When Germany Accepted the 14 Points

By  Professor A.C. Umbreit, Marquette University

By the fall of 1918, the five victory offensives Ludendorff directed in the  first half of 1918 had failed, and Germany's resources were lacking to mount another. Fresh American troops were arriving in an avalanche. The Allies had gained the initiative with successful counteroffensives during the  summer in the Marne and Somme sectors. Then over a  few days toward the end of September, multiple disasters struck the German Army. The Hindenburg  Line north of Paris was breached. Pershing's forces surprisingly mounted their second major offensive in  two weeks, and in the Balkans—Ludendorff would later claim this was the real back-breaker—Bulgaria's  army was shattered and led its government to seek an  immediate armistice, leaving the southern flank of  their Austro-Hungarian allies defenseless.  

This confluence of disasters led to some kind of  tantrum or psychological collapse for General  Ludendorff on 28 September, with some witnesses reporting his writhing on the floor. In any case, he  recovered, calling Hindenburg, demanding an  immediate armistice. The next day Ludendorff  presented Kaiser Wilhelm and the German foreign  minister, Paul von Hintz, with the same recommendations, stating that an armistice would allow German forces to withdraw to the Rhine, where they could  regroup and defend the homeland. Shortly afterward,  Ludendorff shared the same message with the senior  army staff.  It was over these few days that the Kaiser,  Germany's political leadership, and its generals were  forced to face the inevitability of defeat. A consensus  was quickly reached to seek a peace based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points. A new government, headed by the moderate Prince Maximilian of Baden,  was brought in to negotiate with the Allies and  reshape Germany into a parliamentary system with a  constitutional monarch. The new chancellor went  right to work. 

Prince Max von Baden

On 7 October, a note (dated 3 October) was received from Chancellor Maximilian of Germany wherein the  president of the United States was requested to take a hand in the restoration of peace, to acquaint all belligerent states of this request, and to invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of negotiation. 

It was also stated that the German government  accepted the program set forth by the president in his  message to Congress on 8 January 1918 [when the 14 Points where enunciated] and in his  speech of 27 September. This meant the acceptance by Germany of the well-known fourteen propositions the president had announced as necessary conditions precedent to any peace negotiations. This note also requested a conclusion of an armistice on land and sea. 

On 8 October, the reply of the president was forwarded to the German government. In this reply it was stated that before answering the note of the chancellor, the president felt it necessary to assure himself of the meaning of Germany's note on these two points: 

First—Does acceptance of the terms of the message of  8 January and of the subsequent addresses of the  president mean an unconditional acceptance, and will  the object of entering into a discussion be only to  agree upon the practical details of the application of  the fourteen propositions? 

Second—Is the chancellor speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the empire that so far have  conducted the war or is he also speaking for the German people? 

This reply also emphasized the fact that an armistice  was out of the question as long as German armies were on the soil of the nations associated with the United States in this war, and that good faith must be shown by the Central Powers in immediately withdrawing their forces everywhere from invaded territory. 

Post-Armistice: German Troops Marching Home from France

On 12 October, the German chancellor answered this reply of the president, his answer containing, in  substance, these statements: 

I. The German government accepts the terms of the message of 8 January  and the object in entering into a discussion will be to agree upon the practical application of these terms. 

2. Germany agrees to evacuation and suggests that a mixed commission be appointed to make the necessary arrangements therefor. 

3. The government making this proposal has been formed by conferences in agreement with the great  majority of the Reichstag. 

4. The chancellor speaks in accordance with the will of this majority and in the name of the German government and of the German people.

No one would have believed, previous to July 1918, that Germany would accede to these drastic propositions as a foundation for international peace. So, to accede meant that she would surrender all of the advantages she had gained, up to the time mentioned, by force of her seemingly unconquerable military machine. Yet, it will be noted that in the first note of Chancellor Maximilian it was stated that the German government accepted these fourteen propositions. 

Source: Over the Top: Magazine of the World War One Centennial, November 1918.