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| Archduke Franz Ferdinand and a Smiling Kaiser Wilhelm II |
By Jack S. Levy and William Mulligan
Excerpted from: "Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors", Security Studies, 2021
Although changes in power and alliance relationships in both the Balkans and in Central Europe provide the core of an explanation for why the 1914 July Crisis, but not the 1912–13 Balkan crises, escalated to greatpower war, one additional difference in the two sets of crises also played a critical role: the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
A more complete answer to the why-1914-but-not-before question, however, requires the incorporation of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, which went beyond a pretext for war. It eliminated the most powerful and effective proponent for peace in Vienna and fundamentally changed the nature of the decision-making process in AustriaHungary. Counterfactually, we argue that a hypothetical crisis with Franz Ferdinand present would probably have ended differently.
Sean McMeekin agrees that structural systemic factors were necessary conditions for World War I and emphasizes that they were present during the earlier crises without leading to war.44 He identifies the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as the key difference in the July Crisis and argues that in its absence it is unlikely (but not impossible) that a greatpower war would have erupted. This is a classic powder-keg explanation and a fairly common response to deterministic arguments about the origins of World War I, though most of its proponents are not as explicit as McMeekin in linking the assassination to the question of why 1914 but not before.
The Assassination of Franz Ferdinand The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand contributed to the outbreak of World War I in several ways. It added new reputational concerns to Austria-Hungary’s preexisting motivations for war by requiring a response. Critically, the assassination provided a plausible justification for military action in the eyes of leaders in Vienna and Berlin. The assassination was not simply a “streetcar” that would eventually come by and provide the necessary catalyst for war. The most recent streetcar came by in October 1913, and Serbian leaders helped derail it. The increasing stabilization of Balkan politics following the wars of 1912–13 reduced the likelihood of subsequent sparks.
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| The Fateful Day |
The assassination provided additional ammunition to Conrad in his longstanding campaign for a preventive war against Serbia. It also removed an important constraint on Austria-Hungary by significantly increasing the probability of German support in several ways. It raised the principle of monarchial solidarity. The assassination also struck an emotional chord in William II, given his growing fondness for the archduke after their meeting only two weeks before, and it invoked his longstanding racial attitudes toward the Slavs. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in response to the assassination triggered strong Russian support of Serbia, including mobilization measures, which helped create a narrative in which Germany and its Austrian ally were on the defensive, a narrative that Moltke, as well as William II and Bethmann-Hollweg, believed to be necessary to mobilize domestic support for war, especially among the Social Democrats in the Reichstag. These considerations are fairly well known. We focus on another effect of the assassination—on the decision-making process in the Dual Monarchy. The assassination eliminated both the leading advocate for peace in Vienna and the military chancellery that reinforced his influence. As Samuel Williamson argues, Franz Ferdinand’s death was not only “the pretext and occasion for war”; it also “dramatically altered the political structure in Vienna in ways that virtually insured military action against Serbia.”
Franz Ferdinand’s influence on Austro-Hungarian decision making was based on rights and duties associated with his position as heir to the throne, and on the archduke’s personal relationships with the emperor and the foreign minister, which improved significantly after Berchtold replaced Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal in February 1912. The archduke’s influence was reinforced by the informal military chancellery that Franz Joseph created in 1906 for him to lead, and he began 1913 in his new position of inspector general of the armed forces. Franz Ferdinand used the chancellery effectively to access information about military plans and to broaden his political role. With respect to military (but not political) matters, Franz Ferdinand was now second behind the emperor. He had access to military information and the authority to question the strategies and plans of Conrad and the General Staff and to raise new issues. Scholars debate the extent of Ferdinand’s influence, but the comment of a senior Austrian official is telling: “We not only have two parliaments, we also have two emperors.”
The archduke strongly promoted cautious policies throughout most of the Balkan crises, with one brief but notable exception. After advocating restraint and siding with Berchtold against Conrad’s demands for mobilization measures at the beginning of the First Balkan War in October 1912, Franz Ferdinand shifted his position in early November after Serbian forces had routed the Ottomans. Persuaded by the military’s argument that Serbia was now free to act against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he supported precautionary military measures in Galicia and joined a mission to Berlin that secured German support. In early December he persuaded Franz Joseph to reinstate Conrad as chief of the General Staff. He then tried but failed to persuade Berchtold and the emperor to initiate a military confrontation.
After this “momentary lapse,” Franz Ferdinand suddenly reversed course, embraced Berchtold’s search for a diplomatic solution, and split with Conrad. By the end of January 1913 he was emphasizing the risks of war with Russia and reacting strongly against Conrad’s continuing push for preventive war. He urged Berchtold to oppose Conrad’s demands for war against Serbia in the May and October 1913 crises over Albania and instead to cooperate with Russia. Franz Ferdinand recognized Russia’s military strength, worried about Russian intervention in a Balkan crisis and about the reliability of Italy, and he feared the risk of nationalist and social revolutionary upheaval for the empire resulting from a general European war. Well aware of Austria-Hungary’s dependence on Germany, he worried any military campaign in the Balkans, regardless of its outcome, would increase that dependence. Franz Ferdinand was also the leading proponent of internal reform within the Dual Monarchy and feared war would make major reforms impossible. As Williamson argues, “By late 1913 the archduke’s caution and aversion to military action was well established.”
The assassination removed Franz Ferdinand’s restraining hand from deliberations in Vienna, eliminating the one person who might have pressed both Berchtold and Franz Joseph for more cautious policies. It also eliminated an institutional center that provided legitimacy for those with more moderate views to access military information, question the emperor’s own normally bellicose military chancellery, and challenge Conrad himself. Given Franz Ferdinand’s good relationship with William II, the assassination also eliminated a potentially valuable dynastic communication channel with Germany at a time of poor communication between Vienna and Berlin on both diplomatic and military matters. . .
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| Funeral Procession in Vienna |
[Suppose the assassination attempt had failed?] It would have triggered a crisis and invoked some reputational concerns and a more limited pretext for some kind of military action, but it would have left Franz Ferdinand involved in decision making. We will never know the outcome with certainty, and a more through and systematic counterfactual analysis is necessary, but many leading historians have argued both that Franz Ferdinand would have opposed war and that his views probably would have prevailed in turning Franz Joseph against war. Alexander von Hoyos, a leading proponent of war in Vienna, said of Franz Ferdinand that “through his death, he has helped us to the decision, which he would never have taken, as long as he lived.” Williamson concludes that “alive, Franz Ferdinand had acted as a brake upon the pressures for military action; dead, he became the pretext for war.
The removal of Franz Ferdinand from Austro-Hungarian decision making during the July Crisis went beyond creating a pretext. It left Hungarian prime minister Tisza the only top official to press Franz Joseph for caution immediately after the assassination. It also left Berchtold, hawkish but a weak personality and one open to persuasion, alone to face Conrad and the generals. Williamson and Russel Van Wyk argue that “Berchtold probably would have remained committed to a policy of military, threatening diplomacy, everything short of actual war, an approach he had used during the Balkan Wars.”
With Franz Ferdinand and Tisza urging restraint, andwith Conrad and the generals applying the primary pressure for war, there is a very good chance the emperor would not have authorized military action. War would not have occurred, as no other country had incentives to start a war in 1914
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