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| Serbian Troops 1915 |
Dennis Showalter
The Balkan Theater during the Great War defies conventional classification. The fighting there can be understood as an expansion of the regional conflict that began in 1911 between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire. It arguably ended not in 1918 but with the 1924 evacuation of the Greek community in Anatolia and the subsequent Great Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey. Without denying the significance of great-power policies and behaviors in motivating Balkan behavior, the states that emerged in the region during the 19th century were independent actors, willing and able to play autonomous roles. Serbia in particular came in the years prior to 1914 to define its role as a cross between Piedmont and Prussia: focal point for a south Slav union whose nature Serbia would define. In that context, the Sarajevo crisis of 1914 for Serbia essentially launched a "Third Balkan War," whose stakes were understood as conquest or annihilation.
Austria-Hungary for its part also waged what amounted to a total war against an enemy it perceived as seeking nothing less than the destruction of the Habsburg Empire. The Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia in 1914 was accompanied by levels of atrocities previously unknown in modern great-power warfare. The operation was characterized as well by unusual levels of incompetence—to the point where an outnumbered, outgunned Serbia rallied and drove the Habsburgs back across the frontier in a desperate counteroffensive.
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| A Zeppelin Over Sofia, 1915 |
That action represented the last efforts of a state whose resources had been exhausted even before World War I. For most of 1915 the Balkans remained militarily quiet as the Central Powers and the Entente Powers vied for support in their capital cities. The Allied attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula (1915), however, convinced German chief of staff Erich von Falkenhayn of the need to remove the Serbian thorn from the side of the Central Powers and open a Danube route to their hard-pressed Ottoman ally. In October 1915 a joint force of Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians, whose government had entered the war in hopes of avenging earlier defeat and securing future benefits, overran an outnumbered and outgunned Serb army.
As its troops were driven back on all fronts, Serbia called to its allies. As early as December 1914 there had been desultory talk in Paris and London of opening a Balkan front. Cooler heads, however, had correctly observed that such an operation could only be supported through the Greek port of Salonika, itself undeveloped and with no more than a single-track railway connection to Serbia. Nevertheless, in October 1915 two divisions were transferred from the Dardanelles to Salonika—over the determined protests of a Greek government determined to remain neutral. That force was too small by far to prevent the final defeat of Serbia and the subsequent retreat through the Albanian mountains of more than a quarter million soldiers and civilians.
The survivors were initially evacuated to the island of Corfu. Eventually they would be transferred to a Salonika front formed as France and Britain steadily reinforced their troops on the ground. During 1916 the entrenched camp of Salonika absorbed more than a dozen British and French divisions in what was sarcastically described as "the war's largest internment center." Its occupants, according to French politician Georges Clemenceau, contributed nothing to the war effort, instead "cultivating their gardens" in the manner of Voltaire's Candide (1759). That result had not been the original intention of the French government. Premier and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand argued for the possibility of using Salonika as an entering wedge, achieving in that sector the kind of tactical victories that would encourage Greece and Romania to join the Allies. The British were more dubious. Apart from a climate so unhealthy that large numbers of men were disabled by malaria, poor terrain and logistics combined to frustrate large-scale offensives. During 1916 it became increasingly apparent that nothing could be done without the overt support of Greece.
That support was long in coming and in the end owed more to Greek politics than to Allied threats and blandishments. Not until 1917 did a coup remove King Constantine, who was friendly to the Central Powers, in favor of his son, Alexander, and a reorganized government headed by Eleuthérios Venizélos. The Entente Powers during 1916 successfully focused their energy on bringing Romania into the war. While Romania was not as feckless and helpless as its contemporary critics asserted, it was unable to stand against the steamroller the Central Powers promptly sent against it—without interference from Salonika. With most of their country occupied, the Romanian army withdrew toward the Russian frontier and bided its time.
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| British Work Detail—Late War |
Neutralization of Romania shifted attention once again to Salonika. The Serbian government and army spent much of the year purging allegedly disloyal officers. The official entry of Greece into the war, however, encouraged the Serbs to put their house in order more quickly than they might otherwise have done; and Serb divisions, including former Russian prisoners of war, began taking their place on the line. Commander Louis Guillaumat, and his successor, Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, supervised the introduction of new weapons and the improvement of logistical infrastructure.
The operational stalemate nevertheless continued. Political and military controversies between Paris and London, and between the Entente Powers and their local allies, over the purposes and prospects of the theater prevented the reduction of the Salonika garrison to a maintenance force. They handicapped as well its reinforcement to levels promising anything beyond tactical successes gained at high cost, in the fashion typical of the Great War.
In August 1917 a fire reduced much of the city of Salonika to ashes. Disease continued to debilitate Allied ranks. Morale suffered from a general sense that no one knew exactly what anyone was contributing to the war effort in this backwater. Not until September 1918 did the Allies finally strike. By then they confronted primarily a Bulgarian army badly weakened by casualties and disease and shaken by the recent revolutions in Russia. Within days, Soviets were forming in Sofia and the government was asking for an armistice. French divisions thrust up the Danube valley and the British contingent turned toward Constantinople. Serb troops reentered their devastated homeland, and on 29 October the Croat Diet in Zagreb declared its allegiance to the new state of Yugoslavia. On 11 November the last Habsburg emperor abdicated.
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| A Bulgarian Officer Surrenders His Forces, September 1918 |
On balance, the Allies and the Central Powers did have one thing in common. They put enough into the Balkans as a theater of war to destabilize the region—yet not enough to facilitate reconstructing stability in new forms. In the first months of 1919 Yugoslavia clashed with Italy over Fiume and the Dalmatian coast. Romania saw its loyalty rewarded with the Judas gift of Transylvania. Greek troops landed in Smyrna, the vanguard of a doomed dream of an Asian empire. Treaties signed in the suburbs of Paris did nothing to avert a continuing descent into chaos tempered by dictatorship or modified by external conquest—a pattern that continued unabated into the next century. Salonika remains a monument to the long-term consequences of half-hearted measures.
Dennis Showalter, Colorado College
A list of links to our earlier articles on the Salonika or Balkans Front can be found HERE.
Source: Source Citation: "Allied Occupation of Salonika in World War I." History in Dispute, Vol. 9: World War I: Second Series. Dennis Showalter, ed. St. James Press, 2002





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