World War I As a Game of Chicken

"Chicken" Scene from Rebel Without a Cause with 1914 Drivers

By Erik Garzke and Yonatan Lupu

Excertped from "Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence," International Security, Spring 2012

Taken together, these effects of the Balkan Wars created increasing incentives for the great powers to solidify their alliance relationships in the region. The European alliance system was arguably created by the great powers as a deterrent to reduce the likelihood of war. This was the case beginning with the Bismarckian system created in the 1870s and 1880s, designed to protect the newly unified Germany from its neighbors, but also with the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, designed in part to deter each other. The dilemma facing the great powers in the early twentieth century was how to effectively signal their resolve to fight as a means to deter the other side. 

Winning at the game of Chicken involves commitment. To increase their resolve, great powers such as Germany and Russia were increasingly forced to limit their options in crisis situations. As Thomas Schelling explains, decision makers in a crisis can improve expected payoffs by constraining their ability to act with discretion. German and Russian leaders tied their hands in two ways during this era.

First, they increasingly ceded decision making authority to the military by putting in place processes that, once an initial decision was made to begin hostilities, made it costly for civilian leaders to back down. As a result, Joll writes, "The general staffs were taking decisions which often committed them to irreversible military actions if war threatened: and consequently in a crisis the freedom of action of the civilian ministers was often more circumscribed than they themselves realized." The second way in which German and Russian leaders limited their options was by tightening alliance commitments. For example, after failing to support its ally in the Second Balkan War, G.J. Meyer argues that German policy was that "never again must Vienna have reason to doubt the value of its alliance with Germany." The effect of tightening alliances, however, was that of "chain-ganging." Tighter alliance commitments allowed the weaker partner to draw on the power of the stronger partner in crisis bargaining, thereby increasing the prospects for diplomatic success. 

This leverage, however, also increased the hazard that a great power would be drawn into a larger dispute. John Maurer notes, for example, that "it was clear to Russian decision makers that a confrontation with Austria-Hungary entailed running the high risk of conflict with Germany." Attempting to increase the leverage of their allies, the foreign policies of the interdependent powers were gradually being signed over to allies in the Balkans, which lacked both economic ties and interests in maintaining a wider peace in Europe. As a result, German and Russian leaders faced an increasingly difficult choice between honoring alliance commitments and losing credibility in European affairs. The former put in jeopardy the trade and capital networks that now fueled their increasingly destructive military machines, while the latter threatened to nullify their ability to achieve gains diplomatically, without the need to use force. Credibility and support for their partners required increasingly binding commitments, but these in turn created increasingly diametric alternatives for the integrated powers. 

Backing down meant suffering increasing reputational costs, whereas failing to do so required that their counterparts would suffer a similar fate. Ironically, interdependence accentuated this logic, as the high stakes for a contest and previous experience convinced both sides that their opponents would blink first.

Again and again, Balkan crises failed to spread as either Germany or Russia chose to back down. This reassured the interdependent powers that the European system was robust to such crises and that, in future crises, someone (else) would act with greater discretion.

We thus offer [two. . .] points about the period between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. First, disputes among the highly interdependent powers were generally resolved peacefully in the pre-World War I era. Second, disputes among the less interdependent powers generally escalated to wars, except where the (interdependent) great powers saw it in their interests to intervene to mediate disputes and prevent them from drawing in other powers. Finally, as a result of a series of crises, leaders in Germany and Russia, the pivotal states in the alliance system, increasing found the need to bind their fates, and the fate of Europe, to that of their allies Austria-Hungary and Serbia. That a general war did not break out before 1914 is, in many ways, attributable to German and Russian decisions to back down rather than to support regional allies. This in turn led to excessive confidence that wider war would be averted, in no small part because all involved recognized the mutual economic benefit of avoiding a wider contest. 

In 1912 and 1913, Germany and Russia averted war. Why did 1914 end differently? . . Both Germany and Russia honored their alliance commitments to the point of starting a general war. German support for Austria-Hungary enabled the latter’s action against Serbia, and the war would not have spread . were it not for Russian intervention. The question then becomes why Germany and Russia made these decisions in 1914. . . 

A few aspects of the game of Chicken that characterizes the crises leading up to World War I are worthy of additional attention.  There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in a standard two-player game of Chicken: one in which player A swerves and one in which player B swerves.  Yet, these equilibria assume that players are fully informed about what the other will do. The assumption of full information is inconsistent with the larger logic of brinkmanship and tying-hands commitments through alliances. If the players are uncertain about each other’s intentions, then a more complex set of outcomes is possible. If, for example, A overestimates B’s willingness to swerve, then the worst possible outcome can ensue.  With incomplete information, equilibria can occur in the game of Chicken in which neither player swerves, as it seems happened with Germany and Russia in 1914.

More generally, the iterated game of Chicken played by Germany and Russia leading up to the war created increased incentives to convince the other to back down by signaling a resolve to fight. Having learned in previous crises that the other could be brought to heel, especially in the face of firm resolve, each state was intent on pushing the other to its limit.  Austrian leaders believed that giving Serbia an ultimatum supported by Germany would reduce the risk of Russian intervention  The kaiser, in a change in policy from the Balkan Wars, decided to support Austria-Hungary unconditionally, recognizing that failure to do so risked the destruction of the alliance.  As Jack Levy notes, "German decision makers hoped and expected that an Austrian fait accompli against Serbia in the immediate aftermath of  the royal assassination, backed by German warnings to Russia, would minimize the likelihood of Russian intervention."  

German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow famously remarked that "the more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, so much the more quiet Russia will remain."  Prior to the assassination of the archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Kaiser met with and urged Austria-Hungary to go to war with Serbia, believing that Russia would stay out of the fight. 

Russian officials were convinced that Germany and Austria would relent if pushed far enough. Having already lost the Russo-Japanese war and in the 1908-09 Bosnian crisis, Russia did not want to appear weak again  Vigorous Russian support, in turn, strengthened Serbian resolve.  As Joll puts it, "the Austrians had believed that vigorous actions against Serbia and a promise of German support would deter Russia: the Russians had believed that a show of strength against Austria would both check the Austrians and deter Germany. In both cases the bluff had been called, and the three countries were faced with the military consequences of their actions." 

Russia mobilized first, and Germany responded by declaring war. Historians have debated the reasoning for Germany’s decision for decades, mostly famously following Fischer’s argument that Germany courted the war and was largely responsible for it.  We will certainly not settle this complex and enduring debate here, but we can perhaps contribute two points. First, to the extent Germany appeared to be pushing Austria-Hungary toward war, our argument suggests that Germany may have done so not because it sought war but because it sought to convince Russia to back down. 

Second, once Russia had mobilized, Germany’s options were perhaps quite limited. If a major power war were to be fought, Germany preferred that it be fought immediately rather than waiting for the French and Russians to have more time to mobilize. As Meyer points out, "an open-ended postponement of hostilities...would have destroyed Germany’s chances of defeating France before having to fight Russia." Indeed, as James Fearon argues, "part of what made the Russian mobilization in 1914 an informative signal of Russia’s willingness to fight was that it was under-taken in the knowledge that it would increase Germany’s incentive to choose preemptive war." Thus, that the kaiser opted for war in July 1914 may not indicate that Germany had a preference for war (which would be damaging to commercial liberal theory). Rather, it may indicate that Germany opted for a war that seemed the best of limited options. 

To be clear, it was far from inevitable that both Germany and Russia would back their allies in 1914. It was entirely possible that at least one patron would back down again, as had happened previously. Yet, each succeeding crisis increased the incentive for Germany and Russia to heighten their commitments, adding to the cost of backing down and increasing the danger of war.