It's the Anniversary of the Second Battle of the Marne

"Men of Iron"
109th Infantry, 28th Division, at the Second Battle of the Marne

On 15 July 1918 American forces in France began fighting a two-month campaign that—to that point—would become the largest battle the nation had ever engaged in.  The Second Battle of the Marne marked the turning of the tide in World War I. It began with the last German offensive of the conflict and was quickly followed by the first Allied offensive victory of 1918 The 270,000 soldiers committed and the nearly 40,000 casualties suffered dwarfed the previous totals of the previous record holder, the Battle of Gettysburg, which had lasted 3 days and involved 165,000 men counting both sides.

There are a lot of reasons why this rather remarkable fact is overlooked. The title of the action used herein, the Second Battle of the Marne, isn't universally respected.  Some histories use terms like the Aisne or Aisne-Marne Offensive, or the Battle of Soissons,  or bundle the somewhat disjointed Allied operations  with earlier engagements around nearby Chateau-Thierry. Further, American forces didn't fight independently—they were under French command and were intertwined with French, British, and Italian forces. Also, in accounts I've read about the battle, historians seem to understate the size of the American contingent, with some apparently not grasping that American divisions of the Great War were roughly 28.000 effectives, over twice the size of other countries divisions, friend or foe. In fact,  the Yanks constituted about half of all the troops engaged in the fighting. Finally, some histories don't include the period 15-17 July, when American units were deeply involved in the defense of the Marne River line and the Champagne against the last German offensive of the war. 

In any case, the record for largest American Battle ever, was quickly superseded by the St. Mihiel and then the Meuse-Argonne Offensives.  But Jeopardy fans should stay alert for the question: "As of 1 September 1918, what was the largest battle America had ever fought?"  Now here's a little information on the Second Battle of the Marne that I published on my old Doughboy Center site.

42nd Division Troops East of Reims, Awaiting the Opening Attack

Quick Facts

     Where:    The Aisne-Marne Sector, 75 Miles Northeast of Paris in a Triangular Area Bounded by Chateau-Thierry, Soissons and Reims

     When:    July 15 - September 16, 1918

     AEF Units Participating:   Nine U.S. Divisions Under French Command, Coordinated by Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Click HERE To See a List of U.S. Divisions and Their Commanders

     Opposing Forces:    German First, Third, Seventh and Ninth Armies

Areas Captured by U.S. Divisions in the Battle
(42nd Division, East of Reims, Was Strictly on the Defensive)

Summary of Operations

Phase I:  German Operation Friednsturm Launched (5th Ludendorff Offensive), 15-17 July 1918 (Defensive Phase)

15 July 

Three and one-half German Armies attack in the early morning. The 3rd Division and a regiment of the 28th Divisions of the AEF makes a strategically important stand on the left end of the Marne River line.

16-17July 

German units occupy southern bank of Marne between Epernay and Chateau Thierry and advance their line 7 miles east of Reims, where the 42nd (Rainbow) Division holds the line.

 

3rd Division Engineers Building Bridge to Cross the Marne

Phase II: The Aisne-Marne Counter-Offensive, 18 July -  17 August, 1918

 18 July

French 10th and 6th Armies attack the salient from the west, with 1st and 2nd U.S. division and elements of 4th Division attacking south of Soissons. 3rd and 26th U.S. Divisions join crossing of River Marne. German high command decides to reinforce the salient to avoid a rout.

 19 July

American units south of Soissons start meeting fanatical resistance. German air force commands the air.

 21 July

Second assault against the salient from the south. Five more AEF divisions would eventually be committed.

30 July - 1 August 

Battle before Sergy; Ourcq River line crossed.

4-22 August 

Tenacious battle before Vesle River at Fismes and Fismette as German Army defends vigorously on the Vesle.

4th Division Supply Train on Way to the Front

Phase III: The Oise-Aisne Offensive, 18 August - 16 September 1918

August  18

French 10th Army launches major offensive near Soissons

August 28 - 2 September

U.S. 32nd Division captures key town of Juvigny cutting the Soissons-St. Quentin road. Germans find Vesle line untenable and withdraw before River Aisne.

4 September 

Vesle River crossed; U.S. 28th & 77th Divisions advance.

16 September 

Last full American division in sector [77th] relieved as the axis of the French and American offensive operations shifts east to the Champagne and Verdun sectors.

American-Manned Tanks Preparing to Attack Juvigny

Some Eyewitnesses to the Fighting

Captain Jesse Woolridge, 38th Infantry, describes the 15 July fighting along the Marne:

Newly captured prisoners began to give real information - a grand offensive was to be made [where] the Marne was only about 50 yards wide...We had 600 yards of [this] front all to ourselves...[When it began] it seemed [the Germans] expected their artillery to eliminate all resistance...French Officers attached to our Brigade stated positively there was never a bombardment to equal it at Verdun.

At 3:30am the general fire ceased and their creeping barrage started - behind which at 40 yards only, mind you, they came - with more machine guns than I thought the German Army owned...

The enemy had to battle their way through the first platoon on the river bank - then they took on the second platoon on the forward edge of the railway where we had a thousand times the best of it - but the [Germans] gradually wiped it out. My third platoon [took] their place in desperate hand to hand fighting, in which some got through only to be picked up by the fourth platoon which was deployed simultaneously with the third...By the time they struck the fourth platoon they were all in and easy prey.

It's God's truth that one Company of American soldiers beat and routed a full regiment of picked shock troops of the German Army...At ten o'clock...the Germans were carrying back wounded and dead [from] the river bank and we in our exhaustion let them do it - they carried back all but six hundred which we counted later and fifty-two machine guns...We had started with 251 men and 5 lieutenants...I had left 51 men and 2 second lieutenants...

Two future Marine Corps Commandants correspond:

From Co. "H"

At: ?

Date: July 19. Hour 10:45 am

To: Major [Thomas] Holcomb.

I am in an old abandoned French trench bordering on road leading out from your P.C. and 350 yds. from an old mill. I have only two men out of my company. We need support, but it is almost suicide to try and get here as we are swept by machine-gun fire and a constant barrage is on us. I have no one on my left and only a few on my right. I will hold.

[Clifton] Cates, 2nd Lt. 96 Co.

Bridge to Fismette Looking from Fismes

 

Captain Harry Withers, 112th Infantry on attempts to cross the River Vesle from Fismes to Fismette

Absolutely unable to get patrols into FISMETTE. Got down as far as 100 yards from bridge. Streets of FISMES running north and south covered by machine-gun fire and one-pounders. Two casualties in one patrol of six men. REIMS Road covered with machine-gun fire from left. Noticeable absence of flares. FISMETTE very quiet. No firing on FISMETTE since 1000 hrs., August 27. If there any of our men in FISMETTE they are very few and scattered and in hiding. No evidence to confirm any of our men holding out. Will make further reconnaissance. 27 August, 1015hrs.

A Last Word on the Battle from  Erich von Ludendorff, Quartermaster General, German Army

...All [German] divisions [on 15 July] achieved brilliant successes, with the exception of the one division on our right wing. This encountered American units! Here only did the Seventh Army, In the course of the first day of the offensive, confront serious difficulties. It met with the unexpectedly stubborn and active resistance of fresh American troops.

While the rest of the divisions of the Seventh Army succeeded in gaining ground and gaining tremendous booty, it proved impossible for us to move the right apex of our line, to the south of the Marne, into a position advantageous for the development of the ensuing fight. The check we thus received was one result of the stupendous fighting between our 10th Division of infantry and American troops...

America's Beautiful Oise-Aisne Cemetery, Where Many of the Fallen
of the Second Battle of the Marne Found Their Final Resting Place

My thanks to Robin Clayton of Walnut, Mississippi, who encouraged this article. MH

Tesla and the Great War — Explored in Tesla: Wizard at War

Tesla: Wizard at War

The Genius, the Particle Beam Weapon, and the Pursuit of Power

Marc J. Seifer

Citadel Press, 2022

Originally Published at Military Review,  4 August 4 2023

The international bestseller Tesla: Wizard at War: The Genius, the Particle Beam Weapon, and the Pursuit of Power is a formal objective essay with hints of how Nikola Tesla built consensus to create a weapon so powerful that it would discourage war. The book discusses groundbreaking ideas, interactions with historical figures, and the impact of research and inventions on history and current military technology. Author Marc J. Seifer introduces interactions with Joseph Stalin and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as many of Tesla’s other personal relationships during the First World War and leading up to the Second World War. Seifer displays Tesla’s research, inventions in powerful technology with limitless range, and his ambition to succeed at abolishing war.

The book is a composition of released correspondence and documents with public figures, celebrities, scientists, and friends related to Tesla’s technical innovations.  It details projects interesting to the U.S. government that Tesla hoped would end war as we knew it. Seifer’s decades of research and speaking engagements about Tesla are displayed throughout the book. He discusses the invention of a particle beam weapon and wireless power with limitless range during the time of the First World War.

The book shares many writings describing his ideas and projects, specifically surrounding the search for a particle beam weapon. In his writings he describes alternating currents that will travel farther and power more technology, wireless technology, small, unmanned ships, launch of a giant wireless tower to eliminate the use of fuel, a particle beam weapon, and many more inventions. It includes Roosevelt’s inquiry into research on the newest technology, specifically technology that could give any wartime advantage.

The ideas and inventions discussed in the book were of great interest to many influential individuals. They could benefit many groups of people and influence the advancement of ideas of many nations during a pivotal time in history. The manuscript leads to the belief that many of Tesla’s writings were seized after his death and have only recently been released for public review. These writings were so useful that today we still see government and private party projects expanding on the ideas and works.

This volume discusses Tesla’s ideas, inventions, writings, and pursuit of support for his work. It reviews his relationships and sharing of his ideas and inventions with influential individuals, such as how Tesla was able to encourage influential individuals to work with him and develop and distribute the ideas and inventions, and how he influenced others with his ideas and altered thinking about the course of the war. The book is insightful and helpful in understanding Tesla, his beliefs, and desire to end war.

Order HERE

Tesla’s ideas, inventions, and writings are thoroughly reviewed. One of the highlights is Tesla’s drive to solve the problem of war and create peace with a weapon so powerful that it would ensure mutually assured destruction. He believed the weapon’s power, if held by many nations, would discourage waging war. The manuscript concludes with his final writings, the end of his life, and speculation on what has happened with his technology, ideas, and research. I recommend the book to individuals interested in the newest technology and its development.

Author Marc J. Seifer is an acclaimed authority on Tesla. He has researched, spoken, and published extensively on Tesla. His earlier biography on Tesla, Wizard: The Life and Times of Nikola Tesla, published in 1996, has been cited many times and translated into nine languages. Not only has Seifer published, but he has also lectured and starred in a miniseries on Tesla and has appeared in some documentaries and the movie Tower to the People. He published the book Wizard at War to fill gaps in the 1996 book on the life and times of Tesla.

Book Review written by: Kathy Kim Strand, MEd, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The 332nd U.S. Infantry's Military and Political Role in Italy

 

The 332nd Infantry Is Welcomed to Italy

By Cmdr. Alexander Buschor, U.S. Navy

Though American money had been flowing into Italy’s war campaign for some time, since the Italian military’s disastrous defeat at the Battle of Caporetto, Rome had requested more than just U.S. dollars. Fresh troops and materials were needed to reroute the Austro-Hungarians. U.S. brass and policymakers were reluctant to do so, but the 332nd Infantry Regiment was eventually committed to the Italian front. 

It’s worth noting that this is one of the first times an American fighting force was sent to a theater of war 

(a) outside the scope of primary U.S. military engagement (in this case, the Western Front), 

(b) fought under foreign leadership (the 332nd took orders from Italian generals), and 

(c) were committed by diplomatic means between two separate governments as opposed to being a purely Washington-made decision

In Gen. John J. Pershing’s diary, he describes a lunch with the ambassador to Italy, Nelson Page, highlighting the political vice military nature of committing American troops to Italy: “The Ambassador seemed disappointed to find me strongly opposed to the use of our troops anywhere except on the Western Front and as components of our own army.”

Men of the 332nd Deployed Along the Piave River

Northern Italy already had its fair share of Americans aiding the conflict. Red Cross volunteers and ambulance drivers, so well-known from Ernest Hemingway’s dramatization in A Farewell to Arms, had been there for years. The arrival of combat troops, however, was another affair. After departing their home station of Camp Sherman in Chillicothe, Ohio, in late 1917, the 332nd crossed the Atlantic aboard the RMS Aquitania, landed in England, and eventually trained across western Europe until it finally reached Italian soil in 1918. Upon arriving in Milan, the troops were greeted by throngs: “The crowd, now uncontrollable, almost bore the men from their feet in a mad frenzy to honor these first combatant American troops in Italy. The exultant cries continued, ‘Viva l’America! Viva l’America!’ A somewhat humorous note on ethnic and cultural differences is added to this passage in the unit’s enlisted personnel’s Company Log: “The stiff wall of reserve of the Anglo-Saxon could no longer resist the mighty flood of human emotion that surged against it and in that sublime moment, seizing the inspiration of the hour, the men in khaki spoke for America, and cried back, ‘Viva l’Italia! Viva l’Italia!’

It’s important to emphasize that the 332nd was largely detailed to this corner of the war as a publicity stunt, something both Washington and Rome sought to publicize. In lieu of fighting, the American soldiers spent a substantial amount of time in rear billeting, marching around areas of the Italian peninsula not in a combat zone, performing quasi-humanitarian duties, and training. The enlisted man’s log states, throughout the summer of 1918, “The regiment continued intensive training through the late summer; each man, already overtrained, began hoping that the impending day would soon arrive when the big drive in Italy would begin. At the close of the day’s heavy, and by this time, monotonous drill, the men spent their evenings on the streets and in the small shops of Valeggio or bathed in the clear, swift waters of the Mincio. The camp life, too, was diversified by Sunday trips to Lago di Garda and Verona.

However, as the Central Powers began to crumble and the Italian army again gained the initiative, the 332nd found itself on the move, seeing action at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto and the Tagliamento River. Even as Austria-Hungary was penning the armistice, Italian forces with their American helpers took the initiative and attacked wherever they could, mostly against surrendering Austro-Hungarian army units, to take what they saw as rightfully theirs and had been attempting to do so since 1915. As the war ended, word often reached the front lines piecemeal, and depending on what side a soldier was on may determine what level of fighting would occur. At the Tagliamento River, the 332nd found itself in a precarious situation, a prelude to the geopolitical debacle it would later find itself in.  According to the company log:

The American forces were now in a perilous position. They lay deployed on the barren river within easy range of the enemy who held a wholly unobstructed view of the entire maneuver, and who might easily have killed or captured every man in the three platoons by a concentrated fire from the well-fortified parapet now only a few hundred yards away. Events took a strange turn.

Waving a white flag, an Austrian major leaped from the enemy dike and quickly advanced toward the American lines. He was followed by more officers. Coming forward under a flag of truce, they offered to converse with the Americans and Capt. Maroni.

In the parley that followed the Austrians told that on the preceding night they had received orders declaring that an armistice would take effect at midnight—the 2nd— that they should maintain their present position at all hazards and hold the right bank of the Tagliamento while the Allied soldiers would not advance beyond the left—the west. They presented a telegram as evidence that these orders were actually issued, adding at the same time that they—the Austrians— would use force if the Americans advanced further. To strengthen their claims they asserted they would not have destroyed the bridge if the telegram concerning the armistice had come one hour earlier.  [Note:  The 332nd would eventually force the river crossing on the morning of 4 November and advance as to Codroipo and Villaorba and halted there upon hearing an armistice between Italy and Austria-Hungary had been signed.]

Lion of St. Mark and Army of Occupation Shoulder Patches for the 332nd Infantry

[Eventually armistices were executed on all the fronts and preparations for a peace conference were underway.] The 332nd, though, was not about to pack up and head home to America. In the American Battlefield Monuments Commission's summary, there exists a very brief post-conflict history of the 332nd’s role abroad:

After this Armistice the American troops formed part of the Allied forces stationed in Austria and along the Dalmatian coast. The 1st and 3d Battalions were at Carmons near Gorizia, Austria. Later in November the lst Battalion was ordered to go to Treviso and the 3d Battalion to Fiume, Austria. The 2d Battalion was stationed at Cattaro, Dalmatia, and a detachment from it was sent to Cetinje, Montenegro. In March 1919 the regiment was assembled in Genoa and on April 3 its last elements embarked from that seaport for the United States.

This official history is fascinating, for it provides no detail as to why a single American regiment was dispersed along a coastline stretching from Venice to Montenegro or why they were operating in several sectors outside of the American occupation zone delineated by the armistice and the Committee of Admirals. The unit’s enlisted personnel’s Company Log does no better of the unit’s entire foray into the Eastern Adriatic; only two sentences are provided: “The second battalion, which had gone to Cattaro, Dalmatia, on November 12, entered the harbor after a trip around Southern Italy. The battalion is justly credited with having endured more hardships than any other in the 332nd.”

As early as 25 November 1918, the U.S. Army’s Gen. Tasker H. Bliss was concerned about American soldiers operating outside the scope of American interests, stating, “Because this was not provided in the Armistice, the Army does not have proper instructions and serves Italians.

Ironically, the U.S. Army was unwittingly serving the interest of Italian political and territorial machinations but was loved by Italy’s newfound foe, the Yugoslavians. Balkan and Eastern Adriatic natives somewhat correctly identified the presence of American Army troops with the arrival of a new order, the national self-determination so ardently advocated by President Wilson. However, the 332nd’s exclusive command by Italian military leaders, obviously in direct conflict with South Slavic ambitions, made this a precarious situation for every party involved. A field report of the 332nd’s operations under Italian command perfectly illustrates the above-mentioned issue. In a memo titled “The Chargé in Serbia” between American diplomat H. Percival Dodge and the acting secretary of state, Dodge highlights the following overlapping web of American, Italian, and Yugoslavian interests:

At the time Italy was making efforts to occupy Cettigne as she had already occupied the Montenegrin ports of Antivari and Dulcigno but through the efforts of the Allies was dissuaded from this step. Our officers told me however that two companies of Italian troops actually had started for Cettigne, with two companies of American troops (332nd. Infantry) when before reaching the frontier the American commander, Major Scanlon, thought it best to return. The Italians continued and were received at the frontier with gun-shots from the Montenegrins at which they also returned to Cattaro. The Montenegrins are stated to have declared that they would willingly have allowed the Americans to go to Cettigne but absolutely refused to allow the Italians to pass. Serbian troops were occupying Cettigne at the time as well as the principal points of Montenegro.

On this incident, a second memo states, “The facts are exceedingly obscure, and it is doubtful if they are known to any living persons.”  It is even more vexing to consider that these were American troops, under Italian command, operating in the French sector of the Eastern Adriatic.

The Italian army would again employ American troops in another nation’s zone, Great Britain, when they marched them into Fiume on 19 November. It’s worth noting that, within a few weeks of this, the British would abandon their sector of Fiume, leaving it open for Italian army occupation. In The American Naval Mission in the Adriatic, 1918-1921, Dr. A. C. Davidonis states, “Italy employed American troops at Fiume to advance her own political interests,” and that the presence of them gave their objective the veneer of “a legitimate interallied occupation.” In Joseph Lettau’s In Italy with the 332nd Infantry, he states, “It is said that when the Italians attempted to enter Fiume after the armistice was signed, they saw so many Jugo-Slav guns pointed their way that the expedition was called off until Americans could be found to land first. All felt sure that the Slavs would not fire upon Americans,” alluding to Davidonis’s point of using Americans as dressing for an inter-allied occupation force.

As early as 28 November, misuse of the American troops had reached negotiations in Paris, and Secretary of War Newton Baker ordered Pershing to recall the 332nd. However, American diplomat Col. Edward M. House (an honorary title), a longtime sympathizer of the Italian nation and post-conflict cause, intervened; he  convinced Wilson to keep the American troops in the Adriatic to avoid creating an “unfortunate impression.”

Though U.S. soldiers narrowly avoided indirect gunfire during the Italian march to Cettigne, life for the soldiers billeted in Fiume was much more easygoing. American officers were barracked in luxurious quarters aboard a commandeered Austrian steamer, and the troops were scattered throughout the city. This was done intentionally to keep American supervision of their own troops to a minimum and to maximize their use for Italian motives. Furthermore, Italian officers were always placed in charge; Lettau describes the practice in the following terms: “This detestable practice of placing a higher Italian officer over the highest ranking American officer present was a favorite play of the Italians.”

The 332nd Arrives Home, April 1919

By March 1919, however, the writing was on the wall, and the political misuse of U.S. soldiers was too obvious to Wilson and American policymakers. Bliss stated, “It is my unanimous opinion of the American Peace Mission that … the American troops are being used to further a policy of occupation and penetration” and that “the regiment is being employed not for legitimate military purposes but to further political aims.” The 332nd was finally consolidated, assembled in Genoa, Italy, and returned to the United States in April 1919.  They arrived at New York on 14 April, and the following week paraded through the city. Shortly afterwards, the regiment was moved back to Camp Sherman, Ohio, where on 26 April the regiment marched through Cleveland, Ohio. The process of demobilization began after this and over the course of a couple of weeks its various sub-units were disbanded as personnel were discharged. On 5 May 1919, the regiment itself was finally disbanded.

Source: Excerpted from: "Political Troops: The U.S. Army in the Adriatic, 1918-1919," Military Review, September-October 2025

After Rasputin – The Most Controversial Russian of the War Was Vladimir Sukhomlinov

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (born 1848—died 1926) was a Russian general and minister of war who was largely blamed for Russia’s premature and unprepared entry into World War I. [Note:  The late British Eastern Front historian Norman Stone has argued that excessive culpability for Russia's shortcomings has been laid on Sukhomlinov's reputation.]

Sukhomlinov graduated from Nikolayevskoye Cavalry School in 1867 and served in the Uhlans of the Imperial Guard Regiment based in Warsaw. He graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1874 and participated in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), serving for some time on the staff of General Mikhail Skobelev and was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class. He subsequently advanced as a fast-rising field grade officer, a key assignment being as the highly visible head of the officer cavalry school in St. Petersburg from 1886 to 1897. At this time he certainly came to the attention of the future Tsar Nicholas II. At some point, Sukhomlinov—a charming and much-admired raconteur—became a favorite of  the tsar. He and his fourth wife, who was thirty years his junior, would also later become friends with Rasputin.

In any case, he was promoted the next year to general and his career advancement accelerated. Sukhomlinov became chief of staff of the army in  December 1908 and then—almost immediately— appointed Russia's Minister of War.  He served as war minister from 1909 to 1915, and it was under him that the Russian orders for mobilization were given at the outbreak of World War I. 

At the time of Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia, Sukhomlinov assured the government of the combat readiness of Russian troops. The partial mobilization soon revealed the demoralized and unequipped state of the nation’s armed forces. As the war progressed, Russian combat operations were increasingly hampered by shortages of arms, ammunition, and other war matériel, but Sukhomlinov continued to insist that the army was adequately supplied. 

Sukhomlinov (far left), accompanying Emperor Nicholas II during his 1911
trip to Ovruch, is present at the presentation of bread and salt to
Nicholas II by representatives of the city.

Sukhomlinov (far left), accompanying Emperor Nicholas II during his 1911 trip to Ovruch, is present at the presentation of bread and salt to Nicholas II by representatives of the city.

British Observer Major General Sir Alfred Knox recorded some interesting observations of Sukhomlinov's deceptions about artillery shell production in his diary: 

The Minister of War replied on September 28th that the question of the supply of ammunition in the Russian army gave no cause for anxiety, and that the Ministry of War was taking all necessary steps to provide everything required. At the same time the French Military Attache learned from an unofficial source that the output of factories in Russia then amounted to only 35,000 shell a month. Unfortunately, he had no means of ascertaining that the rate of expenditure at the front then averaged 45,000 a day, and he believed that the initial stock on mobilization was more than twice as large as it really was.

If General Sukhomlinov and his Staff had worried to appreciate the situation at the end of September, they must have known that the initial stock only provided shells for two more months of war, and they should then at once have taken adequate measures to cope with the difficulty by ordering from abroad.

It subsequently became known that the officials at Petrograd had received ample warning. On September 9th the Staff of the South-West Front had telegraphed to the Artillery Department : "It is essential to replace the almost exhausted supplies of shell." On October 26th Ivanov had telegraphed : " Supplies of ammunition are entirely exhausted. If not replenished, operations will have to be broken off and the troops retired under most difficult conditions."

Over a year later I learned on unimpeachable authority that in the middle of October General Kuzmin Karavaev, an honourable old man, whose nerves had been shaken by his immense responsibilities as Chief of the Artillery Department, went to Sukhomlinov, weeping, and said that Russia would have to make peace owing to the shortage of artillery ammunition. The Minister of War told him to "go to the devil and quiet himself."

. . .  I interviewed Sukhomlinov in Petrograd on December 16th [1914] to ascertain his views regarding rifles and shells. His first remark was: "As you know, the Germans have been preparing for this war since 1870. We never commenced preparation till five years ago, when I became Minister of War. We have done a lot since then, but I wanted two years more.

 

Sukhomlinov with a Contingent of Allied Officers
(Possibly That Is Sir Alfred Knox in the Rear)

As Minister of War, Sukhomlinov was never trusted by the Army Committee of the State Duma, led by Alexander Guchkov.  Guchkov challenged one of Sukhomlinov's allies to  duel, which turned out to be mutually non-fatal. Sukhomlinov was also resented by Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich, the commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the first phase of World War I. The hostile relationship between the army commander and war minister was intensified by the latter's association with purported spy Colonel Sergey Nikolayevich Myasoyedov, who was eventually executed for treason.

In June 1915 the thoroughly discredited Sukhomlinov was dismissed and replaced by the able General A.A. Polivanov. Despite Sukhomlinov’s close ties with the tsar, public sentiment ran high and charges of malfeasance, corruption, and treason were brought against him by the Duma. He was arrested in April 1916, freed in October at the tsar’s instigation, and rearrested after the Revolution by the provisional government. At his trial in the autumn of 1917, he was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. He was freed by an amnesty granted by the Bolsheviks and went to Finland and later to Germany, where he composed his memoirs, Erinnerungen, published in 1924. He died in poverty in Berlin in February 1926.

Sources:  Encyclopedia Britannica;  "Terrible Internal Enemy", Military Review, January 2015; Wikipedia; With the Russian Army, 1914-1917,  Major General Sir Alfred Knox.

Hollywood Goes to (World) War (One) – Video

 

Recommended by Film Reviewer Andrew Melomet

Eyewitness: A Badly Wounded Private Allan (CEF) Is Taken Prisoner, 2 June 1916

Canadian Prisoners of War with a German Guard

Given the size of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) and the nature of the First World War, the number of Canadian prisoners of war (POWs) was surprisingly small. According to the Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, published in London in 1919, some 3,747 men, including 236 officers, were captured by enemy forces and interned in Germany or in occupied France. The Overseas Ministry reported that 301 died in captivity; 438 were repatriated prior to the end of hostilities; and 100 men, including one officer, escaped during the war. 

Private Alexander Millar Allan (1887–1968) born in Wishaw, Scotland, was an organist and choirmaster by profession when he enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Collingwood, Ontario, on 24 September 1915, service number 475313. He originally joined the 4th University Battery but was transferred to the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

He was wounded at the battle of Mont Sorrel and went missing 2–4 June 1916. He lay injured on the battlefield for two days, surviving multiple artillery bombardments, before becoming a prisoner of war and eventually being repatriated to England, and later Canada, during the war.

. . . for I walked right into a number of Germans. Not a soul spoke they all watched me with staring eyes. I looked at them for a few minutes examining the focus of every one, then signed to them that I wanted water. Still nobody spoke; when I saw that they weren’t likely to have water to give me, I crawled on my way through them all, and not one offered to stop me. I continued on my way with the idea of getting to a place where I knew we had water; very soon I met an officer and some men; when he saw me he yelled ‘the enemy’! Now, I thought, here is where I get it; he calls me the enemy; not much hope there.

I slid down on to the ground and waited to see what was going to happen. He gave a few sharp orders. I looked up to see what he was about to do and I must say I was surprised; he was looking at me with sympathy clearly marked on his face. His orders were to one of his men to take me along to the dressing station and see that I was properly attended to.

Private Allan's lower left jaw was badly damaged and initially treated by the Germans. He was returned from Germany and admitted to the Queen Alexandra Hospital (Millbank) in London, England, on 9 December 1916, where a rib bone was grafted to his jaw, after which he was transferred to the CCAC Shoreham and then on to Hastings. On 10 March 1917, he was transferred to the Eastern Ontario Regimental Depot at Seaford before being invalided to Canada on 25 May 1918 via Liverpool. Upon his return to Canada he was admitted to the Davisville Military Hospital in Toronto on 7 June 1918 for further treatment and was discharged on 12 September 1918. As a result of the damage to his jaw he required special dentures and could no longer sing but returned to being an organist. Allan died in Toronto in 1968.

Source: Canadian War Museum

Haubourdin Aerodrome — The RAF's Landmark Mass Air Attack

A Royal Aircraft Factory SE5a (L) and Sopwith Camel (R) on the Attack

The first massed low-level attack by the Royal Flying Corps on an enemy airfield was carried out on 16 August 1918, when 65 Royal Aircraft Factory SE5as, Sopwith Camels, Bristol Fighters, and de Havilland DH4s flown by Australian and British pilots attacked the German aerodrome at Haubourdin, located on the southwesterly outskirts of Lille, France. The raid was part of a campaign to reduce the concentration of airfields around Lille, which had been a German stronghold for nearly the entire war. The attacking aircraft carried  incendiary and explosive bombs and all the machine-gun ammunition it could carry.  No British aircraft were lost.

Damage to the Aerodrome During the Attack

The Post-Raid Communiqué 

“A raid was carried out on Haubourdin Aerodrome by Nos 88 and 92 Squadrons and 2nd and 4th Squadrons A.F.C. Sixty-five machines in all took part, dropping 136 25-lb and 6 40-lb bombs and firing a large number of rounds from a height varying from 400 to 50 feet. Three large hangars containing machines were completely burnt, and two machines standing outside were set on fire. Several fires were started in huts, and what is believed to be the officers’ mess was blown up and burnt. Several other hangars, in addition to those burnt, received direct hits. The station at Haubourdin was also attacked with machine gun fire from low height, causing confusion among the troops. Two staff cars were fired at, one of which upset in a ditch and another ran up a steep bank; the occupants were not observed to leave. A train was also shot at, which stopped. Considerable casualties were caused among personnel at the Aerodrome who were seen rushing take refuge in a hospital. All machines returned.”

Later review of the German war diaries suggest that Jasta 43 had five aircraft destroyed and two damaged and was grounded until 3 September. Jasta 63 also had one destroyed and a number of others damaged.

Sources: Royal Air Force Museum;  Wings, August 2015; HistoryNet

Notable Medical Researchers from World War I

Some of the greatest medical researchers of the 20th century served in World War I, often gaining insights and motivation for their later accomplishments from their wartime experiences.  Medicine and medical research are two of the many specialties of our regular contributor James Patton. You can find his fascinating in-depth articles  HERE.

Capt. Frederick Banting, Canada:

Surgeon, Canadian Army Medical Corps; wounded in action and decorated for heroism; co-discoverer of insulin; Nobel Prize 1923; killed in plane crash en route to service in WWII.

Grenadier Gerhard Domagk, Germany:

Volunteer with Leibgrenadier Regiment of Frankfurt; wounded on the Eastern Front; transferred to the Medical Corps and worked in numerous cholera hospitals; became M.D. after the war; world's leading researcher in chemotherapy; awarded Nobel Prize in 1940; Nazis forced him to decline award, but he was able to accept it in 1947.

Capt. Alexander Fleming, Great Britain:

Royal Medical Corps, Wound Research Center, Hospital 13, Boulogne, Fr.; inspired by his observations and experiments on the practical effects of antiseptics, he shortly thereafter led effort to develop penicillin; Nobel Prize 1945.

Lt. Herbert Gasser, U.S.A.:

Chemical Warfare Service; did research on traumatic shock; credited with theory unifying nerve physiology and electro-physics; Nobel Prize 1944.

Capt. Paul Dudley White, U.S.A.:

Medical Corps American Expeditionary Force; later assisted Red Cross in fighting a typhus epidemic in Macedonia; pioneer in electrocardiography, heart disease research, and vascular medicine; gained fame when called in as consultant on President Eisenhower's heart attacks; early advocate of exercise and proper diet to prevent heart problems.

Million Dollar Barrage: American Field Artillery in the Great War

By Justin G. Prince

University of Oklahoma Press, 2021

Dr. Michael Boden, Reviewer

U.S. 75mm Battery at Château-Thierry
By Jack Duncan 

Originally presented in Army History, Fall 2023

The numerous innovations in the conduct of war at the start of the 20th century are well known to most people who study the military history of the era. Technological advancements, tactical and operational developments, growing global political rivalries, and other conditions all contributed to the changing character of war. Justin Prince tackles one particular dimension of this environment, the origins of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery branch, in his work, Million Dollar Barrage: American Field Artillery in the Great War. 

To Prince, this period was of primary importance to the service’s coming of age. Prince notes that “these formative years, from 1907 to 1923, saw the establishment of a modern field artillery branch, and through the missteps, failures, problems, debates, and successes, the field artillery gained a new primacy in the minds of American military thinkers” (189). 

To support this assertion, throughout his narrative Prince consistently focuses on three particular areas of development: doctrine, technology, and “the debates about open warfare.”  The book progresses chronologically, for the most part, although there are some overlaps in chapter focus depending on the issue under consideration.

After the introductory chapter, chapters 2  and 3 focus on conditions that necessitated a dramatic change in the application of American field artillery. The second chapter hones in on those developments from 1897 to 1913 that frame the American experience, including such key events as the introduction of the French 75mm gun in 1897,  the separation of field artillery from coast artillery in 1907, and the establishment of the School of Fire at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1911. The third chapter aligns closely with  these initial parameters as Prince emphasizes American technological and training challenges in the years leading up to the First World War. One constant in this period is the importance of the Field Artillery Journal and the centrality of the Fort Sill experience and curriculum in shaping American artillery development. The fourth chapter emphasizes the challenges associated with arming the branch and the friction that developed between the Ordnance Department and the Field Artillery branch in procurement prior to American entry into the war.  This friction resulted, to Prince, in numerous comprehensive shortcomings that persisted through the war, such as the lack of heavy artillery development and the slipshod attempt at developing a standard American field piece.

The following three chapters address the substantial qualitative developments experienced by the force throughout combat operations in Europe. The issues and themes at the forefront in the previous three chapters come together in the fifth, on artillery training after the American entry into the war. The sixth chapter focuses particularly on American observation of fire issues, of which the lack of quality observation methods and poor air coordination were two of the most significant. The seventh concentrates on the application of previous training and development during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. 

Only in the final campaign does Prince perceive that the service addressed many of the issues faced by American artillerymen. To the author, the Meuse-Argonne “was the crucible that shaped American artillery into an effective  military weapon” (164).

The final two chapters summarize the developments of the immediate postwar years (to 1923) and the lessons learned by the American field artillery branch. During these five years, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Prince identifies pivotal developments in the American field artillery service, with relatively swift and broad espousal of lessons learned in the conflict. Prince concludes that training shortcomings were the primary cause of concern for the development of the field artillery service, although not a shortcoming that existed in a vacuum, as they included doctrinal, technological, and fiscal issues. This open attitude helped provide the foundations for acceptance as an equal branch of service on the modern battlefield and the transition from follower to leader in terms of global tactical and technological innovation in the interwar years.

Prince’s approach on a few aspects of methodology should be noted. These are not necessarily critiques but rather observations on his process. For instance, Prince’s discussion of actions in the war occupies a limited frame of the work as a whole—parts of only three chapters. There is less in the work that reflects the long form of the title, American Field Artillery in the Great War, than one might expect. The only chapter that  considers the conduct of combat operations looks solely at the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. One wonders if similar American operations, such as the earlier III Corps operations around Soissons (with the French) or the II Corps actions on the Somme (with the British), experienced the same model of growth and progression that Prince sees in the larger campaign.

Prince’s analysis consistently considers those topics previously noted throughout the work—doctrine, technology, and open warfare. Within that analysis, Prince focuses more on systems as opposed to the role of individuals. Individual agency, though not completely absent, takes a back seat to the roles of institutions and agencies. There are a few exceptions, to be sure. The postwar chief of artillery, Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, was a prominent early advocate for the branch in the prewar years, and Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall’s advocacy for artillery development is noted throughout the narrative.

Order HERE

In developing and presenting his argument, Prince is to be commended for his attention to detail. He is adept at demonstrating how particular issues (e.g. the lack of a standard American field piece for the war) caused friction and challenges in numerous other aspects of wartime development—in this case, training, procurement, and doctrine. A reader with a degree of  experience in the history of American field artillery will find many insightful contributions in these pages. However, for those with little or no prior knowledge, much of the significance of these passages and their detail will be difficult to fully ascertain. Prince also relies a great deal on the articles and arguments presented in the Field Artillery Journal and does an excellent job of demonstrating why that source must be of primary importance when looking at the era’s developments. Aside from these minor observations, anyone interested not just in American field artillery but also in the First World War or in early challenges of combined-arms operations will find Prince’s book of significant value.

Dr. Michael Boden

The Great War's 101 Defining Events, Part 2: 51 – 101

51 — 101

Click on Page Image for Easier Reading

Source: Over the Top Magazine: May 2008