesey,  Boston Common, 24 December 1918

By Philip R. Devlin

Few stories of World War I are better known than the story of the Lost Battalion, a unit in the 308th Infantry of the 77th Division commanded by Major Charles W. Whittlesey. Numerous books and at least two movies exist to tell the dramatic story of the Lost Battalion. Few people realize, however, the remarkable story of the Connecticut 17th Regiment during the Battle of Long Island on 27 August 1776. Like Major Whittlesey’s World War I unit, the Connecticut 17th, a unit of about 300 men, was cut off from the rest of its army. It was surrounded by thousands of British and Hessian soldiers; nevertheless, the 17th inflicted more casualties on the enemy that day on Battle Hill than any other patriot unit. Most importantly, it guarded the flank of the Maryland 400, enabling that valiant unit’s rearguard action to effect the successful retreat of Washington’s army from Brooklyn.

One member of the Connecticut 17th was Private Duren Whittlesey of Haddam, Connecticut, a third cousin four generations removed from Major Charles W. Whittlesey. It is simply an amazing historical coincidence that these distant cousins, both directly descended from John and Ruth Whittlesey, 17th-century settlers of Old Saybrook, Connecticut, found themselves in desperate, parallel circumstances in their respective wars.

Major Whittlesey’s battalion of 554 men was ordered to attack a heavily fortified German line on 2 October 1918, during the Meuse-Argonne campaign. When French units on either side of the 308th withdrew under heavy fire, Whittlesey’s unit was cut off in the Charlevaux Ravine in the Argonne Forest and surrounded by German attackers. The 308th refused to surrender and withstood withering attacks for five days—including friendly fire—before being rescued. Just 194 men of the battalion were able to walk out of the ravine.

Following his unit’s valiant five-day ordeal, Major Charles W. Whittlesey was promoted to lieutenant colonel and was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Feeling personally responsible for the loss of so many of his men, he was besieged by both survivor guilt and incessant media attention for being a hero. Whittlesey finally died by suicide in 1921, jumping off the stern of a boat bound for Havana, Cuba. The Williams College and Harvard Law School graduate was only 37 years old.

Private Duren Whittlesey (1726-1776) was raised in Old Saybrook, but he spent his adult life in Haddam, Connecticut, raising five sons and contributing to the local community as both  a farmer and a tradesman. (Whittlesey is a DAR Patriot Ancestor #A125571.) Duren Whittlesey died as a result of the Battle of Long Island (sometimes also called the Battle of Brooklyn.) The exact circumstances of his death are unknown. He may have died on the battlefield; more likely, he died in captivity as a POW under the brutal circumstances of the notorious British prison ships in New York.

Commemorative Stamp for the Battle of Brooklyn (Long Island)

The small town of Haddam, Connecticut, paid a severe price during the American Revolution, losing 35 of its soldiers. Private Duren Whittlesey was one of 19 men from Haddam who died as a result of the Battle of Long Island, the largest open field battle of the entire American Revolution. It should be noted also that two of Duren’s nephews, John and Stephen Whittlesey, were both killed in action during the Fort Griswold Massacre in Groton on 6 September 1781, an attack that was led by General Benedict Arnold. John was 23 and was bayoneted to death; Stephen, just 16, was shot through the forehead. Duren’s cousin, Captain Asaph Whittlesey, served with the 24th Connecticut Militia Regiment and was killed in Pennsylvania in the infamous Wyoming Valley Massacre on 3 July 1778.  Asaph’s brother, Martin, was with Washington in the defense of New York where he suffered a wound so severe that he collected an invalid pension for the rest of his life. Wars have indeed taken a heavy toll on the Whittlesey family.

Captain Gordon Buell
(Key In-Law)

Both Duren and Charles Whittlesey have numerous interesting connections to other well-known historical figures. Duren’s younger sister, Martha, married a Revolutionary War officer from Killingworth, Connecticut, named Captain Gordon Buell. They were the parents of Sarah Josepha Hale. Sarah not only was the author of the verse “Mary Had a Little Lamb,” but she is also known as the “Mother of Thanksgiving.” Sarah began a letter writing campaign to presidents, starting in 1846 with Polk, advocating for Thanksgiving to become a national holiday. President Lincoln liked her idea, thus Thanksgiving became a national holiday in 1863. As an editor of Godey's Magazine and Godey's Lady's Book—the first female editor in American history—Sarah Josepha Hale might be regarded today as an “influencer,” as her articles about Thanksgiving in that popular magazine have established most of our Thanksgiving traditions, especially traditional Thanksgiving meals.

Mother of Thanksgiving
Mary Josepha Hale

The Whittlesey family is also connected to Ulysses S. Grant. Duren’s son, Samuel, married Anna Grant from Windsor, Connecticut—the ancestral home of President Grant. Anna was a cousin of our famous Civil War general and 18th president.

Duren’s youngest son, William, married Mehitable Fitch, the great-grandmother of John Fitch, now thought by many to be the first inventor of the steamboat. Yet another Charles Whittlesey (1808–1886), a Civil War colonel from Ohio as well as a geologist and historian, published a lengthy defense of John Fitch as the first inventor of the steamboat.

Model of John Fitch's Steamboat
(Library of Congress)

Interestingly, Private Duren Whittlesey of Haddam had two grandsons and three great-grandsons who were graduates of Williams College, the alma mater of Major Charles W. Whittlesey of World War I fame! Furthermore, another relative of Duren Whittlesey who fought in the American Revolution was also named Charles Whittlesey. Charles served as a lieutenant in Colonel Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment. His captain in that unit was none other than Nathan Hale!

Despite all of these interesting historical relationships among members of the Whittlesey family, nothing, however, tops the simply amazing coincidence of two distant cousins—Duren and Charles—who found themselves fighting for two valiant cut-off units in their respective wars 142 years apart!

The Kurds and World War One

A Troop of Kurdish Tribesmen During the War

The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism

The idea that Kurds deserve their own independent homeland started to flourish during the late 19th century. "The Kurdish nation is a nation apart," one Kurdish sheikh wrote in 1880. "We want to take matters into our own hands." However, as the site Kurdish/ Kurdistan History states: "Before WWI, Kurdish society was divided between tribal authority, religious sheikhs, Ottoman loyalists, autonomists and separatists. After World War I, the Kurdish nationalist movement would experience a brief peak of hope followed by deep fragmentation."

War and the Sick Man of Europe

During World War I, several Kurdish rebellions erupted across the Ottoman Empire between 1914 and 1918, driven by forced conscription, heavy taxation, wartime famine, and a growing desire for regional autonomy. These uprisings severely threatened the Ottoman rear, forcing the empire to divert troops from the front lines to suppress internal unrest. In 1916, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain and France secretly agreed to divide much of the Ottoman Middle East into future spheres of influence. 

President Woodrow Wilson, however, argued during the Paris conference that the Kurds deserved a sovereign state and the Allied powers (primarily Great Britain, alongside France) agreed in principle. It was even specified by the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, one of the spin-off agreements of the Treaty of Versailles. But when the dust settled and the borders of the Middle East had been redrawn, the Kurds were to be left out. 

Atatürk Meeting with Kurdish Tribesmen

 

Kurdish aspirations were ultimately defeated by the new post-Ottoman government of Turkey, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which forcefully rejected any Kurdish claims on Anatolia where the most of the Kurds lands lay. This position was buttressed by memories of the Kurds open rebellions and passive resistance during the war, as well as their treasonous aid to the Russian enemy. These activities included:

Rebellions

• 1914 (Bitlis Uprising): Orchestrated by Kurdish tribal leaders just before the outbreak of global hostilities, this early revolt was quickly suppressed by Ottoman authorities. 

• 1915–1916 (Botan and Dersim): Widespread armed resistance broke out in the Botan and Dersim regions. The Ottomans retaliated harshly, burning villages and initiating mass deportations of Kurdish populations. 

• 1917 (Summer Waves): Twin waves of rebellion hit the regions of Kharput, Mardin, Diyarbekir, and Bitlis. The August uprising notably received tactical military support from advancing Russian forces. 

• 1918  (Barzanji Autonomy): Just before the Armistice of Mudros in October, Kurdish leader Mahmud Barzanji broke away from Ottoman rule in Sulaymaniyah. He established a short-lived, quasi-independent Kurdish state under British supervision. 

Indirect Opposition

Beyond direct military confrontations, many Kurdish civilians engaged in subversion against the Ottoman war effort. Thousands of Kurds, for instance, actively resisted Ottoman military drafts, choosing to flee or join rebel factions rather than fight on the front lines.

Some Kurdish tribal units became entangled in the Ottoman destruction and displacement of Armenian populations. Disapproving of state actions, other Kurdish communities hid and adopted Armenian refugees to protect them during the Armenian Genocide. 

[Note: The war was also devastating for Kurdish civilians. Nearly 700,000 Kurds were forcibly removed from their homes by Turkish forces; as many as 400,000 are believed to have died.]

Aid for Russian Forces 

Many Kurdish tribal leaders and irregular cavalry initially supported the Ottoman war effort against Russia and Britain, expecting regional autonomy or protection in return.  In the eastern theater, some Kurdish tribes provided intelligence and logistical support to the advancing Imperial Russian Army. This was not easily forgotten by the Turks.

The Treaty of Sèvres Would Have Resulted in a Large Kurdish Nation

 

Summing Up

The chaos of the war initially opened doors for Kurdish self-determination. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres—signed by the defeated Ottoman Empire—included concrete provisions for an autonomous or independent Kurdish state.  The Treaty was  signed by Sultan  Mehmet VI on 20 August 1920 between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire. It was, however, never ratified—primarily because of intense internal, nationalist opposition led by Kemal.  Following the Turkish War of Independence, the new nationalist government demanded renegotiated terms. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne fully replaced Sèvres, entirely omitting any mention of a Kurdish homeland and partitioning traditional Kurdish lands among Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.  The erasure of  Kurdistan from the final war settlement laid the groundwork for decades of subsequent interwar revolts.  

Much of  what was to be Kurdistan remained in Turkey, which was now ruled by a nationalist movement. President Atatürk announced, "The state which we have just created is a Turkish state." The Turkish government—promoting a policy of assimilation—initially insisted that the Kurds were "mountain Turks" and banned Kurdish schools, publications and religious bodies. Later, open resistance and  heavy handed responses from the government became regular.

Since World War I, the relationship between the Turkish government and its Kurdish population has been defined by forced assimilation, state-led denial of a distinct Kurdish identity, major tribal and political uprisings, and a decades-long bloody armed conflict.

Sources: "Kurds at the Crossroads", Frontline World; Kurdish History; History Guild; The Council on Foreign Relations. The map is a 1992 product of the  the CIA.