Resistance in Occupied Northern France, 1914-1918

Show of Power: Occupying Lille

From James E. Connolly's The Experience of Occupation in the Nord, 1914-1918

Soon after war was declared and the Germans invaded via the north, local French authorities forbade armed resistance on the part of civilians. The mayor of Roubaix, for example, offered the following advice to the population:

Do not commit any act that could serve as a pretext for terrible reprisals. If an individual commits an act against a German soldier, in the present circumstances it would be criminal folly. Such an act could only be the work of an agent provocateur. This will not occur in Roubaix. We are absolutely counting on the fact that the population of Roubaix will provide a good example of calm and will keep its composure.

Similar advice was proffered in Belgium. This proclamation echoes the reticence of many rural communes to encourage civilian armed resistance during the Franco-Prussian War.  Indeed, what applied to many mayors in 1870 also applied in 1914: their first reflex was to disarm their citizens to ensure that they were not tempted to use such weapons, and to show goodwill towards the invader. Across the Nord, especially in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, the population was asked to deposit all weapons at designated municipal buildings. 

Intimidation: Taking Over the Town Square

Once the Germans arrived, they demanded that locals deposit remaining weapons at the Kommandantur. For local notables such Rouesel, this policy was acceptable because ‘civilians should not take any part in hostilities, weapons could be a danger for the security of troops and in taking them away, the German authority avoided a possible conflict that could cause a dangerous incident for the population.’ Naturally, not everyone complied, such as the Mayor of Noyelles-lez-Seclin, who still possessed a revolver on the final date for handing in weapons. The Germans therefore searched for and requisitioned weaponry throughout the occupation.  Handing in weapons was for many a logical, if difficult, decision.

A civilian caught possessing a weapon risked the death penalty, although imprisonment and forced labour were the most frequent sentences. Whether requisitioned by force or voluntarily handed in, weapons were therefore hard to come by and dangerous to own in occupied France. Further, the concentration of Germans made armed resistance seem futile and suicidal. Troop numbers were higher in larger localities, particularly those with vital railway links or near the front, such as Lille, Roubaix-Tourcoing, Cambrai or Valenciennes. One indicator of the scale of the German presence is that from June to August 1915 a total of 169,191 Germans used Tourcoing’s tramway; from September to November 1915, the total was 194,328, although most were not part of the army of occupation.  Still, the close proximity of tens of thousands of armed Germans, the difficulty in acquiring weapons and severe restrictions on liberty of movement and communication undermined the feasibility of armed resistance. Further, the population was in no physical state to fight. For example, in June 1917, forced labourer Jules Claeys weighed just 38 kilograms after three months’ labour.  Many other sources attest to the poor physiological and psychological state of locals 

Nevertheless, there were isolated incidents of civilian violence, such as the alleged shooting of German sentries (one of whom died) by two civilians in Roubaix in October 1917. One of the ‘murderers’ was shot and killed while trying to flee the German police during a follow-up inquiry. A handful of other examples of individual violence exist, not all clearly acts of resistance, such as Arthur Debiève from Gommegnies who was sentenced to ten years’ captivity for having mortally wounded a German soldier who was stealing his vegetables. However, these remain the exceptions that prove the rule.

The Nuisance of Occupation 

The occupied population did not engage in Werner Rings’ ‘Resistance Enchained’: ‘the desperate fight of those who were cut off, without help, and with practically no hope of surviving.’ Occupied civilians were cut off, but there was hope for survival; they were receiving help, directly from the neutral aid organisations, and indirectly from the Allies’ armed struggle against the Central Powers. As Horne and Kramer note, widespread civilian resistance usually occurs with the defeat of conventional forces,  when all hope of military victory is lost; but occupied Nordistes had faith in the Allied victory. It was not the role of occupied civilians to fight the national enemy.

The nature of the war of attrition, in which huge armies made small gains at great loss, and the flat plains of the Nord (lacking mountainous or wooded terrain useful for guerrilla warfare) also detracted from the feasibility of armed resistance. Despite being convinced by material conditions and patriotism that they lived at the military front, the occupés remained above all civilians, not combatants.

As well as being difficult, armed resistance was discouraged by French municipalities who wanted to avoid bloodthirsty and costly urban warfare involving civilians, which could even lead to social disorder (the Paris Commune was still in living memory). Also, authorities did not wish to give the Germans any pretext for reprisals, as happened in the Franco-Prussian War after franc-tireur attacks on the Prussians. 

Intrusiveness: A German Officer Instructing French School Children, in Champagne

Despite this, but precisely because of commonplace franc-tireur attacks in 1870–71, the Germans saw francs-tireurs everywhere during the invasion and responded in kind. Emmanuel Debruyne argues that atrocities played a major role in discouraging armed resistance in 1914–18. Isabel Hull has also emphasised the foundational role of 1870–71 for the German military,  and argued for a ‘spiral of extremity’ in the occupations of 1914–18 involving ‘untrammelled military power.’  This persuaded local notables and the wider population of the foolishness of resistance.

French authorities also wished to avoid breaching the 1907 Hague Convention, which forbade armed resistance unless partisans were organised into clearly identifiable groups. Such units would be crushed by the Germans, and also ran contrary to the French Government’s abandonment of the invaded regions, whereby even fortress cities such as Lille were declared ‘open cities.’ Guerrilla resistance breaching the Hague Convention would give the Germans a legitimate pretext for reprisals, ‘to prove the enemy right.’ It would also show a lack of respect for the law, and, if anything distinguishes this occupation and particularly the resistance that took place, it is a devotion to, almost adulation of, the law, and the importance of respectability. This is a key part of [understanding] the . . . ‘respectable resistance’,  . . . symbolic expressions of patriotism and opposition, . . . and more active forms of resistance [that actually occurred during the occupation.]

Source: The Experience of Occupation in the Nord, 1914-1918, James E. Connolly, Manchester University Press, 2018