Now all roads lead to France and heavy is the tread
Of the living; but the dead returning lightly dance.
Edward Thomas, Roads

Friday, November 20, 2026

"By Turns a Triumph, a Lost Opportunity, and a Disaster": Cambrai, November 1917 in Ten Steps

 

British Troops and Tank with a Captured German Gun at Cambrai (Early Battle)


With the Battle of Passchendaele winding down in late 1917, British commander-in-chief Douglas Haig sought a tangible success to counter the heavy casualties his forces had suffered and to test the evolving combined-arms (infantry-artillery-tanks) tactics his staff was advocating. Capturing Cambrai, a key German rail and supply hub in a quiet sector near the St. Quentin Canal, would threaten German communications if captured. Also, unlike Flanders, the terrain was dry and firm making it suitable for massed tank operations. This battle—launched 109 years ago today—would become the most studied battle of the Great War, despite it's ultimate failure.

1. Planning the Surprise: General Julian Byng and the British Tank Corps planned a surprise raid near Cambrai, France. They chose this sector because the ground was firm and dry, making it ideal for heavy armor.

2. Secret Buildup: British forces moved nearly 500 tanks, 1,000 artillery guns, and six infantry divisions into position under the cover of darkness. They banned registration fire from their artillery to keep the Germans completely unaware of the impending attack.

3. The Dawn Assault (November 20): At 6:20 a.m., British artillery opened a sudden, devastating barrage without warning, using predicted fire techniques. More than 370 Mark IV tanks rolled forward behind the barrage, crushing deep belts of German barbed wire.


Click on Map to Enlarge

Note Depth of Opening Advance and Locations of German Counterattacks

4. Breaching the Hindenburg Line: The tanks carried massive bundles of brushwood called fascines, dropping them into wide anti-tank trenches to create makeshift bridges. British infantry followed closely behind, rapidly capturing the fortified Hindenburg Line and advancing up to four miles on the first day.

5. Stalling at Flesquières: Despite massive success elsewhere, the British 51st Highland Division failed to coordinate closely with its tanks at Flesquières Ridge. German artillery hidden behind the crest knocked out dozens of British tanks, creating a dangerous bottleneck in the center of the advance.

6. Celebration in Britain: News of the dramatic breakthrough sparked wild celebrations back home. Church bells rang across Great Britain for the first time since the war began in 1914.

7. Grinding Attrition at Bourlon Wood (November 23–28): Having lost the element of surprise, the British pushed to capture the high ground at Bourlon Wood. Brutal, close-quarters fighting erupted as German reinforcements poured into the area, exhausting British troops and depleting their remaining tanks.


British Tank Captured in Failed Attack Near Bourlon Wood (Late Battle)

8. The German Counteroffensive (November 30): Germany launched a massive counterattack using new Stoßtruppen (stormtroopers) infiltration tactics. Supported by low-flying ground-attack aircraft and a brief, intense hurricane bombardment, German troops bypassed strong points and encircled British positions.

9. Fighting Retreat: Caught off guard by the speed of the German advance, British forces were pushed back across much of the ground they had gained ten days earlier. Heavy fighting continued in freezing weather as the British scrambled to establish a new defensive line.

10. Stalemate and Legacy (December 7): The battle ends in a bloody stalemate with roughly 45,000 casualties on each side. 

Although little territory changed hands, Cambrai showed that coordinated tanks, infantry, artillery, and aircraft could break the deadlock of trench warfare. It was the focus of study by all nations' army staffs during the interwar period.

Military History Online; Over the Top, February 2011

Thursday, November 19, 2026

The Insalubriousness of Life in the Trenches


Courtesy of the In Flanders Fields Museum

[I thought this nice summary was an good memory refresher for students of the Great War. MH]

Of all the military engagements of the Great War, the deadly battles of Verdun, the Somme and Passchendaele touch our imagination the most. And yet the word "battle" features only rarely in memories and eye-witness accounts. What the men remember is the trenches: the boredom, the cold, the mud, the vermin and the rats, the wretchedness, and lastly, in the face of everything, adventure and friendship. 


Cold

After the mud, the second curse was the cold. The winter of 1917 was extremely harsh: -20º at Ieper. The cold cut through everyone’s clothes. It was scarcely possible to move in the trenches. As for making a fire, that was completely out of the question. Those who were on night watch suffered martyrdom. As a result of standing for long periods in the damp, cold trenches, men caught "trench feet"—blue, lifeless feet, liable to develop gangrene.



Mud

Bad weather was the curse of the trenches. Just a shower was enough to transform everything into a sea of mud. Shell-holes several meters deep filled up immediately with mud in which men, field guns, and tanks became mired. The trenches, therefore, had to be constantly maintained. It was sometimes hard to find them, so unrecognizable had they become. For General Foch, the worst enemies were "boue et Boche" ("mud and the Boche").



Rats and Lice

Rats swarmed in and around the trenches. Not only did they gnaw away at the soldiers’ meager provisions, they also attacked the corpses which lay in no man’s land. In his novel Im Westen nichts Neues (All Quiet on the Western Front), Erich Maria Remarque called them "dead men’s rats": ‘"ate everyone’s bread. Kropp rolled his bread up in his tent canvas and hid it under his head, but the rats ran over his face looking for the bread, stopping him from going to sleep." Lice too were a dreadful curse. Hygiene in the trenches left something to be desired, and everyone suffered from lice. A louse can live for days on end without blood and can withstand the cold easily. With some men, they lived in their hundreds on every part of the body. Delousing constituted an excellent cure for boredom and became a social activity.



Mental Suffering

The suffering was not only physical but mental as well. Life at the front was debilitating in several ways. First and foremost, there was boredom. In addition, there was the fear of death. Each day brought new victims of a grenade or some sniper. The soldiers were often face-to-face with death. The corpses in no man’s land could not always be buried. Sometimes decomposing bodies stayed in front of the trenches.

Lack of sleep, powerlessness and the daily confrontation with death and injury sapped the morale of the troops. According to the Echo des tranchées-ville (Trench-Town Echo) the soldiers were utterly miserable. "One is plunged in a kind of despondency, worn down by the bleakness, with no more zest for life." Some succumbed to madness. Although the army command made little of it, many underwent treatment for mental disorders, especially in the last years of the war.



Consolations

In the trenches, there were good moments, too. The men waited impatiently for the distribution of the rations, even if the cooking was poor and monotonous. If the rations came late or not at all, the soldiers were irritated to the point of mutiny. Another consolation was tobacco. Smoking had become very popular before the war at every level of society. Compared with now, tobacco and cigarettes cost nothing.



Mascots

Cats and other pets from derelict farms were coddled by the soldiers. The men had warm feelings, too, for the working animals—the mules, and above all the horses. Thousands of horses fell victim to grenades, bullets, sickness, and exhaustion. Though apparently unmoved by the groans of fellow-soldiers, even the most battle-hardened veterans had difficulty in holding back the tears when a horse died.

Although it might seem strange, many former combatants also had good memories of the war years, and not only those who idolized the heroism of the years spent at the front, such as the German Gefreiter, Adolf Hitler. A common purpose and shared dangers created links of friendship which made many old soldiers nostalgic about the past.

 

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

How Important Was the Balkan Theater in WWI?


Serbian Troops 1915

Dennis Showalter

The Balkan Theater during the Great War defies conventional classification. The fighting there can be understood as an expansion of the regional conflict that began in 1911 between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire. It arguably ended not in 1918 but with the 1924 evacuation of the Greek community in Anatolia and the subsequent Great Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey. Without denying the significance of great-power policies and behaviors in motivating Balkan behavior, the states that emerged in the region during the 19th century were independent actors, willing and able to play autonomous roles. Serbia in particular came in the years prior to 1914 to define its role as a cross between Piedmont and Prussia: focal point for a south Slav union whose nature Serbia would define. In that context, the Sarajevo crisis of 1914 for Serbia essentially launched a "Third Balkan War," whose stakes were understood as conquest or annihilation. 

Austria-Hungary for its part also waged what amounted to a total war against an enemy it perceived as seeking nothing less than the destruction of the Habsburg Empire. The Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia in 1914 was accompanied by levels of atrocities previously unknown in modern great-power warfare. The operation was characterized as well by unusual levels of incompetence—to the point where an outnumbered, outgunned Serbia rallied and drove the Habsburgs back across the frontier in a desperate counteroffensive. 


A Zeppelin Over Sofia, 1915

That action represented the last efforts of a state whose resources had been exhausted even before World War I. For most of 1915 the Balkans remained militarily quiet as the Central Powers and the Entente Powers vied for support in their capital cities. The Allied attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula (1915), however, convinced German chief of staff Erich von Falkenhayn of the need to remove the Serbian thorn from the side of the Central Powers and open a Danube route to their hard-pressed Ottoman ally. In October 1915 a joint force of Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians, whose government had entered the war in hopes of avenging earlier defeat and securing future benefits, overran an outnumbered and outgunned Serb army. 

As its troops were driven back on all fronts, Serbia called to its allies. As early as December 1914 there had been desultory talk in Paris and London of opening a Balkan front. Cooler heads, however, had correctly observed that such an operation could only be supported through the Greek port of Salonika, itself undeveloped and with no more than a single-track railway connection to Serbia. Nevertheless, in October 1915 two divisions were transferred from the Dardanelles to Salonika—over the determined protests of a Greek government determined to remain neutral. That force was too small by far to prevent the final defeat of Serbia and the subsequent retreat through the Albanian mountains of more than a quarter million soldiers and civilians. 



The survivors were initially evacuated to the island of Corfu. Eventually they would be transferred to a Salonika front formed as France and Britain steadily reinforced their troops on the ground. During 1916 the entrenched camp of Salonika absorbed more than a dozen British and French divisions in what was sarcastically described as "the war's largest internment center." Its occupants, according to French politician Georges Clemenceau, contributed nothing to the war effort, instead "cultivating their gardens" in the manner of Voltaire's Candide (1759). That result had not been the original intention of the French government. Premier and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand argued for the possibility of using Salonika as an entering wedge, achieving in that sector the kind of tactical victories that would encourage Greece and Romania to join the Allies. The British were more dubious. Apart from a climate so unhealthy that large numbers of men were disabled by malaria, poor terrain and logistics combined to frustrate large-scale offensives. During 1916 it became increasingly apparent that nothing could be done without the overt support of Greece. 

That support was long in coming and in the end owed more to Greek politics than to Allied threats and blandishments. Not until 1917 did a coup remove King Constantine, who was friendly to the Central Powers, in favor of his son, Alexander, and a reorganized government headed by Eleuthérios Venizélos. The Entente Powers during 1916 successfully focused their energy on bringing Romania into the war. While Romania was not as feckless and helpless as its contemporary critics asserted, it was unable to stand against the steamroller the Central Powers promptly sent against it—without interference from Salonika. With most of their country occupied, the Romanian army withdrew toward the Russian frontier and bided its time. 


British Work Detail—Late War


Neutralization of Romania shifted attention once again to Salonika. The Serbian government and army spent much of the year purging allegedly disloyal officers. The official entry of Greece into the war, however, encouraged the Serbs to put their house in order more quickly than they might otherwise have done; and Serb divisions, including former Russian prisoners of war, began taking their place on the line. Commander Louis Guillaumat, and his successor, Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, supervised the introduction of new weapons and the improvement of logistical infrastructure. 

The operational stalemate nevertheless continued. Political and military controversies between Paris and London, and between the Entente Powers and their local allies, over the purposes and prospects of the theater prevented the reduction of the Salonika garrison to a maintenance force. They handicapped as well its reinforcement to levels promising anything beyond tactical successes gained at high cost, in the fashion typical of the Great War. 

In August 1917 a fire reduced much of the city of Salonika to ashes. Disease continued to debilitate Allied ranks. Morale suffered from a general sense that no one knew exactly what anyone was contributing to the war effort in this backwater. Not until September 1918 did the Allies finally strike. By then they confronted primarily a Bulgarian army badly weakened by casualties and disease and shaken by the recent revolutions in Russia. Within days, Soviets were forming in Sofia and the government was asking for an armistice. French divisions thrust up the Danube valley and the British contingent turned toward Constantinople. Serb troops reentered their devastated homeland, and on 29 October the Croat Diet in Zagreb declared its allegiance to the new state of Yugoslavia. On 11 November the last Habsburg emperor abdicated. 


A Bulgarian Officer Surrenders His Forces, September 1918


On balance, the Allies and the Central Powers did have one thing in common. They put enough into the Balkans as a theater of war to destabilize the region—yet not enough to facilitate reconstructing stability in new forms. In the first months of 1919 Yugoslavia clashed with Italy over Fiume and the Dalmatian coast. Romania saw its loyalty rewarded with the Judas gift of Transylvania. Greek troops landed in Smyrna, the vanguard of a doomed dream of an Asian empire. Treaties signed in the suburbs of Paris did nothing to avert a continuing descent into chaos tempered by dictatorship or modified by external conquest—a pattern that continued unabated into the next century. Salonika remains a monument to the long-term consequences of half-hearted measures. 

Dennis Showalter, Colorado College 

A list of links to our earlier articles on the Salonika or Balkans Front can be found HERE. 

Source: Source Citation: "Allied Occupation of Salonika in World War I." History in Dispute, Vol. 9: World War I: Second Series. Dennis Showalter, ed. St. James Press, 2002


Tuesday, November 17, 2026

"Viribis Unitis"



By Tony Langley

This simple color reproduction image is taken from the cover page of an Austrian publication called "Viribis Unitis," which translated from Latin means "With United Forces." This was the personal motto of the Emperor Franz Jozef and also the name of an Austro-Hungarian dreadnought. The publication was the second one with that name, the first having been published in 1898 for the 50th anniversary of the emperor's reign. This second title was a chronicle of the events of the Great War as seen through Austro-Hungarian eyes. 

Even though published after the war, it was relatively lavishly illustrated, considering the abysmal economic situation of the country. The publication was edited by the War Assistance Office of the Interior Ministry and later by the Society of the Silver Cross, both of which looked to the needs and care of returning soldiers and invalids. The illustration shows Austrian and German soldiers standing back-to-back and may therefore also be a veiled reference for the editor's desire to effect a union between the rump of Austria and Germany. The dreadnought Viribis Unitis was the ship on which Archduke Ferdinand and his family traveled to Bosnia in June of 1914 and on which he and his wife's bodies were transported back home after the assassination.

 
Battleship Viribus Unitis Sunk in Pula harbour by Italian Divers on 1 November 1918

Sunday, November 15, 2026

On the Brooding Slopes of Mte Mrzli Vrh


Mte Mrzli Vrh Overlooking the Soca (Isonzo River) and Tolmin

Mte Mrzli Vrh (Mount Mrzli Vrh, literally "Cold Peak") is a 1,359-meter (4,459-foot) mountain in the Julian Alps above the Soča Valley near Tolmin, Slovenia. It is renowned as one of the bloodiest World War I battlefields on the Isonzo Front and today serves as an open-air historical museum In the First World War, it figured as one of the key points in the Austro-Hungarian defence of the Tolmino bridgehead. The ridge of Mte. Mrzli Vrh is still densely crisscrossed by numerous trenches and caves of the two belligerent sides. Just below the top of the mountain, in its north-eastern slope, the Austro-Hungarian Army hollowed roomy caves. Mte Mrzli Vrh was the site of a critical breakthrough by Austrian-German forces that effectively destroyed the Second Italian Army in the opening of the 1917 Battle of Caporetto.


Memories of Those Who Served at Mte Mrzli Vrh


Austrian Trenches on the Slope of Mrzli Vrh


31 October 1915

It’s thundering, thundering … as if the whole world went mad. The man, the youths are falling – ours and Italian, the wounded are moaning. The sun has drowned in blood. Never before have I seen so intensely blood-red sky and sun. As if the sky and the sun both got drunk of the holy human blood – because the soil cannot soak it all in time – What are you doing, man?

Lieutenant Albin Mlakar, Slovenian Army


The Commanding View of the Soča Valley from the Summit of Mrzli Vrh


23 June 1916

Well, after I had shaved myself, I was also told that tomorrow would be Sunday; and I thought: let it be. Sunday? What do I profit from Sunday? Shall I possibly go to the holy service? Shall I throw bowls or go to see my girl? Nothing. No, those times have all gone!

Lieutenant Albin Mlakar, Slovenian Army


1917

However, man by the Soča got used to bearing everything. Cold, heat, dust, rock camps, water shortage, flies. He overcame fear of shells and air torpedoes, of bombs that fall from the sky, and of blasting mines which turn up ground, of daggers, hand grenades, booming fire. He got used to everything, almost to death. He only couldn’t get used to one thing – to Mrzli Vrh.

Alice Schalek, Austro-Hungarian War Information Office


Alice Schalek Visiting Austrian Officers on Mte Mrzli Vrh


24 October 1917

We were woken up by deep and heavy rumble in the Bovec basin and on the alp Zaprikraj. The pace of explosions was violent, booming. I asked Sassella to look at the watch: the hand showed two in the morning of 24 October 1917.

Lt. Carlo Emilio Gadda, Alpini Corps


25 October 1917

I can guess from the powerful fiery noise that the enemy in front of us is very strong. Few minutes were enough for the complete change of the situation which became very grave for us. At this moment, it is important that we defend against the attacks of the too powerful enemy the just conquered positions on the Kolovrat and keep them.

Lt. Erwin Rommel, Württemberg Mountain Battalion


Austrian Altar in Mte Mrzli Vrh Chapel


Post-Caporetto

The war still rages. Nevertheless, the peace will eventually bless all the valleys, and the old heavenly tranquility will mercifully reign over the mountains. Then, we shall visit the graves and pay homage to our dead heroes.

Dr. Julius Kugy, Slovenian Travel Writer, Survivor of the Battle


Source:  The First World War Outdoor Museums, the Isonzo Front, 1915-1917

Saturday, November 14, 2026

Remembering a Veteran: Billy Sing—The Super Sniper of Gallipoli


From the Australian War Memorial




William Edward "Billy" Sing (1886–1943) was an Australian soldier of Chinese and English descent who became one of the most famous and feared Allied snipers of World War I during the Gallipoli Campaign. He would earn the nickname "The Assassin."

William “Billy” Sing was born in 1886 to an English mother and Chinese father. He and his two sisters were brought up in Clermont and Proserpine, in rural Queensland. Life on the land was tough, and from a young age Billy had to help his parents with their market garden and milk deliveries. He was also a talented horse rider and skilled at shooting.

When war broke out in 1914, Billy rushed to sign up. As one of the first to enlist, Billy was not subjected to the degree of later resistance against recruiting non-white Australians into the AIF, and he was accepted into the 5th Light Horse Regiment. He was sent to Egypt in December 1914 and on to Gallipoli in May 1915.

On Gallipoli, Billy was given the nickname “the Murderer” or “the Assassin” for his skill as a sniper. Fellow soldier Ion Idriess described him as, “a little chap, very dark, with a jet black moustache and a goatee beard. A picturesque looking mankiller. He is the crack sniper of the Anzacs.” Every morning in the darkness before dawn Billy would find a place to hide and watch over the Turkish soldiers in their trenches. Waiting patiently with a “spotter,” usually Tom Sheehan or Ion Idriess, he would wait for an enemy soldier to come into view. To avoid becoming a target of the Turkish snipers, the Australians would stay in their position until nightfall. The ANZAC war diary for 23 October 1915 states:

Our premier sniper, Trooper Sing, 2nd L.H., yesterday accounted for his 199th Turk. Every one of this record is vouched for by an independent observer, frequently an officer who observes through a telescope.


Billy Sing (L) at His Job

Billy’s fame spread beyond the soldiers at Gallipoli, and his tally was written about in the Australian, British, and American press.

The Turkish Army was also aware of Billy’s reputation. In an effort to eliminate him, they brought in their own crack shot, a man known to the Australians as “Abdul the Terrible.” It is thought Abdul came very close to fulfilling his mission. In August 1915, a single bullet, fired from the Turkish side, passed through Sheehan’s telescope and through his hands, mouth, and cheek before hitting Billy in the shoulder.

In the end, it was Billy who shot and killed Abdul. The Turkish army immediately retaliated, aiming its heavy artillery at Billy’s hiding position and completely destroying it. Fortunately for the Australian sniper and his spotter, they had already evacuated to their unit trenches.

For his efforts on Gallipoli, Billy was Mentioned in Dispatches by General Sir Ian Hamilton, and awarded the British Distinguished Conduct Medal in 1916 for:

Conspicuous gallantry from May to September 1915 at Anzac as a sniper. His courage and skill were most marked and he was responsible for a very large number of casualties among the enemy, no risk being too great for him to take. 

The Australian soldiers were evacuated from Gallipoli in December 1915, and Billy was sent first for training in England and then to fight in France as part of the 31st Battalion.

The type of warfare on the Western Front, was different from that on Gallipoli. It is unlikely that, as a sniper, Billy spent much of his time on the battlefield; nevertheless, his skills were put to good use. In 1917, he was recommended for, though not awarded, the Military Medal for his actions leading an anti-sniper fighting patrol at Polygon Wood, in Belgium. He was again Mentioned in Dispatches for gallantry, this time by the Commander of I ANZAC Corps, General Birdwood, and in 1918 awarded the Belgian Croix de Guerre.

Billy’s health suffered during his service, and he was frequently hospitalized to treat ailments ranging from serious infections to influenza. He was wounded on a number of occasions, and one gunshot wound to the leg caused him problems for years.

In 1917, while recuperating from illness in Britain, Billy married Elizabeth Stewart, a 21-year-old waitress from Scotland. Little is known about her or her marriage, and it is not even certain that she accompanied him back to Australia.


A Relative of Billy Visits His Memorial at Brisbane Cemetery

Billy returned to Australia in July 1918 as a submarine guard on board the troopship SS Boonah. Shortly afterwards he was permanently discharged as a result of being unfit for duty due to ongoing chest problems. He returned to Proserpine, Queensland, to a hero’s welcome, which included the presentation of a purse of sovereigns from well-wishers.

Whether or not Elizabeth had accompanied Billy back to Australia, they were permanently separated by the time he took up a Soldier Settlement farm a few years after his return. This venture failed, as did an attempt to strike it lucky in the Miclere gold fields near his property in Clermont.

In 1942 Billy moved to Brisbane to be near his surviving sister, Beatrice.

A year later Billy Sing died of heart failure at the age of 57. All that remained of this one-time famous sniper was a miner’s hut (worth around £20) and five shillings found in his room in a boarding house. There was no sign of his medals or awards from the war. Billy was buried at Lutwyche Cemetery in Brisbane. His headstone highlights his skills as a sniper, and reads:

His incredible accuracy contributed greatly to the preservation of the lives of those with whom he served during a war always remembered for countless acts of valour and tragic carnage. 

Sources: Alistair Kennedy, Chinese Anzacs: Australians of Chinese Descent in the Defence Forces 1885–1919; John Hamilton, Gallipoli Sniper: The Life of Billy Sing   

Friday, November 13, 2026

Eyewitness: The Action at Gheluvelt, October 1914





James Patton

Hubert C. Rees CMG DSO (1882–1948) was born in Conway, Wales, the only son a of a clergyman, who was the only son of a British Army officer. Educated at Charterhouse School in Surrey, in 1900 young Rees joined the 3rd (Militia) Battalion of the East Surreys. He promptly volunteered for Imperial Service in the Second Boer War (1899–1902). In 1903 he was commissioned in the regulars as a 2nd lieutenant in the 2nd Welsh, and by 1914 had made captain. He served with this battalion as a part of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during the Retreat from Mons, the First Battle of the Aisne and into the First Battle of Ypres. On 21 October Rees’s company fought their way to the relief of a unit of the 1st South Wales Borderers which was taking the brunt of a German attack. Rees was later awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for this action.

Ten days later, at the end of the Battle of Gheluvelt (29-31 October 1914), in Rees’s words “the 2nd Welsh was annihilated” repelling a massive German assault. There were about 1,200 soldiers, from Rees’s battalion and the 1st Queens Royal Regiment (West Surrey), and the casualty rate was 95 percent.

Rees, a captain at the time, wrote in his diary:

As soon as it became light, the storm broke. The trenches, lane, and village were deluged with shells of all calibres. It was impossible to move in the sunk lane and many men were hit. After the bombardment had been going on for some time, a few wounded men from B Company came in to say Marshall had been killed and that practically the whole company destroyed. The lane itself was indefensible, so Colonel Morland decided to move back to the front of the village and hold that with what men he could collect.

Young had come in from my two platoons on the left badly wounded by a rifle bullet. I crawled down to the end of the sunk lane to see if I could get back any of his men, who were in a hopeless situation. When I got to the end, I had a good view of their trench 50 yards off. There was a partially dug communication trench, only a couple of feet deep, between the end of the lane and them. A number of men were trying to run across this 50 yards to the lane, instead of crawling up the trench. I shouted at them to try the trench, but could not be heard. About 25 men attempted to run, but not a single man got more than half way and they seemed to me to be killed outright. It was useless waiting so I went back up the ditch alongside the Menin Road, following the men the colonel had already withdrawn.


 

Key  Locations During the First Battle of Ypres

I found my only remaining platoon more or less intact at the barricade and that Morland had moved towards the SWB [South Wales Borderers]. I started moving the platoon to follow Morland. The shell fire around the barricade was very violent. Two burst in the house behind which I sheltered, one cut the sign post neatly in half at the corner, another came through a wall 10 yards away and killed a man who was passing. Eventually I got away with a dozen men, four of whom were carrying Young in a mackintosh sheet, and one man had a machine gun of which the tripod had been blown to pieces and for which he had no ammunition. I followed Morland, who I estimate had about 80 men with him.

I saw no signs of them where I expected to find them and concluded that they had been forced by the hail of shells to move farther back. Several of my dozen men had been wounded by shrapnel, so without seeing anyone at all, I went through the northern outskirts of Gheluvelt and finally arrived at the position of 54th Battery, RFA [Royal Field Artillery]; commanded by Major Peel to whom I reported that I did not think that were more than 100 men of the Welsh Regiment left. He obviously disbelieved me, and I fancy seriously thought putting me under arrest for spreading alarmist reports. I confess to being shaken, the stock of my rifle had been shot through and the strap of my water bottle cut. He directed me to stand by as escort to the guns. I remained with the guns for some time, collecting stragglers until I had 40-50 men.

At midday a battalion advanced from our left rear moving in lines of companies under heavy accurate shrapnel fire. These turned out to be the Worcesters. About the same time, Lyttleton came over from the brigade to say that every available man was to counter-attack. I followed the Worcesters and came up to their reserve company in a trench to the left rear of Gheluvelt. The rest of the battalion had disappeared on the flank of the village and the rifle fire was heavy. I pushed on across a valley which ran up beyond the trench, through a confused disorganised mass of men under heavy shell fire, and lost most of my scratch command in the confusion.

I went on to see what was going on and just reached the end of the village when I heard my name shouted and, turning back, I saw Colonel Morland. He shouted to me to come to him saying that these 10 men attacks were no use. He added that Ferrar had been killed leading a bayonet charge near the barricade and that the battalion had been wiped out. It appeared that while I was absent with the 54th Battery, the survivors under Colonel Morland, Major Pritchard, Captain Ferrar and Moore had had a most desperate fight on the north edge of Gheluvelt, at one time getting as far back as the barricade where Ferrar was killed and Pritchard severely wounded. Morland and I started to walk back towards the 54th Battery and men from all the regiments involved were running back in the same direction. We endeavoured to rally a few of the groups and collected 25 men of the Welsh Regiment by the time we reached the guns. We got into a trench near the battery and were joined by Moore and Corder.

By this time, the enemy had pushed up south of the Menin Road past Gheluvelt as the battery was under rifle fire and bullets were striking the parapet of a trench a little to our right. Captain Robinson came over to say that Major Peel had been wounded by a bullet through the leg and that he was now commanding the battery. There were now eight officers standing together in the trench. Moore on the left, myself next, then Morland and next to him Captain Robinson with Corder, a captain in the Gloucesters, and somebody else beyond again. It was then that a shell burst in front killing Moore on my left and mortally wounding Colonel Morland on my right. It was a final blow. Morland was a terrible loss. He remained to the very end as cool and collected as if he was on parade at home. Moore was also a great loss and the regiment lost one of its bravest officers.

At this time, Corder and myself were the only two officers who had survived the fighting at Gheluvelt, and we had about 25 men. [Having taken command of the battalion] these I spread out as a firing line across a turnip field a little in front of the guns and went to interview Robinson. I suggested he should open fire on some houses about 500 yards away on the south side of the Menin Road which were obviously full of snipers. He blew the houses about pretty badly with HE [high explosive] and then continued with shrapnel on the slope beyond them. This put a stop to the rifle shooting, which was getting rather trying.

Lieutenant Blewitt of this battery came to say that the Germans appeared to be bringing up a field gun to the barricade in the middle of Gheluvelt and asked permission to take an 18-pounder on to the road and have a duel with it. Having got permission, he man-handled the gun on to the road. The German gun fired first and missed and Blewitt did not give him another chance. He put a stop to any trouble from that quarter for the rest of the afternoon.

If the Germans had pushed home their attack during the afternoon there was nothing to stop them. About 5pm I was handed command of the 1st Queens [West Surrey}, which consisted of Lieutenant Lloyd and 21 men. Major Watson of the Queens, who put me in command, went off to act as brigade major of the 3rd Brigade. My force, consisting of these two battalions, only totalled some 60 men and two officers, the combined strengths of the two that morning could hardly have been less than 1,200 men.

I set out to discover our exact situation. I was at a farm house about 400 yards from the Menin Road. Between me and the road there was a remnant of the Royal Munster Fusiliers and 200 yards of trench full of men who belonged to every regiment of the Army. They were without officers and fast asleep from exhaustion. About that time, two fairly strong companies of the Berkshires came through with their right on the Menin Road. I spoke to their CO [commanding officer] and suggested some caution, he said he had been told to go straight ahead and did so until stopped by rifle fire a little further on.


Gheluvelt Chateau Today

 

I next went to the left and found the 1st Division Cyclists, 160 strong, holding a front of 400 yards with the Black Watch on their left on Polygon Wood. I then went to Gheluvelt Chateau, where I found the SWBs under Lieutenant Colonel Leach still in possession, having had some desperate hand to hand fighting in the chateau grounds. I told Leach what the situation was and then returned. The SWBs withdrew and passed behind my farm shortly afterwards.

Lieutenant Hewitt, Sergeant Smedley and 5 men reported to me about 11pm. He said that they were the sole survivors of the two platoons with whom he had disappeared on the 29th. A shell had killed or wounded five men a few yards away as he was returning. He had been with the 7th Division holding some trenches in the direction of Kruisech. They had been heavily attacked but had beat off all attacks until, after dark, on the 30th, he found himself with 24 men completely cut off by the Germans, who had driven back the troops on either flank. He decided on a bold experiment and forming his men up in fours marched through the Germans in the dark without being detected. He attached himself to the 2nd Queens whom he found holding trenches at the edge of Veldhoek Woods. They came in for heavy shelling and having lost most of his men set out to find the battalion.

‘At 2am, on 1st November, I was ordered to move the Welsh and the Queens south of the Menin Road and dig in. The SWBs, who were still fairly strong, held about 400 yards southwards from the road and we extended beyond them. Colonel Leach, commanding, was badly wounded by a shell splinter in the foot, and Major Reddie became their commanding officer. We had already dug one lot of trenches that night and now had to dig another set before dawn, with only three hours to do it in.

Although Gheluvelt was subsequently lost on 31 October, the momentum of the German advance had been broken in a dashing counterattack by the 2nd Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment.

Rees retained command of his battalion during its reconstitution and was appointed temporary major. He then spent over a year back in the UK, first attending the staff college, then teaching at Sandhurst and finally on the staff of the 43rd (Wessex) and the 38th (Welsh) Divisions, which were in the process of forming. On 15 June 1916 he was temporarily promoted to brigadier general and sent as a last-minute replacement to command the 94th Brigade, 31st Division, a K-2 formation of “Pals” battalions from the Lancashire coalfields. He led them in action at Serre on 1 July 1916, where they took horrendous losses. Rees refused to renew the attack on day two, thus sparing the two battalions of the Barnsley Pals. The 11th E. Lancs (Accrington Pals) had lost 585 men out of 720, at 81 percent one of the heaviest tolls of any battalion on that day (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSIc4mxODc8). In 1988, in this controversial work British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (1988), Australian historical writer John Laffin chose General HC Rees as a particularly glaring example of military incompetence, due to his performance on 1 July.

On 4 July, Rees was moved over to the command of the 11th (Lancashire) Brigade, a regular unit which had lost its brigadier. He held this post until 1 January 1917 before moving on to two other brigade commands. In early 1918 he took over the 150th (York and Durham) Brigade, 50th Division, a first-line Territorial unit. They fought defensive actions against the German Operation Michael in March and Operation Georgette in April, suffering heavy casualties, and were sent to recover and rebuild at the Chemin des Dames, which was a quiet sector. A short while later, however, the German Blücher-Yorck offensive hit them head-on. Seeing that the German advance could not be halted, Rees decided to withdraw from a position on the Plateau de Californie (near Craonne) to PC Terasse (south of Craonnelle). But the 1/4th Yorks (Green Howards) had been overwhelmed, and the Germans were already approaching PC Terrasse. The HQ had to be broken up, and Rees was among those captured. His POW story was described in the Roads post of 3 August 2026, titled “Captured: Fifteen British Generals.” The highlight of his experience was an impromptu (and involuntary) rendezvous with the Kaiser on Craonne ridge. 

 

General Rees Meets the Kaiser 

After the war, he was appointed a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) in the New Year’s Honours. He reverted to his substantive rank of major and took on the command of the 6th (Territorial) Battalion of the Welsh, with subsequent service as a general staff officer. He left the army in 1922. He subsequently published his memoirs, which have recently been re-released as Welsh Warrior - A Personal Record of the Great War, Brig. Gen. Hubert Rees (edited by Peter Hart) (Outline Publishing Ltd, 2025). 

Sources include: National Army Museum; the Internet Archive; BBC.com


Thursday, November 12, 2026

Railway Warfare in the Russian Civil War


Armored Artillery Train, Probably in Siberia
  

The strategy known as "railway" or "echelon" was built around armored trains with artillery on flat rail cars and is distinctive of the skirmishes and battles of 1917–1918 between the Bolsheviks and the Volunteer Army. The latter army was a combination of varied anti-Bolshevik forces drawn primarily from elements of the former Imperial Russian Army (which had fought in the Great War) that coalesced in the  south and east of the country in the hope of overturning the more radical political  aspects of the revolution or, indeed, an actual return to the monarchy. Disparate generals and regiments comprised the army, and political factions hobbled it to some degree, although it enjoyed a brief ascendance in 1919, before being swept southward to either destruction or evacuation and emigration. It is often described as the “White” Army, not always by those participating. They were the “Volunteers.” 


In this style of combat, the train and the forces it carries (together an "echelon") are assigned a range of combat missions. This use of the French term échelon for a naval or aviation combat formation appears to have been adapted for specifically Russian needs in their civil war. Echelons could also be combined under a single command for larger operations. During the Great War on the Eastern Front, unlike the legendary static trenches of the Western Front, the Russians and their foes had manned a much longer front and regularly advanced and retreated large distances. The trains of the Russian Empire successfully supported this front, which was both long (N to S 1600 km) and deep (W to E 500 km). Consequently, a working rail transportation infrastructure was well in place to continue into the civil war and the consolidation of Soviet power.

 

Artillery and Machine Guns Protrude from Turrets

   

Here is a succinct description of echelon war, made possible by the existing rail lines and rolling stock of the empire: "[The] most characteristic features of an echelon war [are]…the absence of continuous fronts; relatively small forces and assets involved in hostilities, operations mainly along railways with minimal removal of the battle area from the railway; and the use of rail echelons to attack and pursue the enemy, or to retreat when meeting with superior enemy forces.”  [Russia’s Railway Forces, N.V. Starostenkov, 2001]


Echelon warfare gave way eventually to larger-scale operations by late 1918. As Russia's Railway Forces comments: “With the increase in the number of armies and the scale of the armed struggle, the troops are gradually switching to unpaved routes, and the methods of echelon warfare begin to acquire a secondary and then auxiliary character. In the second half of 1918, the echelon war loses its significance.”

  

 

 The Volunteer Army armored train On to Moscow, 1919, before its capture by the Reds in 1920 in Novorossiisk
                

~ Kimball Worcester 

 

Source: translator's introduction to A Russian Nurse in War and Revolution, Memoirs 1912–1922 by Tatiana Varnek, translation from the Russian, 2021; Wikimedia Commons; Wikipedia; https://pikabu.ru/story/ikh_zvyozdnyiy_chas_bronepoezda_na_grazhdanskoy_voyne_v_rossii_6719677; 

 

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Memorials to the Missing

  

Verdun Douaumont Ossuary


The historians who advised the producers of the classic BBC/PBS series The Great War (1996) estimated that the total number of personnel reported “Missing” by all combatant forces in WWI was about 7.75 million, or about 35 percent of total casualties. In after-action reports the casualties were usually estimated, and as the war progressed, these estimates became less accurate. In fact, the only two combatant forces that kept consistently good records at all were the British Empire and the Americans. 

The majority of the missing are from the Eastern Front, where (1) there were huge numbers of POWs taken on both sides, many of whom were never accounted for; (2) there were large numbers of desertions, also on both sides; and (3) almost all casualties were buried in unmarked, often mass, graves.  

British Empire missing in WWI were officially tallied as 191,652 or 21 percent, of total killed or died. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission lists on its 127 memorials around the world the names of 397,431 personnel who have no known grave. Thus, somewhere around 205,779 were tallied as dead but their remains are unidentified, lost, or buried at sea. The official total of the fallen was 908,371. 

 A British scholar has this rule of thumb: about half of the British dead lie in known burial places (not necessarily individual graves), about a quarter are buried in sites but not identified, and the  remains of the rest have not been found. In all the CWGC cemeteries there are about 587,000  known burials and 559,000 unknown burials; these numbers include burials from other conflicts. 

Today the CWGC maintains burial sites in 1,992 locations on the Western Front alone. During the war there were many thousands of temporary cemeteries and individual burial sites, and the  consolidation process was inexact. On visiting CWGC cemeteries, one is struck by the large  number of individual graves that bear no names. Some are even merely tagged “A Soldier of the  Great War”, so some of these remains are certainly French or German. 

 

Menin Gate, Ypres - Book Tickets & Tours - 2026 (Verified Reviews)

 The Menin Gate Memorial, Ieper, Belgium, newly restored by the CWGC

Every year additional remains are found, usually as a result of construction, archeological work, or metal detecting. Attempts are made to identify these through artifactual research, war diary entries, and even DNA, if possible.   

In the case of the Americans, the math is much simpler. In 1926 it was determined that there were 4,452 Americans missing (or 3.8 percent of total U.S. losses), and all are commemorated by name on memorial walls at American Battle Monuments Commission cemetery chapels, of which there are just 13. Today the actual number of missing is smaller, as the remains of some Americans have subsequently been found. ABMC cemeteries have 30,921 burials, of which 1,674 (5.4 percent) are marked “Unknown.” At the time of the construction of the permanent cemeteries, American families were given the choice of leaving the remains in the theater or returning them to the U.S., and by over 2 to 1 they chose to bring them home at government expense. 

Comparing the British Empire to the U.S., why are the American ratios of the missing to total casualties and unknown to known burials so much smaller? The answer is simple: American soldiers’ remains didn’t have as much time to get lost. The duration of the combat was much shorter, mostly a little over four months, and the U.S. forces were moving ever forward; the ground wasn’t changing hands and being relentlessly shelled by both sides. 

 

No photo description available.

Montfaucon American Monument, unveiled in 1937

  Jim Patton