Chaos umpire sits.
And by decision more embroils the fury
By which he reigns: next him high arbiter
Chance governs all.
John Milton, Paradise Lost
| American Soldiers on the March in Siberia "The intervention in Siberia offers an example of perhaps the most complex of military operations — military operations other than war." |
[Editor's note: I found this excerpt in a study titled "Adapting to Chaos: American Soldiers in Siberia, 1918-1920" by Col. G.Scott Gorman, USAF, ret. Col. Gorman is the Director of the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program (ASLSP) and Deputy Director for Academics. at the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. His observations presented here—I believe—don't just apply to World War I, but to all wars, including the ones going on right now. His paper, by the way, was presented in 1999, but his findings don't seem at all out of date.]
Like [a] forest, the military system is both complex and chaotic.'' The military system is made up of hierarchically-nested components, each dynamically interacting with one another to produce chaotic effects. As an open system, the military system is subject to additional complexity as the result of interactions with the outside environment. The weather, the enemy, political relationships, and other external factors provide inputs that change both the qualities and the output of the military system.
Owing to these interactions, the military system is non-linear; the outcome of military operations is not necessarily proportional to the inputs to the system. Massive inputs are not always required to produce proportionally extensive results. Uncertainty is not only an initial condition in war, but is also a product of its dynamic action. Not only is there uncertainty of information, but also uncertainty of effects. This uncertainty and unpredictability, a result or the complexity of interactions within and upon the military system, is inherently characteristic of military operations. Traditional reductionist models inadequately account for the unavoidable uncertainty of complex military operations.
The dynamic nature of modern war adds to the complexity of military systems. Changing environments, changing missions, and changing opponents contribute to the chaos of current and future military operations. The environment of military operations continues to change temporally, spatially, and mechanically. Temporally, command and control conducted at the speed of light and weapons delivered at the speed of sound have contributed to the increased tempo of military operations. Spatially, the expanse of the battlefield has grown to cover the globe; in the future, there may be little distinction between the battlefield and the homefront. Recognizing the changing spatial dimensions of modern war and thc expanding array of possible military environments, military theorists and doctrine writers have replaced the word "battlefield" with the more inclusive "battlespace".
Mechanically, technological innovations have produced quicker, deadlier, and more destructive ways of interacting within the military environment. The diversification of military missions has created additional complexity by adding both to the details (increasing the number of parts) and dynamics (increasing the number of interactions between agents) of the military system. Military agents must be familiar not only with more tools, but also with new and innovative ways of using these tools. As the system changes, so too does that of possible opponents. The "systems" opposing future military operations will consist not only of conventional military forces, but also of terrorists, computer hackers, economic: criminals, and even Mother Nature. Changes inherent in modern war have greatly increased the complexity of the military operating environment. . . Small changes in input result in dramatic and unpredictable changes in output.
Col. Gorman included some interesting observations on a category of military operations called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which we have seen a lot of since he wrote this article. Three of his points jumped off the page for me:
- "In the future, there may be little distinction between the battlefield and the homefront."
- "The identity of belligerents may be uncertain and the relationship between a specific operation and a campaign plan may be more difficult to define than would normally be the case in war."
- The failure to adapt to complexity leads to systemic failure in competitive environments.