Heroes or Traitors Reviewed by James M. Gallen

Heroes or Traitors: Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from 
The Great War, 1919–1939

by Paul Taylor

Liverpool University Press, 2015

The guns are silent, the grand review is concluded, the politicians are creating the new world order, and the soldiers return home. Things are different. They are not the same men who marched away. While war has changed them, it has also changed the homes to which they returned seeking to pick up life where they left off. Among none of the nations that were on the winning side during the Great War was the change as profound as it was in Ireland. In 1914 they answered the call in a part of the United Kingdom, but in 1919 they returned to a country seething with rebellion and soon to be one of the new nations to be born out of the cataclysm. How were they to be viewed? As heroes who fought bravely for the kingdom of which their island had been a part for 800 years and that small nations might be free, or as traitors who enabled the imperial power to maintain its grip on their homeland? Those are the start of the questions that author Paul Taylor wants to answer.

The Irish Peace Tower at Messines, Ypres Salient
On 7 June 1917 the Mostly Northern Manned 36th Division Went Over the Top Side-by-Side with the 16th Division Recruited Mostly from Southern Ireland in the Battle of Messines

Taylor begins with an introduction that seeks to untangle the web of myth and history that is, inevitably, written by the victors. As President Mary McAleese noted in a 1985 commemoration, "Those whom we commemorate here were doubly tragic. They fell victim to a war against oppression in Europe. Their memory fell victim to a war for independence in Ireland." (p.4) Taylor shows that Ireland was not as united as Republican tradition would have us believe, nor were the Irish who flocked to the colors as loyal to king and country as some would suppose. Nationalism was stronger in the west, with its dairy industry serving the domestic market, and Unionism more prevalent in the east, where farmers depended on the export market in England.

The author then moves on to examine several facets of the relationships between the returning Irish soldiers and their neighbors. His method relies heavily on statistical analysis and interviews of participants. He examines records of violence and intimidation against ex-servicemen and asks whether they were targeted because of their past service. He cites many examples of men killed or driven into exile by irregulars. Yet men of military experience were of value to both sides in the War of Independence (1919–1921) and the subsequent Civil War (1922–1923). Some offered their skills to the freedom fighters or the Pro-Treaty or Anti-Treaty forces, while others were threatened or executed for suspected espionage. Watch the names carefully; you might find a relative, as I probably did. Britain, like other belligerents, provided benefits to some of its veterans, including pensions and housing. This placed the Crown in the unusual position of providing pensions and owning houses in a land from which it drew soldiers but which was no longer a member of its country.

The expectations of the veterans, the generosity of the Crown and the attitude of the Irish government all contributed to a muddled state of affairs. A few got pensions, and a limited amount of housing was constructed which, while benefiting Ireland economically, was an irritant to its government. When a veteran died should his widow be allowed to stay, or should she be moved out to provide housing for another veteran? Different answers were proposed to that question.

In the final part of the book the author considers the rivalries within society: between those who fought for the Crown in the Great War and later either joined the rebellion, supported the government, or tried to stay out completely, and those who claimed veterans' preferences for having served in various Irish military or para-military units and claimed abstinence from the Great War as a virtue. Heroes or traitors resonated with my interests in Irish and Great War history. At times I found the author to be more statistical and anecdotal in his presentation than I am used to, but overall this is an excellent read for anyone interested in the lingering echoes of the Great War and its wake.

James M. Gallen

A Forgotten Wartime Musical Favorite: I Am Coming Back to Kansas

Contributed by James Patton

I Am Coming Back to Kansas
© Nellie Blanche Smirl 7 Sept 1918, E 432374  

When I have time to dream about you,
Pleasant mem'ries I'll recall,
For I've lived in many places,
But you're dearest of them all.
I can see the rolling prairies
And can breathe the fragrant air,
And Kansas-land shall be my home
When I get thro' over there.

Chorus:
I am coming back to Kansas,
Tho' I am so far away,
There is no place so grand,
It's the fairy land, Of the whole world, I say.
But when duty calls I'll follow,
Follow all the way;
Glad to fight for Uncle Sam with all my might,
But I'll come back some day.

The same old moon I see a-shining,
And he makes me think of you,
For he heard that lass in Kansas
As she promised to be true.
So while birds are sweetly singing
And the sunflow'rs fringe the way,
And wedding bells have rung for us,
I'll be there to always stay.

Chorus:
I am coming back to Kansas,
Tho' I am so far away,
There is no place so grand,
It's the fairy land, Of the whole world, I say.
But when duty calls I'll follow,
Follow all the way;
Glad to fight for Uncle Sam with all my might,
But I'll come back some day.



"I Am Coming Back to Kansas" was composed and published on 31 August 1918 by Nellie Blanche Smirl (24/11/1889–3/11/1986),also Mrs. Clarence G. Smirl, a 28-year-old homemaker with a six-year- old daughter named Mildred, who lived in the small central Kansas city of Ellsworth in the county of the same name.

There is no record of any other music published by Nellie Blanche during her long life. Although all census records available describe her as a housewife, in 1940 she stated that she had income of $200 per year, which was not small change in an era when the minimum wage was 30 cents an hour. Her obituary in the Wichita Eagle described her as a "retired teacher." She has an entry in the Social Security Death Index, so at some point in time after 1935 she registered, presumably because she got a job. Another detail from her obituary is that she parented a niece and a nephew, the children of a sister.

Nellie Blanche may have been motivated to write her work to honor the service of her brother-in-law, Harry L. Smirl (1893–1978), who survived the war and died in Los Angeles.

At Arras: The Short Life of the Iron Duke

This week we will be featuring several articles on the the Centennial of the Battle of Arras.  We begin with a well-known photo from the battle.

This classic photo from the Imperial War Museum shows British Mark II Tank  #781,  aka the "Iron Duke," rolling through the city of Arras 100 years ago tomorrow, 10 April 1917 on its way to the battlefield.  Originally assigned to Tank Battalion C, the Iron Duke was temporarily  ditched for some reason prior to the start of of the Battle of Arras. Possibly this is why it was still in the city when the battle was raging just to the east. It was returned to action eventually but was destroyed by enemy fire on 20 April near the present day site of Feuchy Chapel Commonwealth Cemetery.  There is no record of its commander,  2Lt Street, or any of the crew killed or wounded that day.

Centennial News: U.S. Commemoration Big Success in Kansas City

After streaming the entire Centennial Commemoration of the U.S. Entry into World War I held 6 April in Kansas City, I really regret being unable to attend in person. The program was wonderful in content and epic in scale.  My congratulations to the WWI Commission, the National WWI Museum and Memorial, the Pritzker Museum, and all the other organizations, participants, and volunteers who pulled this off. Helping make the day especially dramatic was the wonderful weather provided courtesy of Kansas City mayor Sly James, who took credit for it during his talk. (I, of course, believe we should take His Honor at his word.)

Below are some images that I hope capture the ceremony with a few of my own impressions. However, you can view the entire event on either YouTube, or at the Commission's site

HERE

Next week I will be publishing another article on the local and regional commemoration held on 6 April 2017.  If you have photos and some descriptions of your event please send them to me:  greatwar@earthlink.net

The Venue at Dawn, 6 April 2017
The Big Screens Would Prove to Be Very Effective in Showing Footage from the War (Extremely Well Done by the War) and Views of the Speakers and Performers

Doughboys of the 1st Division Supported the Event

The View from the Audience
Congressman Emanuel Cleaver of Missouri at the Podium
Congressman Cleaver and All His Fellow Elected Officials Were on Message, Well Informed About the War, and Often Moving and Inspiring

A Young Doughboy Views the Event

WWI Commission Chairman Col. Robert Dalessandro Strongly Made the Case for
a National World War One Memorial in Washington, DC 

Flyover by France's Patrouille de France, Later a USAF B-2 Bomber Flew Over the Crowd

Family Members of Notable WWI Veterans (L-R) George Patton, Noble Sissle,
Alvin York, and John J. Pershing.
Helen Patton (the General's Granddaughter Here at the Podium) Provided My Personal Favorite Moment of the Event When She Sang Lt. Hunter Wickersham's Poem,
 "The Raindrops on My Old Tin Hat" for the crowd.

The Closing Salute, Fittingly,  Was Fired by a Battery from the 129th Field Artillery,
Which Was Capt. Harry Truman's Unit in the Great War

America's Road to War: The First Big Decisions

By Professor Michael McCarthy,  Marshall University

The day after President Wilson signed the war resolution the United States found itself unmindful of and ill-prepared for the degree of involvement which its participation would require. Fundamental strategic questions—such as whether to send an army to Europe, and if so when and where to deploy it to support national goals—remained unanswered until after the Congress granted Wilson's request for a declaration of war on Imperial Germany.

The decision for war itself answered only the first half of a two-part question. The nation now had to decide how to fight. The thought of committing an army to the Continent was revolting to some American politicians. Three strategic decisions had to be made very quickly: The Nature of American Participation in the War,  How to Raise an Army, and Where to Fight.

What to Do?

Both Great  Britain and France had ideas on this and quickly dispatched military missions to the States. On 27 April France's visiting Field Marshal Joffre met with Secretary of War Newton Baker, Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott and Assistant Chief of Staff, General Tasker Bliss.  The Frenchman repeated his appeal for "men, men, men" and requested that an American division be sent to Europe at once. His suggestion would not receive an endorsement. General Bliss stated their position that to immediately dispatch an untrained force would result in the butchering of untrained American recruits. The military's position was clear: the immediate dispatch of an expeditionary force to Europe would not, in their opinion, be in the best interest of the American war effort. 

Just such an expeditionary force, however, departed in June 1917 under the command of General John J. Pershing. The British and French missions seem to have persuaded Wilson, and during the resident's four o'clock private meeting with the French field marshal on 2 May he had "allowed General Joffre to take it for granted that such a force would be sent just as soon as we could send it." In his 65-minute audience with Wilson, the French commander successfully elicited what the American military planners had opposed so passionately ever since war had appeared likely.

How to Raise the Expeditionary Force?

Immediately after America entered the war, the problem of raising manpower was addressed at the urging of Army chief of staff Hugh Scott. Conscription would be needed. The president gave his assent, and Army provost marshal Enoch Crowder drew up a bill that met with intense but narrowly based opposition. On 18 May, Mr. Wilson signed the Selective Service Act which, after some expansion in 1918, would draft 2.7 million recruits to supplement the enlistments in the regular services and National Guard.

What to Do With the Expeditionary Force?

The decision to send an immediate expeditionary force to France did not complete American strategic planning. While the United States had committed itself to a military role, the exact nature of the nation's involvement remained to be shrouded in fog as dense as that which surrounded General Pershing* and his staff as they departed New York Harbor for Europe in late May 1917. 

Of immediate concern was the speed with which American troops would follow the First Division across the Atlantic: would the bulk of the American army remain in North America to complete its training or would the United States begin shipping more soldiers immediately? In addition, during the few months after the initial expeditionary force was dispatched to France, some prominent Americans—even Wilson himself—questioned the wisdom of fighting on the Western Front. Almost three years of relentless fighting there had left the terrain scarred with trenches and graves, yet had yielded little gain for either side. An alternative was sought. Western Front early in their war planning. Baker himself recalled years after the war that "General Pershing, General Scott, General Bliss and I had agreed that the war would have to be won on the Western Front at the time General Pershing started overseas. At one of our conferences before he left we discussed some of the sideshows and decided that they were all useless..."In spite of the sound, strategic rationale for this decision, the General Staff would be forced to explain its reasoning repeatedly throughout the remainder of the year.  

A total of 4,734,991 Americans would serve in the armed forces in the First World War. This would have supported an expeditionary force of 80 of these extra-large divisions in Europe. However, with the help of the AEF, with only half of the planned divisions in theater, the war was brought to a decisive conclusion on the Western Front faster than anyone had dreamt possible in 1917.  Those  planners, however, would have been shocked to hear that American troops would also be deployed to Italy,  Northern Russia,and Siberia as well before all the guns became silent.

*The decision to select General Pershing will be discussed in later postings on Roads to the Great War.

Professor McCarthy's article first appeared in slightly different form in the May 2007 issue of Over the Top magazine.

America's Road to War, 6 April 1917: The United States Declares War on Imperial Germany

On 4 April the Senate held a daylong debate, then voted 82 to 6, with eight abstentions, for war. The House voted 373 to 50 on 6 April, Good Friday. The joint war resolution was rushed to the White House; Woodrow Wilson interrupted his lunch and came to the office of the usher, Ike Hoover. "Stand by me, Edith," he said to his wife. She handed him a gold fountain pen, a gift he had given her, to sign the document. 

Immediately afterward, a signal was passed to a junior naval officer, who  had been instructed by Assistant Secretary Franklin Delano Roosevelt to stand in readiness. Now the young man rushed outside and with his arms semaphored to a figure standing in a window of the adjacent State, War and Navy building, who then ordered that wireless messages be sent to all the ships at sea: the United States of America was at war.

This is the document the president had just signed.

Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the people of the United States and making provision to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

CHAMP CLARK
Speaker of the House of Representatives

THOS. R. MARSHALL
Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate

Approved, April 6, 1917
WOODROW WILSON

Tomorrow: What Next?

America's Road to War: Did President Wilson Make the Right Decision? No, Says Author Burton Yale Pines

Our contributor is former foreign correspondent and editor for Time magazine, who later headed a team of policy experts at a Washington think tank during  the Reagan administration He is the author of the award-winning America's Greatest Blunder: The Fateful Decision to Enter World War One.

Burton Yale Pines

Exactly a century ago, Woodrow Wilson on 2 April 1917 addressed Congress, asking for a declaration of war on Imperial Germany. His speech was eloquent. It also was puzzling—and troubling. Nowhere did Wilson accuse Germany of doing anything to America to warrant our ending neutrality and going to war. He didn't because he couldn't. Germany had launched no attack on us. Germany was not threatening us. Germany, since war's outbreak in August 1914, had been extraordinarily respectful of American neutrality—unlike Britain which repeatedly violated our rights as a neutral.

Then what reasons did Wilson list for sending Americans into battle? His justification: "To make the world safe for democracy." The war, he added, would be a fight for "peace and justice." Four days later, Congress, on 6 April, gave him war. It was an action setting the young 20th century on its course of horrifying violence and destruction.

When the European war had erupted on 2 August 1914, no one thought that it would become America's war. Wilson immediately proclaimed neutrality, a policy fully backed by the nation. So, why did we abandon neutrality to mobilize America's massive industry and manpower to help Britain and France?

There were five big factors.

The first was Britain's phenomenally effective propaganda campaign distorting and fabricating facts to convince Americans that Germany was their enemy. London controlled all information flowing to America. All dispatches from Europe to the U.S. went via Britain, where heavy censorship was imposed. What Americans thought they knew about the war, about Germany, about the Allies, about the battlefield, about troop behavior, about atrocities, about home front conditions all were determined by Britain.

The picture painted by Britain was of Germans as evil predators. Typical was the Bryce Report of May 1915. It professed to be an academic and impartial finding that Germany was committing atrocities—including crucifixion, gang rape, decapitation of POWs, sexual mutilation of Belgian and French women and bayoneting of Belgian infants. As extensive studies after the war concluded, just about everything in the Bryce Report were lies. But, in 1915, as it swept America, it was acclaimed as credible, fixing in American minds the indelible notion of Germans as barbarians.

The second factor undermining U.S. neutrality was America's growing banking, farming and manufacturing dependence on sales to the Allies. This created a huge lobby pushing for America to help the Allies.

The third factor was the March 1917 Russian revolution. By toppling the despotic Romanov dynasty, it removed an obstacle that had been preventing American liberals and progressives and such huge groups as Poles, Finns, and Jews from backing Britain and France, which were allied with the Russia they hated.

The fourth factor was Wilson's feeling that if he were to have a seat at an eventual peace table, then America would have to fight.

A Section of the U.S. St. Mihiel Cemetery
This Was Part of the Price President Wilson Was 
Willing to Pay for a Seat at the Peace Table

And fifth, nothing was more devastating to German standing in America than the U-boat. Americans felt that Germany's U-boat attacks were behavior unacceptable for a civilized nation, akin to a mugging in a dark alley. But the U-boat issue had two sides. Britain, by imposing a blockade and stopping American ships from reaching Germany, was violating our freedom of the seas and our rights as a neutral. Yet Wilson never denounced Britain for that. By contrast, he excoriated the U-boats, even though they were not attacking American ships. Thus America increasingly saw Germany as an outlaw nation.

But Germany viewed the U-boat as a legitimate weapon to break the British blockade. U-boats hunted British and French ships; but U-boats did not attack neutrals. Not until February 1917. Then, desperately attempting to force Britain to lift its blockade, Berlin ordered U-boats to fire on all ships—including neutrals—in the German-imposed war zone around France and Britain. And these attacks, on very few U.S. ships, were cited by Wilson in his call for war.

So America declared war. And the result was decisive. Near war's end— when we were fighting in the Argonne—there were two million Doughboys on the Front. And Pershing was asking a receptive Wilson for two million more. These Doughboys were fresh and eager, in striking contrast to the British, French and Germans who then were fielding their 3rd and even 4th generation of recruits. With their huge numbers and enthusiasm these Doughboys won the war. They tilted the battlefield balance, ending the stalemate and guaranteeing Britain and France the victory allowing them to impose on Germany their draconian armistice and peace—ignoring everything that Wilson had promised Germany: a "peace without victory" and a "peace between equals."

And had America not gone to war. Then what?

Both sides surely would have had to negotiate an end to the conflict. Of course, they would do this reluctantly, balking at admitting that all their suffering had been in vain. But as 1918 unfolded, they would have little choice. Both sides were running out of manpower; were imposing stricter rationing and tightening their economic belts; and were dealing with mounting calls for peace. At a conference table they would do what combatants had been doing in every major European war since the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648: They would compromise. Some territory would be exchanged; some reparations would be imposed; some lines on a map would be redrawn.

It would be, as Wilson long had advocated, "a peace without victors." There would be no one-sided armistice and no Versailles Treaty inflicting horrific punishment on Germany. There would be no conditions that allowed an obscure demagogue like Hitler to enthrall and mobilize masses against Versailles and, more consequential, against the young German democracy.

There thus would have been no Hitler, no WWII and likely no Cold War. Was it a blunder for America to go to war? Indeed, yes. Likely the greatest foreign policy blunder in America's history.

This article is based on the author's work: America's Greatest Blunder: The Fateful Decision to Enter World War One.


Tomorrow:  The United States of America Declares War

America's Road to War: Did President Wilson Make the Right Decision? Yes, Says Commentator Walter Lippman

Walter Lippman (1889–1974) was America's most respected and influential commentator on foreign policy for much of his life. In 1942 with the nation again at war with Germany, he took a fresh look at Wilson's decision to take America to war in this Life magazine article.

Walter Lippman, 1889–1974

Yet it is the fact that we intervened in 1917 in order to defend America by aiding the Allies to defend the Atlantic Ocean against an untrustworthy and powerful conqueror. This can be proved.  As proof I venture to submit excerpts from some articles which were published in February 1917 by the editors of the New Republic. They may be used as evidence because the journalists who wrote them had made it their business to know what was in the minds of President Wilson and of his Administration. 

One of these articles, published February 17, 1917, is called "The Defense of the Atlantic World" and it states that "if the Allied fleet were in danger of destruction, if Germany had a chance of securing command of the seas, our navy ought to be joined to the British in order to prevent it. The safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight. Why? Because on the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean there has grown up a profound web of interest which joins together the western world. Britain, France, Italy, even Spain, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian nations, and Pan America are in the main one community in their deepest needs and their deepest purposes. They have a common interest in the ocean which unites them. They are today more inextricably bound together than most even as yet realize. But if that community were destroyed we should know what we had lost. We should understand then the meaning of the unfortified Canadian frontier, of the common protection given Latin-America by the British and American fleets. 

"It is the crime of Germany that she is trying to make hideous the highways by which the Atlantic Powers live. That is what has raised us against her in this war...When she carried this war to the Atlantic by violating Belgium, by invading France, by striking against Britain, and by attempting to disrupt us, neutrality of spirit or action was out of the question. And now that she is seeking to cut the vital highways of our world we can no longer stand by...A victory on the high seas would be a triumph of that class which aims to make Germany the leader of the East against the West, the leader ultimately of a German-Russian-Japanese coalition against the Atlantic world." 

For Lippman the Control of the Atlantic Was 
the Vital National Interest in Both World Wars

...Let [us ask ourselves] whether the men of Wilson's generation were the deluded, starry-eyed, hysterical fools that our cynical historians have taught us to think they were. For 20 years after the Allied victory had averted the danger which Wilson foresaw, it was very easy indeed to sneer at Woodrow Wilson's demand that the world must be made safe for democracy, and sneering at it, not to understand that he saw then, as we see now, what a victory of German militarism over the sea power of the West would mean. It has taken this country 25 years to realize again what Wilson and his advisers saw then, that "with Germany established in the position of mistress of the seas, our trade would encounter closed doors on every hand...The passing of the power of England would be calamitous to the American national interest. It is as much our concern that England should not be beaten into surrender as it was England's concern that Belgium should not be brutally trampled under...(America) will be morally and politically isolated."

...There was plenty of emotion, and even of hysteria, in 1917. But beneath it was a reasoned and statesmanlike judgment of what was vital to the defense of America, and it was this reasoning, and not the emotion and the hysteria, that moved President Wilson, the most determined pacifist that has occupied the White House since Thomas Jefferson. He did not invent this conviction of what is vital to America. The knowledge that the survival of Britain is necessary to the sure defense of America is as old as the American republic itself.

Whenever Britain's survival against a continental conqueror has been in doubt, American statesmen have realized that a fundamental American interest was at stake.


Tomorrow:  Did Wilson Make the Right Decision?, Part II

America's Road to War: Senator Norris Makes the Case Against Entering the War

Senator George Norris of Nebraska

Mr. President, while I am most emphatically and sincerely opposed to taking any step that will force our country into the useless and senseless war now being waged in Europe, yet, if this resolution passes, I shall not permit my feeling of opposition to its passage to interfere in any way with my duty either as a senator or as a citizen in bringing success and victory to American arms. I am bitterly opposed to my country entering the war, but if, notwithstanding my opposition, we do enter it, all of my energy and all of my power will be behind our flag in carrying it on to victory.

The resolution now before the Senate is a declaration of war. Before taking this momentous step, and while standing on the brink of this terrible vortex, we ought to pause and calmly and judiciously consider the terrible consequences of the step we are about to take. We ought to consider likewise the route we have recently traveled and ascertain whether we have reached our present position in a way that is compatible with the neutral position which we claimed to occupy at the beginning and through the various stages of this unholy and unrighteous war.

No close student of recent history will deny that both Great Britain and Germany have, on numerous occasions since the beginning of the war, flagrantly violated in the most serious manner the rights of neutral vessels and neutral nations under existing international law, as recognized up to the beginning of this war by the civilized world.

The reason given by the President in asking Congress to declare war against Germany is that the German government has declared certain war zones, within which, by the use of submarines, she sinks, without notice, American ships and destroys American lives...The first war zone was declared by Great Britain. She gave us and the world notice of it on, the 4th day of November, 1914. The zone became effective Nov. 5, 1914...This zone so declared by Great Britain covered the whole of the North Sea...The first German war zone was declared on the 4th day of February, 1915, just three months after the British war zone was declared. Germany gave fifteen days’ notice of the establishment of her zone, which became effective on the 18th day of February, 1915. The German war zone covered the English Channel and the high sea waters around the British Isles...

It is unnecessary to cite authority to show that both of these orders declaring military zones were illegal and contrary to international law. It is sufficient to say that our government has officially declared both of them to be illegal and has officially protested against both of them. The only difference is that in the case of Germany we have persisted in our protest, while in the case of England we have submitted.

Senator Robert "Fighting Bob" La Follette of Wisconsin 
also Spoke Against the War

What was our duty as a government and what were our rights when we were confronted with these extraordinary orders declaring these military zones? First, we could have defied both of them and could have gone to war against both of these nations for this violation of international law and interference with our neutral rights. Second, we had the technical right to defy one and to acquiesce in the other. Third, we could, while denouncing them both as illegal, have acquiesced in them both and thus remained neutral with both sides, although not agreeing with either as to the righteousness of their respective orders. We could have said to American shipowners that, while these orders are both contrary to international law and are both unjust, we do not believe that the provocation is sufficient to cause us to go to war for the defense of our rights as a neutral nation, and, therefore, American ships and American citizens will go into these zones at their own peril and risk.

Fourth, we might have declared an embargo against the shipping from American ports of any merchandise to either one of these governments that persisted in maintaining its military zone. We might have refused to permit the sailing of any ship from any American port to either of these military zones. In my judgment, if we had pursued this course, the zones would have been of short duration. England would have been compelled to take her mines out of the North Sea in order to get any supplies from our country. When her mines were taken out of the North Sea then the German ports upon the North Sea would have been accessible to American shipping and Germany would have been compelled to cease her submarine warfare in order to get any supplies from our nation into German North Sea ports.

There are a great many American citizens who feel that we owe it as a duty to humanity to take part in this war. Many instances of cruelty and inhumanity can be found on both sides. Men are often biased in their judgment on account of their sympathy and their interests. To my mind, what we ought to have maintained from the beginning was the strictest neutrality. If we had done this, I do not believe we would have been on the verge of war at the present time. We had a right as a nation, if we desired, to cease at any time to be neutral. We had a technical right to respect the English war zone and to disregard the German war zone, but we could not do that and be neutral.

I have no quarrel to find with the man who does not desire our country to remain neutral. While many such people are moved by selfish motives and hopes of gain, I have no doubt but that in a great many instances, through what I believe to be a misunderstanding of the real condition, there are many honest, patriotic citizens who think we ought to engage in this war and who are behind the President in his demand that we should declare war against Germany. I think such people err in judgment and to a great extent have been misled as to the real history and the true facts by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war.

We have loaned many hundreds of millions of dollars to the Allies in this controversy. While such action was legal and countenanced by international law, there is no doubt in my mind but the enormous amount of money loaned to the Allies in this country has been instrumental in bringing about a public sentiment in favor of our country taking a course that would make every bond worth a hundred cents on the dollar and making the payment of every debt certain and sure. Through this instrumentality and also through the instrumentality of others who have not only made millions out of the war in the manufacture of munitions, etc., and who would expect to make millions more if our country can be drawn into the catastrophe, a large number of the great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known to manufacture sentiment in favor of war.

Representative Jeanette Rankin of Montana Voted Against the War Resolution ( and Did Again in WWII)

It is now demanded that the American citizens shall be used as insurance policies to guarantee the safe delivery of munitions of war to belligerent nations. The enormous profits of munition manufacturers, stockbrokers, and bond dealers must be still further increased by our entrance into the war. This has brought us to the present moment, when Congress, urged by the President and backed by the artificial sentiment, is about to declare war and engulf our country in the greatest holocaust that the world has ever known.

In showing the position of the bondholder and the stockbroker, I desire to read an extract from a letter written by a member of the New York Stock Exchange to his customers. This writer says:

Regarding the war as inevitable, Wall Street believes that it would be preferable to this uncertainty about the actual date of its commencement. Canada and Japan are at war and are more prosperous than ever before. The popular view is that stocks would have a quick, clear, sharp reaction immediately upon outbreak of hostilities, and that then they would enjoy an old-fashioned bull market such as followed the outbreak of war with Spain in 1898. The advent of peace would force a readjustment of commodity prices and would probably mean a postponement of new enterprises. As peace negotiations would be long drawn out, the period of waiting and uncertainty for business would be long. If the United States does not go to war, it is nevertheless good opinion that the preparedness program will compensate in good measure for the loss of the stimulus of actual war.

Here we have the Wall Street view. Here we have the man representing the class of people who will be made prosperous should we become entangled in the present war, who have already made millions of dollars, and who will make many hundreds of millions more if we get into the war. Here we have the cold-blooded proposition that war brings prosperity to that class of people who are within the viewpoint of this writer.

He expresses the view, undoubtedly, of Wall Street, and of thousands of men elsewhere who see only dollars coming to them through the handling of stocks and bonds that will be necessary in case of war. “Canada and Japan,” he says, “are at war, and are more prosperous than ever before.”

To whom does war bring prosperity? Not to the soldier who for the munificent compensation of $16 per month shoulders his musket and goes into the trench, there to shed his blood and to die if necessary; not to the brokenhearted widow who waits for the return of the mangled body of her husband; not to the mother who weeps at the death of her brave boy; not to the little children who shiver with cold; not to the babe who suffers from hunger; nor to the millions of mothers and daughters who carry broken hearts to their graves. War brings no prosperity to the great mass of common and patriotic citizens. It increases the cost of living of those who toil and those who already must strain every effort to keep soul and body together. War brings prosperity to the stock gambler on Wall Street—to those who are already in possession of more wealth than can be realized or enjoyed.

Again this writer says that if we cannot get war, “it is nevertheless good opinion that the preparedness program will compensate in good measure for the loss of the stimulus of actual war.” That is, if we cannot get war, let us go as far in that direction as possible. If we cannot get war, let us cry for additional ships, additional guns, additional munitions, and everything else that will have a tendency to bring us as near as possible to the verge of war. And if war comes, do such men as these shoulder the musket and go into the trenches?

Their object in having war and in preparing for war is to make money. Human suffering and the sacrifice of human life are necessary, but Wall Street considers only the dollars and the cents. The men who do the fighting, the people who make the sacrifices are the ones who will not be counted in the measure of this great prosperity that he depicts. The stockbrokers would not, of course, go to war because the very object they have in bringing on the war is profit, and therefore they must remain in their Wall Street offices in order to share in that great prosperity which they say war will bring. The volunteer officer, even the drafting officer, will not find them. They will be concealed in their palatial offices on Wall Street, sitting behind mahogany desks, covered up with clipped coupons—coupons soiled with the sweat of honest toil, coupons stained with mothers’ tears, coupons dyed in the lifeblood of their fellowmen.

We are taking a step today that is fraught with untold danger. We are going into war upon the command of gold. We are going to run the risk of sacrificing millions of our countrymen’s lives in order that other countrymen may coin their lifeblood into money. And even if we do not cross the Atlantic and go into the trenches, we are going to pile up a debt that the tolling masses that shall come many generations after us will have to pay. Unborn millions will bend their backs in toil in order to pay for the terrible step we are now about to take.

We are about to do the bidding of wealth’s terrible mandate. By our act we will make millions of our countrymen suffer, and the consequences of it may well be that millions of our brethren must shed their lifeblood, millions of brokenhearted women must weep, millions of children must suffer with cold, and millions of babes must die from hunger, and all because we want to preserve the commercial right of American citizens to deliver munitions of war to belligerent nations.

Source:  Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st Session

Tomorrow:  Did Wilson Make the Right Decision?, Part I

America's Road to War, 2 April 1917: President Woodrow Wilson Asks Congress to Declare War on Imperial Germany

By Professor David Traxel, University of the Sciences

April 2nd was another day of rain, but this "a soft, fragrant rain of early spring," as William McAdoo remembered. "The illuminated dome of the Capitol stood in solemn splendor against the dark, wet sky."Just before 8:30 that evening, the president was driven in an  automobile toward that glowing dome protected by a troop of cavalry, hooves clattering along wet streets lined with flag-waving citizens. Standing on the podium before an overflow audience, also flag-bedecked, of senators, representatives, Cabinet members, Supreme Court justices, ambassadors, and every worthy who could wrangle entry, Woodrow Wilson eloquently laid out the case for war, though he had to wait five minutes for the standing ovation to subside.

Dispassionately, in that winning, musical voice that had been noted by so many, he went over the recent history of German aggression: "Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium. . .have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle." Over the centuries, with great difficulty, a minimum of law had been established to protect the lives and property of innocent travelers upon the sea. That had now been swept aside. "Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations...The challenge is to all mankind."

Armed neutrality had turned out to be "impracticable" and "ineffectual," so "with a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking...I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against...the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it." The hall exploded with cheers and shouts as people jumped to their feet, the cheering led by Chief Justice White, himself a Confederate veteran and enthusiastic supporter of the Allies.

Wilson went on to emphasize that war had been thrust upon the country not by the German people themselves—"We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship"—but by the "Prussian autocracy." He then discussed at some length the sabotage and other unlawful acts that had been directed against the country, pointing out: "Prussian autocracy...from the very outset of the present war... filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce." Such threatening despotism had to be countered by a free people: "The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve." And since the United States did not desire conquest or dominion, it would "observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for."

"We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts," he said at the close, "for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right."

Now the great hall shook again with cheers and clapping, just as over the next few days presidential mail would reach flood proportions with more huzzahs and congratulations. Even his once-and-future enemy Henry Cabot Lodge, little the worse for his recent fistfight, pushed through the crowd to congratulate him. Wilson had labored long, hard, and in seclusion on the speech, but it was obvious from his drawn face that none of this patriotic enthusiasm gave him pleasure.   Some definitely were not applauding. Though Jack Reed had been given a Senate pass by Robert La Follette, he refused to attend the historic session, instead taking part in a mass antiwar meeting. Partway through, word came that the president had just asked for war to be declared. Several of the speakers—including the chairman, David Starr Jordan, head of Stanford University and longtime peace activist—then announced that they saw no choice but to support the country, but Reed disagreed, announcing from the platform: "This is not my war, and I will not support it. This is not my war, and I will have nothing to do with it."

Source:  This selection originally appeared in the April 2007 issue of OVER THE TOP.

Tomorrow: Some Dissenters in Congress

America's Road to War: The Turn from Neutrality to Intervention, 1914–1917

This Article Launches Our Week-Long Centennial Series
America's Road to War

[One hundred years ago today,] churches across America celebrated Palm Sunday, beginning the traditional observance of Holy Week by marking Jesus' triumphal entry into Jerusalem. But many congregations seemed eager to celebrate the United States' impending entry into the Great War. In a sermon entitled "America Summoned to a Holy War," a crusading Randolph McKim in Washington proclaimed America's duty: "I have no hesitation ... in saying that the voice of a just God summons us to this War and that it is in the highest sense of the word a Holy War." That same day, in an extraordinary act, Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, the former pulpit of Henry Ward Beecher and Lyman Abbott, prepared a resolution demanding war with Germany. Beecher's own son presented the document, which rejected a mere "affirmation that a state of war exists,"  preferring rather "an out-and-out declaration." 

Professor Richard M. Gamble, 

The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, 
the Great War and the Rise of the Messianic Nation

---

America's Turn From Neutrality to Intervention, 1914–1917

by Roads to the Great War Editor/Publisher Michael Hanlon

As the first rumble of the Great War's cannon fire reached the New World, there had already formed a decisive bloc opposing American belligerency. It included ethnic groups, such as Irish and Eastern European immigrants who had grievances against some of the Allied powers; gatherings like the Progressives, suffragettes, and prohibitionists, who were more interested in pursuing their causes than waging war; and Westerners and farmers who did not feel any affiliation to Europe. These anti-interventionists were buttressed by the long American tradition of non-involvement in the political affairs of the Old World and by President Wilson's early, insistent declaration of American neutrality.

1914 Political Cartoon

Nevertheless, as the war unfolded, these "doves" had to face novel and confounding events that forced them to reevaluate their positions. Remarkably, almost every major incident that followed the war's early days had the effect of pushing, pulling, and even seducing some segment of America into joining the originally minimal pro-intervention coalition.

The German Army, embodiment of "Prussian militarism," quickly acquired a "beastly" reputation by administering occupied territories ruthlessly, executing nurses, and bombarding medieval Louvain library and Reims Cathedral. Their actual misdeeds were magnified by Allied propaganda and by Germany's inability to make their case directly to the American public. The Royal Navy had not only blockaded the Central Powers' maritime commerce, but had also severed Germany's transatlantic cable. In the U.S., these factors contributed to the early "demonizing" of Germany, its legions, and Kaiser Wilhelm. Liberals in particular began to see their dreams of a world of justice based on peace, democracy, and non-monopolistic markets threatened by the existence of the kaiser's regime. Thousands of them felt so strongly that they enlisted in Allied armies and ambulance services. Pacifists, in their turn, evolved the paradoxical position that true peace could be found only after German militarism was eradicated.

By 1915, Allied contracts for weapons and food triggered a boom in the United States. Then, as the Allies' hard currency reserves ran out, huge loans were floated to finance their purchases. Many Americans, from factory workers to farmers to investors, came to have an insufficiently recognized economic stake in an Allied victory. Because of the naval blockade's success, similar economic links never developed with the Central Powers. The ultimate role of economics in American intervention is still hotly debated, but it is an issue whose importance cannot be ignored.

The sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania in the spring of 1915 resulted in the deaths of 1,195 people including 128 U.S. citizens. The ensuing diplomatic hullabaloo was one of the major landmarks of America's journey to the Great War's battlefields. Some lesser-known side effects—probably underestimated later by the German General Staff—edged the country further toward effective intervention. Many people, including some still opposed to intervening, came to realize they were willing to fight for their country if German actions compelled America to enter the war. A war preparedness movement was triggered that succeeded in boosting U.S. military capability, training a larger officer cadre and improving mobilization planning. Later problems along the Mexican border both heightened awareness of impending hostilities and showed the shortcomings of existing logistical systems. Most importantly, all of this re-awoke the nation's dormant martial spirit and esteem for its military heritage.

The Sinking of the Lusitania Made a Deep Impression
on the American Psyche 

As its years of bloody carnage dragged on, the war started to exercise a gravitational pull on US domestic politics. Many activists began to see benefits from participating in the war since a nation on a war footing may undertake, out of urgency, social and political changes that it normally would not. Anti-capitalist elements, for instance, recognized possibilities for more government controls over industry. Advocates of redistributing wealth saw in any war's undoubtedly great expenditures a necessity for imposing an increasingly progressive income tax. Wartime rationing might offer prohibitionists a chance to impose their favorite method of human betterment on the citizenry. Unions saw that a war meant jobs for their members, just as it meant more contracts for the corporations. No one was brazen enough to call for war to satisfy private ambitions, but some Americans became aware that if the country was drawn into war, they might advance their interests.

Concurrently, the anticipated opposition of immigrant groups to participating in the war seemed to dissolve. In the early twentieth century, America was in the midst of the greatest wave of immigration any nation has ever absorbed. Fearing political instability, politicians like Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt felt it necessary to speak-out with disapproval against "hyphenated Americanism" such as Polish-Americanism or Italian-Americanism. But the newcomers all proved uniformly loyal to their adopted nation and its causes. Except perhaps for German-Americans, who hoped to avoid fighting their cousins and lobbied likewise, ethnic-centered opposition to entering the war never became a major factor. People of every heritage, including those of German ancestry and black Americans, rushed to serve under US colors when war finally came.

Public opinion in the United States was dramatically shifting towards intervention throughout 1916. But there was another, Constitutionally empowered, player yet to commit his hand. The President, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, has to support wholeheartedly any war that America plans to fight. No country can expect to succeed in battle with an irresolute, reluctant captain.

For most of the Great War, Woodrow Wilson had seemed to be the most unwilling of war lords. But he had also come to see that his nation's only opportunity to influence the postwar international realignment might be at the peace conference after hostilities ended. And Wilson's multiple unsuccessful efforts at playing peacemaker had educated him to the fact that a seat at the conference table first required some sacrifice on the battlefield.

1916 Election Button

But he also shared his countrymen's customary reluctance to join a European conflict—a tendency reinforced by his political instinct not to get too far ahead of his constituents. During the 1916 presidential campaign, and even into early 1917, he did not feel that the nation was ready to go to war. Still of two minds about American involvement, himself, the President required more direct provocations before taking advantage of the growing support for participation. On 22 January he made a last plea to the combatants as an "honest broker" with his "Peace Without Victory" speech to the Senate.

Germany announced resumed unrestricted submarine warfare at the end of January 1917. Most Americans considered this an unacceptable limitation on freedom of the seas. Diplomatic relations were severed. As U.S. flagged vessels were sunk, emotions heightened.

Then came German Foreign Minister Zimmerman's notorious telegram to his ambassador in Mexico. This message, intercepted by British codebreakers and released at an opportune moment for the Allies, suggested a Mexican, German, and even Japanese alliance against America. If successful, it was suggested, this could have resulted in the return of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona to Mexico. The Zimmerman Telegram caused another uproar, particularly in the western states. Yet even as calls for war from Congress grew louder, the president kept his own counsel.

Finally, events in mid-March that shook the world removed the final impediments to Wilson's opting for war. Revolution in Russia forced the ineffectual autocrat, Tsar Nicholas II, to abdicate. When the Provisional Government assumed authority, America and Mr. Wilson could profess to be crusading with apparently democratically inclined associates, exclusively. And finally Germany provided him an indisputable casus belli when they sank unarmed American ships without warning.

Post U.S.-Entry Poster Playing on the U-boat Threat

Every major social and political obstacle to American involvement in the war had vanished. A national belief that it was in America's own interest to vanquish Germany and save civilization was ascendant. Germany's heavy-handedness and the tsar's overthrow had allowed Wilson to place his remaining qualms aside and pursue a "world safe for democracy". He had only to ask Congress to declare war and the nation would be ready to march.

On 2 April 1917, Woodrow Wilson—who five months earlier had been reelected with the help of supporters cheering, "He kept us out of war!"—rode to the Capitol with a cavalry escort and asked Congress to declare war on Imperial Germany. Only 56 of 531 congressmen and senators objected, and on 6 April  America was at war.

Tomorrow:  President Wilson Asks Congress to Declare War

Remembering a Veteran: Georges Braque: Artist and Soldier

  

Man with a Guitar, 1914
One of Braque's Last Works Before His Induction

Considered to be the co-founder of Cubism, Georges Braque (1882–1963) worked arm-in-arm with Pablo Picasso in developing that revolutionary rejection of the sensual for the analytical in art. However, when war broke out, Braque enlisted in the French Army and served as an infantryman in the 53rd Division. (Picasso, being a neutral Spaniard, was not required to serve.) 

Braque Required Two Years to Recover from His Wound 

Braque received a severe head wound fighting in Artois near Vimy Ridge in 1915 (see photo) and, after a long recuperation, was discharged in late 1916. His only regret about his war service was apparently over his inability to paint during his recovery. He was, though, enormously productive for the rest of his life. Interestingly, Braque seemed to move away from Cubism, the very technique he helped pioneer, in his later work.

World War I Mural at the MacArthur Memorial

In 1963 the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, VA, began a project to complete six 7’ x 13’ murals depicting the life and accomplishments of General Douglas MacArthur. Noted artist Alton S. Tobey was commissioned to paint these after grants were received to complete the massive paintings. One of these, titled "MacArthur in the Trenches," depicts the general's service with the 42nd "Rainbow" Division in the Great War. While a few details don't quite ring true (the British Mark-series tank looks a bit out of place, and the troops were probably wearing puttees rather than leather leggings), the painting does fine justice to the Doughboys, who are trudging with fatigue but looking very determined, nonetheless. Also, MacArthur is well captured, dictating a dispatch to an aide, while looking, well, very MacArthur-like. Learn more about the murals at the memorial's outstanding website at: http://www.macarthurmemorial.org/m_m_mac_murals.asp

The Artist

A prolific artist who created more than 500 works of art during a 60-year career, Alton Tobey was born in Connecticut in 1914 and graduated from Yale University’s School of Fine Arts. Tobey’s work was featured in numerous museum exhibits, and he completed a variety of murals all across the country. His work was published in Life, Reader’s Digest, American Artist, and Spotlight magazines.

Monument to the North African Troops of the French Army

Located in Senlis, France, just north of Paris, near the closest German approach to the city in 1914, is this memorial to the service of the North African colonial units that played an important role in the defense of France during the war.

Two Monumental Equestrian Figures Top the Monument

Escorting a Column of German Prisoners During the Battle of the Marne

Departure Frieze  on the Base

Return Frieze on the Base

Photos from Tony Langley