James Patton
Hubert C. Rees CMG DSO (1882–1948)
was born in Conway, Wales, the only son a of a clergyman, who was the only son
of a British Army officer. Educated at Charterhouse School in Surrey,
in 1900 young Rees joined the 3rd (Militia) Battalion of the East Surreys.
He promptly volunteered for Imperial Service in the Second Boer War (1899–1902). In 1903 he was commissioned in the regulars as a 2nd lieutenant in the 2nd
Welsh, and by 1914 had made captain. He served with this battalion as a part of
the 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during
the Retreat from Mons, the First Battle of the Aisne and into the First
Battle of Ypres. On 21 October Rees’s company fought their way to the relief of
a unit of the 1st South Wales Borderers which was taking the brunt of a German
attack. Rees was later awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO)
for this action.
Ten days later, at the end of the
Battle of Gheluvelt (29-31 October 1914), in Rees’s words “the 2nd Welsh was
annihilated” repelling a massive German assault. There were about 1,200
soldiers, from Rees’s battalion and the 1st Queens Royal Regiment (West Surrey),
and the casualty rate was 95 percent.
Rees, a captain at the time, wrote
in his diary:
As soon as it became light,
the storm broke. The trenches, lane, and village were deluged with shells of
all calibres. It was impossible to move in the sunk lane and many men were hit.
After the bombardment had been going on for some time, a few wounded men from B
Company came in to say Marshall had been killed and that practically the whole
company destroyed. The lane itself was indefensible, so Colonel Morland decided
to move back to the front of the village and hold that with what men he could
collect.
Young had come in from my two
platoons on the left badly wounded by a rifle bullet. I crawled down to the end
of the sunk lane to see if I could get back any of his men, who were in a
hopeless situation. When I got to the end, I had a good view of their trench 50
yards off. There was a partially dug communication trench, only a couple of
feet deep, between the end of the lane and them. A number of men were trying to
run across this 50 yards to the lane, instead of crawling up the trench. I
shouted at them to try the trench, but could not be heard. About 25 men
attempted to run, but not a single man got more than half way and they seemed
to me to be killed outright. It was useless waiting so I went back up the ditch
alongside the Menin Road, following the men the colonel had already withdrawn.
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| Key Locations During the First Battle of Ypres |
I found my only remaining
platoon more or less intact at the barricade and that Morland had moved towards
the SWB [South Wales Borderers]. I started moving the platoon to follow
Morland. The shell fire around the barricade was very violent. Two burst in the
house behind which I sheltered, one cut the sign post neatly in half at the
corner, another came through a wall 10 yards away and killed a man who was
passing. Eventually I got away with a dozen men, four of whom were carrying
Young in a mackintosh sheet, and one man had a machine gun of which the tripod
had been blown to pieces and for which he had no ammunition. I followed
Morland, who I estimate had about 80 men with him.
I saw no signs of them where I
expected to find them and concluded that they had been forced by the hail of
shells to move farther back. Several of my dozen men had been wounded by
shrapnel, so without seeing anyone at all, I went through the northern outskirts
of Gheluvelt and finally arrived at the position of 54th Battery, RFA [Royal
Field Artillery]; commanded by Major Peel to whom I reported that I did not
think that were more than 100 men of the Welsh Regiment left. He obviously
disbelieved me, and I fancy seriously thought putting me under arrest for
spreading alarmist reports. I confess to being shaken, the stock of my rifle
had been shot through and the strap of my water bottle cut. He directed me to
stand by as escort to the guns. I remained with the guns for some time,
collecting stragglers until I had 40-50 men.
At midday a battalion advanced
from our left rear moving in lines of companies under heavy accurate shrapnel
fire. These turned out to be the Worcesters. About the same time, Lyttleton
came over from the brigade to say that every available man was to counter-attack.
I followed the Worcesters and came up to their reserve company in a trench to
the left rear of Gheluvelt. The rest of the battalion had disappeared on the
flank of the village and the rifle fire was heavy. I pushed on across a valley
which ran up beyond the trench, through a confused disorganised mass of men
under heavy shell fire, and lost most of my scratch command in the confusion.
I went on to see what was
going on and just reached the end of the village when I heard my name shouted
and, turning back, I saw Colonel Morland. He shouted to me to come to him
saying that these 10 men attacks were no use. He added that Ferrar had been killed
leading a bayonet charge near the barricade and that the battalion had been
wiped out. It appeared that while I was absent with the 54th Battery, the
survivors under Colonel Morland, Major Pritchard, Captain Ferrar and Moore had
had a most desperate fight on the north edge of Gheluvelt, at one time getting
as far back as the barricade where Ferrar was killed and Pritchard severely
wounded. Morland and I started to walk back towards the 54th Battery and men
from all the regiments involved were running back in the same direction. We
endeavoured to rally a few of the groups and collected 25 men of the Welsh
Regiment by the time we reached the guns. We got into a trench near the battery
and were joined by Moore and Corder.
By this time, the enemy had
pushed up south of the Menin Road past Gheluvelt as the battery was under rifle
fire and bullets were striking the parapet of a trench a little to our right.
Captain Robinson came over to say that Major Peel had been wounded by a bullet
through the leg and that he was now commanding the battery. There were now
eight officers standing together in the trench. Moore on the left, myself next,
then Morland and next to him Captain Robinson with Corder, a captain in the
Gloucesters, and somebody else beyond again. It was then that a shell burst in
front killing Moore on my left and mortally wounding Colonel Morland on my
right. It was a final blow. Morland was a terrible loss. He remained to the
very end as cool and collected as if he was on parade at home. Moore was also a
great loss and the regiment lost one of its bravest officers.
At this time, Corder and
myself were the only two officers who had survived the fighting at Gheluvelt,
and we had about 25 men. [Having taken command of the battalion] these I spread
out as a firing line across a turnip field a little in front of the guns and
went to interview Robinson. I suggested he should open fire on some houses
about 500 yards away on the south side of the Menin Road which were obviously
full of snipers. He blew the houses about pretty badly with HE [high explosive]
and then continued with shrapnel on the slope beyond them. This put a stop to
the rifle shooting, which was getting rather trying.
Lieutenant Blewitt of this
battery came to say that the Germans appeared to be bringing up a field gun to
the barricade in the middle of Gheluvelt and asked permission to take an
18-pounder on to the road and have a duel with it. Having got permission, he
man-handled the gun on to the road. The German gun fired first and missed and
Blewitt did not give him another chance. He put a stop to any trouble from that
quarter for the rest of the afternoon.
If the Germans had pushed home
their attack during the afternoon there was nothing to stop them. About 5pm I
was handed command of the 1st Queens [West Surrey}, which consisted of
Lieutenant Lloyd and 21 men. Major Watson of the Queens, who put me in command,
went off to act as brigade major of the 3rd Brigade. My force, consisting of
these two battalions, only totalled some 60 men and two officers, the combined
strengths of the two that morning could hardly have been less than 1,200 men.
I set out to discover our
exact situation. I was at a farm house about 400 yards from the Menin Road.
Between me and the road there was a remnant of the Royal Munster Fusiliers and
200 yards of trench full of men who belonged to every regiment of the Army.
They were without officers and fast asleep from exhaustion. About that time,
two fairly strong companies of the Berkshires came through with their right on
the Menin Road. I spoke to their CO [commanding officer] and suggested
some caution, he said he had been told to go straight ahead and did so until
stopped by rifle fire a little further on.
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| Gheluvelt Chateau Today |
I next went to the left and
found the 1st Division Cyclists, 160 strong, holding a front of 400 yards with
the Black Watch on their left on Polygon Wood. I then went to Gheluvelt
Chateau, where I found the SWBs under Lieutenant Colonel Leach still in possession,
having had some desperate hand to hand fighting in the chateau grounds. I told
Leach what the situation was and then returned. The SWBs withdrew and passed
behind my farm shortly afterwards.
Lieutenant Hewitt, Sergeant
Smedley and 5 men reported to me about 11pm. He said that they were the sole
survivors of the two platoons with whom he had disappeared on the 29th. A shell
had killed or wounded five men a few yards away as he was returning. He had
been with the 7th Division holding some trenches in the direction of Kruisech.
They had been heavily attacked but had beat off all attacks until, after dark,
on the 30th, he found himself with 24 men completely cut off by the Germans,
who had driven back the troops on either flank. He decided on a bold experiment
and forming his men up in fours marched through the Germans in the dark without
being detected. He attached himself to the 2nd Queens whom he found holding
trenches at the edge of Veldhoek Woods. They came in for heavy shelling and
having lost most of his men set out to find the battalion.
‘At 2am, on 1st November, I
was ordered to move the Welsh and the Queens south of the Menin Road and dig
in. The SWBs, who were still fairly strong, held about 400 yards southwards
from the road and we extended beyond them. Colonel Leach, commanding, was badly
wounded by a shell splinter in the foot, and Major Reddie became their
commanding officer. We had already dug one lot of trenches that night and now
had to dig another set before dawn, with only three hours to do it in.
Although Gheluvelt was subsequently
lost on 31 October, the momentum of the German advance had been broken in a
dashing counterattack by the 2nd Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment.
Rees retained command of his
battalion during its reconstitution and was appointed temporary major. He then
spent over a year back in the UK, first attending the staff college, then teaching
at Sandhurst and finally on the staff of the 43rd (Wessex) and the 38th (Welsh)
Divisions, which were in the process of forming. On 15 June 1916 he was temporarily
promoted to brigadier general and sent as a last-minute replacement to command
the 94th Brigade, 31st Division, a K-2 formation of “Pals” battalions from the
Lancashire coalfields. He led them in action at Serre on 1 July 1916, where they
took horrendous losses. Rees refused to renew the attack on day two, thus
sparing the two battalions of the Barnsley Pals. The 11th E. Lancs (Accrington
Pals) had lost 585 men out of 720, at 81 percent one of the heaviest tolls of
any battalion on that day (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSIc4mxODc8). In
1988, in this controversial work British Butchers and Bunglers of World War
One (1988), Australian historical writer John Laffin chose General HC Rees
as a particularly glaring example of military incompetence, due to his
performance on 1 July.
On 4 July, Rees was moved over to
the command of the 11th (Lancashire) Brigade, a regular unit which had lost its
brigadier. He held this post until 1 January 1917 before moving on to two other
brigade commands. In early 1918 he took over the 150th (York and Durham) Brigade,
50th Division, a first-line Territorial unit. They fought defensive actions
against the German Operation Michael in March and Operation
Georgette in April, suffering heavy casualties, and were sent to recover
and rebuild at the Chemin des Dames, which was a quiet sector. A short
while later, however, the German Blücher-Yorck offensive hit them head-on.
Seeing that the German advance could not be halted, Rees decided to withdraw
from a position on the Plateau de Californie (near Craonne) to PC Terasse
(south of Craonnelle). But the 1/4th Yorks (Green Howards) had been overwhelmed,
and the Germans were already approaching PC Terrasse. The HQ had to be broken
up, and Rees was among those captured. His POW story was described in the Roads
post of 3 August 2026, titled “Captured: Fifteen British Generals.” The
highlight of his experience was an impromptu (and involuntary) rendezvous with
the Kaiser on Craonne ridge.
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General Rees Meets the Kaiser |
After the war, he was appointed
a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) in the New
Year’s Honours. He reverted to his substantive rank of major and took on the
command of the 6th (Territorial) Battalion of the Welsh, with subsequent service
as a general staff officer. He left the army in 1922. He subsequently
published his memoirs, which have recently been re-released as Welsh Warrior
- A Personal Record of the Great War, Brig. Gen. Hubert Rees (edited by
Peter Hart) (Outline Publishing Ltd, 2025).
Sources include: National Army Museum; the Internet Archive; BBC.com