Growing Concern in Germany—Intelligence Reports About Russia in 1910 & 1911

Tsar Nicholas II Inspecting Pilot Candidates for the Expanding Imperial Air Service

By Terence Zuber

The best indicator of the improvements in the Russian political, economic, and military situation in 1910 and 1911 is to be found in the German intelligence summaries. The Germans thought that the Russians had not only repaired the damage from the Manchurian War and internal disorders of 1904–05 but were also in the midst of industrial economic take-off, the Russian economy booming and providing vastly improved material conditions  for the Russian military. 

The German 1910 intelligence summary said that the combat power of the Russian army had increased significantly. The Russians had conducted a massive reorganization: reserve cadres and fortress garrisons had been transformed into maneuver units. Together with some existing active-army formations, this allowed the creation of four new corps in European Russia (XXIII–XXV and III Caucasus), as well as two new corps in Siberia (IV and V Siberian), producing a significant gain in combat power with no increase in peacetime strength. The peacetime garrisons of a number of units were moved out of Poland to the east to co-locate with their recruiting districts, allowing a faster mobilization. Although there was little improvement in the Russian rail net in the west in 1910, most of the new construction being in the east, the Russian rail net was so far developed that a peacetime concentration of units in Poland was no longer necessary—they could be deployed from the interior quickly by rail. The shift to peacetime garrisons in the interior of Russia therefore did not reduce the Russian threat to East Prussia.  

The Russians were de-emphasizing fixed fortifications in favour of mobile warfare. The Russians—still replacing stocks of equipment drawn down for the Manchurian War—allotted 100 million gold marks for this purpose in 1911. The Russians expanded the use of large-scale practice mobilizations: only 86,000 marks had been allocated to this purpose in 1910, while 259,000 marks were was also allocated in 1911. 

Russian  Model 1910 107mm Siege Gun

Their  artillery improving at lightning speed. By the end of 1911 the field artillery batteries were equipped with modern systems (recoil brakes, armoured shields, aiming circles). By the spring of 1911 each of the active-army corps would be equipped with a section (two batteries) of Krupp 12cm howitzers. On order for delivery in the spring of 1912 were 180 Schneider 15cm howitzers, which would give the Russians a capability similar to the German heavy field artillery (Schwere Artillerie des Feldheeres), which was one of the trumps of the German army. On order for the Russian siege artillery were 180 Schneider 10.7cm cannons. The gun was initially developed and produced by the French arms manufacturer Schneider, but was later built by the Putilovski and Obukhov plants in Saint Petersburg.

Internal security and in Russia was good. Discipline in the army continued to improve, although there were still incidents of revolutionary agitation. The harvests in 1909 1910 had been good, and for the first time in many years the Russian government enjoyed a budget surplus. Overall budgetary spending in 1911 was to increase by 230 million marks. The nationalistic majority in the Duma had approved increasing defence expenditures without demur.  

Ready to March–Russian Infantry

The German intelligence estimate for 1911 noted that the Russian army was making great efforts to speed up mobilization and deployment, adopting procedures similar to those of the French army. It was estimated that the Russians would mobilize 34 reserve divisions in European Russia and three in East Asia. The 1911 practice mobilizations were thought to have produced good results. The Russian active army consisted of 37 corps (74 divisions), so that with the 34 reserve divisions the Germans expected the Russian army—fully deployed in the west—would included 108 divisions. In the 1910–11 Aufmarsch I Ost [Deployment Plant] the Germans intended to deploy 15 divisions in the east and the Austrians had 48 divisions, for 63 divisions in total. The Austro-Germans would be effectively outnumbered 2 to 1.

From 1912: "Planning for War" by Terence Zuber, Journal of the World War One Historical Association, Fall 2012