| The Last of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau William Lionel Wyllie, 1918 |
Steve R Dunn
Seaforth Publishing 2025
Adrian Roberts, Reviewer
The naval battles of 1914 such as Battles of Coronel and the Falklands, and others such as the destruction of SMS Emden, were the first use by European nations of the warships that they had been developing for the previous forty years, fighting at distances of thousands of yards with explosive shells that could smash through several inches of armour. They were also the beginning of the end of fighting battles according to the ancient ideals of chivalry, honour and sacrifice.
Honour is emphasised in this book by Steve Dunn, a leading authority on WWI naval warfare. The book is particularly strong in describing how decisions were made, at the Admiralty in London as well as at sea, and how the personalities of the leading commanders and politicians affected those decisions.
To simplify the history for the sake of this review: when World War One broke out the crack squadron of the Imperial German Navy, the Asiatic squadron, was at its base in the German colony of Tientsin in China (now Qingdao). Commanded by Vice Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee, it consisted of the state-of-the-art armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gniesenau and the light cruisers Dresden, Leipzig and Nürnberg. They put to sea and crossed the Pacific with the intention of going into the Atlantic and potentially destroying much of the vital merchant trade around South America, and becoming a valuable resource if they made it back to Germany.
There was a considerable amount of indecision and delay in the British Admiralty. Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty which was a political post not a Naval one, but nevertheless he had a tendency to over-rule the naval experts. The First Sea Lord was Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg; the Chief of the War Staff was Vice Admiral Doveton Sturdee. Neither was particularly decisive: also Battenberg was under unjustified suspicion due to his German ancestry and Sturdee was an unpopular character. Eventually they ordered the British second cruiser squadron which was the nearest to South America to intercept the German squadron. Commanded by Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, this eventually consisted of the protected cruisers Good Hope and Monmouth, the light cruiser Glasgow and the armed merchant cruiser Otranto. Spee's Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were each equipped with a main armament of 4 x 8-inch guns. Good Hope had two 9.2-inch guns but they were older and with a shorter range then the German 8-inch weapons. Good Hope's secondary armament and the entirety of Monmouth’s armament were 6-inch guns, and some of those were mounted in casements one above the other in the hull sides with the lower ones so close to the waterline that they could not be used in rough weather. Both Cradock and the Admiralty in London knew all this, and the book goes into great detail as to what Cradock's orders were and why no reinforcements were sent.
Under Admiral Jackie Fisher's reforms the Royal Navy had developed a new class of warship, the battle-cruiser. This was essentially a battleship-sized vessel with a battleship’s 12-inch guns but with thinner armour to reduce weight and so increase speed: which was fine so long as they were used for their intended purpose of hunting down enemy cruisers rather than engaging similarly armed warships. However none of these vessels could be made available at the time. Cradock knew that the armoured cruiser Defence was in Gibraltar and could get to the South Atlantic fairly quickly and would probably be at least the equal of the German vessels. He requested that it be sent and at one time believed it was coming but the Admiralty did not permit it to go.
Certainly, Cradock believed that his orders were to engage the enemy, and if there were any ambivalence about the orders, as an officer of the old Nelsonian school he was not going to refuse combat and risk the reputation of himself, and more importantly of the Royal Navy to which he was utterly loyal. His only potential reinforcement was the old battleship Canopus, but its arrival was delayed and it may well have been more of a liability than an asset. When Cradock’s squadron lined up against the German Asiatic squadron off the Chilean port of Coronel on the 1 November 1914 he must have known what the outcome would be. His ships were silhouetted against the setting sun; the sea was too rough to use the lower casemates and Good Hope’s forward 9.2 inch gun was disabled early in the action. Good Hope and Monmouth went down with all hands, 1640 men including Cradock which is more than the Royal Navy lost at Trafalgar. This was Britain’s first naval defeat since 1814.
This concentrated minds at the Admiralty. Battenberg had been replaced by 73-year-old Jackie Fisher. You wouldn’t have wanted Fisher as your boss and when he was wrong he was very wrong, but when he was right he was very right and he could certainly get things done. The battle-cruisers Invincible and Inflexible were being prepared for action at Devonport and were supposed to be ready to go in a week. Fisher telegrammed the dockyard captain and ordered in no uncertain terms that they were to sail in three days: and they did! (As a British person I can’t help comparing this with 2026 when the Royal Navy’s only serviceable destroyer HMS Dragon took three weeks to get out of dock when the Iranian war broke out and arrived too late to be of any use).
Fisher ordered Sturdee to lead the task force personally, in Invincible. They set off for the Falklands where they were joined by the light cruisers Glasgow, which had survived Coronel, Kent, Cornwall, Carnarvon and Bristol. I had not realised before reading this book how concerned the Falkland Islanders were about invasion by the Germans. At this point no one had any idea where the German fleet was. Sturdee’s squadron arrived at Port Stanley and started to take on coal on 6 December. Von Spee's squadron arrived on the morning of the 8th of December: if he had arrived a day earlier he would have caught the British squadron still being coaled and unable to put to sea. Von Spee knew that he was doomed once he went into action with the battle-cruisers. He could conceivably have escaped by bypassing the Falklands once he was aware that they were there, but he chose to bring them to action. In the event Sturdee’s squadron was able to put to sea and the battle-cruisers’ 12-inch guns had the German armoured cruisers at their mercy. Scharnhorst went down with all hands including von Spee; Gneisenau went down with most of her crew. Meanwhile the light cruisers had their own battle; Nürnberg and Leipzig were sunk; only Dresden escaped. The Germans lost 2094 men; the British just seven.
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At home this was celebrated as a great victory: but the British fleet had a massive technological advantage. A British Captain suggested that “it is ironic that Sturdee, the man mainly responsible for the loss of Cradock’s squadron [is] the person who profits principally from it…the enemy ran into his arms…” Churchill does not come out of the episode well: he made considerable attempts to shift the blame for the defeat at Coronel including blaming the deceased Cradock whom virtually all the rest of the Navy defended. The book’s author, Steve Dunn, clearly regards Cradock as the hero of the story, and certainly he should be more famous as he encapsulated what the British like to see as the virtues of honour, loyalty and courage in the face of adversity.
TRAGEDY AND REVENGE is all that such a book should be; it is readable and balanced; it investigates the background of events as well as the action; there is a copious index and bibliography and every point that made is referenced. The only slight quibbles are that it could have done with maps of the actions as well as the locality, and the title which was probably chosen by the publisher could be a problem if someone was trying to search online for such a book using the terms Coronel or Falklands. And it does assume a certain level of knowledge of maritime subjects and WW1 naval warfare: admittedly most readers will have some of that knowledge but there are some who may, for instance be perturbed by the statement that on Glasgow the officers’ heads were destroyed, and think this was a tragic occurrence rather than merely an inconvenience.
Adrian Roberts, May 2026