The July Crisis
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, 1888
By Editor Mike Hanlon
On 5 July 1914, Alexander Hoyos, a leading hawk in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, and Count Ladislaus von Szögyény (1841-1916), the Habsburg ambassador to Berlin, met Wilhelm II, German Emperor and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the German chancellor. The following morning, Bethmann Hollweg gave Szögyény this assurance the following morning:
Concerning Austria’s relations with Serbia the German government believes that Vienna has to judge what has to be done to clarify this relationship; in this undertaking it can count safely on Germany’s support of the monarchy as ally and friend – whatever its decision.
This is the infamous "Blank Check" that encouraged Austria-Hungary to proceed with the punitive measures it was contemplating against Serbia but had feared the intervention of Russia, Serbia's fellow-Slavic protector. The Dual Empire did indeed subsequently feel empowered to proceed with their plans. Russian diplomats and intelligence operatives, meanwhile, picked up signs that Vienna was planning an aggressive move with this backing from Berlin. Petrograd had major stakes in such a game, viewing the Balkans as a vital sphere of influence and believed any losses there would signal weakness to its French and British allies.
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| Bismarck by von Lenbach Understood Russia and the Balkans Better Than His Successors |
This failure to anticipate Russia's response to subsequent Austro-Hungarian actions (chart above) led to Russia mobilizing and her allies eventually joining the war, thus turning a local European conflict into a Pan-European war, that quickly became a world-wide war. The "Complete Catastrophe" in other words resulted from the mistaken assumption that Russia would stand-by and let the two Germanic empires have their way with a friendly Slavic state. How could such a monumental error in judgment come about? Below are some of the explanatory theories that historians have advanced of the years.
Amnesia
Those gentlemen who met in Berlin the first week of July 1914 had plenty of warning about being very careful in the Balkans and with the Russian Bear, in particular, from Germany's greatest statesman Otto von Bismarck. The former chancellor had based his mostly successful approach to European diplomacy on "making a good treaty with Russia", pronouncing for all to hear that all the Balkans were “not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier” and that if a major war came to Europe it would start because of "some damned foolish thing in the Balkans." This outbreak of amnesia apparently afflicted all the top German decision-makers, who largely concurred on offering unconditional support to Austria-Hungary during the July Crisis of 1914. One minor exception might be the German Ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, who is considered the most cautious of Germany's senior officials, although he still facilitated the messaging and conveyed that Berlin expected a firm response.
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| Kaiser Wilhelm II and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg 1916 Commemorative Medal |
The Kaiser's Hand
Kaiser Wilhelm II was inclined to believe that Russia would not intervene by his own predispositions, reinforced by his military and diplomatic circles (such as reports from Count Friedrich Pourtalès, the German ambassador to Russia). He also seems to have convinced himself that his cousin (Dear Nicky) Tsar Nicholas II—as a fellow conservative absolute monarch—would never align himself with or defend a nation of "regicides" (i.e. the Serbs responsible for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand).
Misreading the Opposition
The consensus ascendent among Berlin's insiders was a belief (or hope) that giving Austria-Hungary unconditional backing would scare Russia into staying neutral, allowing Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia quickly in a localized conflict without triggering a broader European war. On the diplomatic / ideological front, however, Russia had clearly and overtly used Pan-Slavism to justify aggressive geopolitical moves and territorial ambitions directed against the Ottoman Empire. Abandoning Slavic Serbia would be inconsistent with that policy and undermine it. The ability to reflect realistically on Russia's interests appears lacking in reports on the discussions.
Gamesmanship
German planners believed Russia's military was still unrecovered and unready from the disastrous Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 and had not yet fully implemented army reforms. They assumed Russia would be too weak to fight and would back down if faced with the combined might of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg viewed an Austria-Hungary against Serbia war in July 1914 as a "calculated risk" to break up the Triple Entente or secure a localized diplomatic victory for the Central Powers. This latter point came from treating the crisis as an opportunity.
Combining All of the Above: There was An Epidemic of Wishful Thinking (My Opinion for What It's Worth)
Eschewed Wishful Thinking
Caesar by Rubens
What we wish, we readily believe, and what we ourselves think, we imagine others think also.
Julius Caesar, Commentaries
How did the leadership of an influential world power make the tragically dangerous assumption that a competing power would stay passive when a major conflict—in which it had a big stake—unfolded on its doorstep? Putting this article together reminded me a bit of what I've read about the attack on Pearl Harbor and how it surprised all of America's civilian and military leadership when so much information was available to them. (We've lost track of the Japanese carriers! They couldn't be headed for Honolulu, could they? Nah.) In both cases it the most senior decision makers acted like some infectious agent carrying the wishful thinking pathogen was in the air.
History is filled with all sorts of episodes of groups of people collectively acting out in irrational or destructive ways: the Dutch Tulip Craze, the Rwandan Genocide, and my favorite, The Strasbourg Dancing Plague of 1518, are examples. The first of these examples is something of a definitive clinical case of an epidemic of wishful thinking. According to a study by University of Amsterdam (where they well-remember the tulips), wishful thinking becomes an epidemic when high stress, uncertainty, and emotional stakes combine with social reinforcement and information overload, causing cognitive biases to spread across groups.
What about in Berlin in 1914? Were German statesmen captured by this phenomena? The pre-conditions described above certainly match the pressure chamber that Germany's statesmen found themselves in the midst of the July Crisis. The assembled collectively wished away the greatest danger to their nation in making their decision. The world war that followed, in my view, seems to have been caused by an epidemic of wishful thinking at a decisive moment.
Sources: "TWE Remembers: Austria-Hungary Issues an Ultimatum to Serbia ", The Council of Foreign Relation; "The illusion of limited war: chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's calculated risk, July 1914 ", Leibniz-Institut Repository; "Making the future too bright: how wishful thinking can point us in the wrong direction," Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2024.


