Burden of Guilt: How Germany Shattered the Last Days of Peace, Summer 1914

By Daniel Allen Butler

Casemate, 2010

 Reviewed by Robert Warwick

In this concise and lucid account Mr. Butler argues that step by devious step, during the month of July 1914, after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Germany worked behind the scenes to bring about a full-scale conflict. They inspired the Austrians to deliver impossibly harsh demands on the Serbs, which encouraged the Russians to mobilize, all the while lulling the British and French with deceptive protestations of Germany's peaceful and merely defensive intentions.

In private, in response to a request from the Austrians, the Kaiser offered full support to them in their conflict with the Serbs. This offer was reiterated and supported by the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. This expression then gained the support of the Austrian Emperor, who had been against the whole military operation and properly concerned about the Russian reaction. 

Significantly, the Germans did not tell the Austrians about the Russian-French mutual defense treaty. Von Berchtold, the Austrian foreign minister, went about preparing for war against Serbia, concealing from the world his intentions. Masking their true intentions, many of the leading figures, including the Kaiser, took their scheduled vacations, in order not to alarm foreign governments. But suddenly on 23 July, the Austrian note to the Serbs was delivered, and within a day the Austrian army began to deploy. 

But as troop trains were rumbling all over the European landscape, many key figures had regrets  and second thoughts. Even before serious fighting started in Serbia, von Berchtold observed the enthusiastic, patriotic crowds demonstrating in Vienna and considered that his goals for domestic unity had been pretty much accomplished. He began to have reservations about risking a wider  conflict. Bethmann-Hollweg also had a change of heart, and he regretted that he had supported the  "blank check" that the Kaiser had impulsively given to the Emperor. But it was the Kaiser that made  the most radical shift. Completely losing his zest for war, he raised objections to the plans and  searched for avenues for negotiations. 

At the beginning of August 1914, a day or two before the attack on France and Belgium was to begin, the Kaiser received a wire from Count von Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, reporting  a conversation that he had with Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister. Lichnowsky stated that the British were prepared to offer their neutrality as well as guarantee the neutrality of the French if Germany would pledge not to attack France.

Galvanized into action, the Kaiser immediately sent for General von Moltke, who alone had the power to countermand orders for the invasion. Here is the author's own description of that encounter: 

Holding up Lichnowsky's telegram triumphantly, the Kaiser …declared, "Now we can go to war against Russia only. We simply march the whole of our army to the East." 

…Von Moltke was stunned… All [he] could see was the abandonment of the Schlieffen Plan, … and to his mind this was synonymous with chaos. 

…He lied and said: 

"Your Majesty, it cannot be done. The deployment of millions cannot be improvised … Those arrangements took a whole year of intricate labor to complete and once settled, it cannot be altered." 

But, as the author goes on to say, it could have been done. The deployment could have been altered, and von Moltke knew it. In ten years, every contingency had been considered by the General Staff and complete arrangements for a movement of troops to the east by rail were available. The jump-off time (for the assault in the west) was 7 p.m., 3 August 1914, and German troops began to move across the borders of Belgium and Luxembourg as scheduled. 

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After the war, the last minute changes of heart by so many of the major players in this tragic drama gained prominence.  The aggression by Austria, the mobilization dates of the Russians, and the phony news stories about French shelling across the border have tended to conceal German culpability and contribute to what became the popular explanation for the war: that the secret treaties and inflexible schedules dragged the nations into a conflict that no one wanted. With admirable clarity Burden of Guilt disposes of this misconception. This well-written account of the fateful days of July 1914 accurately conveys the dread and anxiety felt by the informed political and military leadership, contrasted with the celebratory patriotism of the excited populace. 

Robert Warwick