William Jennings Bryan's Response to the Lusitania Sinking

Wilson's First Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan

By Paolo E.Coletta

I. Addressing the Unfolding U-boat Threat

The death of an American, Leon C. Thrasher, on 28 March 1915, on the torpedoed British unarmed passenger ship Falaba, drove home the danger that threatened Americans on belligerent ships. The Falaba case was doubly important because it would serve as a precedent if similar torpedoings occurred and drove President Wilson, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, and key State Department Counselor Robert Lansing to restudy at length their position on the U-boat. 

As Lansing saw it, by warning its citizens against traveling on belligerent ships the United States would give up its right as a neutral to protect them on the high seas and in effect give up its wartime trade with the Allies in favor of Germany, or the United States could insist upon the right of Americans to travel, subject to the normal rules of visit and search, thereby guaranteeing the Allied trade and risking war with Germany. He chose the second course. By permitting Americans to act as shields for trade with the Allies, Lansing was extending the strict accountability doctrine to cover any ships which had an American aboard. 

Bryan vigorously objected. He told Wilson that an American knowing of the submarine danger who took passage upon a British ship was guilty of contributory negligence and denied that U-boat warfare could be condemned as illegally improper. Undecided between Lansing and Bryan, Wilson asked Lansing for an opinion. Lansing saw the sinking of the Falaba as a "wanton act . . . in direct violation of the principles of humanity as well as of the law of the nations." He would ask Germany to "disavow the act . . . punish the perpetrator . . . make just reparation for the death of Leon C. Thrasher,” and take steps to avoid future incidents. 

Bryan disagreed. Did not the arming of British merchantmen justify U-boat attacks? Why not enter a claim against Germany without announcing the American position on submarine warfare? Moreover, he would deny to a single individual, by taking passage on a belligerent merchantman, the right to involve the entire nation in difficulty. Lansing stuck to his position, adding that the German publication of notices to American citizens not to take passage on British ships traversing the German war zone was a "formal threat" to those who would exercise their "just rights" on the high seas and an "insolent" procedure which usurped the prerogative of the State Department.  He would answer additional U-boat attacks with armed force. Bryan instead saw Germany as wishing to avoid the raising of embarrassing questions and held to his doctrine of contributory negligence. Wilson broke the impasse by saying that he would postpone final settlement of claims arising out of the Falaba, Cushing, and Gulflight incidents until after the war "in case present efforts fail." He temporarily rejected Lansing's "strict accountability" doctrine and reduced Bryan's fear of war with Germany by accepting his suggestion that he "make a protest against the holding up of our trade with neutrals at the same time we protest against the submarines." 

II. Lusitania 

But then any goodwill Germany may have gained by offering full recompense for torpedo damage to the Gulflight vanished on 7 May 1915 when 124 Americans were among the 1,201 persons lost on the Lusitania.

Bryan charged that Britain had been using Americans to protect her munitions on the Lusitania and asserted that "to maintain strict neutrality we must send a note to England protesting against her interference with our shipping—as well as one to Germany for destroying the Lusitania." But House believed that the United States must force Germany to give assurances that she would not sink passenger ships if she did not voluntarily do so, Page demanded war with Germany lest the United States forfeit respect from the Allies.  Lansing concluded that Germany was culpable regardless of the fact that the Lusitania carried contraband, and Wilson hesitated to arouse the hackles of the Allies with a protest as long as the submarine problem remained unsettled. Bryan was alone in demanding what he called a "Real Neutrality," one which gave equal treatment to both sides. This required that the interests of America, not those of any belligerent, be placed "first," that the Lusitania affair be settled by peaceful means, and that the right of a neutral to travel was not more sacred than that of a neutral to trade. In the end, Wilson, saying that his arguments seemed to be unanswerable, adopted Lansing's position and wrote a note in which he completely upheld the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Rather than severing diplomatic relations as Lansing wished, however, he would give Germany an opportunity to alter her submarine methods. 

During the next two weeks Bryan reiterated a four-part plan: use conciliatory means with Germany; warn Americans from traveling on belligerent ships; postpone settlement of the Lusitania  case until after the war; and send guilty Britain a note. Wilson declined his advice on all points except on the note about Allied violations of neutrality. Yet he preferred to revive the old modus vivendi in which the British would lift their food blockade of Germany and Germany cease U-boat warfare, and in the end vetoed even the note to Britain lest it be thought he was making a concession to Germany. Germany rejected the modus vivendi except on terms that would prove unacceptable to Britain and in her reply to the Lusitania note presented a legalistic defense of the sinking of the ship and concluded that U-boats could not follow the rules of cruiser warfare.

Robert Lansing on the Right Advising the President

III. Bryan's Departure

Bryan charged the Cabinet was being pro-Ally, was rebuked by Wilson, and hinted that he would resign if the Lusitania case was not solved peaceably. Wilson asked him to submit new suggestions on a course of action. Bryan repeated his four-part plan; he had no further ideas. He had done all he could to advise Wilson, he concluded, and could do no more. Wilson pondered Bryan's plan but chose Lansing's policy of "strict accountability.”

Had American ships and citizens been barred from the danger zone as Bryan suggested, a clash with Germany might have been avoided because no Americans would have been on ships sunk by U-boats. Unrestricted submarine warfare would then concern only the Allies. However, Wilson's compounding of national honor, international law, morality, emotional sympathy with the Entente powers, and the safeguarding of the important trade with the Allies led to a policy of inflexibility on the submarine issue. Since he could not compel Wilson to adopt his views, Bryan's only alternative was to resign, which he did on 8 June. Wilson then sent his note. Germany must follow the rules of "cruiser warfare" and also give assurances that American lives and ships would be safeguarded. 

Bryan's saying that he had resigned because of disagreement with Wilson in method but not in objective was mystifying, for the Lusitania note was less harsh than the strict accountability note of February. If he was out of the administration, he was in no sense "out of the picture,” however, and he obtained both a hearing and a following. His resignation left a void in the highest echelon of American government. There was no one left around Wilson who sincerely believed in neutrality. Out of office, Bryan immediately became the leading spokesman for the anti-interventionists.

Source: Over the Top, May 2015