| French Troops Pinned Down on the Chemin des Dames |
The Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames failed in April and May 1917 because unrealistic promises of a rapid 48-hour breakthrough collided with poor tactical planning, bad weather, and deep German defensive preparations. General Robert Nivelle had promised to halt his "steamroller" operation if it did not succeed with 48 hours. Instead, he continued pushing his forces to attack for weeks, losing 30,000 killed, 100,000 wounded, and 4,000 captured. He had to go. In the article, Brigadier General Robert Doughty tells the story of his replacement of General Nivelle by General Philippe Pétain. More details on what Nivelle's "Winning Formula" was can be found HERE.
One of the first casualties of the offensive was Nivelle's position as commander of French forces on the north and northeastern front. Aware of threats against his remaining in command, Nivelle visited Pétain on 27 April and offered him a position as his chief of staff. He made the offer even though he did not like Pétain personally and considered him too pessimistic and negative. Obviously, he thought having Pétain close to him would help deflect personal attacks. Pétain had already been informed, however, by a representative from the Ministry of War on 24 April that if Nivelle were relieved, he would be Nivelle's replacement. So he declined Nivelle's offer without warning the besieged general of his imminent relief.
A few days later Pétain was summoned to Paris to meet with Painlevé and then Ribot, who told him formally that he would become chief of the General Staff and shortly thereafter succeed Nivelle as commander of the Armies of the North and Northeast. With the offensive formally ended but with its remnants still stirring, the government was unwilling to relieve Nivelle and thereby acknowledge publicly the failure of the offensive; political leaders also were reluctant to infuriate the British by not supporting their Arras offensive.
| Nivelle |
Pétain became chief of the General Staff on 29 April, and on 1 May he arrived in Paris and began carving out a larger role for himself. First, he sought to limit what Nivelle could do by limiting the size and scope of a new attack being planned for the Reserve Army Group. With the support of the minister of war, he canceled the most difficult part of this operation, the attack on Brimont. Next, on 4 May, he attended a meeting with the British to address their fears that the French, under his hand, would adopt a defensive strategy and do nothing but await the arrival of American forces. By the end of the meeting, the British and French had agreed that they would no longer seek a “rupture” of the enemy's front but instead would focus their efforts on destroying the enemy's forces and preserving their own. With limited objectives and incessant attacks, particularly with artillery, the two allies could weaken German forces and ultimately prevail. In essence, the two allies had accepted Pétain's method, which relied on attrition of the enemy, not rupturing German lines.
Getting rid of Nivelle proved to be complicated. On 11 May, the French government asked him to resign but he refused. He told a liaison officer, “They want my hide...But neither my dignity, my conscience, nor my sense of what I owe my country permits me to play their game.” On the morning of 15 May, Poincaré and Painlevé met with Nivelle, but he remained adamant.
That same day the Council of Ministers demoted him to being an army group commander, and Pétain succeeded him as commander of the Armies of the North and Northeast. Since there was no vacant position for an army group commander, Nivelle was put on leave for three months. Pétain later refused to allow Nivelle to take command of an army group, and he eventually was reassigned as commander of French forces in North Africa. Pétain took command of the Armies of the North and Northeast, a month after the beginning of the Nivelle offensive and three days before General John J. Pershing received orders naming him commander of the American Expeditionary Force. Pétain's first task was to repair the damage done by Nivelle and his second was to welcome the arrival of the U.S. Army.
| Pétain |
To strengthen the confidence and capability of the army, Pétain began by reassuring French soldiers that their lives would not be wasted in useless attacks. In essence, he renounced costly offensives but he did not renounce offensives. On 19 May, four days after being named commander of the northern and northeastern fronts, he published his Directive No. 1 which stated explicitly that the situation on the Western Front ruled out, “for the moment,” a “rupture” of the front followed by “strategic exploitation." The French, he said, had to deal with the “actual war” and not some false model detached from reality. Obviously with the failed Nivelle offensive in mind, he explained that a huge attack aimed at distant objectives would lose the benefit of surprise because of its size and would be costlier for the attacker than the defender.
He preferred limited offensives that could be launched with minimum preparation and could surprise the enemy. Such attacks would rely as much as possible on the artillery and avoid unnecessary exposure of the infantry. Instead of trying to end the war quickly, the French had to launch operations, he said, that, while avoiding casualties in the infantry, would inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy. Such operations could occur anywhere along the front and thereby could “fix the enemy and take away his freedom of action.” When the situation changed, meaning when it was time to do something else, Pétain would issue, he said, new directives for the ensuing operations.
Meanwhile, Pétain did not halt all attacks, and he maintained pressure on some of the same points Nivelle had attacked. He did not know how the war would end, but he expected his limited offensives to bleed the Germans considerably and ultimately to compel them to seek peace. As Pétain's critics noted at the time, this could take a long time, for years. Some soldiers saw no reason to be optimistic about the outcome.
Source: Over the Top, May 2017