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On 20 August 1914, the German Eighth Army was surprisingly defeated by the larger, but clumsily advancing Russian First Army commanded by General Paul von Rennenkampf. It was—by the standards of the Great War—a smaller and less dramatic victory/defeat. This is a relative matter, of course. The two armies committed 138,000 combatants that day and suffered a combined 34,000 killed and wounded. Nonetheless, the responses and subsequent actions to the event by the local commanders and the general staffs overseeing them are a much bigger story. Those men and their immediate decisions would powerfully influence the conduct of the war on both the Eastern Front and Western Front.
In an action just three days earlier at Stallupönen (map below), the Germans—anticipating a Russian drive towards Konigsberg—had administered a small but stinging defeat on their adversary. They been both better prepared for their first battle of the war and lucky. German General Hermann von François, commander of I Corps of the Eighth Army had decided—on his own initiative—to take his forces to Stallupönen where he expected Russian forces to be probing for a flanking attack. His quick attack devastated a Russian division that had no awareness of the presence of an enemy corps in the neighborhood. This forced a temporary halt for Russia's First Army, which was just initiating a major invasion of East Prussia. German forces, strategically on the defensive, then withdrew and consolidated at what seemed to be a strong defensive position around Gumbinnen.
Three days later, German Army Commander General Maximilian von Prittwitz ordered a pre-emptive attack on the now slowly approaching Russians. German forces initially had some success on the flanks—especially, once again, von François in the north. Overall, however, the attack was largely repulsed by surprisingly strong Russian artillery, against the German XVII Corps under August von Mackensen in the center. The Germans were forced to retreat — advantage Russia (Apparently). However, both commanders were surprised by the results, and responded to the outcome in ways that would dramatically influence future operations.
The losing commander, General Maximilian von Prittwitz, whose mission had been to slow the Russian advance while the main German forces dealt with France, was overawed by the combination of the defeat and the subsequent receipt of information of the advancing Russian Second Army from the south. When he suggested a plan to–in effect–abandon East Prussia to the enemy, he was quickly sacked in favor of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff team.
General Rennenkampf's response (or maybe non-response) of failing to continue pressuring the Germans, however, would have disastrous implications for his army's further operations on the Eastern Front. Within a week, it would allow the new Eighth Army leaders to disengage from Russia's First Army, concentrate on Samsonov's Second Army, and administer a catastrophic defeat on it at Tannenberg. Any sort of major thrust by First Army would have forced the Germans to divert troops to face him. But there was no pressure.
Russian Artillery Was the Key to the Russian Victory at Gumbinnen
Despite its setback at Gumbinnen, Eighth Army had been left free to execute the strategy— worked out in pre-hostilities war games—of punching Russia's northern army hard enough to stop it in its tracks, and then turning south to deal with their enemy's other army deployed in the northern theater.
On a broader scale, Gumbinnen may also had a war-shaping impact on Germany's 1914 campaign in the west. After the defeat, General Moltke at the German High Command seems to have lost confidence in the disposition of forces in the East and ordered two army corps and a cavalry division away from the Western Front. This critical troop diversion may have weakened the right wing of the German advance into France, contributing to the eventual failure of Germany's plan for victory. Such were the consequences of the Battle of Gumbinnen.
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