Enemy at the Gates of Antwerp, Part II

German Siege Artillery Being Placed

By Tony Langley

A second Belgian sortie took place during early September, at the height of the battle of the Marne, the intention being to take pressure off the Entente forces fighting to the south. A third and final sortie and advance took place on 13 September.

When it became clear after the battle of the Marne that Germany was to be denied Paris and the destruction of the French armies after being forced to withdraw to the Aisne river, the German command decided it was finally time to remove the irritant of the enemy army entrenched in Antwerp. It was all well and good to bypass enemy strongpoints such as Maubeuge and Antwerp and to contain them with covering forces when engaged in a rapid advance, but once the trench lines were more or less consolidated, leaving even small numbers of enemy forces in the rear of the main army made for bad strategy. The Belgian Army in Antwerp was uncomfortably close to German supply lines running from the German border through Brussels and southward, and the prospect of Antwerp being reinforced by Entente forces was alarming as well. Lines of communication to the Belgian coast were still open and functioning, and it took about a day by motor transport for troops disembarking at Ostend to reach Antwerp. Neither Great Britain nor France had any troops to spare at that time, but the threat was always present.

The German and Austrian siege artillery that was used to reduce Liège, Namur, and Maubeuge was diverted from its destination of Paris and brought to bear on the Antwerp forts. Finding adequate placements was a problem, as these artillery pieces needed a concrete flooring from which to fire. Factories and warehouses in the areas surrounding the outer forts were used to this purpose, their outer walls demolished, or else hastily constructed narrow gauge railways were used to bring up the artillery and building material. The actual number of German artillery pieces used during the siege was surprisingly small. There were four 420mm cannon with a range of about 15 km, the famous Big Berthas constructed by the Krupp works. These outranged the heaviest Belgian artillery by at least five km or more. There were also five 305mm naval mortars and four 305mm Austrian Škoda mortars, thus 13 artillery pieces in all that formed the backbone of the coming German assault. They were set up in four positions to the south and southeast of the city.

Antwerp Fort Utterly Destroyed by German Artillery

Command of the upcoming operation was given to German General Hans von Beseler (1850–1921), an unimaginative but thoroughly competent commander. After making his name by taking the hitherto considered impregnable fortress of Antwerp, in the coming years he would also be given command of other siege operations, mainly on the Eastern Front, and end his military career as governor-general of the German-occupied part of Poland from 1916 till 1918. Von Beseler's plan was simple: he would concentrate his forces and artillery to the south and southeast of the outer perimeter of forts and attack a small sector of the line running from the forts of Walem, Duffel, St.Catherine Wavre, Koningshooikt, and Lier. These he would subject to a concentrated artillery barrage, and when they were put out of combat, infantry attacks would follow.

The siege operations commenced on 27 September with a bombardment of the city of Malines. Just outside the city, the main pumping station for the Antwerp waterworks was hit and rendered inoperable, thereby depriving Antwerp and much of the surrounding region of potable water. Subsidiary stations were activated, of course, but during the siege, the city would be faced with a shortage of drinking water, and what water there was had a distinctly brackish and unhealthy taste to it. Lack of sufficient water pressure also hindered fire fighting in the last days of military operations. When the main bombardment started on the 28th, Belgian troops had been holding positions beyond the outer perimeter.

The bombardment against the outer forts lasted four days and was of a hitherto unknown intensity and violence. The main problem facing the Germans was to confine the bombardment to a very specific area. Accuracy in shooting from a distance of 15 km was not always guaranteed, and many shells fell short or wide. But by the law of averages, enough heavy-caliber shells hit the targeted forts in strategic places, blowing up munitions depots, such as happened at Fort Loncin at Liège, or simply putting Belgian artillery out of combat or penetrating the thick concrete walls of the forts, demolishing barracks or underground casemates in a roar of fire and acrid smoke. The demoralizing effect of the bombardment was great. Noise of impacts and explosions thundered throughout the forts, dust and smoke made breathing nigh impossible, and electrical equipment was often destroyed, throwing the forts into darkness, even at high noon. Though it was certainly not diagnosed as such at the time, cases of shell shock were prevalent, and soldiers were hospitalized with violent and uncontrollable shaking.

German Postcard, Celebrating General von Besseler's
Capture of the "Queen of the Scheldt"

It did not take long before the Belgian command realized that the forts and the city could not be held, certainly not by Belgian forces alone. On 30 September the Belgian government formally asked for aid from Great Britain and France. Belgium was not an ally to either nation, merely a co-belligerent, but both Britain and France, though short of reserves, quickly dispatched token units to Antwerp with plans for more substantial reinforcements to follow.