The Allies Face Defeat at Gallipoli

Temporary Cemetery Anzac Sector

During the land campaign, the invading troops and generals at Gallipoli found themselves bogged down in the same sort of 1915-style trench warfare as their counterparts on the Western Front. There, the 1915 campaign saw failure after failure: Aubers Ridge, Artois (twice), Loos, and Champagne (twice). In August 1915, the last Allied offensive at Gallipoli failed in similar fashion. 

Following the failure of the August offensive at Suvla Bay and Anzac, the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), General Sir Ian Hamilton, knew the best he could hope to achieve in the short term was to establish a defensive line strong enough to deter any future Turkish attack. While Hamilton believed a decisive victory was still possible, he also knew that this would require additional divisions. Any extra divisions were unlikely, as the British cabinet was losing confidence in the concept of an indirect approach against the Central Powers through Constantinople.

Key Positions of the Allied Forces
Note That Turkish Forces Control Almost All the Peninsula (and All the High Ground and the Straits)

The Western Front was seen as the decisive theatre and one that had priority on resources. The result was a declining flow of reinforcements to the peninsula, leaving many units well below their authorized establishments. Despite this, Hamilton would not contemplate an evacuation, fearing significant casualties from such a difficult operation. 

In early September Hamilton requested 95,000 additional troops. Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener denied the request. By October, there was growing sentiment in the British press and Parliament for evacuating Gallipoli.

Facing an impasse, the British cabinet acted and on 14 October 1915 replaced Hamilton with General Sir Charles Monro, an experienced commander from the Western Front. Prior to his departure, Monro was warned by Winston Churchill that a withdrawal from Gallipoli would be disastrous. By 31 October Monro had undertaken an inspection of his new command and provided an assessment of the Gallipoli situation to Lord Kitchener. With the exception of the Anzacs, Monro felt his troops were not capable of further sustained effort. Any successful offensive would require frontal attacks into entrenched enemy positions and, even if contemplated, there was no room within the existing beachheads to accommodate the men or artillery required to support future offensives.

Lord Kitchener at Cape Helles

Furthermore, the approaching winter gales would make any logistical buildup across the beaches increasingly difficult. Intelligence reports also indicated  the impending arrival of significant German artillery reinforcements, including heavy caliber howitzers. Once the Ottomans had these weapons in place they could systematically demolish the Allied trenches. Monro concluded that an evacuation was the only course of action open. Upon learning this, Churchill said of Monro, ''He came, he saw, he capitulated."

On 1 November, Monro and naval commander Admiral de Robeck agreed to establish a joint naval-military committee to develop an evacuation plan. Monro formally advised Kitchener to evacuate the peninsula "in consequence of the grave daily wastage of officers and men. . . and owing to the lack of prospect of being able to drive the Turks from their entrenched lines." He estimated a loss of roughly 40 percent—40,000 men—in an evacuation. Kitchener initially refused to accept defeat and the pessimistic casualty prediction of an evacuation so quickly.

V Beach Under Fire

After considering some alternate schemes for salvaging the Gallipoli operation, Lord Kitchener concluded the Allies were left with only two options, staying put or evacuating. He decided to assess the situation himself and sailed from Marseilles on 7 November for the headquarters at Mudros.

His first stop was on the 12th at Cape Helles, where he visited the beaches, but not the front line. Kitchener mostly met with senior staff and officials, including Lt. General William Birdwood, who would ultimately command the evacuation. His most informative stops were over the next two days at Anzac and the Suvla sector. 

The subsequent days were spent in meetings and conferences at Mudros. Then Kitchener left temporarily for a flying visit to Salonika and to interview the Greek king in Athens. Returning on 22 November, and after further consultation with senior commanders, he recommended to the British War Cabinet that Anzac and Suvla be evacuated and Helles retained for a time.

Wounded Diggers and Medics

General Monro was then elevated to the position of commander-in-chief Mediterranean and the commander of the Anzacs, Lieutenant General William Birdwood, was confirmed as commander of the Dardanelles Army. He would oversee the withdrawal. Birdwood's chief of staff, Brigadier C.B.B. White, started work on the evacuation plan. On 7 December the British Cabinet approved the scheme to evacuate Suvla and Anzac.

Sources: Commonwealth Department of Veterans' Affairs, Canberra; The Australian Defense News Bureau; Over the Top, January 2016