Million Dollar Barrage: American Field Artillery in the Great War

By Justin G. Prince

University of Oklahoma Press, 2021

Dr. Michael Boden, Reviewer

U.S. 75mm Battery at Château-Thierry
By Jack Duncan 

Originally presented in Army History, Fall 2023

The numerous innovations in the conduct of war at the start of the 20th century are well known to most people who study the military history of the era. Technological advancements, tactical and operational developments, growing global political rivalries, and other conditions all contributed to the changing character of war. Justin Prince tackles one particular dimension of this environment, the origins of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery branch, in his work, Million Dollar Barrage: American Field Artillery in the Great War. 

To Prince, this period was of primary importance to the service’s coming of age. Prince notes that “these formative years, from 1907 to 1923, saw the establishment of a modern field artillery branch, and through the missteps, failures, problems, debates, and successes, the field artillery gained a new primacy in the minds of American military thinkers” (189). 

To support this assertion, throughout his narrative Prince consistently focuses on three particular areas of development: doctrine, technology, and “the debates about open warfare.”  The book progresses chronologically, for the most part, although there are some overlaps in chapter focus depending on the issue under consideration.

After the introductory chapter, chapters 2  and 3 focus on conditions that necessitated a dramatic change in the application of American field artillery. The second chapter hones in on those developments from 1897 to 1913 that frame the American experience, including such key events as the introduction of the French 75mm gun in 1897,  the separation of field artillery from coast artillery in 1907, and the establishment of the School of Fire at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1911. The third chapter aligns closely with  these initial parameters as Prince emphasizes American technological and training challenges in the years leading up to the First World War. One constant in this period is the importance of the Field Artillery Journal and the centrality of the Fort Sill experience and curriculum in shaping American artillery development. The fourth chapter emphasizes the challenges associated with arming the branch and the friction that developed between the Ordnance Department and the Field Artillery branch in procurement prior to American entry into the war.  This friction resulted, to Prince, in numerous comprehensive shortcomings that persisted through the war, such as the lack of heavy artillery development and the slipshod attempt at developing a standard American field piece.

The following three chapters address the substantial qualitative developments experienced by the force throughout combat operations in Europe. The issues and themes at the forefront in the previous three chapters come together in the fifth, on artillery training after the American entry into the war. The sixth chapter focuses particularly on American observation of fire issues, of which the lack of quality observation methods and poor air coordination were two of the most significant. The seventh concentrates on the application of previous training and development during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. 

Only in the final campaign does Prince perceive that the service addressed many of the issues faced by American artillerymen. To the author, the Meuse-Argonne “was the crucible that shaped American artillery into an effective  military weapon” (164).

The final two chapters summarize the developments of the immediate postwar years (to 1923) and the lessons learned by the American field artillery branch. During these five years, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Prince identifies pivotal developments in the American field artillery service, with relatively swift and broad espousal of lessons learned in the conflict. Prince concludes that training shortcomings were the primary cause of concern for the development of the field artillery service, although not a shortcoming that existed in a vacuum, as they included doctrinal, technological, and fiscal issues. This open attitude helped provide the foundations for acceptance as an equal branch of service on the modern battlefield and the transition from follower to leader in terms of global tactical and technological innovation in the interwar years.

Prince’s approach on a few aspects of methodology should be noted. These are not necessarily critiques but rather observations on his process. For instance, Prince’s discussion of actions in the war occupies a limited frame of the work as a whole—parts of only three chapters. There is less in the work that reflects the long form of the title, American Field Artillery in the Great War, than one might expect. The only chapter that  considers the conduct of combat operations looks solely at the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. One wonders if similar American operations, such as the earlier III Corps operations around Soissons (with the French) or the II Corps actions on the Somme (with the British), experienced the same model of growth and progression that Prince sees in the larger campaign.

Prince’s analysis consistently considers those topics previously noted throughout the work—doctrine, technology, and open warfare. Within that analysis, Prince focuses more on systems as opposed to the role of individuals. Individual agency, though not completely absent, takes a back seat to the roles of institutions and agencies. There are a few exceptions, to be sure. The postwar chief of artillery, Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, was a prominent early advocate for the branch in the prewar years, and Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall’s advocacy for artillery development is noted throughout the narrative.

Order HERE

In developing and presenting his argument, Prince is to be commended for his attention to detail. He is adept at demonstrating how particular issues (e.g. the lack of a standard American field piece for the war) caused friction and challenges in numerous other aspects of wartime development—in this case, training, procurement, and doctrine. A reader with a degree of  experience in the history of American field artillery will find many insightful contributions in these pages. However, for those with little or no prior knowledge, much of the significance of these passages and their detail will be difficult to fully ascertain. Prince also relies a great deal on the articles and arguments presented in the Field Artillery Journal and does an excellent job of demonstrating why that source must be of primary importance when looking at the era’s developments. Aside from these minor observations, anyone interested not just in American field artillery but also in the First World War or in early challenges of combined-arms operations will find Prince’s book of significant value.

Dr. Michael Boden