Four Shadows Over the Russian Army of 1914

At the Winter Palace, 29 July 1914

By  Stephen Walsh, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Excerpted from "The Russian Army and the Conduct of Operations in 1914",  British Journal for Military History, February 2016.

 

The Russian Army of 1914–18 seems indelibly associated with the image of an ill-equipped mass of brave, but limited, soldiers, led by an inept officer corps, the representatives of a discredited tsarist political system that went to war, ironically, amongst other things, to uphold Russia’s status as a great power. The Russian Army of 1914 was a flawed instrument, the unwieldy tool of a tsarist state incapable of harnessing Russia’s military potential. However, it is a fact that while the Russian Army was regularly defeated by the Germans in 1914, it also inflicted a significant defeat on the Austro-Hungarian Army, one of the few decisive strategic events of the 1914 campaign.  

Three factors (shadows) hanging over the Tsar and Stavka–the Russian high command—at the opening of the war influenced the strategic and operational choices that brought a combination of success and disaster in 1914.

Russian Soldiers Facing a Banzai Attack
in the Russo-Japanese War

1. The Legacy of the Russo-Japanese War 

In August 1914, the Russians wanted to restore a military reputation trashed by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. The Treaty of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, signed in September 1905, publicly acknowledged Japan’s victory and Russia’s humiliation. The army was defeated and the navy thrashed, with their performance depicted as symptomatic of a medieval tsarist autocracy, ill-equipped for the modern world. 

Defeat in war provoked domestic unrest and, in October 1905, the tsarist regime barely staved off revolution by granting a political constitution and an elected assembly, the Duma. The Russo-Japanese War revealed that "we did not know modern war," and initially the army was eager to discern and absorb its lessons. 

However, by 1908, unity of purpose had degenerated into bickering, cabalistic antics that undermined reform and disrupted Russian strategic planning despite the fact it was "fuelled by the certainty of a general European War." The Russian Army had five Chiefs of the General Staff in the period 1908–13: each was either a product of, embroiled in or consumed by, endemic factionalism.

2.  The Bosnian Crisis of 1908–09 

[This diplomatic defeat] revealed, in the face of Austria’s determination to annex Bosnia, that the Russian Army could not seriously contemplate war and was in fact incapable of going to war, even against the wheezing conglomerate of Austria-Hungary.  Russia capitulated and was exposed as a great power unable to use war as an instrument of state policy. The Russian press described the Bosnian humiliation as a "diplomatic Tsushima." It cast a long shadow. During the successive Balkan crises of 1912–13, Count Thurn, the Austrian ambassador to Russia repeated on numerous occasions: 

. . . that although the Russian leadership sought and badly needed peace, it would accept even a nearly hopeless  war rather than face further humiliation.

In the period 1909–14, Russian foreign policy was dominated by an enduring desire to  maintain its status as a great power, if necessary by force. It was driven by the need to cultivate allies, to avoid further humiliations, to advance Russian interests in the Black Sea and to restore Russian military power as a credible factor in international relations In August 1914, the Russian government chose to fight because in many ways it did indeed fear peace and humiliation more than war. 

Russian Infantry

3.  Myth of the Steamroller 

In the wake of the Bosnian humiliation, the army benefited from enormous investment in road and rail infrastructure as well as manpower and equipment. The Great Programme envisaged an army of 1.7 million men by 1917: a bigger, better army, capable of rapid mobilisation and sustained operations, with more firepower,  greater reserves, and increased flexibility. The vision impressed France and haunted Germany, which feared a reformed Russian Army would become an unbeatable strategic colossus. In February 1914, Moltke explicitly stated that "Russia’s preparedness for war has made gigantic strides since the Russo-Japanese War and is now much greater than ever in the past."

Yet, "for all these improvements, the army still lagged dangerously behind its probable enemies." One of the enduring myths of the 20th century, then as now, was  the perception, if not reality, of Russia’s unlimited manpower. True, in August 1914,  the Russian Army was the largest in the world, but it was a superficial superiority. Russia mobilised a smaller percentage of her manpower than France or Germany while the notorious exemption system ensured many who could serve, did not, while those who did were of inferior quality. Quantity did not offset poor quality, and the exemption regime also robbed the officer corps of capable individuals who were not, like the aristocracy, socially conditioned to serve in the army. Yet, Russia’s allies and rivals, especially Germany, persistently overestimated the Russian Army, convinced it was shifting the balance of power toward the Triple Entente. The  Dual Alliance evolved from a nervous strategic insurance policy, driven by fear of Germany, to a more confrontational military alliance. French and Russian joint military planning was more urgent and meaningful in the period 1911–14. Russia’s perceived military recovery influenced French strategic planning while Russia’s  alliance with France dominated Russian strategy in August 1914. It was a strategy defined by an enduring struggle to reconcile ends and means. 

Commemorative Flag of the Franco-Russian Alliance

4. Strategic Dilemmas

In the period 1909–14, Russian strategic planning was dominated by the struggle to establish a war plan capable of reconciling the need to fight a two-front war against Germany and Austria, support the French, defend Poland, invade Germany, and protect Serbia. These strategic dilemmas remained unresolved in August 1914; indeed, they haunted the [1914] campaign. The dilemmas revolved around a series of key strategic questions that were distinct and problematic in their own right but also interacted with each other in a complex, elusive manner. These were not esoteric puzzles but urgent questions of military strategy, in a world where:  

First, should Russian strategy be offensive or defensive? 

Second, how could Russia simultaneously support the French, fight the Germans, challenge the Austrians, and defend the Serbs? 

Third, if Russia attacked, should its priority be East Prussia, an invasion of eastern Germany on the Berlin axis, or the Austrians in Galicia? 

Fourth, was the Polish salient a key strategic asset, one that presented offensive and defensive options against Austria and Germany or an indefensible strategic liability, full of bitter Poles?  

Fifth, should Russia seek a decisive victory over Austria but adopt a more defensive strategy against Germany or, vice versa, attack Germany and conduct defensive operations against the Austrians? 

Sixth, was a rapid Russian victory over the Germans a realistic possibility, and if not, why waste forces on bloody, indecisive or unsuccessful operations against Germany at the expense of a strategic offensive against Austria? 

Seven, was a defensive strategy against the Germans actually possible when France required a Russian offensive to divert German troops from the west? 

Eight, could Russian strategy focus on Austria based on the widely held assumption the main German forces would strike west? If Russia prioritised Austria, but the Germans drove east, a strategic catastrophe loomed. It was unlikely but had to be considered.

Nine, the Russo-Japanese War and the Bosnian humiliation seriously questioned the idea that Russia’s ability to defeat the Austrians, never mind the Germans. 

Tenth, how, if at all, could Russia actually protect the Serbs and Russia’s interests in the Balkans? 

Initial Deployments on Eastern Front, August 1914

Going to War

. . .In the final analysis Russian strategy in August 1914 was driven by the French alliance.  If Russia had to fight, it could not fight alone. Success in the east required French survival in the west, while survival in the west required Russian offensives in the east.  This is not to suggest that Russia selflessly sacrificed itself for the French.  Russia did not go to war for France, but Russia’s strategic options were dependent on her alliance with France. The French and the Russians were partners in the Dual Alliance, but each manipulated the other while officially acknowledging the  interests of their ally. The French wanted a Russian invasion of eastern Germany as well as East Prussia because for France, the alliance was about Germany, not Austria.  The Russians’ "natural" foe was the Austrians, not the Germans, but Russia feared the Germans and could not contemplate war with Austria without France.

Download Stephen Walsh's full 30-page article about Russia's 1914 campaign HERE