On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War

By Holger Afflerbach

Cambridge University Press, 2022

Ron Drees Reviewer

(Left to right) Hindenburg, the Kaiser, Chancellor Bethmann, the King of Bavaria, Ludendorff, and Admiral Holtzendorff, pictured at Pless in early1917. 

Rather than a traditional military history, this book on the First World War is more a political history and how military events affected politics. Afflerbach does not go into detail about the epic battles but does provide some explanation as to why they originated and their results. The maps, photos and charts are timely and do much to explain the military/political situation as it evolved during the war. I rather wish that he had referred to it as the Great War as no one at the time knew it was the First World War.

I first became aware of this book when I watched episode 141 of the History Happy Hour, a weekly podcast hosted by two historians who interview authors of new books. To watch the episode and learn more go HERE. 

Germany in 1914 had numerous problems, one of which was that it felt surrounded and cut off from the world by the treaty between France and Russia. The war was necessary to defend itself against attack from some unknown source. The nation believed its army was superior to any in the world. While those factors contributed to the start of the war, the situation was worsened by what Hans-Ulrich Wehler called a polycratic chaos because of all the competing power centers: Kaiser Wilhelm and his court, diplomats, the army command, the navy commanders, the Reichstag, the public and the Reich Chancellor. These power centers seriously conflicted the ending of the war, especially since so many were ill-informed by the lies of the army and did not know the true military situation.

WWI was a continuing series of misunderstandings, blunders, enormous casualties, coverups, bad guesses, overly optimistic guesses, and lies. Politicians failed to realize that the July 1914 crisis would erupt into war with over five million casualties by January, 1915. The attack on the Western Front had failed. By November, 1914, Falkenhayn realized that the war was lost because Germany did not have the strength to win on either front. Further, the West would have difficulty settling for peace because a treaty had been signed that prohibited separate peace agreements but was irrelevant as every belligerent nation wanted to acquire more land and thus had limited interest in peace. Later the navy would promise that unrestricted submarine warfare would bring England to its knees. Instead, the U.S. entered the war, supplying 200,000 soldiers per month and crushing Germany, much to the shock of German leaders.

The war continued as the West wanted to militarily defeat Germany while Germany felt weak but not defeated. The winter of 1917/1918 brought German victories and successes against Italy, Romania, and Russia, encouraging a continuation. However, the German offenses in the spring of 1918 were foreordained to fail as German forces lacked mobility due to the lack of trucks, wagons and horses to connect railheads to advancing forces. 

As 1918 continued, the German situation worsened as morale sank lower and more Americans poured in, increasing the Allied numerical advantage. Depletion of the German army continued due to casualties, desertions, prisoners taken by the West and constant Allied pressure.

Author Holger Afflerbach

By the end of September, the situation was hopeless and a few weeks later the army had given up. Some leaders wanted a fight to the death yet the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the navy mutiny quashed any thought of a final battle. The loss of the war was a shock to the nation.

While Germany had been seeking peace for months, its efforts were complicated by its convoluted government, a military that dictated to civilians and denied its situation, a desire to expand boundaries, ignorance of non-German perspectives and an inability to objectively evaluate its own situation. Afflerbach’s analysis does much to explain the conduct of the war on both sides.

The genesis of the book’s title is revealed in the last chapter. Memoirs of David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill indicate that they thought the war remained “on a knife edge” for a long time and that it could have ended differently than it did. The Central Powers were very efficient militarily and if they had not invaded Belgium or declared unrestricted submarine warfare, the war might have been fought to a stalemate, a compromise peace.

After the trenches were dug from the North Sea to Switzerland, I don’t recall Germany launching an offense on the western front that could have conquered France. The Verdun offensive was intended to bleed France white, which could have resulted in a negotiated settlement, but not like they occupied Paris as they did in 1940. Further, Verdun bled everyone white, making a military victory even more unlikely. I do not understand how Germany could have won the war; perhaps a negotiated settlement whereby they would have annexed territory but not a military victory resulting in a surrender.

A major value of this book is a discussion in the last chapter of peace offers the Germans made, how the Allies reacted, and the overall conduct of each side. For various reasons the Entente discounted and dismissed them. The Allies rejected anything other than victory but the cost was severe and continues to this day.

What made settling the war early basically impossible was the army’s lies, Germany’s belief in its military superiority, and the Allies refusal to settle for anything less than victory (“…we won’t be back till it’s over over there”). Each side thought they could win. Finally, the Allies won but were unable, out of bitterness, to establish a working international order, to bring Germany back into the family of nations. The ramifications of that tragedy remain with us today.

Ron Drees