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| Newspaper Depiction of the Incident |
The Dogger Bank incident (also known as the North Sea Incident or the "Russian Outrage") occurred on the night of 21–22 October, 1904, when the Baltic Fleet of the Imperial Russian Navy mistakenly opened fire on British civilian fishing trawlers in the North Sea. Vice Admiral Admiral Rozhdestvensky's ships, of the Russian Baltic fleet, then coming off the coast of Norway, had received rumors from several sources of the presence of Japanese torpedo boats in the vicinity, and on this account the fleet set sail for the Far East 24 hours ahead of schedule. The admiral issued orders for officers of the watch to open fire in the event of an evident and imminent attack by torpedo boats.
In hindsight, the drama that eventuated seems driven by some combination of inexperienced sailors and commanders, bad intelligence, and paranoia. The Russo-Japanese War had started months earlier with a surprise Japanese torpedo boat attack on the Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur. This apparently terrorized Russian naval command, making torpedo boats a looming, invisible obsession for the entire fleet, even though Tokyo to England seems a very long cruise for small ships.
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| Admiral Rozhdestvensky |
The course followed by the Russian ships toward the southwest took its last two divisions close past the Dogger Bank, the usual fishing ground of the fleet of Hull trawlers consisting of some 30 of small steamboats and over an area of several miles. Toward 1:00 a.m. on 22 October the night was rather dark, a slight, with a low fog partly clouding the air, when the Russian ships stumbled upon the fishing fleet from Hull, England out dragging their nets for cod and haddock. The Russians, somehow under the misapprehension that the English vessels were the feared Japanese torpedo boats, opened fire, with the result that one fishing boat was sunk and others damaged, killing two fishermen and injuring six more. The Russian gunners also managed damage one their own ships, the cruiser Aurora, which is miraculously still surviving today as a museum ship.
Later investigation concluded that Admiral Rozhdestvensky had personally done everything he could, from the beginning to the end of the incident, to prevent trawlers recognized as such from being fired upon by the squadron. It was never determine who gave, or if , an open fire order was ever given. The attack naturally outraged the British public when word spread. Thee Royal Navy was ordered to clear for action, and shadowed the Russian fleet through the Bay of Biscay. Although Britain had a defensive military alliance with Japan at the time, a direct military conflict through timely international diplomacy.
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| One of the Damaged Fishing Boats Back at Hull |
During the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, a treaty had been signed establishing a Permanent Court of Arbitration. Behind the scenes, diplomats of the two countries involved steered the ongoing controversy to this court with the Kingdom of Great Britain as claimant for damages and Russia as the respondent. The British Foreign Office through this court requested a full apology, full reparation, and the punishment of those responsible for the attack as well as assurances of non-repetition from Russia. The arbitrators, five admirals—one each from the participants and three neutrals—spent two months reviewing the case. They concluded that no Japanese torpedo boats were present and that the firing was entirely unjustified. In February 1905, Russia accepted the findings and paid Great Britain £65,000 to £66,000 (roughly $300,000) in compensation for the victims and property damage.
Back at sea, the Russian Fleet was still a long, long way from its Pacific destination. Three months later, however, the Russian fleet would suffer possibly the most decisive defeat in naval history (only Trafalgar and Midway are comparable) at Tsushima.
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| Funeral of the Two Dead Hull Fishermen |
The Dogger Bank incident had two short-term and one much more important impact on international relations leading up to the Great War. It demonstrated the viability of international arbitration to avert a great-power war and led to its use or some form of negotiation to resolve several subsequent pre-1914 international disputes. It also set something of an international precedent for financial compensation for state accountability for harm to neutrals in case of conflict.
Longer term, the semi-amicable resolution of a dispute between Russia and Britain paved the way for the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907 which—combined with the 1904 British-French Entente Cordiale—de facto created the Triple Entente. Successfully managing the military blunder had reminded both sides they had some important common interests and dangerous opponents. Russia's defeat at Tsushima and the subsequent 1905 revolution also made it clear to the tsar and his ministers that they needed more friends on the international stage. France, already allied with Russia, actively worked to bring a new partner to the coalition to counter its greatest threat, the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.
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| 1914 Russian Poster Celebrating the Triple Entente |
Clearly defining the two competing and militarily potent blocs proved to be a critical turning point in the run-up to the July Crisis of 1914 and the disastrous general war that ensued. Historian David Stevenson argues that inter-alliance diplomacy became markedly "rougher" after Dogger Bank as the European system shifted away from flexible, localized alignments toward a rigid system with two antagonistic blocs in which civilian leaders gradually became "militarized" by the constant demands of military preparedness. The almost comical Dogger Bank incident helped lock in the system of competing alliances which would eventually (inevitably?) find a crisis which would prove beyond diplomatic solution and would result in a general war by default.
Sources: The Permanent Court of Arbitration; Oxford Public International Law: Dogger Bank Incident (1904);"Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914," International Security, Vol. 22, No.1, David Stevenson; Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914, David Stevenson; Wiki Commons










































