Plotting for Peace: American Peacemakers, British Codebreakers, and Britain at War, 1914-1917

Capt. (later) Admiral Sir Reginald "Blinker" Hall

Tomlinson Prize, 2022

By Daniel Larsen

Cambridge University Press, 2021

Justus D. Doenecke, Reviewer

Review originally presented on the Robert Jervis International Security Forum, 2024

The 2022 release of the German film All Quiet on the Western Front can only lead one to again raise the salient question of whether there was a time in the history of World War I when the carnage could have been stopped. Two works have recently addressed this topic. One is Philip Zelikow’s The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War. The second is the book under discussion, Daniel Larsen's Plotting for Peace: American Peacemakers, British Codebreakers, and Britain at War, 1914-1917.

Larsen focuses in his work on the role British cryptologists played in sabotaging peace negotiations in 1916 and early 1917. He consulted many manuscript collections, both in Britain and the United States, as well as contemporary and scholarly books and articles. Most importantly, he combed the sparse files of Britain’s naval intelligence director, Admiral Reginald (“Blinker”) Hall. Operating from the Admiralty’s famous Room 40, with an ambiance so ably captured in Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmermann Telegram (1958), Hall arbitrarily withheld information from his own government in his effort to stymie a negotiated peace.

Larsen’s narrative effectively challenges the myth that Britain’s leaders were never open to American mediation. Indeed, by May 1916, Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, along with Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald McKenna, fully realized that their nation was going broke. Hence, they avidly sought to end the conflict. They were increasingly stymied by David Lloyd George, who became prime minister in December 1916; Andrew Bonar Law, Conservative party leader in the House of Commons and McKenna’s replacement at the Exchequer the same month; and General Sir William Robertson, chief of the imperial general staff.  Larsen finds Lloyd George particularly active in attempting to stifle any negotiations.

Although this commentator has raised questions concerning any possibility of a successful peace conference, he finds Larsen’s account most valuable, particularly in unearthing intelligence material historians have previously overlooked. Particularly helpful is Larsen’s in-depth description of Britain’s precarious economic situation, a circumstance that gave the United States maximum leverage in pushing negotiations between the belligerents. Valuable de-mythologizing takes place as Larsen offers an appreciative treatment of Asquith and of the machinations of his political foes.

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Other reviewers are extremely favorable to Larsen’s work. Steven Wagner finds it “a superb study” that should be required reading for those curious concerning the diplomatic, political, and economic aspects of the world conflict. Priscilla Roberts calls it a “stimulating revisionist study” of Anglo-American relations, its greatest strength lying in its revelations concerning the inner workings of the British cabinet and Larsen’s use of admittedly fragmentary materials from Room 40. To John Milton Cooper, Jr., the book is “excellent,” its strength lying in its thorough research, superior style, and “well-considered and often penetrating interpretations.”

Justus D. Doenecke