Was There a Missed Opportunity at S Beach Gallipoli: 25 April 1915?

25 April 1915 

It must have looked like a great plan on paper.  To get the fleet through the mined and fortified choke points on the Dardanelles, a major force would be landed at five points around Cape Helles on the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, seize the commanding positions a few miles to the north, and isolate and destroy the local forces, allowing free access at the Turkish defenses along the strait. Meanwhile, about 14 miles to the north, on the Aegean side of Gallipoli, a second force composed of Australia's and New Zealand's finest were expected to land, gain the heights above the beaches, and crash across the peninsula, thus sealing of the critical zone from enemy reinforcements. 

The invasion would turn about to be a double failure—unbeknownst to anyone at the time, the whole campaign was over by sundown on 25 April. At what came to be known as ANZAC the planners had missed both the elevations and ruggedness of the triple ridge-line facing the assault troops.  Down south at Helles, the defenders fought with determination at some of the beaches but left other sites thinly covered, so were vulnerable. Unfortunately, the local commanders did not understand that the key to amphibious operations was getting the hell off the beaches. The most blatant example of this was at the site designated S Beach.

At Cape Helles

Cape Helles, Gallipoli, Invasion Beaches of 25 April 1915

Click to Enlarge and Read Captions

This is a photo of a photo so there is considerable distortion.  It shows, however, all five landing beaches as well as the early objectives of Krithia village and Achi Baba hill.  The capture of both would effectively cut the peninsula and trap any remaining Turkish defending forces while allowing subsequent attacks on the Turkish forts and artillery along the straits (right on the photo). For judging distance, W Beach to the peak of Achi Baba is 5.6 miles;  X Beach to S Beach is 2.1 Miles. One correction: the caption for S Beach should be much closer to the Turkish memorial as is shown correctly on the map below.

The main force for the initial British landings at Helles was the 29th Division formed almost entirely of regular British infantry battalions brought back from colonial postings following the declaration of war on 3 August 1914.  Two Royal Naval Division battalions were attached to the 29th Division for the initial landings; Plymouth Battalion RMLI and Anson Battalion. The expectation was that once ashore the various units would link up and form a complete brigade line down to the Dardanelles shoreline to begin neutralizing Ottoman defenses of the straits.

Five beaches around Cape Helles were to be attacked: X Beach situated on the north west coast of the Cape Helles promontory; W Beach on the western section of the southern coast between Tekke Burnu and Cape Helles; V Beach at the eastern end of the cove lying between Cape Helles and Sedd el Bahr; and S Beach at De Totts Battery at the eastern end of the sweep of Morto Bay. 

S Beach  in Morto Bay Today
The De Totts Battery (Turkish Artillery) Was Placed on the Bluff

Battleship HMS Cornwallis Supported the Landing
on S Beach

At S Beach

The 2nd South Wales Borderers were to land on S Beach. Signalers, engineers, and medical personnel were attached to the detachments. The force assaulting S Beach totaled about 750 officers and enlisted with a battleship HMS Cornwallis assigned to support the landing.

The landings at nearby V and W beaches faced fierce opposition and were initially unable to break out. The forces at S Beach, however, faced few defenders, had easy access for moving quickly inland, and—since they quickly gained control of the heights above the beach—knew of the difficulties facing the assault forces at the other beaches were facing. Yet they stayed in position.  

Hans Kannengiesser (1868–1945) was a German general who eventually commanded the 9th Turkish division in the Fifth Army of General Liman von Sanders at Gallipoli. He held the Turkish rank of Pasha—roughly equivalent to marshal. In 1928  he published the work The Campaign in Gallipoli, which we have reviewed HERE.  In 1940, he published a monograph quoted here titled The Landing of the British Forces in Gallipoli which focuses on the events of 25 April 1915.  Below are his disapproving observations on the landing at S Beach that day.

Day One: Results

Landings at V Beach continued to go badly through the mid-morning and were then suspended until after dark. Invasion commander General Hamilton next suspended the landing at V Beach and diverted those forces to W Beach, where his forces were pinned down.  

The fighting at W Beach was furious. British reinforcements started landing at 9:30 a.m., and by 10 a.m. the lines of trenches had been captured, and the beach  was secured. By 12:30 p.m. the troops had linked up with the 2nd Battalion, which had landed at X beach to the left with the capture of the defensive position called Hill 114. However, it was not until 4 p.m. that the more heavily defended position to the right, Hill 138, was captured following heavy naval bombardment and an assault by the Worcester Regiment.

By the end of the day, the forces landing around Cape Helles had gained a foothold, but they had a much smaller footprint than was fully secure, and the prime objective of Achi Baba might have been on another planet.

Men of the South Wales Borderers Later in the Campaign

Day One: What If?

Suppose Lt. Col. Casson at S Beach had decided to show some initiative. Could he have saved the day for the British landings? By the time such a venture could have been organized,  his flow of reinforcements had been cut off. His only feasible mission would have been to seek consolidation of his under-sized force with the other British landings, most likely with V Beach, and take it from there. The truth of the matter is the landings were doomed to fail from the start. The determination and tactical skill of the opposition, the brutal terrain, the difficulties of amphibious operations, and the defensive advantages of artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire had all been underestimated by the mission planners. There was no chance the combined forces of S and V beaches would have ever reached Achi Baba. Colonel Casson (a future brigadier by the way) probably saved some of his men's lives by sitting in place.