East Africa—the Forgotten Front? Not Any More!

Colonial Claims in Africa at the Time of the War

By Dr. Anne Samson

Back in 2004, Ross Anderson’s The Forgotten Front: the East African Campaign 1914-1918 was published. Three years later, Edward Paice’s Tip and Run: the Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa hit the shelves, and in 2005 my own Britain, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign 1914-1918: The Union Comes of Age was published. All three drew heavily on primary source or archive material, there not being much else to work with other than such mainstream works like those by Brian Gardner, On to Kilimanjaro: the Bizarre Story of the First World War (1963), and Charles Miller, Battle for the Bundu: The First World War in East Africa (1974) with Hew Strachan’s The First World War in Africa (2004). (My book deals more with politics than the military and local conditions). In those days, a Yahoo search (before Google) returned about 20,000 hits on East Africa. Today a Google Search returns over 20,000 pages.

Since then and with the advent of the Great War centenary, many others have come to hear about the East Africa theater with the result that around five books telling the grand story have appeared in print. Of these, few have made use of archival sources, the result being simply that a rehash of events in the theater, some of fairly decent quality, others not.

British Soldiers with Native Bearers

Alongside these "grand narratives," are more local studies—generally well researched as authors had to access primary material as little, if anything, had been published before. Here, specifically, Northern Rhodesia (Britain, Northern Rhodesia and the First World War: Forgotten Colonial Crisis, Edmund J. York, 2015 and Forged in the Great War: People, Transport and Labour, the Establishment of Colonial Rule in Zambia, 1890-1920, Jan-Bart Gewald, 2015), the Malawi (The Chiwaya war: Malawians and the First World War, Melvin E. Page, 2000), Tsavo (Guerrillas of Tsavo: an Illustrated Diary of a Forgotten Campaign in British East Africa 1914-1916, James Wilson, 2012) come to mind as does Michelle Moyd’s work on the German askari (Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa, 2014).

In addition, many individual accounts, often privately published, have come to light as people looked to see what ‘dad’ or ‘granddad did in the war’. 17 Letters to Tatham: a WW1 surgeon in East Africa (Ann Crichton-Harris, 2002) began to shed light on the medical front, a case furthered by On Call in Africa in War and Peace 1910-1932 by Norman Parsons Jewell (2016). Julia and Anthony Seth-Smith published Donald's War: The diary of a settler in the East Africa Campaign in 2018, while Fiona Claire Capstick’s Between Two Fires—The African Saga of Margarete Trappe came out in 2012, both settler accounts, the first British East Africa, the second German East Africa.

More creatively, the number of novels on the war in Africa have risen exponentially, from 63 in 83 years (1916–1999) to 23 in fewer than 20 years (2005–2020). The most popular topics being Lake Tanganyika and the zeppelin and Wilbur Smith being the most prolific author. Of the total 86 known titles, only 12 do not touch on the war in East Africa.

It is therefore difficult to see how East Africa can still be regarded as a forgotten front as some recent authors have tended to do—even with books published in 2023. Rather than forgotten, there remain hidden aspects of the campaign, such as unit histories detailing the different experiences, accounts of the different home fronts. Eight countries were directly involved in the campaign and at least 275 different communities. Yet, we remain focused on the grand narrative with an infatuation for the German commander Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck—whose memoirs were the only German accounts translated until recently. Reliance on his work can only skew the narrative, as few English authors engage with the German texts, not to mention the Portuguese and Belgian.

German Schutztruppe with SMS Königsberg Gun

There is much still to be discovered around the Great War in Africa—if researchers are wiling to get their hands dirty, so to speak, and into the archives. It’s painstakingly slow work but so rewarding. What do you know about:

•  German South West Africa (Namibia) which fell to South African forces in July 1915?

•  Togoland—the first German colony to fall to the allies, as early as the end of August 1914?

•  German Cameroon—where the campaign ended in March 1916 with many German troops escaping into neighbouring Spanish territory?

•  Egypt and the campaigns against the Senussi?

•  The neutral countries which by all accounts supported Germany in Africa? Spain’s Fernando Po.

•  The home fronts and West African countries?

More is coming to light about French West Africa’s role in Europe, but how much do we know of what they did in Africa? And Belgian Congo’s role in West Africa as well as East?

There are a few academics in Africa who have written about the war, yet their work has not made it into the wider market—with the result that the local experience is being lost, despite all the talk of equality and the value of diversity.

Having followed Roads to the Great War, almost since its inception, it’s been great to see Africa increase in mention, yet disappointing that so much of what it conveys is "more of the same." That no doubt is the fault of us researchers who for whatever reason do not share our obscure discoveries, causing others to think there is still little known about the East Africa campaign.

British Camp

It is well known that the archives are difficult to access, not least because of costs. With this in mind, the Great War in Africa Association (GWAA) has started to publish primary source accounts such as the Lake Tanganyika Expedition 1914-1917: a Primary Source Chronology, Melvin E Page’s oral interviews of Malawian veterans from World Wars I and II (Chiwaya War Voices and Chiwaya War Echoes), with more to come in the near future including translations of German and Scandinavian works. The GWAA has a growing Bibliography of publications mentioning the war in Africa covering all theaters (over 2,000 titles) and a list of people known to have been involved in the war in and from Africa (British related including Portuguese, German and Belgian), as well as some books for sale not available through other retailers. (See GWAA link below.)

With a wider range of primary source material coming into the market and with digital access of war diaries by the UK National Archives (https://nationalarchives.gov.uk—search on Africa war diaries), it is hoped that more diverse accounts of the First World War in Africa will start to come to light. Keep your eye on the GWAA (https://gweaa.com) and Roads to the Great War. 

Anne Samson (dr)

Co-ordinator Great War in Africa Association: https://gweaa.com

Independent historian: https://thesamsonsedhistorian.wordpress.com

South Africa WWI: https://southafricaww1.com 

Bwana General: The Secrets of von Lettow-Vorbeck's Success

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was born on 20 March 1870 in Germany. His father was an army general who encouraged his son to start a military career. In 1888 he studied at the War Academy. Later he was posted to China during the Boxer Rebellion as adjutant of the commander of the German contingent. During this time he fought alongside British troops and had experiences that would be useful in the future. 

Additional key assignments were to South Africa where he worked as an independent Company and Detachment Commander and to German South West Africa (now Namibia) where he helped to suppress the Herero and Hottentot rebellion. Lettow-Vorbeck used these years to learn and train that bush fighting tactics he would later use against the British during the East Africa Campaign. Back to Germany he got command of the 2nd Marine Battalion. In this time he had the chance to study the relationship between naval power, ground troops, and expansionism, an experience that was rare at this time. Before he went back to German East Africa (now Tanzania) to become commander of the Schutztruppe (protection force) in 1913 he was commander of the Schutztruppe in Cameroon.

After his arrival in German East Africa, he used the time to inspect the country, learn about the colony and its people, about the infrastructure, and especially about the British neighbors in the British-ruled East Africa Protectorate (now Kenya). He inspected the border very closely and “once the war started, Lettow-Vorbeck defended German East Africa with skill, determination and courage.” His troops consisted of never more than 3,000 Germans and 12,000 African soldiers, known as Askari, and porters. During the war, Lettow-Vorbeck managed to hold out against a considerably larger force of British, Belgian, Portuguese, and African troops. 

An Askari Company of the Schutztruppe, 1914

It was obvious for him from the beginning, that it would be impossible to defeat the British with their settlements in East Africa and South Africa on the one hand and with the Royal Navy that controlled the sea and therefore the supplies to East Africa on the other hand. “Instead he decided that his greatest service to his country would be to occupy as many troops as possible, for as long as possible, in order to prevent them being used against Germany in other theatres of war.”

[For more information on the campaigns in East Africa, clice HERE to read the articles we've published on that subject over the years.]

By the last year of the war, however, Lettow-Vorbeck's force had been reduced to about 2,000 of his most hardened troops. This last year of the East African campaign thus saw little fighting but endless marches of the Schutztruppe, pursued by the British, Portuguese, and Rhodesian troops, who were never able to catch it. The Schutztruppe left a trail of scorched earth as it marched through several thousand kilometers of Portuguese East Africa, the southwestern part of German East Africa, and finally North Rhodesia, which it invaded in October 1918.  Although his Schutztruppe had not been defeated, Lettow-Vorbeck surrendered to the British 14 days after the end of the war in Europe.  

The war in East Africa was different to the war in Europe. No entrenched mass armies fought against each other, it was small scale engagement over large stretches of bush country and “the military commanders lived and fought with their troops”. This was necessary for three reasons.

*First, fighting a war in bush country with a relatively small amount of troops calls for a lot of movements and quick reaction times, especially when the enemy has a lot more troops and communication over distance is not reliable.

*Second, the coherence of the troops is very important and the combining of German Schutztruppe with African soldiers called for a very engaged leadership, especially with the burden of long and fast marches and no supply lines.

*Third, the commander had to be able to react to the disposition of enemy forces and to adapt quickly to changes of the enemy’s tactics, which can be done best while being in theater personally. 

In the case of L.-V.,  his leadership philosophy while living and fighting with the troops was successful. One adversary, General Crowe, who served under General Smuts made the comment: “Colonel von Lettow had undoubtedly gained the confidence of the forces under him.”

Monument on Hamburg Barracks Named in
Honor of Lettow-Vorbeck

The Keys to Lettow-Vorbeck's Success

Unquestionable Legal and Personal Authority

The governor of German East Africa (Heinrich Schnee) was the supreme military authority in German East Africa. At the beginning of the war the governor wanted the colony to stay independent, but Lettow-Vorbeck's plan was to engage the adversary and do as much harm as possible. In the end, Lettow-Vorbeck convinced Schnee, and after that he had the support of the command in Berlin and the governor in Dar-es-Salaam. Therefore, he had full legal authority.

On his relationship to the men he commanded—Lettow-Vorbeck had the experience of his postings to China, South Africa and Cameroons before he was appointed to East Africa. He also had experience as a commander of a Schutztruppe from his time in Cameroon. Because of these facts, his experience was never questionable.  He earned the respect and loyalty of his Askari troops in a number of way such by limiting the number of personal servants of  officers and convincing his officer corps not to claim any special comforts for themselves. Such measures help explain why almost all his African troops stayed with him throughout the entire war and shared all the hardships.

Skill at Matching Tactics to Strategy

Lettow-Vorbeck was a commander on the operational level, conducting guerilla warfare with regular troops with the mission of defending a German colony against the adversary while inflicting as much harm on Allied troops as possible. 

The strategy L.V.  adopted was to tie down as many British troops as possible both to do as much harm as possible to the adversary and by preventing their redeployment to other theaters more critical to the Central Powers. According to the force ratio between the Germans and British it was clear for Lettow-Vorbeck  from the outset, that it would be impossible to defend German East Africa against the British conventionally for an extended period of time. “The need to strike great blows only quite exceptionally, and to restrict myself principally to guerilla warfare, was evidently imperative," he later wrote.

The tactics to achieve this aim were absolutely different to those applied in Central Europe. There were no mass armies in Africa and no war out of trenches fighting for each single meter of ground. It was a guerilla war with small specialized fighting units,  agile, mobile, and highly motivated troops. Lettow-Vorbeck described his methods:

Knowledge of the desert improved, and in addition to patrols for destruction and intelligence work, we developed a system of fighting patrols. The latter, consisting of twenty to thirty Askari, or even more, and sometimes equipped with one or two machine-guns, went out to look for the enemy and inflict losses upon him. […] The influence of these expeditions on the self-reliance and enterprise of both Europeans and natives was so great that it would be difficult to find a force imbued with a better spirit.

Furthermore, it was necessary for Lettow-Vorbeck to adapt his troops and his tactics to the level  of supply and the terrain they had to operate in:

Expeditions through districts providing neither water nor food require a degree on experience on the part of the troops which could not possibly exist at that stage of the war. […] this conditions improved as the troops became better trained, and as our knowledge of the country, which was at first mainly terra incognita, increased.

Ability to Operate Independently

Lettow-Vorbeck operated with a near total  absence of communication with the headquarters in Berlin. He could not receive orders on a regular basis and not sent reports on a regular basis. But in a general sense—as both a former member of the German General Staff and as the army's most experienced colonial officer, and with his vast and specific issue of knowledge of the local environment, natives, and opposing forces in the adjacent colonies—he did not need a lot of direction. In his combination of mastery of details, enormous self-confidence, and independence of mind, he is a rare bird among generals of the Great War.  He brings Mustafa Kemal to mind.

Lettow-Vorbeck's Triumphal Return in Berlin

Lettow-Vorbeck returned to Germany on 2 March 1919 to a hero's welcome. He led the veterans of the Schutztruppe in their tattered tropical uniforms on a victory parade through the Brandenburg Gate, which was decorated in their honor. Fourteen months after his return to Germany, Lettow-Vorbeck commanded the troops that ended the Spartacist Uprising in Hamburg. He was well known in Germany after the end of WWI, and the Nazi regime wanted to use him for their program, which he strictly refused. This refusal caused a lot of inconvenience for him, and by the end of WWII he lived in near poverty. He recovered and was able to visit Africa and the site of his successes. Lettow-Vorbeck died with the age of 94 in 1964

Sources: "What Were the Keys to Success for Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and T.E. Lawrence," Capt S.W. Fliege, Canadian Forces College; "Lettow-Vorbeck", 1914-1918 Online; Wiki Commons

Botha, Smuts and the Great War

Click HERE to Purchase This Book

By Antonio Garcia & Ian Van Der Waag

Helion & Company, 2023

Reviewed by Jim Gallen

The United States' slow and meandering road to the Great War is familiar to many Roads readers. Less well known is the path the Union of South Africa followed to the Great War.  These two USAs shared some factors. Protected by thousands of miles of ocean, both had strong British influences countervailed by anti-British ethnics: German and Irish in America, Dutch Boer in Africa. Either could have sat out the war without much disruption to their lives and in each the decision to go to war was politically divisive. Botha, Smuts and the Great War is the saga of South Africa's road to and through the Great War and the men who led it.

The background to South Africa's entry into the Great War was unique. The interior of the tip of Africa was settled by Dutch who migrated inland from the Cape of Good Hope to escape pressure from arriving British. Boer isolation lasted until gold and diamonds were discovered in their republics. After British conquest during the Boer War, a segment of Boer political and military leadership hitched their wagons to the empire’s star and became a dominant force in the political life of the Union. Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, both prominent officers in the Transvaal Republic Army, became leaders of the new dominion within the empire. It was they who fought as empire soldiers against the foe and worked as nation builders during and through the war.

South African participation in the Great War was driven and limited by its tradition and geography. Its Union Defense Force (UDF), a blend of Boer commandos (comparable to American militia) and a faint copy of British forces, was better equipped for cavalry campaigns in Africa than in the trenches of the Western Front. There was, however, one exception to this policy. A volunteer infantry brigade was organized and sent to Egypt and then on to the Western Front. These Springboks, as they called themselves, fought notably on the Somme in 1916 and the further British campaigns of 1917–1918.

Bordering on German Southwest Africa and within striking distance of German East Africa, its best opportunity to contribute to the Allied cause was to neutralize German colonies while freeing British troops for the European Theatre.  Germany’s goal was to hold as many troops in Africa as long as possible. Moreover, the German wireless station in Windhoek was an Axis asset the Allies could not be allowed to capture.

Success in Southwest Africa

South Africa participated in two major campaigns from September 1914 through July 1915, initially taking German Southwest Africa. Southwest Africa was significant, both for the threat it posed to the Union and for information transmitted from its wireless station in Windhoek.  After an initial rebuff on 26 September 1914 at Sandfontein, the prime minister and General Botha designed a three-pronged attack to subdue the German forces. Botha commanded the  northern force invading from Walvis Bay, a South African enclave midway on the SWA coast, while Smuts landed a central force at the German naval base at Luderitz and joined with UDF’s Eastern and Southern forces. This led to the unconditional surrender of SWA on 9 July  1915. Having achieved peace in the west, Botha returned to Pretoria to face a Boer revolt and political opposition over government policies while Smuts moved to the east.   

Fighting in German East Africa was a much more drawn out, less organized campaign spreading over German East Africa, British Northern Rhodesia, Portuguese Mozambique, and the Belgian Congo. In contrast to the desert of Southwest Africa, the terrain, thick vegetation and disease ecology made the East Africa Theatre less conducive to the sweeping movements of mounted troops on which Botha and Smuts had built their success.  Commissioned to lead a polyglot army drawn from South Africa, East and West Africa, the Belgian Congo, Lusophone (Portuguese speaking) Africa, Britain, and India, Smuts took on the respected German commander, Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. From the beginning to the end of 1916, Smuts built a reputation for success of which the Allies otherwise had little. Though his German and African forces were outnumbered, Lettow-Vorbeck’s German and native troops used interior lines and initiative to keep the campaign active until news arrived of the armistice of 11 November 1918.

Jan Smuts (Detail), by John Singer Sargent,
National Portrait Gallery

Smuts was too talented a character to be left in African jungles. On 12 March 1917, he arrived in London to public adulation and as South Africa’s representative to the Imperial War Conference and, at Lloyd George’s request, joined the War Cabinet. Though plans to grant Smuts a military command were stymied by British unwillingness to share rank with a colonial who so recently had been an enemy, Smuts was a convenient handyman, carrying out missions to the United States, North Africa, the Middle East and Italy, playing a part in the settlement of labor strikes in South Wales involving police and coal miners, and the establishment of the Royal Air Force. He would be a significant figure in the Versailles Peace Conference, advocating for the League of Nations and his vision for southern Africa. 

Roads readers appreciate the multi-faceted impacts of the Great War. This 311-page volume sheds light on theatres rarely illuminated. Its description of African campaigns, supplemented by photos and maps, describe types of warfare not normally associated with the Great War, but shown to be related to the whole. The war that destroyed empires and spawned nations is shown to have molded South Africa. Amidst the turmoil of war, South Africa’s choice of the path to apartheid, which still influences our world, is documented on these pages. Authors Antonio Garcia and Ian Van Der Waag have crafted a valuable addition to Great War literature in this book. 

Jim Gallen

Conscription of Colonial Labor to Support the War in Africa

Michelle Moyd,  Indiana University

World War I in Africa could not have been fought without the mobilization of vast numbers of soldiers and workers from the continent. . . These mobilizations occurred both alongside and beyond the battlefields of the four African campaigns of World War I, which were fought in the German colonies of Togo, Cameroon, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa. The conscription of African laborers and troops was embedded in the wider violence of military campaigns occurring in these places. The German colonies became targets of Entente colonial forces at the war’s outset, as Entente powers anticipated, correctly, that conquest and occupation of these lands would accrue more land to their empires. Togo fell to British forces in August 1914, Southwest Africa to South African forces in  1915, and Cameroon to combined French, British, and Belgian forces in 1916. The campaign in German East Africa lasted until November 1918, when German Schutztruppe commander General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck finally surrendered to the British in Northern Rhodesia, or what is today Zambia. 

The mechanisms by which colonial powers pressed African men, women, and children into various forms of unfree labor were largely the same before, during, and after the war. What changed during the war was the scale. European mobilization of African troops and workers during World War I in Africa reflected longstanding colonial practices of labor conscription, resource extraction, and land grabs. The war exacerbated the harshest conditions of colonial occupation. This is the lens through which we should seek to understand the effects of World War I on Africans and Africa.   

Lettow-Vorbeck and the [native] askari who fought alongside him during the East African campaign (shown above) committed many abuses against African communities. They seized provisions and livestock, disrupted planting and harvest cycles, and pressed people into work for which they rarely received adequate compensation. Women were forced into performing domestic labor for soldiers on the march and were frequently the targets of sexual violence.

Like his German counterparts fighting in Europe, Lettow-Vorbeck prioritized military necessity in prosecuting the East African campaign. While on the march, columns of his troops ruthlessly exploited African communities, requisitioning food stores, crops, and livestock. In the latter stages of the campaign, they also seized people, especially to fill the ranks of porters and laborers. In prioritizing military objectives over all others, Lettow-Vorbeck’s campaign ensured that significant portions of eastern and southeastern Africa would suffer from wartime devastation well into the post-war period. German East Africa’s last colonial governor, Heinrich Schnee, was appalled at Lettow-Vorbeck’s refusal to entertain any notion of preserving the colony for future development under continued German rule. But military necessity won the day, as it did in so many other places between 1914 and 1918.

To make things worse, the columns of Entente soldiers did the same things as they pursued the Schutztruppe throughout eastern and southeastern Africa until  Lettow-Vorbeck’s surrender in November 1918. The devastating effects of these depredations on East African populations also caused significant hardships due to famine and the spread of the influenza pandemic to the region through globalized military shipping and soldiers’ and laborers’ travel around the world.

Lettow-Vorbeck’s surrender to the British in Northern Rhodesia, a territory administered by British colonial authorities, in November 1918, marked the end of a campaign that had lasted more than four years. The Entente’s numbers far exceeded those of the Schutztruppe, as did their ability to resupply their forces. Despite the Entente’s numerical superiority, Allied armies had great difficulty in stopping the Schutztruppe in part because of Lettow-Vorbeck’s highly mobile style of warfare, which forced Entente troops to pursue his columns across vast distances. In the campaign’s final year, much of the fighting took place not in German East Africa but in Portuguese East Africa.

Source: "Ordeal and Opportunity:Ending the First World War in Africa", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 2019

A Very British View of the Great War in Africa

Digging deep in the Internet, I came up with this interesting centennial "talking points" paper from the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  It is very interesting, but remember the point of view as you read along. The authors included this disclaimer: "This is a subjective and partial account of the First World War from an African perspective, intended to give an idea of the issues which might affect African states’ attitudes to the centenary. It is not a narrative of the Great War in Africa."

Native Troops & Bearers in East Africa

The First World War followed hard on the heels of the Scramble for Africa, that period immediately following the 1885 Berlin Conference marked by a precipitate grab by the European powers for African territory, regardless of its economic or strategic value.  In some parts the Scramble had not yet finished, and campaigns of colonial conquest continued even as colonial powers squared up against each other.  In other places Africans tried to exploit the distraction of their masters to win back their independence.  But even more than they were during the Scramble, Africans were helpless – if not always passive - victims of the Great War.  The feeling of futility which characterises popular European perceptions of the War is even more true of their former African subjects.  But set against that, African soldiers who fought for France in Europe returned emboldened with new (to Africa) political ideas which contributed to the growth of modern nationalism (a trend greatly reinforced by the experience of French African soldiers in the Second World War).

By 1914 all of the western European powers had major holdings in sub-Saharan Africa.  In spite of being the largest landowner there, Britain always considered it secondary to India, the “Jewel in the Crown”.  But it was home to much of the French empire, most of the German and Italian, and all of the Belgian.  There were only two independent territories, Liberia and Ethiopia, the former a virtual American colony and the latter only free because of some deft diplomatic (and military) footwork at the end of the 19th century.  Although the continent had almost provoked European wars (including the famous Fashoda incident in 1898 ),all of the colonial authorities got on fine with their neighbors, sharing the “white man’s burden”.  

German Mounted Forces Near Kilimanjaro 

There was little to choose between colonial authorities.  The ruthlessness which had characterised the Scramble (and the early excesses of Belgian and German colonialism) was tempered by the humanitarian (if paternalistic) impulses which had always been part of Europe’s approach to Africa.  The colonial authorities looked forward—as far as scarce resources allowed—to bettering the lives of their charges (mostly by making them productive units in the global economy).  All this was overturned by the outbreak of war, which intensified certain aspects of colonialism (economic exploitation, for example) while diminishing others (like education and health care).   Again, there was a reverse to this coin in that—for France at least—development became part of a “blood debt” owed to Africans for their sacrifices in the war.

The Berlin treaty had included a clause which forbade the export of European wars to Africa.  Although the governor of German East Africa tried to invoke this clause, any pacific civilian impulses were trumped by their military colleagues, infected by the same bellicosity which afflicted their metropolitan counterparts.  Before the end of August 1914 the Times was proclaiming Britain’s “first naval victory in the war” on Lake Nyasa (now Malawi) an outcome facilitated by the German commander’s ignorance of the outbreak of hostilities.  Across the continent Allied forces mobilized to conquer their German neighbors.  South Africa—delayed by a short Afrikaner rebellion—was not far behind, anxious to demonstrate that it was a loyal dominion worthy of sharing the spoils of empire.

Col. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck

Most of the German colonies fell relatively quickly.  Only in East Africa did they hold out to the end—and beyond.  Led by Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, the colony’s Schutztruppe fought a peripatetic guerilla war which took it through Mozambique and Northern Rhodesia, surrendering only when it heard of the Kaiser’s abdication.  Characteristically, though, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s aim had  been not to preserve the German colony but to divert Allied resources from the decisive theatre in Europe.  The vast majority of his troops were black Africans, whose tenacity—unwittingly—meant that South Africa did not get the mandate over German East Africa (also, known as Tanganyika, now part of Tanzania) which it acquired over South West Africa, which in turn meant Namibia’s independence was delayed almost 30 years after Tanganyika’s.

Other than in East Africa, the most tenacious resistance to the Allies came from indigenous Africans led by fellow Africans, sometimes in ostensible alliance with the Turks.  Ominously, and not coincidentally,the hardest campaigns were fought in places all too familiar to 21st-century diplomats.  A Tuareg rebellion against the French (in what is now Mali and Niger) linked up with the Senussi rebellion against the Italians (and their British allies) in Libya, the first and only time until 2012 that Tuareg resistance to outsiders took on the nature of a jihad.  In Somalia the so-called “Mad Mullah ” fought a long hard jihad against the British which only spluttered to a close in 1920.  Worried that the outbreaks of Islamic militancy in East and West Africa might join up, the British conquered the Sultanate of Darfur in 1916.  In northern Nigeria the Native Authority in Bussa province (south west of Sokoto) was massacred by rebels in June 1915, prompting the dispatch of a military expedition.

Mobilizing the British Empire for War

8,689,467

This is the number of troops mobilized for military service from the British Empire over the course World War I. Almost one million of these men would perish during the war. The figure includes forces raised in the UK plus empire contingents sent to serve overseas from India, the Dominions, and other colonies. A breakdown by country can be found HERE.  (Note that the above figure does not represent the numbers in uniform all serving at the same time.) The National Army Museum in London fills out the story behind the British Army component of this astonishing statistic.

In 1914, the Germans and their allies went to war not just with Britain but with the whole of the British Empire. Britain went to war in 1914 with a small, professional army primarily designed to police its overseas empire. The entire force consisted of just over 250,000 Regulars. Together with 250,000 Territorials and 200,000 Reservists, this made a total of 700,000 trained soldiers. Compared to the mass conscript armies of Germany, France, and Russia, this was tiny.

Volunteers and Conscripts

The Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, realized the conflict would be long and on an unprecedented scale, so Britain would have to create a new mass army. Thousands of eager volunteers soon flocked to the colors on the outbreak of war, but these men were completely untrained. They spent their first months in the Army learning the basics of soldiering

Despite the influx of volunteers, the British still needed more men. Conscription was introduced in 1916, and this eventually expanded the Army to a force of over four million men by the end of the war in 1918. However, even an army this large was not sufficient to meet all of Britain’s commitments. Throughout the conflict it was bolstered by forces from across the British Empire, the nations of which pledged full support for Britain following its declaration of war against Germany in August 1914.

Caribbean

Around 15,000 West Indians enlisted, including 10,000 from Jamaica. Others came from Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the Bahamas, British Honduras (Belize), Grenada, British Guiana (Guyana), the Leeward Islands, St Lucia, and St Vincent. Although a few served in regular British Army units, most men from the Caribbean served in the West India Regiment and the British West Indies Regiment (raised in October 1915), serving in France, Italy, Africa, and the Middle East. Twelve battalions of the British West Indies Regiment were raised, mainly as laborers in ammunition dumps and gun emplacements, often coming under heavy fire. Toward the end of the war, two battalions saw combat in Palestine and Jordan against the Turks of the Ottoman Empire.

Indian Troops Serving at Gallipoli

India

Soldiers from the Indian sub-continent (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) fought in all the major wartime theaters and made a decisive contribution to the struggle against the Central Powers. Two infantry and two cavalry divisions had arrived on the Western Front by the end of 1914, and eventually 140,000 men saw service there.

In 1915, Indian troops arrived in the Middle East, where they fought against the Ottoman Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq). That same year, soldiers from the Indian Army fought alongside British, Australian, and New Zealand troops on the Gallipoli peninsula. They also formed a large proportion of the Allied forces occupying former enemy territory in East Africa, the Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Caucasus. In total, 1.27 million Indians voluntarily served as combatants and laborers.

Africa

African troops played a key role in containing the Germans in East Africa and defeating them in West Africa. Europeans and Indians struggled in the harsh African climate, but the local inhabitants had the skills to survive and prosper. By November 1918, the "British Army" in East Africa was composed mainly of African soldiers. The units involved were the West African Frontier Force, drawn from Nigeria, the Gold Coast (Ghana), and Sierra Leone and the King’s African Rifles, recruited from Kenya, Uganda, and Nyasaland (Malawi). At least 180,000 Africans also served in the Carrier Corps in East Africa and provided logistics support to troops at the front. 

South Africa

Over 60,000 laborers came from South Africa. Black South Africans were restricted to a logistical role because the South African government feared arming them. Around 25,000 black South Africans were also recruited to the South African Native Labour Contingent that served on the Western Front in 1916–17. In 1915, an expeditionary force of 67,000 white South African troops invaded German South-West Africa (Namibia). Many of these soldiers later fought in East Africa as well.

White South African units were also sent to the Western Front. On 14 July 1916, the 1st South African Brigade—3,153 officers and menzentered Delville Wood on the Somme. After six days of vicious fighting in hellish conditions, only around 750 officers and men remained unharmed.   

Depiction of an Attack on South African Forces Defending Delville Wood, Somme Battlefield

Canada

Following the outbreak of war, Canada raised the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) for service on the Western Front. From 1915, it fought in most of the major battles, winning renown at the Second Battle of Ypres (1915), on the Somme (1916), at Vimy Ridge (1917), and at Passchendaele (1917).

Canadian troops also played a leading role in the victorious Hundred Days offensives of 1918, spearheading many of the Allies’ key attacks. The CEF lost over 60,600 men killed during the war, nearly ten percent of the 620,00 Canadians who enlisted.

Newfoundland

Newfoundland, not part of Canada until 1949, also sent troops. The Newfoundland Regiment fought at Gallipoli (1915) but the following year was almost wiped out at Beaumont Hamel on the Somme. It later fought at Arras and Passchendaele in 1917 and helped repel the German Spring Offensive of 1918.

Australia

Over 410,000 Australians served with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) during the war, sustaining around 200,000 casualties. In April 1915, Australians landed at Gallipoli in Turkey with troops from New Zealand, Britain, and France. The following year, Australian forces fought in campaigns on the Western Front and in the Middle East, where they defended the Suez Canal and helped take Sinai. Later, they advanced into Palestine and helped capture Gaza and Jerusalem.

In 1918, the Australians played a leading role in the decisive Allied advances on the Western Front from August until the end of the war.

Infantry from New Zealand Heading for the Somme Battlefield

New Zealand

Following the outbreak of war, New Zealand forces helped Australia capture Germany's colonies in the Pacific. Almost 100,000 New Zealanders also served overseas in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF), including 2,700 Māori and Pacific Islanders.  Around 18,000 New Zealanders gave their lives. This included 2,700 men killed at Gallipoli and over 12,000 soldiers killed on the Western Front. As was the case with their Australian and Canadian comrades, the experience of fighting together away from home helped the NZEF’s soldiers forge a distinct national identity.

(Sources: The Long, Long Trail; the National Army Museum)

The Importance of Africa in the Great War

Soldiers of the King's African Rifles

The European War of August 1914 quickly spread to Africa and would soon lead to fighting throughout the continent.  It would be a sideshow, but for those involved a vast and costly sideshow.

• The war fought in Africa was fought principally by Africans themselves. Over 2,000,000 natives served as soldiers or porters; about 10 percent died in service.

• Campaigns were instigated in North Africa by Germany and the Ottoman Empire.

• Local rebellions were initiated or continued against colonial rule.

• And 19th-century style campaigns were waged by the Allies against German colonies in sub-Saharan Africa – Cameroons, Togoland, Southwest, and East Africa.

• Large numbers of colonial troops and laborers were also raised to fight elsewhere. On the Western Front 440,000 indigenous soldiers and 268,000 indigenous war workers were sent alongside 140,000 settlers of European descent between 1914 and 1918. The Armistice would end the German colonial empire and lead to a repartition of the continent.

• Yet the First World War did not result in the upsurge of African nationalism sparked by World War II.

Askaris and Bearers in East Africa

The initial impulses of the white settlers, however, had been to maintain order among the natives, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The earliest fighting involved reducing German radio and coaling coastal stations in the name of keeping the sea lanes open.

However, both the expansionist-minded among the locals and the European governments harbored territorial aims. The German colonies, being smaller and abutting the territories of several Allied war participants seemed to be easy pickings. The Allied parties were usually the aggressors.

The war was different in Africa than in Europe:

• No modern transport. (Animals often could not be used either because of the tsetse-fly.) Human bearers made up the majority of the forces. 

• No large formations.

• Little artillery.

• Disease rather than wounding was the big killer and disabler.

German Troops on Parade – Probably Early in the War

The campaign in East Africa produced one of the most admired soldiers of the war: German Col. Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who tied down Allied forces ten times the size of his past the Armistice date. He returned home a hero, Berlin took a break in the revolution to welcome him.

Transport and supply were the big problems in Africa. Vast numbers of bearers were conscripted locally, usually two to three times the number of soldiers. Yet they suffered casualties at the same, sometimes higher, rates.  

Disease was the big killer; besides malaria, there were blackwater fever and other exotic tropical diseases. 

Senegalese Troops on the Western Front

Colonial troops from Africa were a great asset for the Allies, especially France. Take Senegal for example:

• By the end of 1918, a total of 163,000 Senegalese fiflemen were serving in French forces in the west. Tirailleur battalions served with the U.S. First Army at St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne campaign.

• The Allies —  France, for example — emerged victorious in 1918 and moved quickly to improve public services in her African colonies and take advantage of the goodwill and prestige of the returning native veterans.

General Jan Smuts and his First World War in Africa, 1914–1917

By David Brock Katz

Casemate Publishers, 2022

Jim Gallen, Reviewer

General Smuts on an Inspection Tour of the Western Front

Roads readers are familiar with the Western Front, maybe Gallipoli and the Russian or Italian Fronts, but few with the Great War in Southern Africa. General Jan Smuts and his First World War In Africa, 1914-1917 is an in-depth study of that theatre from the South African perspective. Author David Brock Katz has crafted a defense of Smuts against his critics, primarily those who disparage him as an amateur soldier, unqualified for his level of command, while telling the saga of the Great War in Southern Africa.

The scene is set historically and geographically. South Africa had emerged from its war between the Afrikaner Republics and the British as a country divided between empire loyalists and Boer nationalists. Its neighbors included German Southwest Africa, later Southwest Africa and now Namibia, and German East Africa, later Tanganyika, and now the mainland portion of Tanzania.

The central figure of this work, General Jan Smuts, was, like his mentor and superior Prime Minister Louis Botha, a multi-faceted man. A scholar in literature and science, placed by at least one commentator on a par with John Milton and Charles Darwin, a lawyer, a politician and a military leader, Smuts is one of the most impressive figures of both world wars. 

A fighter for the Afrikaner Republics during the South African War, Smuts, along with Botha, became political leaders who strove to unite Dutch and English settlers in a Dominion of the British Empire. A political and military leader, in the tradition of Napoleon, he balanced a vision of political expansionism with his public’s desire for low casualties. Though an Empire loyalist, Smuts remained a practitioner of the South African way of war. An advocate of maneuver rather than frontal attack, he lacked the will to annihilate his enemy but led his men to victory.

South African Troops in Action

Envisioning the expansion of South Africa to encompass Africa to the equator and the position of the dominant Dominion in a Cape-to-Cairo British domain, Smuts’ war aims meshed with those of his British colleagues. As rulers of the waves, Britannia sought to drive the German Navy from the South Atlantic by capturing the German Western African ports of Luderitzbucht and Walvis Bay and the destruction of the German wireless stations in those ports and Windhoek. While achieving those goals, Smuts led his South African forces to capture the whole territory. Success having been achieved in the West, Smuts and his forces turned to German East Africa which it conquered in joint actions with British and Belgian units.

With South Africa holding sway over much of the southern portion of the Continent, Smuts was dispatched to London to be part of the Imperial War Cabinet and to participate in the peace conference. Resisting offers of the Egyptian Command, deeming it a sideshow, and a secret mission to Russia, which he regarded as a spent force, Smuts played roles in the development of air power and the settling of Welsh strikes. In peace discussions, Smuts’s expansionist goals were thwarted but South Africa emerged as an enhanced Dominion, and his international reputation would carry him into prominence in the Second World War.

Smuts’ war was in a secondary theatre. Why should a Roads reader take the time to add this study to his Great War canon? I see several reasons. It is well written. Katz has skillfully woven cultural, political, and military themes into his account. The text is helpfully supplemented by maps, tables, photos, a bibliography, and cartoons. A student of military operations will appreciate the detail with which they are presented.

Smuts is depicted, in my view, as more of a Pershing, in his preference for movement, than a Haig, Nivelle or Smuts's British colleagues in South Africa in their practice of static warfare and direct attack. Smuts, the Afrikaner political leader, first had to draw public opinion into support for the war before marching onto Mars’s fields. One is reminded of Confederate heroes, Joseph Wheeler and Fitzhugh Lee, who re-donned the blue to rally Southern support for the Spanish American War. Katz illustrates that some warriors fought in a manner unlike the bloodbath of the Western Front. This book reminds us that the Great War was, after all, a world war that profoundly shaped world history beyond Europe and even the Middle East. It provides a perspective lacking in most Great War histories.

Jim Gallen

The East Africa Campaign 1914-1918

By David Smith

Osprey Publishing, 2022

Bryan Alexander, Reviewer

The German East African theater of the First World War has a nearly legendary aura. Unlike the horrendous slaughter and stalemate of the Western Front, this series of campaigns involved smaller forces in wide-ranging maneuvers. A massively outnumbered and outgunned German colonial force successfully outperformed Entente (later Allied) armies for years - indeed, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s units survived the defeat of the German Reich they fought for.

This unusual story is well served by David Smith’s The East Africa Campaign 1914-1918. Smith begins briskly, with a short sketch of the political and military situation facing Germany’s East African colonial leadership in 1914. Governor Schnee desired peace and sought neutrality, but his military opposite number, von Lettow-Vorbeck, prepared for a war he deemed likely. His strategy was neither to conquer other African colonies, since the odds were poor (the Germans fielded only 15,000 troops at a maximum (38)). Instead, he would prove to be an annoyance to Britain and other colonial powers in the region, tying down forces and resources that would otherwise have appeared in France. 

A British Force Crossing a River

Von Lettow-Vorbeck has several advantages. First, he relied extensively on local troops, while Entente powers sent in soldiers from other colonies (notably India) or Europe. The locals had the benefit of local knowledge and fighting for their land, but also greater immunity to the diseases which wracked foreigners. Second, several of the Entente commanders were slow to move or failed to take advantage of tactical opportunities, while the German lieutenant colonel acted and reacted swiftly, often changing tactics on the fly. Third, von Lettow-Vorbeck was willing to improvise, while his opponents preferred to work through extended supply systems. At one point his units salvaged naval cannons from a defeated light cruiser and hauled them around the interior to great effect. Fourth, the German force fought a guerilla war rather than a conventional one, which its enemies had a difficult time grappling with.

The first major battle, the November 1914 Battle of Tanga ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tanga), showed these features. A sluggish British amphibious attack attempted to take a coastal town, but Germans dug in quickly, then drew in reinforcements at speed, while the British delayed and ultimately withdrew. von Lettow-Vorbeck had already raided British East Africa and would continue to do so, attacking the Uganda Railway in 1915. These raids served several purposes: surprising enemy commanders, degrading their forces, and obtaining supplies. The latter was key as German Africa, like the home nation, remained under British blockade.

Britain’s commitment expanded, as von Lettow-Vorbeck had hoped, building up larger and larger armies while adding to them a major South African force. The Germans, outnumbered four to one, drove off an initial South African attack at Salaita Hill in 1916 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Salaita_Hill). Other colonial powers entered the conflict, like Belgium and Portugal, motivated in part by the desire to win parts of the German empire. Overwhelming force and some shows of military competence gradually won the Entente German East African lands. By 1917 the colony was lost.

Yet von Lettow-Vorbeck kept forces in the field, forcing his opponents to remain fighting. After the 1917 Battle of Mahiwa (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mahiwa), which the Germans won, but suffered high numbers of casualties, the now General reduced his army to merely 2,000 effectives in order to require fewer resources and to increase mobility. They then withdrew from the occupied colonial territory and invaded Portugal’s, quickly winning one battle at Negemano (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ngomano) and grabbing there enough material to keep going for another year. The German force - where Europeans and Africans were intermixed, including black officers giving orders to white soldiers - raced north to invade yet another colony, Rhodesia. That ragged, small, and effective army outlasted its Kaiser. In November 1918 word of the armistice reached central Africa and the Germans eventually surrendered “a force still maintaining itself proudly and victoriously in the field.” (90)

Soldiers of the German Colonial Forces, 1914

This Osprey book is a pleasure to read. Smith's style is clear throughout, guiding us well through complexities. The volume is also lavishly designed. Copious illustrations show us photographs and paintings of key players, the appearance of different troops, terrain, battlefields, posters, ships, aircraft, and more. Large and detailed maps—far too often lacking from WWI books!—let the reader follow the action well, year by year and through many locations.

The East Africa Campaign 1914-1918 can be ordered online from the publisher's website HERE

Bryan Alexander